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au printemps 2017. Cette mobilité internationale a bénéficié du soutien financier de l’Ecole
d’économie de Paris et du Département d’économie de l’Ecole normale supérieure.
La Fondation Médéric Alzheimer a également apporté son soutien à l’ensemble des re-
cherches de cette thèse par l’attribution d’une bourse doctorale d’encouragement à la re-
cherche en 2015, renouvelée en 2016.
1www.modapa.cnrs.fr.
2https://www.opening-economics.com/.
3https://www.netspar.nl/en/research/projects/.
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Reading guide / Guide de lecture
English follows.
Cette thèse se structure sur la base de quatre articles empiriques, chacun d’eux explorant
des questions de recherche spécifiques. Chaque chapitre a été rédigé de manière à pouvoir
être lu de manière indépendante. En particulier, chaque chapitre est accompagné d’un ré-
sumé, de mots-clefs, de sa classification JEL et d’annexes propres. De ce fait, certaines des
explications fournies sur les aspects institutionnels et des faits stylisés se retrouvent dans
plusieurs chapitres.
L’Introduction générale vise à fournir une vue d’ensemble des questions à laquelle cette
thèse entend apporter des éléments de réponse. Elle présente également le contexte général
dans lequel s’insère cette recherche et sa pertinence au regard tant de la littérature écono-
mique que des politiques publiques. La thèse se clôt par une Conclusion générale qui résume
ses contributions, expose ses principales limites et esquisse des pistes pour le prolongement
des recherches.
Il a été choisi de rassembler l’ensemble des références bibliographiques dans une Biblio-
graphie générale insérée à la fin de la thèse. A chaque fois qu’une référence est citée dans
le texte, les noms des auteurs ainsi que l’année de publication sont mentionnés. Lorsque
les auteurs sont plus de deux, seul le premier est cité, suivi de la mention « et al. » dès le pre-
mier appel de référence. Si plusieurs références des mêmes auteurs ont été publiées la même
année, les lettres a, b, c etc. sont ajoutées après l’année de publication. Lorsqu’un même pre-
mier auteur a écrit plusieurs articles avec des ensembles de co-auteurs différents la même
année, l’ensemble des auteurs est cité dans le texte.
Des tables des figures et des tableaux sont proposées en fin d’ouvrage. La numérotation
des figures et des tableaux se fait chapitre par chapitre. Ainsi la figure 3.2 renvoie à la seconde
figure insérée dans le chapitre 3 ; le tableau 2.C.4 renvoie au quatrième tableau de l’annexe
C du chapitre 2 etc. Les figures et tableaux numérotés par un simple chiffre renvoient à l’In-
troduction générale.
L’essentiel de cette thèse a été rédigé en anglais, afin de faciliter la dissémination et la dis-
cussion de ces travaux dans les milieux universitaires et les institutions non-francophones.
Bien que les trois premiers chapitres traitent des politiques françaises de l’accompagne-
ment des personnes en situation d’incapacité, les questions abordées ont une pertinence
en termes scientifiques et de politiques publiques qui va au-delà du seul contexte français.
Certains résultats du chapitre 1 ont été publiés dans une revue française et la rédaction d’une
version française du chapitre 3, à destination d’une revue faisant le pont entre la recherche
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en sciences sociales et l’administration publique, est prévue. Le chapitre 4 a quant à lui été
écrit avec des co-auteurs belge et néerlandais. Un résumé long de la thèse en français est
également fourni.
Bien que la concision ait été systématiquement recherchée, elle ne s’avère pas toujours
au rendez-vous. En espérant que l’écriture parfois prolixe de cette thèse ne constitue pas un
obstacle à une agréable lecture.
?????
This thesis is based on four empirical papers : each of them investigates specific research
questions. Each chapter was written so that it can be read as a standalone essay. It comes
with a summary, key-words, JEL classification and own detailed appendices. As a conse-
quence, some explanations about institutional features and stylized facts are repeated in
several chapters.
The General introduction aims at providing a comprehensive overview of the research
questions I tackle in this thesis, as well as of the broad context my research fits in and its
relevance with respect to both the economic literature and public policies. The thesis ends
with a General conclusion that reviews the contributions, discusses the main limitations and
sketches directions for future research.
All bibliographic references are gathered in a general Bibliography placed at the end of
the thesis. Each time a reference is referred to in the text, the authors’ names and the year
of publication are mentioned. When there are more than two authors, only the first one gets
cited and I add the mention “et al.” to indicate that there are more. If several references from
the exact same authors were published in the same year, the letters a, b, c etc. are added after
the year of publication. When a first author has co-authored several papers with different
sets of co-authors in the same year, all authors are cited in the text.
Lists of the figures and of the tables are inserted at the end of the thesis. The numbering
of figures and tables is done chapter by chapter. Figure 3.2 refers to the second figure inserted
in Chapter 3 ; Table 2.C.4 refers to the fourth table of Appendix C of Chapter 2 etc. The figures
and tables numbered by a simple numeral are placed in the General introduction.
Most of this thesis is written en English, in order to facilitate the dissemination and
discussion of my research in non French-speaking academic circles and institutions. Even
though the first three chapters deal with French long-term care policies, they aim at tackling
research questions that have scientific and policy relevance beyond the French context.
Chapter 4 was co-authored with Belgian and Dutch co-authors.
Although I have made my best to be concise, the final product is fairly long, if not long-
winded in some instances. I hope this is not an obstacle to a pleasant reading.
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Résumé long en français
Dans les pays de l’Organisation économique de coopération et de développement
(OCDE), le vieillissement démographique et la prévalence croissante de certaines maladies
chroniques conduisent à une hausse marquée des effectifs de personnes ayant besoin
d’assistance pour réaliser les activités de la vie quotidienne, qui est appelée à se poursuivre
et s’amplifier dans les décennies à venir. L’augmentation du nombre de personnes âgées
dites dépendantes constitue une préoccupation sociétale de premier plan et un défi majeur
pour les politiques publiques. L’ensemble des pays de l’OCDE a mis en place des dispositifs
publics, de type assurantiel ou relevant de l’aide sociale, visant à permettre aux individus
de recevoir ou de financer des aides médico-sociales (aussi dites soins de longue durée,
de l’anglais long-term care). Ces aides recouvrent une large palette de services, englobant
les soins infirmiers, les soins au corps, les aides ménagères et d’autres formes d’assistance
dans les activités de la vie quotidienne ; elles peuvent être apportées par des professionnels
(aides formelles) ou par des proches (aides informelles). Ces aides peuvent être reçues soit
au domicile de la personne, soit au sein d’un hébergement spécialisé (maison de retraite en
particulier). Dans la plupart des pays, la couverture du risque dépendance par la puissance
publique est limitée, ce qui contribue à expliquer l’implication importante des familles sous
forme d’aides matérielles et d’assistance dans les activités de la vie quotidienne. Même
en l’absence de changements dans les dispositifs actuels, les pays de l’Union européenne
(UE) anticipent une augmentation des ressources qui seront affectées au financement de la
dépendance : la dépense publique consacrée aux aides médico-sociales passerait ainsi de
1,4 % à 4,3 % du Produit intérieur brut (PIB) de l’UE entre 2015 et 2060. Si le débat relatif aux
arbitrages budgétaires à consentir pour maintenir ou ajuster le niveau de protection sociale
offert aux personnes en situation d’incapacité reste fondamentalement sociétal et politique,
l’analyse économique peut contribuer à éclairer les tenants et les aboutissants des options
de réforme envisageables.
Dans cette optique, cette thèse traite de deux questions économiques et de politique pu-
blique : les politiques visant à financer les soins de longue durée sont-elles efficientes ? Dans
quelle mesure sont-elles équitables ? Cette problématique, très générale, est déclinée en des
questions de recherche plus spécifiques, à caractère empirique et se rattachant à des en-
jeux théoriques. Comment les dispositifs publics visant à financer les aides médico-sociales
affectent-ils les aides formelles et informelles reçues par les personnes en situation d’inca-
pacité ? Observe-t-on des disparités socio-économiques dans la consommation de soins de
longue durée ? Les restes-à-charge supportés par les individus sont-ils équitables ? Quelles
caractéristiques des dispositifs existants pourraient être modifiées de manière à rendre les
systèmes plus efficients et plus équitables ? Les analyses proposées sont pour partie posi-
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tives et pour partie normatives ; elles sont regroupées en quatre investigations empiriques,
qui constituent autant de chapitres.
La thèse s’ouvre sur une Introduction générale qui s’organise en trois grandes sections.
La première partie vise à préciser l’objet d’étude, à partir des définitions des concepts d’in-
capacité, de dépendance et des soins de longue durée. Elle présente également le contexte
dans lequel s’insèrent les questionnements de la thèse, en offrant une vue d’ensemble des
tendances démographiques et épidémiologiques ainsi que des politiques publiques de fi-
nancement des soins de longue durée dans les pays de l’OCDE.
La seconde partie situe la problématique de la thèse dans la littérature économique exis-
tante. La question de l’efficacité des dispositifs de financement des soins de longue durée
peut, dans une certaine mesure, s’appuyer sur les analyses des dispositifs assurantiels offrant
à l’assuré une réduction du prix des traitements en cas de maladie (health insurance theory).
Ces analyses ont mis en avant l’importance du paramètre d’élasticité-prix de la demande de
soins médicaux et l’existence d’un aléa moral ex post induit par la couverture assurantielle.
Transposer ce cadre d’analyse à l’étude des dispositifs de couverture du risque dépendance
permet d’attirer l’attention sur deux éléments empiriques. D’une part, les effets-revenu dans
la consommation de soins de longue durée conditionnent l’existence des gains d’efficience
associés au transfert de ressources vers les personnes dépendantes que vont permettre les
dispositifs. D’autre part, c’est la substituabilité entre soins de longue durée et autres biens
de consommation dans les préférences individuelles qui conduirait les dispositifs prenant
la forme d’une subvention sur le prix des aides médico-sociales à s’accompagner d’ineffi-
ciences allocatives. Si des études empiriques menées en France et à l’international ont mon-
tré l’existence d’une sensibilité au prix et au revenu de la demande d’aide à domicile, elles
n’ont pas abouti à une quantification des paramètres d’élasticité-prix et d’élasticité-revenu.
Concernant l’équité des politiques de soins de longue durée, la revue de littérature sou-
ligne que relativement peu de travaux empiriques ont été produits à ce jour. Ceux-ci se foca-
lisent sur l’existence d’iniquités horizontales dans le recours aux aides liées au statut socio-
économique ou à la région de résidence. Etudier l’équité des dispositifs consiste à poser la
question du caractère juste de l’allocation des soins de longue durée ou de la répartition de
leur financement au sein de la population, et requiert donc tant de documenter les inégali-
tés existantes au regard de ces deux dimensions que de mobiliser des jugements de valeur.
Or les analyses empiriques existantes discutent peu les principes de justice sociale auxquels
elles se rattachent. C’est de fait le principe de la tradition égalitariste selon laquelle l’alloca-
tion des soins doit se faire selon les « besoins » qui est mobilisé. Là encore, l’économie de
la santé peut apporter un éclairage utile à l’analyse de l’équité dans le champ des soins de
longue durée, dans la mesure où de nombreux travaux théoriques et empiriques ont pro-
posé et mis en regard différentes définitions possibles de l’équité en santé. En particulier,
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les développements récents autour de la théorie de l’égalité des opportunités font ressortir
trois éléments centraux dans toute évaluation empirique de l’équité dans la consommation
de soins se plaçant dans une veine égalitariste. Premièrement, la partition des caractéris-
tiques individuelles entre besoins et déterminants illégitimes du recours aux aides est un
exercice empirique dont la portée normative est essentielle ; deuxièmement, les hypothèses
faites sur l’équité verticale dans la consommation de soins conditionnent les conclusions re-
latives à l’équité horizontale. Enfin, l’analyse empirique doit statuer sur le rôle à donner aux
préférences individuelles. La revue de littérature s’achève par une discussion du « besoin
d’aide », terme fréquemment utilisé dans les analyses économiques sans qu’une définition
claire en soit proposée. A la différence du système de santé, les dispositifs de soins de longue
durée prévoient généralement une évaluation des besoins comme préalable aux aides ; la
pertinence de l’utilisation des droits ouverts comme mesure des besoins dans le cadre d’une
analyse normative des dispositifs publics doit toutefois s’apprécier au regard du contexte
institutionnel.
La thèse apporte des contributions empiriques à la littérature sur l’efficience et l’équité
des dispositifs de financement des soins de longue durée dans le contexte de deux pays
européens, la France et les Pays-Bas. Bien que connaissant des situations économiques et
démographiques relativement proches, ces deux pays se caractérisent par des systèmes de
financement des soins de longue durée sensiblement différents. Les Pays-Bas ont mis en
place un système d’assurance sociale du risque de perte d’autonomie, qui offrait jusqu’à ré-
cemment une couverture publique généreuse et intégrée d’un large ensemble de services.
La couverture publique offerte en France repose quant à elle sur l’assemblage de dispositifs
répondant à des logiques d’intervention distinctes ; elle se distingue en outre par l’existence
d’une barrière d’âge, qui conduit les personnes âgées de moins de 60 ans à relever des dispo-
sitifs « handicap », tandis que les personnes de 60 ou plus peuvent prétendre aux aides à la
« dépendance ». Les deux pays ont toutefois en commun de connaître depuis quelques an-
nées un débat public et politique nourri sur les évolutions à apporter aux dispositifs existants
alors même que des réformes importantes ont déjà été mises en œuvre ces dernières années.
Dans ce contexte, il apparaît utile de documenter la performance des politiques existantes
en matière d’efficacité et d’équité, tant pour anticiper les effets des réformes récentes que
pour discuter les orientations des mesures à venir.
Dans une dernière et troisième partie, l’Introduction générale détaille les questions de
recherche spécifiques abordées dans chacun des quatre chapitres de la thèse. Cette section
présente également les outils analytiques et les méthodes empiriques mises à profit. Les ana-
lyses s’appuient pour partie sur la théorie microéconomique néoclassique, et en particulier
la théorie du consommateur. Les résultats empiriques sont obtenus principalement à partir
des données observationnelles individuelles, complétées dans un chapitre par des simula-
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tions. Les méthodes microéconométriques utilisées s’inspirent des méthodes d’évaluation
des politiques publiques en forme réduite ou répondent à une approche plus structurelle.
L’évaluation des inégalités et iniquités dans la consommation de soins de longue durée se
fait notamment à partir d’indices de concentration et d’iniquité horizontale largement utili-
sés en économie de la santé. Les analyses empiriques s’appuient sur plusieurs types de don-
nées – données d’enquête, données administratives et fichiers-clients d’un service d’aide à
domicile ; certaines ont été pour partie collectées dans le cadre d’un projet de recherche col-
lectif (projet MODAPA), les autres étant mis à la disposition des chercheurs par les instituts
statistiques néerlandais et français. Le périmètre des soins de longue durée auquel se réfère
chacune des analyses est précisé. L’introduction s’achève par une mise en regard des défi-
nitions empiriques du besoin d’aide et des approches de la question de l’équité proposées
dans les différents chapitres.
Chapitre 1
Le premier chapitre étudie les effets de la barrière des 60 ans dans les dispositifs publics
de financement des soins de longue durée. Schématiquement, un individu de moins de 60
ans résidant en logement ordinaire et ayant des restrictions d’activité pourra prétendre à la
Prestation de compensation du handicap (PCH), tandis qu’il pourra faire une demande d’Al-
location personnalisée d’autonomie (APA) s’il a 60 ans ou plus. La distinction qui est faite
entre les personnes « handicapées » et les « personnes âgées dépendantes » n’apparaît pas
conforme à l’environnement légal de l’Union européenne, selon lequel l’accès aux disposi-
tifs de compensation des incapacités ne doit pas dépendre de l’âge de l’individu. Alors même
que le débat sur le caractère discriminant des dispositifs français s’est intensifié depuis 2005,
avec la promulgation d’une loi prévoyant l’uniformisation des dispositifs handicap et dépen-
dance, l’effet de la barrière des 60 ans sur la façon dont les restrictions d’activité et limitations
fonctionnelles sont compensées au quotidien n’avait jusqu’alors pas fait l’objet d’une éva-
luation quantitative. La comparaison des dispositifs « sur le papier » est rendue difficile par
le fait qu’il existe des différences multiples entre les dispositifs ; PCH et APA se distinguent
ainsi tant par les critères d’éligibilité, la nature des aides humaines pouvant être subvention-
nées, le barème de la participation financière des bénéficiaires ou encore les conditions de
rémunération de proches aidants.
Afin de nourrir le débat par des éléments empiriques, le chapitre mobilise des méthodes
économétriques pour répondre à la question suivante : est-ce-que le fait d’être considéré
comme une personne âgée dépendante plutôt que comme une personne handicapée affecte
la nature des soins de longue durée reçus ? Deux dimensions complémentaires sont explo-
rées : il s’agit tout d’abord d’évaluer l’effet de la barrière des 60 ans sur les aides formelles et
informelles reçues au domicile des personnes résidant en logement ordinaire ; puis de tester
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l’impact de la discontinuité institutionnelle sur les configurations résidentielles, en l’occur-
rence sur la probabilité de résider dans un établissement spécialisé.
L’analyse s’appuie sur une enquête en population générale, l’enquête Handicap-Santé
(HS) réalisée par l’Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (Insee) et
la Direction de la recherche, des études, de l’évaluation et des statistiques (Drees) en 2008-
2009. Cette enquête comporte un volet réalisé sur les individus résidant en logement ordi-
naire, appelé HSM, qui comporte des informations tant sur l’état fonctionnel, la santé et les
aides formelles et informelles reçues que sur les caractéristiques démographiques et socio-
économiques et l’environnement familial des enquêtés. Sont sélectionnés dans l’échantillon
les individus âgés de 50 à 74 ans ayant des restrictions dans les activités de la vie quotidienne
(N=3 121) afin de pouvoir comparer les aides reçues par deux sous-populations d’individus
relativement proches, les 50-59 ans d’une part et les 60-74 ans d’autre part, séparées cepen-
dant par la barrière institutionnelle des 60 ans. Un modèle probit bivarié est estimé pour
tenir compte de la simultanéité entre les décisions de recours aux aides formelles et infor-
melles ; un riche ensemble de variables de contrôle ainsi que des effets d’âge sont inclus
afin d’isoler l’effet d’avoir 60 ou plus sur la probabilité de recevoir une aide formelle ou une
aide informelle. L’enquête dispose également d’un volet réalisé sur les individus résidant en
hébergement spécialisé (volet HSI) et d’une base de données spécifique réunissant des in-
formations issues d’HSM et d’HSI. De cet échantillon représentatif de l’ensemble de la popu-
lation française, nous retenons à nouveau les 50-74 ans (N=12,784) ; afin d’estimer l’impact
du fait d’avoir 60 ans sur la probabilité de résider en institution, nous mettons en œuvre une
technique d’estimation paramétrique par régression sur discontinuité (RDD).
Trois principaux résultats se dégagent de l’analyse. Premièrement, la probabilité de rece-
voir une aide à domicile formelle est plus élevée pour les personnes âgées dépendantes que
pour les personnes handicapées de moins de 60 ans, à caractéristiques observables don-
nées ; la probabilité de recevoir une aide informelle est au contraire plus faible, mais cet effet
apparaît moins robuste. Deuxièmement, au sein de la population résidant en logement ordi-
naire, les effets sont hétérogènes selon le genre et la sévérité des incapacités. Les hommes de
60 ans et plus sont ainsi plus susceptibles de recevoir une aide formelle mais aussi une aide à
la vie quotidienne apportée par leur entourage, tandis que l’effet positif de relever des dispo-
sitifs dépendance sur la probabilité de recevoir une aide professionnelle à domicile n’est dé-
tecté que pour les individus ayant des restrictions dans les activités de la vie quotidienne au
sens strict (AVQ). Troisièmement, la probabilité de résider de manière permanente dans un
établissement spécialisé est plus forte pour les personnes âgées dépendantes, toutes choses
étant égales par ailleurs.
Lever le voile sur les mécanismes expliquant ces effets n’est pas aisé, les données ne
permettant pas de connaître les montants des prestations handicap ou dépendance per-
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çues par les individus. Nos estimateurs capturent un effet global des différences de dispo-
sitif, qui englobe tant le différentiel d’accès à des aides et la générosité de celles-ci que des
différences dans l’offre de services. Côté domicile, l’offre de Services de soins infirmiers à
domicile (SSIAD) pour les personnes de moins de 60 ans était en 2008 encore très limitée,
ce qui pourrait expliquer que les personnes handicapées ont une probabilité plus faible de
recevoir des aides aux corps apportées par des professionnels. L’interprétation des résul-
tats doit aussi se faire à la lumière d’une caractéristique importante du plan d’échantillon-
nage de l’enquête Handicap-Santé : si les personnes âgées dépendantes ont été considérées
comme résidant en institution dès lors qu’elles étaient entrées en maison de retraite, les per-
sonnes de moins de 60 ans régulièrement hébergées dans des établissements pour adultes
handicapés mais revenant au domicile familial de manière ponctuelle dans l’année ont été
considérées comme résidant à domicile. Ceci implique que les individus de moins de 60 ans
considérés comme résidant en logement ordinaire dans l’enquête ont une probabilité plus
forte de recevoir des aides professionnelles dans des établissements spécialisés, lesquelles
ne sont pas observées dans le volet HSM de l’enquête, que les personnes âgées.
Globalement, les résultats obtenus suggèrent que la barrière des 60 ans dispositifs de
financement des aides médico-sociales en France a un impact sur les modalités d’accom-
pagnement des personnes ayant des restrictions d’activité. L’interprétation doit rester pru-
dente, du fait de certaines limites de l’enquête au vu de la question de recherche et de l’ap-
proche économétrique en forme réduite. Par ailleurs, les implications des résultats en termes
économétriques doivent être discutées sur la base de considérations normatives : ainsi, si les
préférences pour l’aide informelle, relativement à l’aide formelle, varient avec l’âge ou la gé-
nération, les différences observées en termes de configurations d’aide à domicile ne reflètent
pas nécessairement une iniquité horizontale dans le recours aux aides médico-sociales.
Chapitre 2
Le chapitre 2 a été co-écrit avec Quitterie Roquebert. Il prend comme point de départ
une implication du Chapitre 1, lequel suggère que les individus ayant des restrictions dans
les activités de la vie quotidienne modulent leur consommation de soins de longue durée
en fonction des subventions à l’aide à domicile dont ils peuvent bénéficier. Mais dans quelle
mesure ? L’objectif du chapitre 2 est de contribuer à la littérature internationale évaluant les
effets des dispositifs de financement des aides à domicile sur la consommation de ces aides
en proposant une quantification des réactions comportementales des personnes âgées dé-
pendantes, et en particulier de la mesure dans laquelle celles-ci ajustent la quantité d’aides
consommées au prix qu’elles doivent débourser de leur poche pour les financer. L’ensemble
des pays de l’OCDE s’étant engagé dans la voie du maintien à domicile des personnes âgées
dépendantes, disposer d’estimateurs de l’élasticité-prix et de l’élasticité-revenu de la de-
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mande d’aide à domicile s’avère essentiel pour mieux comprendre les effets des programmes
de subvention de l’aide à domicile en termes d’efficience allocative, ainsi que anticiper l’im-
pact des réformes de ces dispositifs sur les volumes consommés et les restes-à-charge sup-
portés par les bénéficiaires.
Le chapitre 2 propose une estimation de la sensibilité au prix des bénéficiaires de l’APA
résidant en logement ordinaire dans leur consommation d’aides ménagères, aides au corps
et autres services d’assistance dans les activités de la vie quotidienne. L’APA fonctionne
comme une subvention horaire sur le prix facturé par les services d’aide à domicile au
bénéficiaire, le taux de la subvention étant d’autant plus fort que le revenu est faible. La
subvention est accordée dans la limite d’un nombre d’heures individualisé, appelé plan
d’aide, sur la base d’une évaluation des besoins faite par une équipe médico-sociale. Si
le bénéficiaire désire consommer des heures au-delà de son plan d’aide, il peut le faire à
condition de payer l’intégralité du prix facturé par le service d’aide à domicile – la subven-
tion horaire APA ne s’appliquant plus. En termes microéconomiques, l’APA créé ainsi un
coude dans la contrainte budgétaire des bénéficiaires, localisé au niveau de leur plan d’aide.
Comme aucune base de données existante en France ne rassemble des informations sur
la quantité de soins de longue durée consommée et leur prix, l’analyse exploite des fichiers
individuels sur les bénéficiaires de l’APA collectés de manière ad hoc, dans le cadre du projet
de recherche MODAPA. L’APA étant mise en œuvre par les départements, un Conseil dé-
partemental a été sollicité pour permettre aux membres de l’équipe d’accéder à ses don-
nées de gestion. Celles-ci contiennent une information précise sur le plan d’aide, la quantité
d’aide effectivement consommée sur une base mensuelle, le taux de subvention APA ainsi
que sur le revenu, l’âge, le genre, la situation matrimoniale et la commune de résidence de
l’ensemble des bénéficiaires de l’APA à domicile. Par ailleurs, nous disposons d’une infor-
mation exacte sur le reste-à-charge horaire supporté par les bénéficiaires s’adressant à des
prestataires dits autorisés. Ces services constituent le type de structures d’aide à domicile
fournissant la majorité des heures subventionnées par l’APA ; le tarif horaire que chacun de
ces services doit facturer aux bénéficiaires APA est arrêté une fois par an par le Conseil dé-
partemental. L’échantillon retenu est constitué de l’ensemble des bénéficiaires de l’APA du
département ayant reçu une aide fournie par un service prestataire autorisé aux mois d’oc-
tobre 2012, 2013 et 2014 (N=8 190).
L’approche semi-structurelle adoptée permet d’obtenir un estimateur du paramètre
d’élasticité-prix de la demande, supposée constante. Ce paramètre est identifié principa-
lement par les variations inter-individuelles dans les prix facturés par les services d’aide
à domicile, tandis que les variations inter-individuelles de revenu permettent d’identifier
l’élasticité-revenu de la demande. Notre stratégie empirique répond à deux écueils. Premiè-
rement, seule la consommation des heures subventionnées par l’APA est enregistrée dans
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les données administratives départementales dont nous disposons ; pour chaque individu,
les heures potentiellement consommées au-delà du plan d’aide ne sont pas observées. Afin
de tenir compte de la censure par la droite de notre variable dépendante, nous utilisons
un modèle Tobit de régression censurée. Deuxièmement, les bénéficiaires sont en théorie
libres de s’adresser au service d’aide à domicile de leur choix, ce qui peut conduire à une
endogénéité des variations inter-individuelles dans les niveaux de prix des services d’aide
à domicile. Cette dernière est prise en compte au moyen d’une stratégie d’estimation
par variable instrumentale. Le prix du service auquel s’adresse un bénéficiaire donné est
instrumenté par le nombre de communes desservies par ce service ; la corrélation positive
entre ces deux variables peut s’expliquer par les coûts de transport et de planification
que doivent subir les services desservant un territoire géographique étendu. En l’absence
d’indication empirique d’un rationnement de l’offre dans certaines zones, on peut supposer
que la variabilité géographique dans la zone de desserte des services d’aide à domicile n’a
pas d’incidence sur le volume individuel de consommation d’aide.
Les estimations suggèrent qu’une augmentation de 10 % du reste-à-charge horaire des
individus conduirait à une baisse de 4 % du nombre d’heures d’aide à domicile consom-
mées à la marge intensive. A taux de subvention APA inchangé, une augmentation de 10 %
du revenu induirait une augmentation symétrique de 4 % des heures consommées, suggé-
rant que les services d’aide à domicile que finance l’APA sont des biens de nécessité au sens
de la théorie du consommateur. Nos estimateurs révèlent également que dans le cadre de
l’APA, une augmentation du revenu a peu d’effet sur la consommation d’aide dès lors qu’elle
s’accompagne d’une revalorisation de la participation financière à la charge du bénéficiaire :
effet-prix et effet-revenu se compensent. Les estimateurs de l’élasticité-prix et de l’élasticité-
revenu obtenus sont combinés afin de dériver une valeur de l’élasticité-prix de la demande
hicksienne d’aide à domicile, de -0,4 à -0,3.
Ces résultats impliquent que les dispositifs de subvention de l’aide à domicile ont un im-
pact sur la consommation d’aide à domicile via des effets-revenu mais également des effets
de substitution : ce type de dispositif s’accompagne ainsi de pertes brutes d’efficience allo-
cative. L’élasticité-revenu étant positive mais de faible ampleur, il est possible que les gains
d’efficience que permet le transfert de ressources qui s’opère envers les bénéficiaires de l’APA
soient faibles. Ces deux éléments tendent à laisser penser que l’APA est un dispositif peu per-
formant à l’aune du seul critère de l’efficience allocative. Il convient toutefois de souligner
que notre analyse ne prend pas en compte les externalités négatives qu’un faible recours à
l’aide professionnelle peut laisser peser sur les aidants informels ou la santé du bénéficiaire ;
elle n’intègre pas non plus les gains d’efficience ex ante que permet l’existence d’un disposi-
tif d’assurance contre le risque financier associé à la dépendance. Nos estimations indiquent
également que les individus ayant un revenu supérieur à la médiane sont plus sensibles au
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prix dans leur décision de consommation. L’existence d’un taux de participation croissant
en le revenu du bénéficiaire pourrait ainsi répondre à un enjeu d’efficience tout autant qu’à
un objectif de redistribution. En dépit d’une précision statistique relativement faible, nos es-
timateurs pointent en outre vers une élasticité-prix inférieure à 1 en valeur absolue, ce qui
implique qu’une réduction du reste-à-charge horaire de l’aide à domicile devrait conduire
à une hausse moins que proportionnelle de la consommation, et donc à une réduction des
restes-à-charge totaux supportés par les bénéficiaires. Nos résultats invalident le présupposé
selon lequel les personnes âgées ayant des restrictions d’activité seraient extrêmement sen-
sibles dans leur consommation d’aide professionnelle à domicile.
Chapitre 3
Le chapitre 3 approfondit l’étude du dispositif APA à domicile, en se concentrant sur la
question de l’équité du dispositif. Si l’APA permet de redistribuer des ressources des contri-
buables vers les personnes âgées dépendantes, deux caractéristiques importantes de cette
allocation semblent par ailleurs limiter les inégalités dans la consommation d’aide à do-
micile et dans les restes-à-charge associées entre bénéficiaires. Premièrement, le taux de la
subvention horaire est d’autant plus élevé que le revenu du bénéficiaire est faible, ce qui
permet d’accentuer l’effort financier en faveur des bénéficiaires plus modestes. Deuxième-
ment, l’existence du plan d’aide individualisé, déterminé sur la base d’une évaluation des
besoins et soumis à des plafonds nationaux dont le montant est d’autant plus élevé que le
groupe iso-ressource (GIR) du bénéficiaire indique un niveau de dépendance sévère, permet
d’accroître la redistribution de ressources vers les individus les plus dépendants.
En attendant la prochaine mise à disposition d’une nouvelle enquête en population gé-
nérale (CARE, Insee-Drees), documenter précisément les écarts de consommation d’aide
professionnelle et de restes-à-charge entre les bénéficiaires APA appartenant à des GIR dis-
tincts ou ayant des niveaux de revenu différents s’avère difficile, pour deux raisons. Tout
d’abord, les registres administratifs que tiennent les Conseils départementaux sur leurs bé-
néficiaires APA (cf. chapitre 2) ne contiennent aucune information sur les heures d’aide pro-
fessionnelle que peuvent consommer les bénéficiaires au-delà de leur plan d’aide. Les don-
nées collectées et mobilisées dans le chapitre 2 indiquant qu’environ 40 % des bénéficiaires
du département considéré ont une consommation d’aide subventionnée égale à leur plan
d’aide, il paraît légitime de s’interroger sur la proportion effective des personnes âgées dé-
pendantes bénéficiant de l’APA mais consommant une aide professionnelle non subven-
tionnée en sus, ainsi que sur l’impact de cette « surconsommation » sur les restes-à-charge
supportés. Le deuxième facteur qui rend difficile l’appréciation des restes-à-charge est la
marge de manœuvre laissée aux Conseils départementaux dans l’application du barème de
la subvention APA ; en particulier, le calcul de la subvention horaire sur la base d’un tarif for-
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faitaire observé dans certains cas conduit à ce que même les bénéficiaires ayant un taux de
participation légal APA supportent un reste-à-charge horaire non nul. On soulignera finale-
ment que les données d’enquête existantes (avant CARE), en particulier l’enquête HSM (cf.
chapitre 1) offrent une information riche sur les aides formelles consommées mais ne per-
mettent guère d’apprécier les sommes déboursées pour ces aides ni de repérer de manière
précise les bénéficiaires des dispositifs publics.
Afin de compléter les estimations de consommations d’aide à domicile et de restes-à-
charge proposées par la Drees, le chapitre 3 s’appuie sur des données observationnelles ori-
ginales, collectées dans le cadre du projet de recherche MODAPA : il s’agit des fichiers-clients
d’un important service d’aide à domicile de type prestataire, ayant son activité dans un dé-
partement métropolitain. Pour le mois d’octobre 2014, ces données renseignent la consom-
mation subventionnée d’aide à domicile ainsi que les éventuelles heures consommées au-
delà du plan d’aide de chacun des clients du service. On observe également le taux de sub-
vention APA, le tarif forfaitaire auquel ce taux est appliqué et, partant, le reste-à-charge ho-
raire. Ces données permettent ainsi de documenter de manière précise les consommations
et les restes-à-charge pour un échantillon de bénéficiaires de l’APA. Les données mobilisées
présentent toutefois l’inconvénient de mesurer de manière imparfaite le revenu et le GIR.
Des imputations sont proposées pour pallier cette limite.
Outre une visée descriptive, le chapitre 3 revêt une dimension normative : il s’attelle à
évaluer si l’équité horizontale dans la consommation d’aide et l’équité verticale dans le fi-
nancement direct sont assurés par le dispositif APA. En l’occurence, il s’agit de vérifier si les
bénéficiaires de l’APA ayant les mêmes besoins, mesurés ici par leur GIR, ont une consom-
mation d’aide qui ne dépend pas systématiquement de leur revenu, et si les restes-à-charge
représentent une proportion du revenu qui ne décroît pas avec celui-ci.
L’évaluation faite à partir des données observationnelles permet de documenter la si-
tuation avant qu’une réforme importante du dispositif APA à domicile soit mise en place en
2016. Cette dernière a consisté en une série de mesures dont l’objectif était d’accroître l’ef-
fort public en direction des individus les plus défavorisés, des classes moyennes ainsi que
des bénéficiaires les plus dépendants. Le seuil de revenu en-deçà duquel le taux de partici-
pation légal est nul a été abaissé ; le taux de subvention a été augmenté plus fortement pour
les bénéficiaires de la moitié haute de la distribution des revenus ; le taux de subvention est
également devenu fonction du plan d’aide, permettant une participation financière horaire
moindre pour les individus les plus dépendants ; enfin, les plafonds nationaux applicables
aux plans d’aide ont été relevés. L’impact de ces mesures sur la distribution des consomma-
tions et des restes-à-charge selon le niveau de dépendance et le revenu, et donc sur l’équité
du dispositif APA, n’est pas aisé à anticiper, car il dépend en particulier des réactions com-
portementales des bénéficiaires aux modifications dans leur contrainte budgétaire que va
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induire la réforme.
Comme nous ne disposons d’aucune source de données individuelles permettant une
évaluation ex post des effets de la réforme, le chapitre 3 propose également une évaluation
ex ante à partir d’une simulation des modifications de consommations et de restes-à-charge.
Cette simulation s’appuie sur un certain nombre d’hypothèses ; en particulier, celle que les
équipes médico-sociales réévalueront l’ensemble des plans d’aide de manière proportion-
nelle à la hausse des plafonds nationaux décidée par la réforme. L’ajustement de la consom-
mation d’aide par les bénéficiaires de l’APA est simulé à l’aide des valeurs d’élasticité-prix et
d’élasticité-revenu dérivées dans le chapitre 2.
Les données mobilisées indiquent que, avant la réforme, les différences entre niveaux
de revenu dans la consommation d’aide professionnelle à domicile semblaient limitées, les
bénéficiaires au milieu de la distribution des revenus tendant toutefois à consommer un
volume d’aide moindre – à niveau de dépendance donné. Les restes-à-charge apparaissent
élevés pour les bénéficiaires en GIR 1 et 2 en particulier (avec une moyenne de près de 350
€ mensuels) et sont non négligeables même pour les bénéficiaires du quintile inférieur de
revenu, dont le taux de participation légal à l’APA est pourtant très faible. Les simulations
des consommations post-réforme laissent anticiper une augmentation du volume d’heures
d’aide formelle consommées pour l’ensemble des bénéficiaires, de 12 % en moyenne. Lors-
qu’on contrôle par le GIR, la consommation des bénéficiaires appartenant aux quintiles de
revenu 1 et 4 reste toutefois inférieure à celle des autres bénéficiaires - en moyenne -, ce qui
suggère que la réforme n’a pas complètement permis d’atteindre l’équité horizontale dans
l’utilisation d’aide formelle. Il est également prédit que la réforme s’accompagnera d’une
baisse des restes-à-charge totaux pour les bénéficiaires appartenant aux quintiles de revenu
3 à 5, qui profitent le plus de la baisse du taux de participation légal. Du fait d’une hausse
marquée de la consommation d’aide, les restes-à-charge totaux pourraient en revanche aug-
menter en bas de la distribution des revenus ; la réforme pourrait ainsi conduire à une dé-
gradation de l’équité verticale dans la participation financière des bénéficiaires. La baisse
importante des taux d’effort pour les bénéficiaires des GIR 1 et 2 que prédisent les simu-
lations laisse anticiper une amélioration de la couverture du risque financier associé à une
prise en charge à domicile des dépendances lourdes, grâce à la réforme.
L’extrapolation de ces résultats doit être faite avec prudence, dans la mesure où l’échan-
tillon utilisé n’est a priori pas représentatif de l’ensemble des bénéficiaires de l’APA à do-
micile. Néanmoins, cette analyse exploratoire illustre l’intérêt des techniques de simulation
dans l’évaluation d’une réforme d’un dispositif de subvention de l’aide à domicile. Elle met
également en lumière l’importance de documenter et d’anticiper les réactions comporte-
mentales des agents, dans la mesure où celles-ci peuvent infléchir les visées redistributives
des réformes des dispositifs de solvabilisation des aides médico-sociales.
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Chapitre 4
Le quatrième et dernier chapitre de la thèse se focalise sur le système d’accompagnement
de la dépendance aux Pays-Bas. Il vise dans un premier temps à documenter les éventuelles
inégalités socio-économiques dans la consommation d’aides médico-sociales ; et dans un
deuxième temps, à évaluer si les individus ayant des mêmes besoins de prise en charge re-
çoivent des services similaires, de manière indépendante de leur revenu. Bien que l’assu-
rance sociale néerlandaise du risque de perte d’autonomie soit perçue comme garante d’un
accès aux soins de longue durée très égalitaire, peu d’éléments empiriques viennent appuyer
ce constat. Documenter la performance du système au regard de l’équité horizontale dans le
recours aux soins de longue durée aux Pays-Bas apparaît d’autant plus important à l’heure
actuelle, à mesure que des modifications substantielles sont apportées aux dispositifs pu-
blics existants. En particulier, les changements récents intervenus dans le barème de la par-
ticipation financière des bénéficiaires aux coûts des soins et les discussions portant sur la
pertinence de modifications ultérieures invitent à s’interroger sur le lien empirique observé
entre la consommation d’aides médico-sociales d’un individu et ses ressources financières.
L’étude proposée dans le chapitre 4, co-écrite avec Pieter Bakx et Eddy van Doorslaer,
s’appuie sur des données administratives extrêmement riches et bien adaptées à une ana-
lyse distributionnelle. Le cœur du jeu de données est constitué des les registres exhaustifs
des décisions d’éligibilité à une solvabilisation publique de soins de longue durée, pour l’en-
semble de la population néerlandaise. Ces registres sont mis en regard avec les aides médico-
sociales effectivement consommées. Les volumes consommés des différents types d’aide à
domicile qui peuvent être solvabilisés par l’assurance sociale néerlandaise (soins infirmiers,
aide au corps, etc.), ainsi que les séjours en institution spécialisée sont directement rensei-
gnés ; les données fournissent également une information sur le recours à une prestation
monétaire plutôt qu’à une aide en nature, qui relève aux Pays-Bas du choix du bénéficiaire.
Ces données sur l’éligibilité aux soins de longue durée et leur utilisation effective sont ap-
pariées avec les registres fiscaux et municipaux, permettant ainsi d’avoir une information
précise sur les revenus et le patrimoine des bénéficiaires, leur situation matrimoniale, leur
lieu de résidence, la composition de leur foyer, mais aussi leur origine ethnique ainsi que leur
âge et leur genre. L’étude se focalise sur les individus ayant 60 ans ou plus en 2012 et ayant
été éligibles à un financement public de leurs soins de longue durée, en 2012, en raison d’une
situation de perte d’autonomie (N= 616,934).
L’analyse repose sur le calcul d’indicateurs synthétiques, l’indice de concentration et l’in-
dice d’iniquité horizontale. En mettant en regard la valeur monétaire de l’ensemble des soins
de longue durée consommés par les individus de la population d’intérêt avec leur revenu im-
posable individualisé, l’indice de concentration permet de mesurer de manière synthétique
l’éventuelle concentration des soins de longue durée reçus parmi la population riche, ou
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pauvre, définie en termes relatifs. La mesure de l’iniquité horizontale découle quant à elle
de la distinction faite entre les inégalités dans la consommation de soins de longue durée
considérées comme légitimes – car reflétant les besoins de prise en charge –, des inégalités
considérées comme illégitimes. L’originalité de l’analyse proposée tient à la manière dont
est conceptuellement et empiriquement défini le besoin légitime d’aide. Les travaux exis-
tants s’appuient sur une dérivation statistique d’une mesure du besoin, reposant sur l’hypo-
thèse relativement forte d’absence d’iniquité verticale en moyenne dans la consommation
de soins ; nous mobilisons en revanche une variable unique et explicite, à savoir la valeur
monétaire de l’ensemble des soins de longue durée pour lesquels un individu a été jugé éli-
gible. Ce choix se justifie par le contexte institutionnel néerlandais : l’évaluation des besoins
est confiée à une agence centrale indépendante, appelée CIZ, dont les agents s’appuient sur
une grille précise pour déterminer l’ensemble des services pour lesquels un individu sera au-
torisé à recevoir une aide publique. Ainsi, l’hypothèse sur laquelle s’appuie notre évaluation
de l’équité horizontale dans la consommation de soins de longue durée est que les décisions
d’éligibilité prises par l’agence CIZ incarnent et révèlent la norme d’équité verticale dans
l’utilisation des soins qui prévaut dans le système d’assurance sociale néerlandais.
L’analyse indique que les individus dans le bas de la distribution des revenus tendent à
consommer davantage de soins de longue durée, en valeur. La concentration « pro-pauvre »
des soins de longue durée se maintient même lorsqu’on tient compte du fait que le be-
soin d’aide, tel que reflété par les décisions d’éligibilité de l’agence CIZ, décroît avec le re-
venu. On observe notamment que les bénéficiaires appartenant au premier décile de re-
venu consomment en moyenne 25 % plus de soins de longue durée —- en valeur –– que
les bénéficiaires appartenant au décile de revenu supérieur ; l’indice d’iniquité horizontale
est ainsi négatif. Une décomposition de l’indice d’iniquité est réalisée sur la base d’une ré-
gression linéaire de la consommation de soins sur les caractéristiques démographiques et
socio-économiques qui, conditionnellement au besoin d’aide, sont considérées comme des
déterminants illégitimes du besoin d’aide. Cette décomposition a vocation non pas à iden-
tifier des relations causales, mais à mettre en lumière les facteurs corrélés simultanément
avec le revenu et avec l’utilisation faite des soins de longue durée. Cet exercice met en lu-
mière la contribution importante du fait de résider avec un conjoint : avoir un conjoint en
vie, qui est une situation plus fréquente chez les personnes âgées relativement aisées, est
associé à une consommation d’aide formelle plus faible. Par ailleurs, le revenu lui-même est
fortement et négativement corrélé à la consommation de soins. En revanche, les inégalités
inter-régionales observées dans l’utilisation de soins ne recoupent pas les inégalités de re-
venu au sein de la population âgée néerlandaise : le lieu de résidence ne contribue donc pas
à l’iniquité horizontale mesurée.
A l’inverse des données d’enquête mobilisées par les quelques études empiriques sur
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l’équité horizontale dans la consommation de soins de longue durée liée au statut socio-
économique qui ont pour l’heure été menées, nos sources administratives donnent à voir
conjointement les prises en charge à domicile et en institution. Elles permettent d’observer
que, parmi les individus qui ont été déclaré éligibles à un accompagnement en institution,
ceux appartenant au décile inférieur de revenu sont davantage susceptibles d’entrer effec-
tivement en institution ; les individus relativement plus aisés qui se trouvent éligibles à une
prise en charge institutionnelle ont davantage tendance à demander la conversion de leurs
droits en un ensemble de services à recevoir au domicile ou, pour les plus riches, en une
prestation monétaire, ce que permet le système néerlandais. L’accompagnement en institu-
tion ayant une valeur monétaire plus élevée que les services à domicile proposés par équi-
valence, la propension plus grande des bénéficiaires relativement aisés à substituer de l’aide
à domicile à une entrée en institution contribue ainsi à expliquer que les bénéficiaires mo-
destes tendent à avoir une utilisation de soins de longue durée plus importante en valeur
que les bénéficiaires plus aisés.
Globalement, l’analyse révèle l’existence d’inégalités socio-économiques dans la
consommation de soins de longue durée dans le système d’assurance sociale néerlandais.
Les implications des résultats en termes d’équité dépendent en revanche des mécanismes
à l’œuvre derrière ces inégalités ainsi que des jugements de valeur adoptés. L’organisation
du système de provision des soins de longue durée pourrait conduire à ce que, à besoins
donnés, les bénéficiaires modestes se voient attribuer de manière prioritaire certains
types d’aide. La substitution d’aide à domicile à l’institutionnalisation pourrait également
découler de l’existence d’une participation financière aux coûts des soins, qui est fortement
croissante avec le revenu bien que plafonnée. Il n’est pas non plus possible d’exclure que
les résultats reflètent des différences systématiques selon le statut socio-économique dans
les préférences pour certaines configurations d’aide ; si, selon la tradition welfariste ou la
théorie de l’égalité des opportunités, les préférences doivent être considérées comme des
déterminants légitimes de la consommation de soins, alors l’existence d’un indice d’iniquité
horizontal négatif ne devrait pas s’interpréter comme la preuve d’une iniquité horizontale «
pro-pauvre ». On notera enfin que la plus grande propension des individus les plus défavo-
risés économiquement à entrer en institution peut découler du fait que la prise en charge en
institution semble être un bien inférieur au sens de la théorie micro-économique. Une telle
interprétation conduirait à conclure à l’existence d’une iniquité horizontale en défaveur des
plus modestes, et à s’interroger sur l’efficience d’un système où les bénéficiaires les moins
favorisés au regard de leur situation socio-économique se trouvent contraints de recourir
à des formes de prise en charge socialement coûteuses bien qu’étant individuellement et
collectivement peu valorisées.
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La thèse se clôt par une Conclusion générale qui synthétise les principales conclusions
des différents chapitres tout en en soulignant les principales limites. Bien que l’aide fournie
par les proches représente la plus grande partie des aides reçues par les personnes âgées ré-
sidant en logement ordinaire, l’utilisation de données administratives et de fichiers-clients
dans les chapitres 2 à 4 ne permet pas de prendre en compte l’aide informelle potentielle-
ment reçue par les populations d’intérêt, alors qu’elle pourrait modifier le diagnostic porté
sur l’efficience et l’équité des dispositifs étudiés. Si les analyses des chapitres 2 et 3 ont pu
être conduites grâce à des données inédites, la collecte ad hoc de ces informations a dû se
faire à un niveau local, ce qui limite a priori la validité externe des résultats obtenus. Par
ailleurs, si l’accent mis sur l’APA à domicile dans les chapitres 2 et 3 permet de documenter
précisément les propriétés de ce dispositif, il implique également que les dispositifs publics
alternatifs ou complémentaires à l’APA à domicile, et notamment l’institutionnalisation, ne
sont pas intégrés à l’analyse.
Des enrichissements substantiels du système d’information sur la consommation
d’aides médico-sociales et les bénéficiaires des dispositifs publics en France devraient per-
mettre à des travaux ultérieurs de vérifier la robustesse des résultats présentés dans la thèse
et d’explorer des problématiques adjacentes. L’appariement de données administratives et
de données d’enquête néerlandaises devrait par ailleurs permettre de déceler d’éventuelles
inégalités dans l’activation des droits des personnes âgées aux Pays-Bas.
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General introduction / Introduction générale
English follows.
Préambule
En France, l’actualité sociale du début de l’année 2018 a été marquée par un mouvement
de grève inédit : celui des personnels des établissements accueillant des personnes âgées
dépendantes. Infirmiers et aides-soignants réclament davantage de moyens financiers, à la
fois pour améliorer leurs conditions de travail et pour permettre un accompagnement des
résidents qui soit garant de leur dignité et d’une meilleure qualité des soins. Cette vague de
revendications a surpris sans surprendre. Si elle est portée par des professionnel·le·s d’un
secteur structurellement peu enclin aux mobilisations collectives, elle fait écho à un senti-
ment largement partagé par l’opinion publique : nous ne faisons pas assez pour nos aînés
les plus fragiles.
Sous cet apparent consensus, se font rapidement jour des questionnements fondamen-
taux sur le sens à donner à ce diagnostic et les réponses à y apporter. Qui devrait être da-
vantage mobilisé pour améliorer l’accompagnement des personnes en situation d’incapa-
cités, en particulier au grand âge : la puissance publique ? Dans ce cas, à quels arbitrages
budgétaires faudra-t-il consentir ? Doit-on attendre davantage des familles ? Celles-ci, déjà
largement impliquées dans l’accompagnement des personnes handicapées et dépendantes,
se trouvent reconfigurées par la baisse de la fécondité et l’évolution des comportements en
matière d’unions et de participation au marché du travail. Doit-on alors en appeler davan-
tage à la responsabilité individuelle et aux solutions proposées par le marché ?
Au niveau individuel, le développement d’incapacités physiques, sensorielles ou cogni-
tives à l’âge adulte est un risque, dont la probabilité d’occurrence augmente avec l’accrois-
sement de la longévité. A l’échelle des sociétés ayant achevé leur transition démographique,
c’est en revanche une certitude qui s’impose : celle de voir le nombre de personnes âgées
augmenter fortement et représenter une proportion croissante de la population totale. Au
vieillissement démographique s’est ajoutée la double crise économique et des finances pu-
bliques dans les pays de l’Organisation de co-opération et de développement économique
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(OCDE), produisant un contexte dans lequel le rôle des pouvoirs publics dans l’organisation
et le financement de l’accompagnement des personnes en situation d’incapacités est mis
en question. La question des ressources humaines et financières à consacrer aux personnes
âgées dépendantes surgit dans l’intimité des familles comme sur les bancs de l’Assemblée
Nationale ; elle constitue une des grandes questions sociétales et politiques de notre époque.
Sans évidemment prétendre constituer la seule approche disciplinaire pertinente, la
science économique, par ses outils conceptuels et empiriques, peut apporter des éclairages
précieux sur les politiques d’accompagnement de la dépendance. Elle se révèle particuliè-
rement bien outillée pour aborder la question suivante : dans quelle mesure les dispositifs
publics de prise en charge des soins de longue durée existants sont-ils efficients et équi-
tables ? C’est à cette interrogation générale que cette thèse entend apporter des éléments
de réponse et contribuer ainsi au débat public. Pour ce faire, elle s’appuie sur un ensemble
d’analyses empiriques. Comment les dispositifs existants influencent-ils les aides reçues par
les personnes en situation d’incapacités ? Observe-t-on des inégalités socio-économiques
dans le recours aux aides médico-sociales ? L’allocation de ces aides est-elle équitable ? Les
contributions financières demandées aux bénéficiaires des aides publiques le sont-elles ?
Ces contributions sont-elles compatibles avec une bonne couverture du risque financier as-
socié à la dépendance ? Sous quelles conditions des réformes peuvent rendre les dispositifs
existants plus justes et plus efficients ?
Nous proposons pour commencer une introduction générale à la thèse, qui s’organise
en trois grandes parties. La première partie vise à préciser l’objet d’étude, à partir des défi-
nitions des concepts d’incapacité, de dépendance et de soins de longue durée. Elle présente
également le contexte dans lequel s’insèrent nos questionnements, en offrant une vue d’en-
semble des tendances démographiques et épidémiologiques et des politiques publiques de
prise en charge des soins de longue durée dans les pays de l’OCDE. La seconde partie situe
la problématique de la thèse dans la littérature économique existante. Elle met en outre en
regard les systèmes de prise en charge des soins de longue durée des deux pays sur lesquels
portent nos analyses, la France et les Pays-Bas, et montre l’intérêt de leurs contextes institu-
tionnels au regard de notre problématique. La dernière partie passe en revue les questions
de recherche soulevées dans les différents chapitres, les principaux résultats obtenus et leurs
implications. Elle précise également les outils conceptuels et les méthodes utilisés, les don-
nées mobilisées ainsi que les définitions empiriques des soins de longue durée, du besoin
d’aide et des principes d’équité qui sont utilisées dans la thèse.
Le reste de cette thèse est rédigé en anglais.
2
Preamble
In France, the year 2018 started with an unprecedented strike hitting the news: that of the
employees of nursing homes. Nurses and other professional caregivers are claiming more
financial resources from the government, in order to improve their working conditions, in-
crease the quality of care and guarantee the elderly residents’ dignity. Although the protest
was unexpected, it did not come as a surprise. Even though the strike was led by the work-
ers of a sector that is structurally little prone to collective protests, it echoes a feeling largely
shared by the public opinion: too little is done to help our most fragile elders.
Behind this apparent consensus, many fundamental questions arise, relating to the sense
that we should give to this diagnosis and the remedies to offer. Who should be more involved
in supporting the disabled individuals, in particular the elderly: the government? In such a
case, which budgetary trade-offs have to be accepted? Should we rather expect more from
the families? Those are already greatly involved in the provision of informal care; in addition,
they are being reconfigured by lower fertility rates and the evolution of behaviors in terms of
unions and females’ labor market participation. Should we then call for more individual
responsibility and more room for market-based solutions?
At the individual level, the onset of physical, sensory or cognitive limitations in adult life
is a risk, whose probability can increase along with the rise of longevity. At the level of the
countries that have completed their demographic transition, it is certain that the number of
the disabled elderly will keep increasing and represent a growing share of total population. In
the countries of the Organization for economic co-operation and development (OECD), the
economic and public finance crisis came on top of population aging; this has resulted in a
context in which the role of the government at large in the financing and in the organization
of care provision for disabled individuals is being challenged. The question of the human
and financial resources that should be devoted to long-term care arises both in the intimacy
of families but also in Parliamentary discussions; it is one of the major societal and political
questions of our time.
Thanks to its conceptual and empirical tools, economics can shed light on this question,
even if it is certainly not the only relevant disciplinary approach to it. It shows well adapted to
tackle the following question: to what extent are public long-term care policies efficient and
equitable? This is the general issue that this thesis intends to address and thereby contribute
to the public debate.
The thesis starts with a general introduction. The first part aims at exposing the general
topic, starting with definitions of the concepts of disability, dependency and long-term care.
It also offers a broad overview of the demographic and epidemiological trends as well as of
the long-term care policies in OECD countries. The second part relates the general question
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addressed in the thesis to the existing economic literature. It also presents the long-term
care systems in the two countries under investigation in the empirical analysis, France and
the Netherlands, and highlights the interest of their institutional features with respect to the
questions being discussed. The third section reviews the specific research questions that
are tackled in each Chapter, the main results and their implications. It also presents the
conceptual tools, the empirical methods, the data as well as the empirical definitions of long-
term care, care needs and the equity principles that are used in this thesis.
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1 Object of study and context
1.1 Disability, dependency and long-term care: some definitions
This thesis investigates into the long-term care (hereafter LTC) policies designed for the
disabled, or dependent, individuals.
In the international economic literature, the terms “disability” or “dependency” are of-
ten used interchangeably to designate individuals who are not able to perform the activities
of daily living without any assistance. In the conceptual framework proposed by the World
Health Organization as the International Classification of Functioning (ICF), disability corre-
sponds to “any restriction or lack ... of ability to perform an activity in the manner or within
the range considered normal for a human being” (WHO, 2002). Disability is dynamically
produced by the interactions between health, other personal characteristics — such as age,
gender, life style, education and socio-economic characteristic — and environmental fac-
tors – such as public services and policies, social norms and relationships, or technology. In
this model, the concept of disability covers both functional limitations, activity restrictions
and limitations in social participation. Functional limitations correspond to the difficulties
to make use of physical, sensory or cognitive functioning to perform basic activities, such
as walking, engaging into a conversation, remembering the day, etc. Functional limitations
reveal the functional status of the individual, which depends on her past and present dis-
eases including sarcopenia, accidents and malformations. They are independent from the
individual and environmental resources that the person may mobilize to limit their impact
on her daily life (Cambois and Robine, 2003). Activity restrictions have to do with what the
individual can effectively do or not in terms of daily activities, given her resources. The epi-
demiological literature usually distinguishes between the Activities of daily living (ADLs) and
the Instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs) (Katz et al., 1970; Lawton and Brody, 1969).
The former designate restrictions in personal care activities (grooming, dressing, eating) or
in essential mobility (getting up from a bed or a chair), while the latter designate activities
that may be more straightforwardly delegated (going grocery shopping, preparing the meals,
doing the paperwork and the house chores, etc.). The term “dependency” is used to refer to
situations in which an individual, given her disability, depends on external supervision or
assistance to carry out these daily activities.
The word “dependency” is however often used in a more specific context, that of dis-
ability taking place at an old age. This is explicitly the case in France: the term entered the
legislative framework when the first public scheme devoted to individuals aged 60 and older
was created.4 Such a use is also encountered in the economic literature. The recent impor-
4Loi 97–60 du 24 janvier 1997.
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tant development of empirical studies in geriatrics, epidemiology and public health relating
to the concept of frailty (Fried et al., 2001; Rockwood et al., 1994) may reinforce the geriatric
conception of dependency. Yet the decision to set apart, or not, “old age disability” may be
due more to political and societal considerations (Mormiche and Jourdain, 2013). Under that
regard, the definition adopted by the Council of Europe in 1998 specifies that “dependency
may affect any section of the population and not only elderly people”.5
In economic terms, disability is associated with two types of costs (Stapleton et al., 2008).
First, revenue costs correspond to the difference between an individual’s actual income and
her counterfactual income had she no disability. Second, disability induces expenditure
costs, which can be loosely defined as the extra expenditures incurred by a disabled person to
reach the situation of an individual similar in all regards but with no disability. Expenditure
costs cover the monetary and opportunity costs of the services required on a long term basis
by an individual to perform the activities of daily living, that is to say long-term care.
In the same way ill-health differs from disability, LTC should be distinguished from acute
care: the latter aims at curing a disease, while the former aims at “alleviating pain and re-
ducing or managing the deterioration in health status for people with a degree of long-term
dependency” (OECD, 2017a). While acute care treatments have an explicit end, LTC gen-
erally has to be provided on a permanent basis, although restoration of functioning may
sometimes be observed even for elderly patients (Cambois and Lièvre, 2004). The distinc-
tion becomes more delicate when we take chronic diseases into account: in many cases,
their treatments are not curative and are provided on a permanent basis.
Figure 1 – The range of long-term care services.
5Recommendation no R(98)9, September, 19th 1998, cited in Juin (2016).
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LTC may also be defined positively by the types of services it encompasses (Figure 1). As
noted by Norton (2000),
“LTC, however, is anything but a homogeneous good” (p. 958).
LTC services include domestic help and assistance with other IADLs (e.g. help preparing
the meal or do the shopping), as well as supportive guidance (help the person organizing and
managing her day) and activating guidance (help the person adapting her behavior when be-
havioral or psychological problems are observed) that will help a community-dwelling per-
son to keep on living independently. They also cover personal care (i.e. grooming, bathing
and dressing), assistance with other ADLs (e.g. getting up from bed) and nursing care (e.g.
dressing wounds, administering injections). LTC encompasses various levels of skills: nurs-
ing care requires medical qualifications, while domestic help depends less crucially on the
specific skills of caregivers. The classification of certain categories of services may be diffi-
cult in practice: the medical treatments for disabling diseases (such as symptomatic treat-
ments for Alzheimer’s Disease) may not be specifically considered as LTC but rather as gen-
eral health care. Similarly, services such as “meals-on-wheels” or even domestic help itself
are often regarded as part of general social assistance or support programs. Under its 2011
System of Health Accounts (SHA), the Organization for Co-operation and Economic Devel-
opment (OECD hereafter) provides definitions of the services to be included in the health
component and social component of LTC (OECD, 2017b). The OECD however acknowledges
that:
“... due to differing administrative, financing and provision standards, the national
boundaries of long-term care may not necessarily be aligned with the SHA-defined
boundaries” (p. 92).
LTC may be provided either in the community, and in particular at the home of the dis-
abled person, or in a specialized institution, such as a nursing home or a residential care
home. The cost of board and lodging charged to the residents of specialized institutions is
generally considered as a LTC cost. In some countries, such as the Netherlands, it is directly
included in the public daily rate for institutional stays. In other countries, such as France, it is
charged to residents separately from the price covering nursing and personal care provision,
but it is still considered one of the costs associated with disability.
When provided in the community, LTC can be either informal (provided by relatives) or
formal (provided by professional workers). Informal caregivers typically lack the relevant
skills for providing nursing and other medical care, but they often substitute for professional
provision of personal care, domestic help and assistance with other IADLs (see e.g. Bonsang
(2009)). In additional, informal caregivers are often in charge of coordinating the various
professional caregivers, especially when the LTC system is fragmented.
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1.2 The prevalence of disability in OECD countries
A variety of empirical measures of disability
What is the proportion of the population who lives with a disability? There exists no
standardized measure of disability at the international level (Roy, 2016). Empirical works
in epidemiology, public health and health economics rely on different definitions, which in
many cases may make it difficult to compare results from different studies. The measures of
disability may be epidemiological and rely on the concepts of functional limitations and ac-
tivity restrictions discussed earlier; those are constructed using general population surveys
or epidemiological cohorts. Alternative indicators are the numbers of individuals benefiting
from LTC policies or using LTC services, computed on the basis of administrative records
(Ravaud et al., 2002).
Let us take the case of France, which this thesis will extensively deals with. The 2008–2009
Disability and Health survey is representative of the entire French population. On section
of the survey (HSM) investigates community-dwelling individuals while the second section
(HSI) surveys individuals who live in an institutional setting. HSM allows to measure the pro-
portions of individuals who: (i) declare at least one functional limitation, (ii) declare they are
totally unable to perform one ADL or IADL. It additionally contains the Global Activity Lim-
itation Indication (GALI), which makes it possible to compute the share of individuals who
have been experiencing a limitation in their daily life for at least 6 months due to a health
condition.6 Among individuals living in the community (i.e. not in a residential care facil-
ity) and aged 16 or older, 11.5 million (23%) were disabled under one of the three indicators
(Roy, 2016). This proportion reaches 45% among those aged 60 and older. Although the large
majority of individuals with activity restrictions also have functional limitations (Barberger-
Gateau et al., 1993), 11% of the 16+ have functional limitations without any absolute activity
restrictions. If we define disability as meeting all the three criteria simultaneously and add
up the individuals residing in handicap centers, residential care homes and nursing homes,
only 6% of the adult population (16% of the 60+) are disabled.7 Using two very recent sur-
veys conducted on the French 60+ population, Brunel and Carrère (2017a) and Brunel and
Carrère (2017b) confirm that the number of the disabled varies widely depending on the way
we define disability.
Turning to administrative records, about 840,000 individuals aged 60 or older benefited
from a home care subsidy paid by the departments in 2014, and additional 550,000 were
living in an institution (Amar et al., 2016; Bozio et al., 2016). With this administrative
6The standard wording of the GALI question is “For at least the past 6 months, to what extent have you been
limited because of a health problem in activities people usually do?” (Jagger et al., 2010).
7These figures were derived using the numbers presented in Roy (2016) and the 2008 French legal popula-
tions (Insee, 2013).
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definition of disability, only 8.9% of the French 60+ are found to be disabled. All in all, there
is no such thing as the number of the disabled elderly.
The prevalence of disability increases with age
Whatever the definition, the prevalence of disability increases with age. Using the Health
and Disability Survey presented earlier, Dos Santos and Makdessi (2010) documents that
the proportion of community-dwelling individuals who are dependent8 is of 0.5% among
the 20–39 years-old, of 1.0% among the 40–59; it then reaches 3.3% among the 60–79 and
13.7% among the 80+. Severe limitations in locomotion are the most frequent limitations for
the elderly. With the more frequent onset of dementia, the prevalence of severe cognitive
limitations also increases markedly with age, as those affect 11% of the 60–64 years-old and
26% of the 80+.
Focusing on the 60+ population, we observe that the prevalence of cognitive and physical
functional limitations, of restrictions in grooming and of general limitation under the GALI
definition are higher for women at each age (Brunel and Carrère, 2017a). Combined with
the higher life expectancy of women, this implies that the majority of the disabled elderly
are women. This is indeed the case for almost 3/4 of the beneficiaries of the main French
home care subsidy program (Amar et al., 2016).
Cross-country variations in the prevalence of disability
What is the situation of countries other than France? In order to ease international com-
parison, surveys such as the EU–SILC (European Survey on Income and Living Conditions)
collect individual-level information on disabilities that are consistent across countries.
Based on the GALI indicator, the share of the 16+ population with a severe limitation ranges
from a low 3.7% in Sweden and Bulgaria, to a high 11% in the United Kingdom and in
Greece.
The GALI is also used to compute the disability-free life expectancy (DFLE), defined as
the number of years an individual may expect to live without limitations under the current
conditions of mortality and morbidity. For individuals who have reached age 65, DFLE is
equal to 9.4 years in the European Union, for both males and females (European Commis-
sion, 2018). As 65-years old men can expect to live 17.9 more years, against 21.2 years for
women, they can expect to live a higher proportion of their shorter life without disability.
Countries exhibit large differences in their DFLE: 65-years old Italian women can expect
to live only 1/3 of their remaining 22 years of life without disability, while this proportion
rises to 71% for their Norwegian counterparts. These gaps stem from disparities not only in
8In Dos Santos and Makdessi (2010), an individual is said to be dependent when she has physical and cog-
nitive functional limitations that come along with restrictions in the activities of daily living.
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epidemiological conditions but also in the demographic structure of the population and in
socio-economic conditions. They imply that there are factors of cross-country heterogeneity
in the economic costs of disability and in the demand for LTC services in the aggregate.
The share of LTC users also shows evidence of cross-country heterogeneity (OECD,
2017a). In the 18 countries who were able to report the share of individuals using LTC either
at home or in institution, 13% of the 65+ received formal LTC in 2014. This was the case
for less than 8% of the elderly in Portugal, Spain and Korea but of more than 15% in the
Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Israel. France ranks in the bottom of the
distribution, with less than 11% of its elderly population using formal LTC. Interpretation
of these figures must remain cautious: LTC benefits and LTC utilization rates do not merely
reflect the population functional status, they also heavily depend on family structures, local
norms regarding the provision of care and the institutional features of LTC policies.
Figure 2 – Formal LTC utilization rates in the 65+ population, across OECD countries.
SOURCES: OECD (2017a); graph taken from Muir (2017).
NOTES: Data from 2014 or from nearest year. Countries with a star only report LTC recipients
in institutional settings.
1.3 The coverage of long-term care costs across OECD countries
Quantifying the financial risk associated with old-age disability
Prevalence rates and life expectancies are aggregate indicators conveying only a partial
picture of the economic implications of disability at the individual level. What is the proba-
bility for a given individual to eventually face disability? What costs can she expect to incur?
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In the United States, Kemper et al. (2005) estimate that 62% of the 65-years old will not
face LTC costs before they die whereas 16% will be exposed to LTC costs in excess of USD
100,000 over their remaining lifetime. In the United Kingdom, these figures are estimated to
be of 1/4 and 1/10 respectively (Dilnot, 2011). Hurd et al. (2013) report that a 50-years old
American has more than 50% chances to enter a nursing home one day, and estimate that
the average duration of a stay in a nursing home is 1 year, conditional on entry.
The unit cost of formal LTC services relative to GDP varies widely from one country to
the other, even within the Old Europe (Colombo et al., 2011; Muir, 2017). It depends on geo-
graphical factors and the LTC market structure, but it is also influenced by public regulations
regarding the status of providers, staffing requirements and other quality standards. Yet for
severe disability, in all OECD countries the financial costs of formal LTC, whether received
in institution or at home, exceed the median disposable income of individuals aged 65 and
older (Muir, 2017).
Disability is thus a risk that entails substantial and variable financial consequences. This
risk may be covered in four different ways: (i) the individual has assets that she can spend
down; or (ii) she has relatives willing, and able, to provide informal care; (iii) she holds a
private LTC insurance policy; or (iv) the government steps in. How is the coverage of LTC
costs ensured across OECD countries? How does this translate into aggregate LTC costs and
public spending on LTC policies? In what follows, I focus on the case of disability taking
place after retirement and, consistently, the schemes made available to the elderly.
The public coverage of long-term care costs
In Europe, the medical components of LTC (medical treatment of dementia and chronic
diseases, and in some cases nursing care) are often integrated in health care insurance sys-
tems; as such, the out-of-pocket costs on these services tend to be limited. To help disabled
individuals meeting other LTC costs, all OECD countries have implemented some social pro-
tection schemes. LTC policies may consist in the public provision of LTC, subsidies on care,
cash benefits or support to informal caregivers. The organization and financing of LTC poli-
cies are often decentralized at the regional or municipal level. In some countries, access to
public support depends on age and the schemes made available to the elderly differ from
those offered to the working-age population (e.g. England, France). More generally, there
are cross-country variations in the way LTC systems are financed and organized, and in the
types and generosity of the benefits they offer.
Over the past, one salient difference between LTC systems was the emphasis on institu-
tional care, with Scandinavian countries having much higher institutionalization rates of the
disabled elderly than Mediterranean Europe. This is less marked today: all countries have
defined “aging in place” as a priority policy orientation. Although cost savings may be elusive
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(Konetzka, 2014), home care seems more in line with the ex ante preferences of individuals
regarding LTC provision, as documented by opinion polls. 63% of the French adults refuse to
contemplate living in a nursing home in the future and 80% would prefer their close relatives
to stay home in the event of disability (Grobon, 2014).
Initiatives from the OECD and from the international research project ANCIEN (Assessing
Needs for Care in European Nations; see Kraus et al. (2010)) have provided detailed descrip-
tions of LTC systems covering the elderly population in OECD and EU countries. They also
propose several typologies. Muir (2017) distinguishes between: (i) universal, tax-funded LTC
systems offering a comprehensive coverage (found in the Nordic countries), (ii) separate LTC
insurance schemes offering comprehensive (e.g. the Netherlands and Japan) or more partial
coverage (Germany and Korea), (iii) systems relying extensively on cash benefits as opposed
to in-kind care provision (e.g. Austria, Italy), and (iv) heavily means-tested LTC systems en-
suring a safety net (the United States and the United Kingdom).
As a result of these differences, public expenditures as a share of GDP differ substantially
from one country to the other. The Scandinavian countries devote more than 2.3% of their
GDP to public coverage of LTC costs, while this figure is at most twice lower for some coun-
tries with similar economic conditions (e.g. Canada, Germany, Italy or the US) (Figure 3).
Differences in demographic contexts and epidemiological conditions cannot explain such
large differences.
Figure 3 – Public spending on LTC as a share of GDP.
SOURCES: OECD (2017a); graph taken from Muir (2017).
NOTES: Data from 2014 or from nearest year.
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Public expenditures per se say nothing about the degree of coverage of total LTC costs.
Aggregate figures on private spending on formal LTC may be not sufficiently robust for accu-
rate cross-country comparisons (Colombo et al., 2011). To overcome informational gaps, the
OECD has adopted a bottom-up approach implemented in 14 OECD countries (Muir, 2017).
The authors define 3 levels of disability and 3 levels of incomes. For each disability level, the
OECD estimates associated LTC costs in each country. It then uses the eligibility rules and
conditions relating to public LTC schemes to compute, for each disability-income profile: (i)
the share of LTC costs that is publicly financed, and (ii) the individual’s out-of-pocket cost
on LTC and how it compares with income.
The outcomes are contrasted, depending on the country, but several patterns are ob-
served. First, most countries apply some means-testing by income in access to public LTC
financing, resulting in individuals with relatively low income and moderate or severe needs
not being able to afford professional home care. Second, countries generally meet the costs
of institutional care for individuals with severe needs and limited financial resources. To
benefit from this safety net, individuals may be required to contribute all of their income,
left aside a pocket money allowance that is set at a low level in France and in the United
States. Third, the average public coverage of institutional care tends to be lower than the
coverage of home care for individuals with median to high income, as many countries re-
quire specific user contributions on board and lodging costs. On the one hand, the limits set
on the public support to home care costs, which are explicit and binding in several coun-
tries (e.g. Canada and France) aim at orienting individuals with severe disability towards
institutional care, which become less expensive than home care for demented or bedridden
patients. On the other hand, higher cost-sharing on institutional care aims at increasing the
financial participation of well-off individuals when they use those costly services.
In short, current social protection schemes imply that, in many countries: (i) patients
with moderate needs, who do not qualify for comprehensive coverage in an institutional
setting, often incur high out-of-pocket cost on home care or have to rely extensively on their
relatives; and (ii) individuals in the top half of the income distribution are not provided
public coverage against the risk of asset depletion linked to LTC financing. We can anticipate
these features of LTC policies to weigh on socio-economic inequalities in the use of LTC and
on the social welfare gains achieved by public intervention.
Informal care: a free but costly form of long-term care
For a significant part, LTC is provided informally, by the family. Among the disabled el-
derly, men are typically provided care by their spouse, whereas women, who are more often
widowed (Trabut and Gaymu, 2016) are more frequently helped by their children. Daughters
and daughters-in-law are on the front line for the provision of personal care and domestic
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help. Sons are more often involved in assistance with administrative tasks and the coordi-
nation of care (Pennec, 2009). Informal caregivers may also provide financial assistance and
psychological support, in particular when their relative is institutionalized. Survey data indi-
cated that 4/5 of the community-dwelling disabled elderly in France receive some informal
care and 1/2 receive some formal care; 1/3 combine both types of care (Soullier and Weber,
2011). Informal care seemingly amounts to 3/4 of total home care hours.
Assessments of the economic costs of informal care were conducted in several countries.
The economic literature has proposed several methods to assign informal care, which is gen-
erally provided for free, with a unit cost (Davin et al., 2015). The time that caregivers devote
to care activities may be valued using the unit labor cost of formal care; this gives the cost
of replacing informal care with formal care (substitution costs method). A second option is
to refer to the opportunity cost of informal care for the caregiver, by using her own actual
or potential wage (opportunity costs method). In the case of France, except for nurses, most
professional LTC workers are paid at the minimum wage; the substitution costs method gives
a lower aggregate value of informal care than the opportunity costs method. A third option
is to use contingency evaluation methods and the willingness-to-pay for care provision of
informal caregivers. This technique may be undermined if informal caregivers are unable or
refuse to attach a monetary value to the care they provide (Paraponaris and Davin, 2015).
Using the substitution cost method, the French High Family Council estimates the value
of informal care provided to the disabled elderly to reach 11 billion euros, an amount equiv-
alent to the cost of formal LTC set aside nursing care and the cost of board and lodging in in-
stitution (HCF, 2011). According to some estimates (cited in Brown and Finkelstein (2011)),
the economic costs of informal care would exceed the financial cost of formal LTC in the
United States.
Despite informal care being a major component of the LTC received across all OECD
countries, there is international variation regarding the degree of involvement of relatives
and the public support they receive (Kraus et al., 2010). As the potential adverse health
consequences of informal caregiving are being better acknowledged and that individuals
in their late 50s and early 60s are increasingly encouraged to remain in the labor force,
alleviating the “burden” of informal care has become a policy orientation in most OECD
countries (Muir, 2017).
The private long-term care insurance market: still a minor role
Theoretically, the pooling of the old-age disability risk could be done by private markets.
The development of the LTC insurance market yet suffers from severe ex ante information
asymmetry on the disability risk. Adverse selection, whereby those with a higher willing-
ness to pay for an insurance policy are those with higher expected costs, is circumvented by
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the medical selection operated by insurers (Hendren, 2013). Medical selection implies that a
high share (up to 25% of the 65+ in the US) are not able to buy a LTC insurance. Adverse selec-
tion also exerts an upward pressure on prices; so do the very substantial loading factors in the
sector (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007). Those are partly explained by the long-term horizon
of the insured risk, the uncertainty regarding future epidemiological conditions, LTC costs
and LTC policies, and imperfect competition in the sector (Braun et al., 2017). Uncertainty
makes it necessary for insurers to keep high liabilities in their books. High market prices im-
ply that LTC insurance policies are bought either by individuals with no close relatives likely
to provide informal care, or by relatively wealthy individuals (Brown and Finkelstein, 2011).
The contracts currently offered leave a substantial residual risk on the clients, as they offer
monetary annuities (in France) or capped reimbursements (in the US) instead of a coverage
up to the marginal cost of LTC services. On the demand side, denial of the risk of severe dis-
ability and bias towards the present further reduce the willingness-to-pay for such contracts
(Fontaine et al., 2014).
As a consequence, the development of LTC insurance products is extremely limited,
except in a few countries where a mandate for private LTC insurance was introduced
(HCFEA, 2017). Setting aside these countries, France and the US are the two countries where
the take-up of private insurance is the highest. In France, about 12% of the adult population
hold a LTC insurance policy but less than 4% are provided a lifelong coverage (as opposed to
a one-year guarantee; Zerrar (2016)). In the United States, the insurance ownership rate was
of 14% in the 60+ population in 2008 (Brown and Finkelstein, 2011).
The overall picture that emerges from this snapshot is that the coverage of LTC costs is
today a major individual concern and policy challenge. We now provide an overlook of the
future demographic and epidemiological trends to show that challenges are growing more
pressing.
1.4 Looking at the past, looking at the future: trends in disability and
long-term care spending
An aging population
Over the past 50 years, the more developed countries9 have witnessed a rapid population
aging. In 2016, in the European Union (EU 28), the persons aged 65 and older represented
19% of the total population (European Commission, 2018). The increase in the relative num-
ber of the 65+ is partly due to the decrease in fertility rates: the EU 28 average crude birth rate
9The United Nations defines the more developed regions as Australia/New-Zealand, Europe, Northern
America and Japan.
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has fallen from 18 to 10 per 1,000 between 1996 and 2016. The population aging observed
across the more developed regions is however primarily due to the large decrease in mor-
tality in adult life, which took place over the last 50 years thanks to improvements in living
conditions and in the survival rates associated with cardio-vascular diseases and cancers.
Life expectancy at birth has increased by 10 years in Europe between 1960 and 2015 and
now reaches 82.6 years for females and 76.8 years for males (European Commission et al.,
2017). Yet aging is not equally pronounced even within Europe, with Southern, Western and
Baltic Europe totaling today a higher share of their population aged 75 and older in 2015 than
Northern and Central Europe (Gaymu, 2017).
What should we expect for the coming decades? Figure 4 compares the age composition
of the the European population today and what it is projected to be by 2080.
Figure 4 – Age pyramid in the European Union: 2016 versus 2080.
SOURCES: European Commission (2018); the graph is taken from Eurostat website.
NOTES: Each blue (yellow) horizontal bar gives the number of males (females) of a given age in the European
Union (EU–28), in 2016 (estimations) or in 2080 (projections).
The European Commission projects the share of the 65+ to reach 29% by 2070, and the
share of the very old (80 and older) to go up from 6% today to 13% (European Commission
et al., 2017). In the EU–28, there are 11 adults aged 15-64 for every person aged 80 or older
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today, but there will be less than 4 in 2070. While fertility rates are expected to slightly in-
crease, the continuing rise in life expectancy should maintain a structural “aging by the top”
(Blanchet and Le Gallo, 2013). Population aging will be pronounced until 2040 due to large
baby boom cohorts reaching age 65 (Blanpain and Buisson, 2016b). The pace of aging will
then slow down and the share of the 60+ in the more developed regions of the world should
stagnate around 1/3 between 2050 and 2070. The rest of the world is also entering a phase
of sustained population aging, as the share of the 60+ will be multiplied by 2.5 between 2015
and 2050 in the less developed countries (Piggott and Woodland, 2016). The gender com-
position of the elderly population is also expected to change: males’ mortality rates should
decrease more than female mortality with the progress of cardiovascular disease treatments.
While there were about 75 men for 100 women aged 60 and older in 2015 in the more devel-
oped regions, this number should exceed 85 by 2070.
How reliable are these projections? In the more developed countries, the baby boom
phenomenon implies that there is little doubt about population aging being sustained in the
two decades to come. Projections at a more distant future, and in particular those regard-
ing the number of the very old, are more sensitive to the assumptions made on future life
expectancy gains (Blanpain and Buisson, 2016b). Looking backward at its past predictions,
the UN acknowledges that the projected population of the 80+ has been repeatedly under-
estimated. Future mortality reduction may again be underestimated, meaning that there
remains substantial uncertainty regarding the magnitude of population aging (Piggott and
Woodland, 2016).
Uncertainty regarding future epidemiological conditions
A the aggregate level, population aging induces an increase in the number of the dis-
abled elderly absent any epidemiological evolution. Yet the increase will be further magni-
fied (counteracted) if mortality reduction translates into a rising (falling) prevalence of dis-
ability at a given age. As a consequence, the demographic trends alone are not sufficient to
build projections of the disabled elderly population: we need some insights into the extent
to which additional life years will be spent without disability.
The epidemiological literature has proposed 3 scenarios regarding how the reduction in
mortality rates at old age should relate to morbidity. In the “expansion of morbidity” sce-
nario (Gruenberg, 1977), reduced mortality induced by successful medical research would
lead to survive more years with chronic disabling conditions. In the “compression of mor-
bidity” scenario (Fries, 1980), changes in life styles would postpone the onset of diseases at
older ages. The number of years without any disability is expected to increase. Finally, the
“dynamic equilibrium” scenario (Manton, 1982) offers an intermediate perspective. If medi-
cal treatments allow to slow down the progression of disabling diseases, then the increase in
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life expectancy may come with both a reduction in the time spent with severe disability and
an increase in the time spent with chronic conditions and moderate disability.
Which of this scenario most closely describes the past decades? Original studies and
reviews of international studies have suggested a decrease in the prevalence of IADL restric-
tions and cognitive impairments in the late 1980s and 1990s in the elderly population (Cut-
ler, 2001; Freedman et al., 2002). Evidence regarding ADL disability is conflicting (Freedman
et al., 2002), potentially reflecting measurement issues. All in all, most OECD countries wit-
nessed a dynamic equilibrium in the 1990s after experiencing a compression of disability in
the 1980s (Cambois et al., 2013).10
More recent trends have been less clear: over the years 2000-2005, in Europe and North
America, some countries experienced a decrease in the prevalence of ADL restrictions while
others saw this prevalence increase (Lafortune and Balestat, 2007). In the United States,
Crimmins et al. (2016) document an increase in the share of life expectancy at age 65 spent
with no disability between 2000 and 2010. There was however no such relative compression
of morbidity for the working-age population. Cambois et al. (2013) also find evidence of an
expansion of disability for those aged 50–65 in France in the 2000s.
How can we expect these figures to evolve in the future? What does this imply for the
number of the disabled elderly? Projections have to rely on assumptions regarding the evo-
lution of morbidity, of which discovery of new medical treatments of disabling conditions
(e.g. against neurodegenerative diseases) or further changes in life style are major but hard-
to-predict determinants. Statistical institutes and the European Commission typically con-
struct different scenarios reflecting the standard three epidemiological assumptions (Euro-
pean Commission et al., 2017). Given the evolution observed in the past decades, the sce-
nario of an absolute compression of morbidity, whereby the number of years spent with
disability would decrease over time, is generally deemed too optimistic. For example, the
French Ministry of Health implements 3 alternative scenarios; for all of them, it is assumed
that the time spent with the most severe ADL restrictions and cognitive impairments will re-
main constant (Lecroart et al., 2013). The scenarios differ with respect to how the time spent
with moderate disability will increase, or remain constant. Depending on the scenario, the
number of the disabled elderly is predicted to increase by 60%, 105% and 135% respectively
between 2010 and 2060. They would represent between 2.5% and 3.6% of the French popu-
lation by 2060. This relatively wide range does not even reflect the uncertainty regarding the
evolution of life expectancy itself.
10The reviews by Christensen et al. (2009) and Crimmins and Beltrán-Sánchez (2011) conclude to increased
prevalence of chronic diseases such as heart condition, cancer, arthritis and diabetes as well as of obesity in
most OECD countries and in the United States. It however came along with a decrease in the onset of disability
and an increase in the proportion of disability-free life years. Finally, Crimmins et al. (2009) document a stability
in the number of years spent with ADL and IADL restrictions.
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Trends in long-term care expenditures
Predicting the number of the individuals who may use LTC services is only the first step
in forecasting future LTC spending. Further assumptions need to be made.
First, the future costs of formal LTC use will depend on the extent to which the disabled
elderly will receive informal care (OECD, 2011b). The likelihood to be provided informal
care in old age may change with the evolution of family structures. On one hand, low fertility
and the higher participation rate of women are expected to lower the number of potential
caregivers among children. On the other hand, the rising life expectancy of men means that
women will be more likely to have their spouse still alive when experiencing restrictions in
the activities of daily living, even though more frequent couple break-ups partially offset this
trend (Gaymu, 2017). The OECD uses the current country-specific shares of the population
who provide informal care by age and gender to predict the number of informal caregivers
by 2050 in some European countries and in the US. It concludes that the number of informal
caregivers would rather need to be 20% to 40% higher to keep the ratio of family carers to
the number of disabled individuals to its current level. It is yet far from granted that the
behaviors in terms of informal caregiving will remain constant (Fontaine and Arnault, 2016).
Second, future aggregate LTC spending will depend on the unit cost of care. Contrary to
the health care sector, the LTC sector is extremely labor-intensive. The development of new
technologies (e.g. robotics) may however allow productivity gains in the future, lowering the
cost of LTC relative to the average wage. On the other hand, higher quality requirements
may increase the demand for skilled workers, exerting an upward pressure of wages in the
sector. In addition, as the population of the oldest old rises, the average institutionalization
rate may grow and increase the average unit cost of LTC.
Third, the evolution of LTC use and costs will critically depends on policy decisions. Pub-
lic spending in particular, will depend on changes in the mix between public and private
financing (OECD, 2011b). Actually, in some countries, public spending as a share of total
spending on LTC is expected to decline if current policies are left unchanged. This follows
from indexation rules of LTC benefits. In France, public LTC benefits are indexed on prices.
If real GDP grows in the future decades and that the unit LTC cost follows the same pace,
this implies that, absent a policy change, public coverage of LTC costs will decrease. This is
illustrated through a simplified example in Table 1, by the comparison of Columns (1) and
(2). Furthermore, Column (3) shows that even if LTC benefits were indexed on the unit cost
of LTC, the disabled elderly’s out-of-pocket spending on LTC as a share of their income is
expected to increase, as pension benefits are indexed on prices. Given the relatively limited
coverage that public benefits currently offer in France, it is dubious that current policies can
be politically sustained if they imply substantial increases in effort rates on LTC spending.
For these reasons, the French Ministry of Health assumes in its central scenario that the
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Table 1 – The impact of indexations of pensions and LTC benefits on future coverage and
effort rates: A simple illustration.
Reference
year
Alternative scenarios for the future
t0 t0 + t t0 + t t0 + t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assumptions
Nominal GDP (wages) index 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5
Nominal prices index 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2
Nominal unit LTC cost index 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5
Indexation of pension benefits on: – Prices Prices Wages
Indexation of LTC benefits on: – Prices Wages Wages
Pension benefits [a] 100 120 120 150
LTC costs [b] 50 75 75 75
LTC benefits [c] 30 36 45 45
Out-of-pocket LTC costs [d] 20 29 30 30
Public coverage of LTC costs [c]/[b] 0.60 0.48 0.60 0.60
Effort rate on LTC [d]/[a] 0.20 0.33 0.25 0.20
NOTES: Pension benefits, LTC costs and LTC benefits are expressed in nominal units. It is assumed that
between time t0 and time t0 + t nominal GDP would increase by 50% and prices by 20%. LTC unit cost is
assumed to increase like GDP and wages.
value of LTC benefits will rise at a pace in-between prices and nominal wages (Darcillon,
2016; Renoux et al., 2014; Roussel, 2017). Using a micro-simulation approach, it projects
public LTC spending to increase from 1.1% of GDP in 2014 to 2.1% in 2060. Under alter-
native assumptions on the number of the disabled elderly and indexation rules, this figure
varies between 1.85% and 2.25%. Unlike pension expenditures, projected public spending
little depends on the macroeconomic scenario – but private effort rates do. Absent a policy
change, the out-of-pocket spending of the French elderly would increase by 0.64 to 0.79 pp.
of GDP, amounting to a rise comprised between 11% and 38% of the out-of-pocket cost to
GDP per disabled elderly (Roussel, 2017).
At the international level, the OECD’s and the European Commission’s projections rely
on macro-simulation models (Economic Policy Committee, 2015; OECD, 2011a). The 2015
Aging Working Group (AWG) scenario projects public LTC expenditures to reach 4.3% of GDP
by 2060 in the EU, following an increase by 2.9 percentage points. Projected increases differ
widely across countries: in Norway and in the Netherlands, it is assumed to exceed 3pp of
GDP, translating into public expenditures on LTC of more than 7% of GDP in 2060 while
this figure would not exceed 2pp. in the countries who are currently low spenders. These
projections integrate recent reforms that were made either to curb LTC spending (e.g. in the
Netherlands) or to improve coverage (e.g. in Spain).
Three key messages should be taken away. First, OECD countries expect a substantial
increase in their disabled elderly population and of the aggregate costs associated with LTC
use. Second, the baby-boom will greatly emphasize these trends between 2030 and 2045.
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Third, the uncertainty regarding future demographic and epidemiological conditions makes
it necessary to design social protections schemes that are resilient to unfavorable scenarios.
Whatever the scenario that comes true, governments will have to make budgetary trade-offs
and find adequate fiscal resources if they are willing to accept the large projected increases
in public spending on LTC. If the status-quo regarding the public coverage of the old-age
disability risk is deemed unsatisfactory, fundamental policy decisions will have to be made.
This is where economic analysis can prove especially useful by highlighting the implications
of the different options.
2 What this thesis is about
2.1 The general issues under investigation
My PhD research tackles two broad economic and policy questions: how efficient are
public LTC policies? And how equitable are they? It intends to sheds light on how existing
public LTC schemes affect the use of LTC and the coverage of their costs for the disabled
adults. My research addresses empirical questions, which connect with theoretical issues. It
involves both positive analysis — describe and understand the world – and normative state-
ments — state how the world should be. I mostly focus on the situations of individuals who
have already retired. Consistently with the design of some of the LTC schemes I study, I de-
fine the elderly as the individuals aged 60 or older.
In this section, I review the existing economic literature relating to efficiency and equity
in LTC systems. I then provide an overview of LTC policies in France and in the Netherlands
and justify why these countries provide interesting institutional contexts for empirical inves-
tigations into equity and efficiency in LTC use and financing.
2.2 Efficiency and equity of long-term care policies: what does the eco-
nomic literature tell us?
The interest of economists in LTC is relatively recent. Early works date back to the late
1980s and mostly originated in the United States. They were fostered by the collection of
longitudinal survey or experimental data. As policy concerns about LTC costs gained promi-
nence and new survey data were collected, many more empirical investigations have been
produced since the beginning of this century, especially in Europe. Today, the applied liter-
ature on LTC is sizable and combines the insights from different fields of economics: eco-
nomic demography, family economics, labor economics, health economics and insurance
theory (Norton, 2000). Many studies shed light on aspects of efficiency and inequalities in
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LTC systems. Yet the empirical literature suffers from several blind spots on these questions
and a limited number of studies investigate into the equity of LTC schemes.
Efficiency of long-term care policies: from health insurance theory to the public eco-
nomics of long-term care
Regarding efficiency aspects, economic theory predicts that there is a welfare gain asso-
ciated with reducing the risk borne by risk-averse agents. LTC policies operate a pooling of
the risk of (old-age) disability at the population level, thereby they reduce individual uncer-
tainty regarding the economic costs of disability and increase ex ante allocative efficiency in
the economy.
Ex post allocative efficiency requires LTC services to be consumed at a level such that
their marginal cost equals individuals’ willingness-to-pay for them. Studying ex post effi-
ciency of LTC schemes may be done drawing inspiration from the health insurance theory.
As of today, there exists a prolific economic literature with both theoretical and empirical
contributions on the welfare effects of health care insurance. Prior to the path-breaking
analysis of Nyman (1999), the price effect in health care use associated with health care re-
imbursement policies was entirely considered as an inefficient distortion in the allocation of
resources (Pauly, 1968). The critical role given to ex post moral hazard, whereby an individ-
ual spends more on health care when she bears only part of its full cost, motivated numerous
estimations of the price elasticity of the demand for health care (e.g. the RAND experiment,
Aron-Dine et al. (2013)).
Under a health insurance that provides a reduction on the price of health care, the in-
crease in the consumption of care for the insured should actually be decomposed into two
components: (i) an ex post income effect, which arises because the insurance price payoff
induces a transfer of income from those who remain healthy to the ill who consume medi-
cal care, and (ii) a substitution effect that stems from the fact that the relative price of health
care is made lower by the health insurance (Nyman, 2006). Nyman (1999) has defended the
idea that the inefficiency loss due to ex post moral hazard corresponds to the substitution
effect alone. Any change in the use of care that is attributable to the income effect alone is
instead a welfare gain: it reflects the fact that the willingness-to-pay for medical care is made
higher by the ex post transfer of resources enabled by the insurance. In the case medical care
does not substitute for other consumption goods at the margin, the insurance price payoff
allows the individual to reach a higher ex post utility whereas the price distortion itself has
no effect on the individual consumption of health care. But as soon as individual preferences
exhibit some substitutability between medical care and other consumption goods, a health
insurance that takes the form of a price payoff comes with some (gross) efficiency costs.
Transposing this framework to LTC insurance implies that (i) the existence of ex post wel-
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fare gains associated with the insurance-induced income transfer depends on the income
elasticity of the demand for LTC services, and (ii) the existence of ex post welfare loss associ-
ated with the insurance-induced change in the relative price of LTC depends on the degree
of substitutability between LTC services and other consumption goods in individual prefer-
ences. Assessing substitution effects, or the price elasticity of the hicksian demand for LTC,
and income effects in the demand for LTC of the disabled elderly is critical to the under-
standing of the welfare effects of LTC subsidy programs. The common a priori view regarding
substitutability of LTC services is expressed by Norton (2000):
“Public home care has an obvious moral hazard problem. Who would not want some paid
help at no out-of-pocket cost with household chores?" (p. 960).
Consistently, moral hazard is expected to be smaller for medical LTC services than for
domestic help and assistance with other IADLs.
The economic literature has provided evidence that the demand for LTC is price-elastic.
Some studies have detected a statistically significant effect of home care subsidies, in
North America (e.g. Ettner (1994); Stabile et al. (2006)) and in France (Fontaine, 2012; Rapp
et al., 2011). Evidence on the price elasticity of institutional care use is more mixed: in the
United States, state or time variations in Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement rules were
found to affect nursing home stays by Hoerger et al. (1996); Garber and MaCurdy (1990)
and Reschovsky (1998). On the contrary, Grabowski and Gruber (2007) and Reschovsky
(1996) conclude to an inelastic demand for institutional care. In any case, the reduced-form
approach adopted in existing papers does not allow to distinguish between substitution and
income effects.
Regarding income effects, several papers have provided evidence of a socio-economic
gradient in the use of LTC services. On a sample of European elderly from the SHARE sur-
vey, Bonsang (2009) find that the 50% income-richest individuals use more domestic help,
at both the extensive and intensive margins. But this does not hold in all countries. Bakx,
de Meijer, Schut and van Doorslaer (2015) find a positive income gradient in the home care
utilization rate in Germany but not in the Netherlands. Other comparative analysis provide
contrasted results depending on the country under study (see Ilinca et al. (2017) for a re-
cent review). Deriving income effects from the differential use of care by income levels is
made difficult by the fact that, in many countries, public subsidies on LTC are higher for
low-income individuals.
The potential substitution between formal care and informal care is a major reason why
the analogy between health care insurance and LTC insurance does not fully hold. The
welfare gains associated with LTC insurance also depend on how informal care provision
changes when formal care use is subsidized and, underneath this relationship, the moti-
vations behind informal caregiving (Pestieau and Ponthière, 2016). They also depend on
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whether parents value informal care more than formal care (Pauly, 1990); and what the full
economic costs of informal care are.
An extensive literature has assessed the effects of informal care provision on the use of
formal home care and institutional care (see e.g. Juin (2016) for a review). Theoretical and
empirical contributions suggest that the cross-price elasticities between informal care and
formal care are non-zero but differ depending on the skill content of the task. The use of
informal care or of formal home care is also found to reduce the use of hospital care and
some inpatient care (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004; Rapp et al., 2015). An optimal LTC sys-
tem should limit the inefficiency associated with such “offsetting effects” between LTC and
health care, in the same way as the design of an efficient health care system has to antici-
pate and minimize the offsets between different types of medical care (Chandra et al., 2007;
Gaynor et al., 2007).
Regarding the costs and benefits of informal care, three strands of literature have
emerged. First, some studies have documented the opportunity costs of informal care
channeling through its impact on the labor market participation of caregivers (see Lilly
et al. (2007) for a review). A second strand has assessed the effects of informal care on the
cognitive and mental health of the disabled elderly (e.g. Barnay and Juin (2016)). Finally,
several papers have provided an empirical assessment of the “burden of care”, by detecting
negative effects of caregiving on one’s physical and mental health (e.g. Do et al. (2015);
Van den Berg et al. (2014)). We can take away two implications from these results. First,
efficient subsidies on formal LTC should be relatively higher (lower) when formal care
complements (substitutes) for informal care. Second, if there happens to be external costs
of informal care on both the disabled elderly and the caregivers, then an efficient LTC policy
may rather aim at decreasing some forms of informal care use, in particular intensive ones.
Additional features of disability and LTC limit the analogy with health and health care.
The fact that the prevalence of disability increases steeply with age embeds the financing of
LTC and the provision of informal care in inter-generational transfers and bequest consid-
erations (Masson, 2009). The current inability of the private insurance market to deal with
information asymmetry and uncertainty regarding future epidemiological conditions seem
to make the case for social insurance especially strong (Barr, 2010).
Recent contributions from the theoretical literature shed light on levers for achieving ef-
ficiency in the design of LTC systems (Klimaviciute and Pestieau, 2018). To keep the models
tractable, each paper builds in only some of the most salient features of LTC provision. Cre-
mer et al. (2016) focus on the design of LTC insurance in the presence of ex post moral hazard
and information asymmetry on informal care supply. The presence of informal caregivers in-
duces the optimal reimbursement rate to be lower for LTC than for health care, at least at the
margin. Klimaviciute (2017) focuses on intra-family moral hazard (Pauly, 1990), whereby an
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individual is less prone to insuring against the disability risk if she anticipates that holding
an insurance will decrease the incentives of her relatives to assist her. Lump-sum benefits,
as opposed to proportional reimbursement of LTC costs, are a way to mitigate intra-family
moral hazard, although they inefficiently leave some risk uninsured. In the real world yet,
lump-sum benefits may turn inefficient if they can be captured by family members; they
also tend to have a lesser political acceptability. Assuming no moral hazard but high load-
ing costs, Drèze et al. (2016) find that the optimal LTC insurance policy would provide full
insurance above a deductible.11
From a policy point of view, the theoretical literature has thus not come to a consensual
conclusion as to how efficient LTC benefits should be designed. Ultimately, assessing the
relative welfare gains and costs of each option requires empirical investigation.
Equity in long-term care: an empirical literature in its infancy
The theoretical literature just reviewed usually draws on the public economics approach
to an optimal policy and integrates a trade-off between efficiency and redistribution objec-
tives (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 2015): depending on the definition of social welfare that is as-
sumed, incurring some efficiency loss may be warranted if it allows to reach a more equitable
situation.
Concerns about the disabled elderly not receiving appropriate care or sufficient financial
public support are pervasive in the public debate. Investigating into equity in the field of LTC
amounts to asking whether the allocation of LTC services in the population and the financial
contributions made to the schemes are deemed to be fair. Answering this question presup-
poses to: (i) document inequalities in the allocation and financing of care, and (ii) state value
judgments about what is to be regarded as a fair situation.
Very few empirical studies on equity in LTC have been conducted so far. The feeling that:
“The “academic-papers-written-to-public-expenditures” ratio is far lower for long term
care than for the health sector as a whole.”
expressed by Brown and Finkelstein (2011) seems especially true when it comes to
normative questions.
Empirical assessments of equity in LTC
The empirical economic literature interested in equity in LTC has so far addressed two
main questions: that of territorial inequity and that of socio-economic horizontal equity in
the use of LTC. The first strand provides evidence of systematic differences in LTC use across
11See Klimaviciute and Pestieau (2018) for a detailed review of this literature.
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the territory in different countries, once differences in morbidity and socio-economic con-
ditions are controlled for (e.g. Arrighi et al. (2015); Miller (2002); Pulkki et al. (2016)). In the
Netherlands, Duell et al. (2017) have documented the existence of inter-regional disparities
in eligibility for publicly-subsidized LTC, which yet show little correlation with indicators of
local care supply. The concern that individuals in different places have different access to
formal LTC partly stems from the fact that the implementation of LTC policies is decentral-
ized in many countries.
A few papers have tested the existence of socio-economic horizontal inequity in LTC use,
defined as individuals with the same “needs for care” but different socio-economic status
receiving different amounts of LTC services. They rely on concentration and horizontal
inequity indexes: those have been widely used in the empirical health economics literature
to provide a synthetic measure of income-related inequalities and horizontal inequity in the
use of care services respectively (Kakwani et al., 1997; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000a).
With this approach, individuals are ranked by a continuous measure of socio-economic
status (e.g. income or wealth). Individual characteristics are partitioned between “need
variables”, i.e. the factors that lead to legitimate differences in LTC use (e.g. health and
functional status) and “non-need factors”, i.e. factors inducing differences in LTC use that
are deemed unfair (e.g. socio-economic status or ethnicity). A negative (positive) horizontal
inequity index indicates that the poor (the rich) tend to consume more LTC services than the
rich (the poor) when we control for systematic differences in care needs across the income
or wealth distribution. Following this approach, García-Gómez et al. (2015) find professional
home care use to be disproportionately concentrated among the rich elderly in Spain. Ilinca
et al. (2017), Rodrigues et al. (2017) and Carrieri et al. (2017) exploit the SHARE survey to
estimate horizontal inequity indexes in European countries. Carrieri et al. (2017) conclude
that there is at most limited income-related horizontal inequity in the use of personal or
nursing care at the extensive margin, in Southern Europe as in Nordic countries, unlike in
Continental Europe.
How do empirical studies connect with the theories of social justice?
Given the normative nature of empirical equity assessments, it is important to unveil the
theories of social justice they connect with.
The theoretical approach to the public economics of LTC discussed earlier generally
models the efficiency-equity trade-off by assuming a utilitarian social welfare function
(e.g. Pestieau and Ponthière (2016)). With utilitarianism, a fair allocation of resources
across individuals maximizes the sum of individual utilities; the financing of a LTC pol-
icy by income-dependent contributions can be fair if the marginal utility of income is
decreasing. Instead, the “equal care for equal needs” principle tested by the empirical
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literature (Carrieri et al., 2017; García-Gómez et al., 2015; Rodrigues et al., 2017) reflects
an egalitarian distributional objective. It is however not clear why the allocation of LTC
services, separately from other goods and services, is a legitimate concern; nor how the
focus on socio-economic-related or territorial horizontal inequity can be reconciled with
other dimensions of inequity.
In the field of health economics, there has been much debate about the normative impli-
cations of different measures of inequity (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011; Wagstaff and van
Doorslaer, 2000a). One item for discussion is whether we should be ultimately interested
in the allocation of health care or in the allocation of health. One line of argument states
that allocation of health care should matter only inasmuch as health care is instrumental
to health. The parallel with LTC is not straightforward, as restoring of individual functional
status is generally not possible. From an ex post perspective, the objective of a LTC policy
cannot be to ensure a fair allocation of functionings. It thus makes more sense to look at the
allocation of LTC services.
In a large number of studies (reviewed in van Doorslaer and van Ourti (2011)), equity
in the allocation of health care has been assessed on the basis of the “equal treatment for
equal needs” (ETEN) principle. This principle has been promoted by the Marxists and the
20th egalitarian school of thought (Rochaix and Tubeuf, 2009). It is often paired with another
principle that has generated an extensive empirical literature: the principle that the financ-
ing of health care should reflect individual ability to pay. These two principles have been
shown to command a large support among physicians and policy makers in Europe (Culyer
et al., 1992); there are the explicit cornerstones of the French Health Insurance (Jusot et al.,
2017). Investigations of horizontal inequity in use based on the ETEN principle have often
used the concentration and horizontal inequity indexes. Systematic differences in need vari-
ables are netted out with an indirect standardization method (O’Donnell et al., 2008), which
provides a measure of the difference between the actual use of LTC and the use we would
observe if it would only depend on need variables. Isolating horizontal inequity in use yet
requires an assumption on the norm of vertical equity in the use of care, i.e. how health care
should optimally be apportioned to needs. The literature has commonly relied on the as-
sumption that “on average, the system gets it right”: the empirical average quantity of health
care received by individuals with same needs is used to infer how different health care use
should be across different levels of needs. Rather than ruling out average vertical equity in
use of health care, Sutton (2002) has proposed a way of testing for it, but his attempt has not
given rise to a new strand of studies.
Regarding equity in financing, most studies have focused on vertical equity in financing,
i.e. whether individuals with different abilities to pay make appropriately different payments
to health care. The most common normative standpoint tested in the literature is that an eq-
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uitable health care system should have a progressive financing, i.e. that payments for health
care should represent a larger share of income for individuals with higher income (Wagstaff
and van Doorslaer, 2000a).
Two criticisms have been made to this literature. First, in a system that does not com-
pletely sever the link between care use and payments, as it is generally the case for LTC,
lower payments to the scheme arise if individuals forgo treatment. A focus on vertical equity
in financing alone, with no information on the distribution of use across the income distribu-
tion, may be misleading (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011). Second, most empirical tests of
the ETEN principle have focused on territorial or socio-economic-related inequalities, leav-
ing aside part of the systematic correlation between care use and illegitimate determinants
of care use other than socio-economic status or place of residence, such as ethnic origin or
gender.
Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) have proposed a framework to connect the partial ap-
proach to horizontal inequity in use based on the concentration index with the more gen-
eral approach of equality of opportunity, or responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, applied
to health care. Responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism relies on the idea that the influence of
certain factors on health care use should be compensated, while the inequalities induced by
other variables should be ignored. It relies on two critical elements: first, a partioning of the
determinants of health care in circumstances versus effort; second, a compensation princi-
ple, which defines the fair allocation of health care across individuals with the same effort
but potentially different circumstances. In the context of health care, effort may include
medical needs and preferences for treatment (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011). The com-
pensation principle then states that to be fairly distributed, health care should be the same
for individuals with the same care needs and preferences, irrespective of non-need factors;
this provides a definition of horizontal equity in use. To be complete, the theory of equality
of opportunity yet requires a second principle: the reward principle, which states how care
should be allocated among individuals with the same circumstances, or non-need variables,
but different efforts. The liberal reward thus corresponds to the norm of vertical equity in
care use. Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2011) have proposed an empirical measure of the in-
dividual disadvantage, the fairness gap, that is consistent with the compensation principle.
They show that the indirect standardization method, on which the horizontal inequity index
and a number of empirical studies rely, is equivalent to this fairness gap when the reward
principle is defined based on the conventional assumption that:“on average, the system gets
it right”.
Plugging the standard empirical approach to horizontal inequity in care use into the the-
ory of equality of opportunities highlights three lessons that will be critical to any empirical
investigation of equity based on egalitarian principles of fair allocation. First, the partioning
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of individual characteristics in needs versus non-needs factors is a first empirical step with
crucial normative content. Second, assumptions regarding the norm of vertical equity in
use will condition conclusions regarding horizontal equity in use. Third, the classical ETEN
principle from traditional egalitarianisms implicitly considers preferences to be irrelevant
for equity. More precisely, the fact that preferences are often not accounted for in empirical
studies may rely on two alternative premises: (i) preferences for health care are not disre-
garded but they merely reflect care needs, (ii) preferences are irrelevant for the definition of
a fair allocation of care.
The premise on the role of preferences relates to another intensively-debated question:
should we care about access to or use of care services (Culyer et al., 1992; Mooney et al., 1991)?
Referring to access instead of use has been promoted as a standpoint more respectful of indi-
vidual preferences (Mooney et al., 1991). Let alone the conceptual and empirical difficulties
raised by the definition of access (Le Grand, 1991), it is not even clear that equivalizing access
is compatible with the cornerstone of Paretian welfare economics, that the optimal alloca-
tion of resources depends on individual utilities and thus on preferences (Wagstaff and van
Doorslaer, 2000a). On the other hand, if the ETEN principle applied to LTC use comes along
with the premise that preferences are irrelevant, it unambiguously implies a non-Welfarist
conception of equity. Whether such a position is ethically acceptable is a deep normative
question: some consider that the respect for preferences is a necessary condition for the es-
sential respect for freedom (Fleurbaey, 2008), but others reject the idea that considerations
about individual responsibility and utility should be taken into account in the evaluation of
social justice.
Whatever the premise on preferences, one important question remains: why should we
care about equity in health care, or equity in LTC, more than in other goods or services?
In the case of LTC, we can point towards two justifications. One pragmatic reason is that
policy-makers and the public opinion tend to express concerns about the allocation of
certain services in isolation from the set of other market goods and services. A more
fundamental justification is that, for individuals with activity restrictions, LTC services are
considered to be necessary to ensure that human dignity is respected and that individuals
have the capacity to “flourish” as human beings (Gillon, 1986; Sen, 1992). Of course, this
justification comes with a gray area: what do we intend exactly by human dignity and
flourishing? Should we ensure equity in the use of very basic LTC services, such as assistance
with ADLs and IADLs, or does this induce an ethical mandate for providing the disabled
with the means to participate into social activities and the public life?12
12Economists are certainly not the best equipped to answer these questions, but they have to make sure that
the outcomes they refer to do not clash with the insights provided by moral philosophy, psychology, social
sciences and other relevant disciplines about what a decent life is acknowledged to be.
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How should we define the needs for long-term care?
As soon as we adopt an egalitarian standpoint, one critical issue is to define needs. As
Culyer (1995) puts it:
“Neither [vertical nor horizontal] equity [in health care use] is operational if the concept of
“need” is not sufficiently quantifiable for judgments of sameness or difference to be made
with acceptable precision...” (p. 727).
This implies that both the concept of needs for care and its measurement should be made
clear. In the health care context, the debate has progressively converged towards the idea
that a sensible definition of needs takes into account the scarcity of resources and is con-
tingent on what the health care system can actually achieve in terms of treatment (Culyer,
1995). One popular definition proposed by Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) defines needs as the
minimum amount of resources required to exhaust one’s capacity to benefit from health care
at the margin.
By contrast, the concept of “needs for LTC” has not deserved much attention in empirical
works. In the chapter on “Long-term care” in the Handbook of Health Economics, Norton
(2000) writes:
“The theory of demand for LTC is straightforward. The most important
factors are health status, which determines need, and the out-of-pocket
price relative to the price of close substitutes.”
Like this example, many papers use the term “needs” with no specific normative con-
tent, to designate disability and health status in a vague way. The wording used in some
studies suggest that individuals have a zero price elasticity and reach a satiety level in their
consumption of LTC services; or that needs for LTC should be understood as the level of LTC
services such that any inferior consumption is life-threatening. In the egalitarian framework
of equity assessments, the definition of the “needs for LTC” should rather encompass all in-
dividual characteristics whose impact on the demand for LTC is deemed legitimate.
To make things clearer, let us refer to a simple graphical representation. In the middle
part of Figure 5, we find the core elements of a positive analysis of the use of LTC services,
whether formal or informal. Demand for formal (informal) care interacts with its supply, and
demands for informal and formal care may influence each other through the relative price
of care services.
[Figure 5 to be found on the following page.]
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Figure 5 – What do we mean by long-term care needs? A schematic representation.
READING: All elements that are included in a circle or a box can be empirically measured; in the case
of the (normative) “LTC needs”, the box means that an empirical measure can be constructed under
definite value judgments. By contrast, the remaining elements are typically more difficult to mea-
sure or non-empirical. The arrows show the relationship between the different elements. Dashed
arrows are used when the links they represent are critical for the scope of empirical assessments of
equity that take eligible needs as a sensible measure of normative needs. Bold boxes indicate the
elements that are mostly studied throughout the thesis.
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I then enrich the graph to highlight how the “normative needs” for LTC referred to in eq-
uity assessments may be related to the standard quantities used in the positive empirical lit-
erature. LTC needs are represented in the red box. They stem from the individual functional
status and health conditions, filtered through ethical considerations about what makes LTC
a special good. Let us focus first on formal LTC. Needs are not the only determinants of the
demand for formal care: other individual factors, such as income, may influence LTC use in
a way that is socially deemed illegitimate. Preferences over LTC, which may be influenced
by health and functional limitations, also condition the demand for LTC. I also add to the
picture what I call the “eligible needs” (purple box), i.e. the amount of public support an
individual is entitled to given her personal situation. Eligible needs are expected to partially
overlap with normative needs; but there are several reasons why the former may not provide
a sensible measure of the latter. Eligibility for publicly-subsidized LTC may depend on in-
come or wealth (in countries with means-tested LTC schemes), on age (where LTC schemes
have age conditions), or on the region of residence (when LTC policies are decentralized).
Constraints on public budgets may also weigh on eligibility decisions in a non-transparent
way. Depending on the institutional context, eligible needs may thus partly reflect determi-
nants of LTC use that will be deemed illegitimate.
In some countries, eligible needs are contingent on the presence of potential informal
caregivers. This brings about two very important issues that do not arise in the context of
health care: should we take into account the supply of informal care when defining the nor-
mative needs for formal care? Does it make sense to focus on the allocation of formal LTC,
in isolation from the allocation of informal care? If we transpose the definition of health
care needs presented earlier into the LTC context, we may say that an individual will have a
positive marginal capacity to benefit from LTC (i.e. LTC needs) as soon as there are activities
of daily living that she is unable to perform alone and that are not being done by someone
else, or through a technical device, for her. With such a definition, the LTC needs of a person
become zero if she receives extensive help from her relatives. Is this an acceptable definition
of LTC needs?
If, following Culyer (1995), we believe that:
“[A practical measure of care needs should] be directly derived from the objective(s) of the
... care system” (p. 727).
then for the purpose of empirical investigations, it makes sense in the first instance to
refer to how the LTC system in which we are interested treats informal caregiving. If eligi-
bility for publicly-subsidized formal care is independent from (depends on) the presence of
informal caregivers, need variables should exclude (include) family composition. In their
study of income-related horizontal inequity across European countries, Ilinca et al. (2017)
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has explored the sensitivity of the horizontal inequity index to the classification of house-
hold composition as a need variable or as a non-need factor. As higher-income elderly indi-
viduals tend to live more often with a spouse and closer to their children, taking household
characteristics as legitimate determinants of formal care use results in less pro-poor/more
pro-rich horizontal inequity in formal home care use.
The available empirical studies of socio-economic or territorial inequity in LTC use have
focused on the use of formal care, separately from the use of informal care. Rodrigues et al.
(2014) and Ilinca et al. (2017) have also documented socio-economic horizontal inequity in
the utilization of informal care. Italy is an interesting case, as it exhibits pro-poor horizontal
inequity in informal care utilization and pro-rich inequity in the utilization of formal home
care. It is not clear under which conditions we can conclude that, in the aggregate, two forms
of inequity compensate for each other (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011).
2.3 Two countries under investigation: France and the Netherlands
This doctoral thesis brings empirical contributions to the economic literature on effi-
ciency and equity just reviewed, in the settings of two European countries: France and the
Netherlands. As part of the old continental Europe, these two countries share fairly similar
economic and demographic characteristics, even though the Dutch GDP per capita is about
20% higher than the French one in purchasing power parity. The share of the 75+ population
reaches 9% in France and is of 7.5% in the Netherlands, and both countries expect a doubling
of their 75+ population by 2050 (Gaymu, 2017). Yet, in 2014, public spending on LTC reached
4.3% of GDP in the Netherlands and did not exceed 1.9% in France (OECD, 2017a).
In what follows, I briefly review the French and Dutch LTC systems as they stood before
2015. I then provide some elements about the recent reforms that were implemented in
each country. Although the LTC systems of the two countries differ in many fundamental
ways, they both have recently witnessed an intense political debate about the future of LTC
policies. Concerns about the equity and the efficiency of the schemes are ubiquitous in the
two countries. This makes the research questions I address practically relevant in these two
institutional contexts.
General organization of the Dutch and French long-term care systems
In 1968, the Dutch government established a national social insurance ensuring univer-
sal coverage of the expenditure costs associated with disability (the Algemene Wet Bijzondere
Zietkekosten, or AWBZ scheme).13
13In 2015, the system was fundamentally reformed. I describe the system as it was before 2015 and bring
some elements on the reform here-below.
34
The construction of the French LTC system was more progressive and consisted in the
overlay of different schemes, with varying operating principles and philosophies. Over the
20th century, the issue of “old-age disability” has been alternatively considered as part of
either disability policies or of social assistance to the destitute elderly (Capuano, 2017a).
Since 1997, the French LTC system has been split in two different policies: the handicap
policies, targeted to the individuals who became disabled before age 60; and the dependence
policies, devoted to the disabled elderly. Chapter 1 of the thesis specifically studies the
impact of the French age threshold in LTC policies and presents the handicap schemes.
Given that the remainder of my research focuses on the 60+ population, in this general
overview I focus on the schemes available to the dependent elderly.14
The long-term care services covered and the benefits offered
The Dutch social LTC insurance covers a broad range of services provided either at-home
or in an institutional setting. The elderly may enter a nursing home or instead a residen-
tial care home, where they benefit from an independent living unit and a package of LTC
services accessible to all residents. Nursing care, assistance with ADLs and assistance with
some IADLs (supportive and activating guidance) are covered by AWBZ. In institutions, the
costs of board and lodging are not distinguished from other LTC costs. Domestic help, how-
ever, has not been part of the AWBZ scheme since 2007. Municipalities are responsible for
the provision and financing of domestic help, under the WMO (Wet Maatschappelijke On-
dersteuning) social support scheme. AWBZ covers 95% of public expenditures on LTC, while
WMO covers the remaining 5%.
In France, there is public coverage of a wide range of LTC services through different
schemes. Personal care and assistance with IADLs, including domestic help, are paid for
through the Allocation personnalisée d’autonomie (APA). Created in 2002, the APA scheme
provides universal benefits, under the form of a partial subsidy on the costs of home care
(except for nursing care) or the services received in institutions.15 The development of home
care and institutional care has been little integrated, leading to a dual system with little room
for intermediary living arrangements (Bozio et al., 2016). In institutions, board and lodging
are not considered as LTC services and are not covered by APA. Individuals can benefit from
a means-tested benefit (ASH), which pays for the nursing home fees of individuals who have
exhausted their assets. The descendants of the beneficiary can legally be asked to reimburse
the ASH benefits, if they can afford to. For individuals living in the community, nursing care
and some personal care are provided by nursing services (SSIAD) or private nurses, who are
paid by the national Health Insurance.
14In French, these schemes are conventionally referred to as “dispositifs de prise en charge de la dépendance”.
15Article L232-2 du Code de l’Action sociale et des familles.
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The French Ministry of Health has recently developed integrated accounts bringing
together information on spending of the different dependence schemes (Comptes de la
dépendance). In 2014, the health care component represented 50% of public spending on
LTC; the “pure LTC” component amounted to 35%, while the remaining 15% correspond to
the benefits paying for the board and lodging costs (Roussel, 2017).
Needs assessment and eligibility
In the Netherlands, the entry point into the LTC system is the needs assessment made
by an agency called CIZ (Centrum Indicatiestelling Zorg). CIZ is an independent and central
agency, which was created in 2004 to address concerns about territorial inequity in entitle-
ments to public support (Schut and Van Den Berg, 2010). Through its regional offices, CIZ
processes all claims for LTC benefits: depending on her disability level and environment, an
individual can be made eligible for home care or for institutional care.
In France, the elderly can choose to apply either to the at-home APA program or to a nurs-
ing home stay: there is not a unique assessment procedure ensuring that the option retained
is the less costly one (Bozio et al., 2016). For the at-home APA scheme, eligibility is processed
by each Departmental Council. Evaluation teams are made of nurses and social workers and
have to base their decisions on the activity restrictions of the claimant. Eligibility for nursing
care is assessed by general practitioners (GPs) for their own patients.
In France, access to public home care support does not depend on potential and actual
informal caregiving; the law does however not explicitly states whether the volume of
subsidized care an individual is granted should depend on her family environment. In
practice, there is anecdotal evidence that evaluation teams may take into account the family
environment (Gramain, Billaud and Xing, 2015b; HCFEA, 2017). Instead, the Dutch AWBZ
scheme explicitly provides that the household members of a disabled elderly provide her
with some “usual care”, i.e. an amount of personal care and domestic help along a norm of
mutual assistance among family members. Eligibility for WMO benefits also depends on the
family environment.
Financing and out-of-pocket payments
In the Netherlands, the AWBZ budget is financed through income-dependent social con-
tributions (2/3) and general taxation (1/4). 8% are financed by direct co-payments. Co-
payments in the AWBZ depend on the individual’s financial resources and the consumption
of care. The WMO scheme is financed by general taxation and by co-payments, the schedule
of which is freely chosen by municipalities (Schut and Van Den Berg, 2010).
The French LTC system is a mixed system with features of both Beveridgian and Bisc-
marckian models, with a major role left to families (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Joël et al., 2010).
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The national Health Insurance is financed by social security contributions levied on wages
and, to a lesser extent, on other forms of income. Cost-sharing on services paid by the
Health Insurance is limited and independent from income. On the contrary, the APA benefit
comes with an income-dependent co-payment. 30% of the APA program resources were col-
lected by a specific social protection fund, called CNSA (Caisse nationale de solidarité pour
l’autonomie), which allocates resources across departments. CNSA funding come from to-
bacco taxes, a tax on all types of income (CSG) and two roughly proportional contributions
levied on labor and pensions respectively (CSA and CASA). The Departmental Councils (Con-
seils départementaux), who have a legally “leading” role in LTC policies, finance about 70%
of APA spending. The financing of APA as well as of the Dutch AWBZ scheme includes some
fiscally regressive taxes.
In spite of the good coverage provided by the national Health Insurance, private financ-
ing of LTC is high in France (Joël et al., 2010; Muir, 2017). Although APA can be comple-
mented with tax rebates and other social assistance schemes, the out-of-pocket payments
on LTC services (left aside board and lodging and at-home nursing care) represent 23% of
costs (Roussel, 2017). Under some assumptions on unobserved private spending, the Min-
istry of Health estimated that out-of-pocket payments reachede300 a month on average for
at-home APA beneficiaries prior to 2016 (Fizzala, 2016), or over one fifth of the average pen-
sion benefit (Solard, 2015). The ratio of out-of-pocket payments to income (the effort rate)
was conjectured to exceed 40% for the most severely disabled. Despite co-payments being
increasing in income, the effort rate decreases with the income level (Fizzala, 2016). Public
schemes in France cover only 47% of the costs of board and lodging (Roussel, 2017). Out-
of-pocket payments on nursing homes exceed income for beneficiaries earning less than
e1,800 per month. Even after the means-tested ASH steps in, the effort rate on institutional
care remains decreasing in income (Fizzala, 2016).
Instead, the Dutch AWBZ is such that out-of-pocket payments increase with income for
moderate to severe disability when LTC is received in the community and, unless income is
very high, for institutional care.
Out of the 10.4 billion euros of estimated private spending on LTC in France, only 2.4%
are reimbursed by private LTC insurance (Drees, 2016b; HCFEA, 2017). According to the
typology of LTC systems established by the ANCIEN research project, France belongs to
the cluster of systems with emphasis on formal LTC use but with simultaneously a strong
orientation towards informal care (Kraus et al., 2010). By contrast, informal care represents
a lower share of the care provided to the elderly in the Netherlands. According to Bolin et al.
(2008), the average volume of the informal care received by the single-living Dutch elderly is
one of the lowest in Europe.
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The policy debates and recent long-term care reforms
At the end of the 2010s, in both countries LTC policies were increasingly seen as “unsus-
tainable”, but for different reasons. This diagnosis triggered the important reforms that took
place between 2013 and 2016.
In the Netherlands, the high projected increase in public LTC expenditure has motivated
a wave of reforms seeking to improve the allocative efficiency of the LTC system. In 2013,
co-payments were increased by taking into account a higher share of the wealth of benefi-
ciaries (van Ginneken and Kroneman, 2015). More emphasis was placed on “aging in place”:
institutional care is now accessible only to the patients requiring constant supervision or 24h
care due to physical problems or severe dementia (Maarse and Jeurissen, 2016). In 2015, an
important reform led to the creation a new social assistance scheme (known as WMO-2015):
it has upgraded the role of municipalities in LTC financing and provision, by entrusting them
with the provision of more care services relating to ADLs and IADLs. In parallel, nursing care
and support in grooming and dressing have been entrusted to the regional health insur-
ers. More largely, the Dutch LTC system has been undergoing a “normative reorientation”
(Maarse and Jeurissen, 2016): while universality and national solidarity have been the cor-
nerstones of the LTC social insurance since its creation, a greater weight is now placed on
individual responsibility and the support that can be provided by families and local commu-
nity networks.
Concerns about this wave of reforms have been expressed by many actors of the LTC sys-
tem, including patients organizations and unions of LTC workers. Reduced budgets have led
some municipalities to ration care and contract with providers at lower tariffs, threatening
the economic sustainability of home care providers — an issue that is also frequently en-
countered in France. Fears also relate to unjustified territorial inequalities in the access to
LTC and coordination difficulties in the provision of different types of LTC services due to the
lack of integration of the new system (Maarse and Jeurissen, 2016; van Ginneken and Krone-
man, 2015). The latter problem has been longstanding in France, where it is being addressed
by local initiatives and experimental programs encouraging cooperation between different
care providers (Gand et al., 2017).
In France, the public debate has been rather calling for decreasing the responsibility left
to the dependent elderly and to their families. The existence of high co-payments, in par-
ticular for the most severely disabled and those with low incomes, has been one of the ma-
jor criticisms addressed to the system, so as the lack of respite care options for informal
caregivers. Horizontal (geographical) and vertical equity in the financing of LTC policies is
undermined by the important role of local authories, which rely on local taxes that are not
all income-based to finance their LTC spending (Chevreul and Brigham, 2013). As the De-
partmental Councils have been financially strained since the European public budget crisis,
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substantial territorial inequalities in the public support offered to the disabled individuals
have been documented (Billaud et al., 2012) and have become a major concern for policy
makers (HCFEA, 2017).
In 2011, a “national debate” on dependence policies was launched by the French Presi-
dent of the Republic, in order to set the scene for an ambitious reform. Several policy op-
tions were considered, among which: the recognition of dependency as a social risk and the
creation of a new social insurance scheme (Vasselle, 2011); or the setting of a mandate for
a private LTC insurance (Rosso-Debord, 2010). Due to the public finance crisis, the reform
was however postponed sine die in 2011. While many specialists were not expecting a reform
any time soon (Chevreul and Brigham, 2013), the year 2015 ended with a law that brought
substantial changes to the at-home APA scheme.16 The design of the APA benefit was sub-
stantially reformed to make it more generous with the poorest, the middle-class beneficiaries
and those requiring high volumes of professional home care. The reform was tailored such
that the expected increase in public spending can be financed by a new tax levied on pen-
sioners. An allowance to finance respite care for informal caregivers was also created. The
reform also enacted a modification of the financing of nursing homes, which has triggered
a wave of protests from LTC professionals in the recent months. In early 2018, the Ministry
of Health initiated consultations to improve the funding of institutional care and its quality
and the propositions of the government are expected to be made public in the Fall of 2018.
Even more recently, the President of the Republic announced that a broader reform of LTC
benefits and their financing would soon be discussed.
While LTC policies remain a topic high on the political agenda in France and in the
Netherlands, there has not been sufficient time since the reforms were implemented to make
ex post evaluations available. By bringing descriptive and analytical empirical elements on
how the Dutch and French LTC systems worked before the reforms, this thesis aims at mod-
estly enlightening the policy discussions on the evolution of LTC policies, in these two coun-
tries and beyond.
16Loi 2015–1776 du 28 décembre 2015 relative à l’adaptation de la société au vieillissement.
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3 Outline and contributions
3.1 Intended contributions to the literature
Regarding efficiency aspects of LTC policies, my thesis focuses on questions that have
been little documented by the empirical literature: How do LTC beneficiaries adjust their
consumption of formal home care services to a change in the out-of-pocket price of care?
How important are substitution effects, as opposed to income effects, in the behavioral re-
actions to distortions in the relative price of home care services?
As evidenced by the literature review, many fundamental questions regarding equity in
LTC have not yet been tackled by applied economists. I intend to bring contributions in this
field by empirically addressing the following questions in the French and Dutch institutional
contexts. How do the consumption of LTC services and the out-of-pocket payments vary
with disability levels and income? Are these differences fair? Which features of LTC policies
induce undesirable inequalities across population groups?
By referring to the principles of “equal treatment for equal needs” and “from each accord-
ing to her ability to pay”, I adopt the normative standpoint of “old-egalitarianism”. I yet pay
a particular attention to the definition of LTC needs and propose an original way to define
the norm of vertical equity in care use, so that my normative stances make sense in the insti-
tutional contexts under scrutiny. In addition, I discuss the role of preferences to tentatively
bridge the gap with Welfarist conceptions of social justice.
3.2 Overview of the Chapters
This thesis is organized in four Chapters; each of them addresses specific research ques-
tions. Chapters 1 to 3 investigate into the French LTC policies, while Chapter 4 deals with
the Dutch LTC system. Whereas Chapters 1, 3 and 4 concentrate on equity considerations,
the analysis in Chapter 2 conveys implications primarily in terms of the efficiency of LTC
policies.
Chapter 1
Chapter 1 investigates into the effect of the age 60 barrier in the French LTC policies. The
distinction between the “handicapped adults”, who are aged less than 60, and the “depen-
dent elderly” clashes with the legal environment of the European Union, which provides that
access to LTC benefits should not depend on age. Over the past decade, the debate over the
discriminatory nature of French LTC schemes has been fierce. Yet the effects of the age 60
threshold on the way disability is compensated on a day-to-day basis had not been previ-
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ously documented. In order to bring empirical elements to this policy debate, I address the
following issue: does it make a difference to be a dependent elderly rather than a handi-
capped adult, in terms of the LTC services you receive?
A general population survey allows me to tackle two complementary questions: first,
what is the effect of the age 60 threshold on the formal care and informal home care received
by community-dwelling individuals? Second, does the age barrier affect the probability to
live in an institution rather than in the community? Three main results emerge from my
analysis. First, the probability to receive formal home care is higher for the dependent elderly
than for the handicapped adults among those living in the community, while the probability
to receive informal care is suggested to be lower. Second, the results differ by gender and by
disability level. Third, the probability to be recorded as living in an institution is higher for
the dependent elderly, all other things being equal.
The results imply that individuals who are similar in all aspects but their age tend to
receive different LTC services. Does this mean that the French LTC system does not en-
sure horizontal equity in the use of LTC services, i.e. that individuals with equal needs are
treated differently? If we focus on the community-dwelling individuals and define the rel-
evant “treatment” as “receiving some home care”, whether formal or informal, the answer
would be no. Indeed, the age 60 threshold has no effect on the probability to receive some
home care. But the two main French home care subsidies are not subsidiary, suggesting that
we should consider the use of formal care as the relevant treatment. Even then, differences
in the utilization of formal care may stem from age-related differences in the preferences
regarding care provision, although little research supports this assumption (Kane and Kane,
2001). If so, such deviations from the “equal treatment for equal needs” principle may be
considered as fair; unless adaptation mechanisms actually explain why care arrangements
differ between those who have suffered from a disabling condition since a relatively young
age and those who became disabled quite late in life.
Although this analysis has policy relevance primarily in the French context, it may be of
interest for countries with age barriers in their LTC or other social policies. It also fits into
the critical debate on ageism in social policies.
Chapter 217
The starting point of Chapter 2 is an indirect result of Chapter 1: the disabled elderly
adjust their care consumption to the home care subsidies they may benefit from. But by
how much? Empirical studies from the international literature had not been able to quantify
this effect. The aim of Chapter 2 was to overcome this limitation by studying the behavioral
reactions, and in particular the price sensitivity, of the beneficiaries of the largest French
17This Chapter was co-authored with Quitterie Roquebert.
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home care subsidy program, the Allocation personnalisée d’autonomie (APA).
The price elasticity of the demand for LTC is a crucial empirical parameter, for two main
reasons. First, it provides an indication of the magnitude of ex post moral hazard in LTC
use, which conditions the welfare gains associated with public LTC insurance schemes (cf.
Section 2.2). Second, it allows to anticipate how potential reforms of LTC subsidies will affect
the use of LTC services and thus public spending.
Our semi-structural approach allows us to identify both a price elasticity and an income
elasticity parameters. A 10% increase in the out-of-pocket price of care is predicted to de-
crease the consumption of professional care by 4% at the intensive margin. A 10% increase
in the individual income is predicted to increase care use by 4% for APA beneficiaries, sug-
gesting that professional home care is a necessity good.
Our estimates imply that home care subsidies affect the use of home care through both
income and substitution effects, suggesting that such programs come with some gross ef-
ficiency loss. The income elasticity of home care use being low, the welfare gain from the
additional home care use generated by the APA-induced income transfer towards beneficia-
ries may be relatively low. This alone would suggest that home care subsidies do not induce
significant welfare gains; but our analysis is blind to their potential positive external effects
on medium-run health and on informal caregivers, as well as to the traditional risk-bearing
gain. We also find suggestive evidence that high-income beneficiaries are more sensitive to
the price of care. By setting higher cost-sharing on those who are more reactive to a change
in the relative price of care, the APA scheme may not only meet redistributive objectives but
also increase the efficiency of the policy.
Our research was embedded into a larger research project, the MODAPA project. The
project sought to obtain price elasticity estimates by the means of different databases and
varying identification assumptions. Hege (2016) and Bourreau-Dubois, Gramain, Lim and
Xing (2014) find a price elasticity estimate of -0.15 and -0.55 respectively. Low statistical
precision makes it impossible to reject that our three estimates are identical. Our studies
point to a price elasticity lower than unity in absolute value, implying that a reduction
in the out-of-pocket price of care should lead to a less than proportionate increase in
care consumption, and thus to a reduction in total out-of-pocket payments. The a priori
view that the use of home care services, and in particular domestic help, is extremely
price-sensitive is not supported by our empirical analysis.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 digs further into the “economics of the APA scheme” and addresses the three
following questions: how do professional home care use and out-of-pocket payments vary
along the income distribution and across disability levels for APA beneficiaries? Are these
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distributions equitable? How may the 2016 reform of APA have affected equity in the use and
in out-of-pocket financing of home care?
Presumably, the design of the at-home APA aims at reducing inequity in the use of home
care and in out-of-pocket payments. Indeed, the at-home APA policy comes with two critical
features: depending on her disability level, each beneficiary is entitled to a maximum num-
ber of hours on which she can receive the APA subsidy. Moreover, the subsidy is computed
on the basis of an income-dependent co-payment rate. The 2016 reform precisely sought to
accentuate public effort towards the very low-income and middle class beneficiaries as well
as towards the most disabled, who were deemed to incur excessive out-of-pocket payments.
Data limitations have yet made it difficult to document the extent of the resource transfers
among APA beneficiaries prior to the reform; they also explain why no ex post evaluation of
the reform had been conducted.
I use original data from 2014 providing precise information on the use of care and out-of-
pocket payments for a sample of APA beneficiaries. I define normative stances and accord-
ingly assess how equitable the pre-reform APA scheme was. Finally, I propose a simulation
of post-reform home care use and out-of-pocket payments, based on the price and income
elasticities estimated in Chapter 2.
The pre-reform data show novel evidence of high out-of-pocket payments on home care
for low-income beneficiaries, due to the leeway left to the Departmental Council in com-
puting the co-payment levied on beneficiaries. The average effort rate18 is roughly constant
across all five income quintiles, signaling pro-rich vertical inequity in the direct financing of
the scheme. High effort rates also arise for the severely disabled beneficiaries, consistently
with the absence of a stop-loss mechanism in the APA and the low ceilings that bind the care
plans. I also find evidence of a slight pro-rich horizontal inequity in home care use.
I predict that the 2016 reform would increase home care use across all disability groups
and income levels. Out-of-pocket payments would increase for the poorest and decrease
for the richest, thereby accentuating vertical inequity in financing. This unexpected conse-
quence of the reform critically depends on the assumption of constant elasticity parameters
across income levels. The reform would induce the most disabled to consume more hours
of care while decreasing their out-of-pocket payments, thus reducing vertical inequity in use
and improving the coverage of the financial risk associated with severe disability.
Together with the companion analysis by Hege (2018), which was similarly conducted
within the MODAPA research project, our simulations offer the first assessment of the effect
of a major reform of the APA scheme. Our ex ante evaluations illustrate that behavioral reac-
tions may lead the reforms of home care subsidy schemes to deviate from their objectives in
terms of redistribution and equity.
18Effort rate is defined as the ratio of out-of-pocket payments on home care use to individual income.
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Chapter 419
Chapter 4 leaves France and lands in the Netherlands. It aims at (i) documenting income-
related inequalities in the use of LTC services in the Netherlands, and (ii) assessing whether
individuals with the same needs for care receive similar LTC services.
From an international perspective, the Dutch public LTC insurance stands out for of-
fering a generous coverage of LTC costs. It is also perceived as a very egalitarian system,
although no systematic evidence supports this view. As the Dutch LTC systems is undergo-
ing major changes, insights into inequity in the pre-reform system should come in handy to
policy discussion.
We measure inequalities and inequity in LTC consumption using standard concentration
and horizontal inequity indexes. Our analysis however contrasts with the existing empirical
literature in the way “needs for care” are defined. We take advantage of an important feature
of the Dutch social LTC insurance: eligibility for publicly-subsidized LTC is based on a need
assessment conducted by a centralized and independent agency. We consider that eligibility
decisions reveal the legitimate needs for care and the norm of vertical equity in use prevailing
in the Dutch LTC system. Our horizontal equity assessment does not have to rely on the
standard yet strong assumption that “on average, the system gets it right”.
One additional strength of our analysis with respect to the scarce existing literature is
that we use high-quality, exhaustive administrative data on eligibility for and use of publicly-
subsidized LTC by the Dutch elderly. We are able to observe both individuals living in the
community and those who are institutionalized. We use national tariffs of LTC services to
aggregate care use over the different types of services.
Individuals with low income are found to use on average more LTC (in value) than high-
income individuals. When eligible for institutional care, those with a higher income are more
likely to convert their entitlements into a package of home care services or to use cash bene-
fits, which are less costly types of LTC than institutional care. The income-rich are also more
likely not to use any LTC when eligible for it. As a consequence, differential use across the
income distribution remains large even when we control for systematic differences in needs.
The policy implications of our results crucially hinge upon how we interpret them. Our
“pro-poor” horizontal inequity index might imply that the Dutch LTC system overshoots its
goal of ensuring equitable use of LTC. Co-payments on institutional care steeply increase
with income and this creates a monetary disincentive for the rich to enter a nursing home.
If the Dutch public LTC insurance aims at ensuring an equal access to institutional care for
the rich and the poor, our results question further increases in co-payments for richer ben-
eficiaries. But if our findings stem from institutional care being an inferior good, they imply
that the Dutch social LTC insurance does not allow the poor to access more preferred LTC
19This Chapter was written with Pieter Bakx and Eddy van Doorslaer.
44
options. If we adopt a Welfarist definition of social justice, we conjecture that equity and ef-
ficiency may both be improved if alternatives to institutional care were fostered. In any case,
the prior that the comprehensive Dutch LTC system ensures horizontal equity in the use of
care is challenged by our analysis.
3.3 Concepts, sources and methods used in the thesis
Analytical tools and methods from economics
This thesis draws on various analytical tools and empirical methods from economics.
The general approach is micro: it focuses on individual behaviors and the allocation of scarce
resources. The analysis draws on neoclassical micro-economic theory, in particular on the
consumer theory. Individuals are implicitly or explicitly assumed to trade-off utility gains
from marginal LTC consumption with its out-of-pocket cost. To fit the design of the French
APA scheme, I use the analytical framework of consumption decisions in the presence of a
kinked budget constraint.
The findings of this thesis are derived mainly from observational data. In Chapter 3,
simulations are conducted to overcome the lack of individual-level data in the post-APA
reform period. Empirical analysis make use of several microeconometric methods. The
analysis in Chapter 1 is conducted within the spirit of a policy evaluation. It first derives
reduced-form evidence from a very standard multivariate regression analysis; it addition-
ally exploits the regression discontinuity design created by the French LTC policies to obtain
quasi-experimental evidence (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Chapter 2 adopts a more structural
approach. A censored regression model (Tobit) is used to deal with observational issues and
an instrumental variable estimation allows to address endogeneity concerns. Identification
is achieved parametrically, by Maximum likelihood estimation. Finally, Chapters 3 and 4 es-
timate linear regression models that allow simple tests on interaction terms and the imple-
mentation of decomposition techniques (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000b; Wagstaff et al.,
2003).
The measurement of income-related inequalities and horizontal inequity in LTC use in
Chapter 4 relies on synthetic indexes that have been widely use in applied health economics.
The concentration index and the horizontal inequity index (Kakwani et al., 1997) embed sev-
eral implicit assumptions that are important for the interpretation of the results. These in-
dexes measure relative inequalities, as opposed to absolute inequalities; they provide an in-
dication of system-wide average inequality by attributing implicit weights on the inequalities
at different parts of the income distribution (Bleichrodt and van Doorslaer, 2006).
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Data sources
The contributions of this thesis are essentially empirical, meaning that the strengths and
weaknesses of the data that were used are critical to the scope of my results. Finding out
the data that were the most appropriate given my research questions has been an important
aspect of the thesis. I review here the trade-offs I faced in selecting the sources.
All the datasets used in the thesis provide individual-level information. Chapters 1 and 4
rely on data that are readily available to researchers, under some conditions. The data used
in Chapters 2 and 3 were instead collected ad hoc. Chapters 2 and 4 exploit administrative
records of publicly-subsidized LTC beneficiaries, Chapter 3 uses the customers files of a
home care provider and Chapter 1 relies on population survey data.
Survey data
In Chapter 1, I use the Disability and Health (HS) survey from 2008 to compare the
LTC received by the “dependent elderly” with the care received by the “handicapped
adults”. One section of the survey (Handicap-Santé Ménages, HSM) is representative of
the community-dwelling population, while another section surveyed the institutionalized
population (Handicap-Santé Institutions, HSI). A small dataset matching information from
HSM and from HSI is made available and provides a sample representative of the entire
French population. The fact that HS is a general population survey provides me with a
sample of both individuals below and individuals above the age 60 threshold I am interested
in.
The HS survey is made accessible through the academic network Réseau Quételet and
has been extensively used in applied economics studies. Its cross-sectional nature limits
the analysis in certain ways. A two-wave survey similar to HS was conducted in 1999 and
2001 (enquête HID),20 but the LTC schemes I assess the effects of were reformed in the early
2000s.
Administrative data
Chapter 2 required individual-level information on the consumption of home care ser-
vices, on out-of-pocket prices and a reliable measure of income for APA beneficiaries. As of
today, there is no national dataset that contains all three sets of information. Departmental
Councils are responsible for the implementation of the APA policy on their territory and for
the records they keep. All metropolitan departments now keep electronic records on APA
beneficiaries, including each beneficiary’s care plan volume, some information on the home
care provider she selected and her APA co-payment rate. However, until new legal provisions
20For a critical overview of this survey, see Mormiche (2003).
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were enacted following the 2016 APA reform, Departmental Councils had no requirement to
forward individual-level information to the statistical office of the Ministry of Health and
Social Affairs (Drees). In 2011, the Drees launched a collection of departmental records on a
voluntarily basis. This dataset, called Remontées individuelles APA, however contains no in-
formation on provider prices. Therefore, it does not allow to precisely infer the out-of-pocket
price of care.21
In order to estimate the price elasticity of the home care demand, one strategy consists
in working with exact information on out-of-pocket prices thanks to departmental data.
This requires liaising with one Departmental Council and obtaining its APA records. This
is the approach adopted in Chapter 2. We collected the APA records (January 2012 to De-
cember 2014) of one metropolitan department.22 Actual use of subsidized home care and
out-of-pocket prices are precisely observed for individuals served by an authorized home
care provider, which is the case of the majority of APA beneficiaries at the levels of this de-
partment and of metropolitan France as a whole.
Chapter 4 relies on exhaustive national administrative records, reflecting the centraliza-
tion and quality of the information system on LTC benefits in the Netherlands. Under some
conditions, Statistics Netherlands (CBS) provides access to an extensive set of tax and death
registers, to the registers that the Dutch municipalities keep of their resident population
and to the records of eligibility for and use of publicly-subsidized LTC services. Researchers
may be granted the authorization to link together these datasets through individual and
household identifiers.23 The use of the administrative data on LTC is quite recent. Because
they cover the entire population and the large majority of LTC services being used in the
Netherlands, these data are especially suited for studying distributional questions.
Customer files of a home care provider
Chapter 3 exploits the customer files of a large home care provider operating in one
French department. For APA beneficiaries receiving care from this provider, these data
contain exact information on the total consumption of home care, including the hours that
are consumed beyond the maximum volume of care subsidized by APA. Administrative APA
records from Departmental Councils contain information only on the hours subsidized by
the scheme; using these data to document income-related inequality in the use of home
care would have hidden the differential propensity to consume unsubsidized home care
21For more details on these data, see drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/etudes-et-statistiques/
open-data/handicap-et-dependance/article/les-donnees-individuelles-apa-ash.
22In order to preserve the confidentiality of the data we collected, ad hoc agreements for access to and use of
the data were signed.
23To avoid any leak from these highly identifiable data, access is only provided through a remote access sys-
tem operated by CBS.
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across the income distribution. These customer files also make it possible to retrieve precise
information on the out-of-pocket payments borne by APA beneficiaries, contrary to other
available sources. Although the sample can hardly be assumed to be representative of
the total French population of APA beneficiaries, the data enable simulating the effects of
modifications in the APA design.
Data costs
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of each of the datasets used in the thesis. For a
researcher, the decision to use, and in some cases to collect, specific data should take into
account both monetary and non-monetary costs.
The HS survey and Dutch administrative data are made available to researchers under
the form of clean and well-documented files. CBS charges a relatively high price for access
in order to cover the costs associated with the provision of clean data, the maintenance of the
remote access service and the use of powerful computer servers. While the HS survey is pro-
vided for free, the collection of such an ambitious general population survey was costly; for
this reason, it has not been followed by a second wave nor replicated yet. For Departmental
Councils and home care providers, sharing their data with researchers should come at a lim-
ited marginal cost — provided their information systems are functional.24 For researchers,
the ad hoc collection and cleaning of data involve high time costs, which are better recouped
within a collective project.
[Table 2 to be found on the following page.]
24That being said, I acknowledge that this cost is non-zero; I again sincerely thank our interlocutors in the
Departmental Council and home care provider for their good will in providing access to the data.
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Table 2 – The datasets used in the thesis: contents, blind spots and costs.
Chapter 1∗ Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
France (home care) The Netherlands
General information
Type of data Population survey Administrative
records
Customer files Administrative
records
Years 2008 2012–2014 October 2014 2012
Time dimension Cross-sectional Panel Cross-sectional Cross-sectional
Representation National One department One home care
provider
National
Contents of the data
Formal care use Extensive
information, with
some imprecision
Precise
information on
APA-subsidized
care for a
sub-population of
APA beneficiaries
Precise
information on
total care use
Exhaustive for
publicly-
subsidized
care
Informal care use Extensive
information
No information No information No information
Provider prices +
out-of-pocket price of care
None Exact for a
sub-population of
APA beneficiaries
Exact Partial
Total out-of-pocket
payments
No information Exact for
sub-population of
APA beneficiaries
Exact No information
but can be
retrieved
Individual income Noisy Good Good Excellent
Socio-demographics Extensive Limited Very limited Extensive
Costs of use
User costs Data treatment Data collection,
cleaning &
treatment
Data collection,
cleaning &
treatment
User fees & data
treatment
(Marginal) social costs Very costly survey Relatively limited Relatively limited High
Number of observations
In the selected samples 3,121 8,190 1,616 616,934
NOTES: ∗ The description of the data used in Chapter 1 that I include in this Table refers only to HSM, the
section of the HS survey that was collected on community-dwelling individuals. The number of observations
refers to the size of the samples that were selected for the analysis presented in this thesis.
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The MODAPA research project
As a matter of fact, the data used in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis were collected for
the purpose of the collective MODAPA research project. Initiated in 2014, this project brings
together a dozen of French researchers working in the field of LTC policies. The collection
of data and the analysis presented in Chapter 2 was conducted after four researchers of the
team had accessed and analyzed the APA records of a first department.25 In working at the
departmental level, we favor internal validity over external validity. Conducting two separate
studies on the same type of data, with empirical strategies adapted to each local context, was
a way to assess the robustness of the results.
The customer files used in Chapter 3 were initially collected in order to test for another
identification strategy of the price elasticity of the demand for home care.26 Working with the
censored measure of home care use provided by the departmental data makes it necessary
to make assumptions on the stability of preferences when studying behaviors in terms of
home care demand (Chapter 2). By exploiting the customer files of a home care provider,
which contain the total use of home care, weaker assumptions can be made. This however
comes at the cost of a reduced external validity, as the sample is further restricted to the APA
beneficiaries of one department who are served by a given provider.
The unique features of the dataset have allowed researchers of the group to document
the empirical relationships between the APA national ceilings, the care plan volumes and the
actual use of care.27 Finally, these data have been used by two members of the group (Robin
Hege and mysef) to document the distribution of home care use, out-of-pocket payments
and public spending.28
The perimeter of long-term care in each Chapter
As a consequence of the differences in the datasets being used as well as in institutional
contexts, what I call “long-term care services” differs from one Chapter to the other.
As summarized in Table 3, my definitions of formal home care include assistance with
ADLs and with IADLs, at least partially. For France, I am able to retrieve information on any
personal care an individual may benefit from when I use the HS survey; this is not the case
when I focus on LTC eligible for APA subsidies (Chapters 2 and 3), as some personal care may
be provided by nurses. For the Chapters dealing with the French case, the definition of home
25The results from this study, conducted by Cécile Bourreau-Dubois, Agnès Gramain, Helen Lim and Jingyue
Xing, are presented in Bourreau-Dubois, Gramain, Lim and Xing (2014) and in Bourreau-Dubois, Gramain,
Lim, Xing and Roquebert (2014).
26The collection of the dataset and initial analysis were conducted by Léna Gazaix (Gazaix, 2015). Two other
researchers of the group, Agnès Gramain and Olivier Supplisson, are currently working on an estimation of the
price elasticity of home care demand based on this dataset.
27See Fontaine and Gramain (2017).
28The analysis by Robin Hege is presented in his doctoral thesis: Hege (2018).
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care systematically excludes nursing care, which is paid by the Health Insurance and not by
LTC schemes strictly speaking. On the contrary, nursing care is included in the definition of
home care used in Chapter 4, as it is subsidized by the Dutch social LTC insurance scheme.
For symmetrical reasons, domestic help is included in the definition of home care for Chap-
ters 1 to 3 but not in the Chapter dealing with the Netherlands. One shortcoming of relying
on some forms of administrative data (as in Chapters 2 and 4) is that it limits the ability to
take into account potential substitution between the LTC services that are not subsidized by
the same schemes. This may hide some offsetting effects (Ramos-Gorand, 2015).
Only the survey data used in Chapter 1 allow to observe informal caregiving. Utilization
of institutional care is observed in the HSM-HSI dataset (Chapter 1) for individuals who live
in an institution on a permanent basis; all nursing home and residential care stays are ob-
served in the Dutch data used in Chapter 4.
Table 3 – The definition of long-term care in each Chapter.
France The
Netherlands
Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
HSM-HSI HSM
Formal home care
Nursing care 7 7 7 7 3
Personal care 7 3 Partially Partially 3
(assistance with ADLs)
Assistance with IADLs 7 3 3 3 3
(other than housekeeping)
Domestic help 7 3 3 3 7
Informal care
Assistance with ADLs/IADLs 7 3 7 7 7
Institutional care
Any 3 7 7 7 3
NOTES: “HSM-HSI” refers to the dataset of the HS survey that brings together information on the community-
dwelling respondents and on the institutionalized respondents.
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The definitions of needs for care and of equity in each Chapter
As a final element of this General introduction, I present and compare the definitions of
equity and the empirical measures of the “needs for LTC” that I use in the different Chapters.
They are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4 – The definition of LTC needs and equity principles in each Chapter.
Chapter 1 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Equity principles Horizontal inequity in use
of LTC if the age 60
threshold causally affects
formal LTC use
(1) Income-related
horizontal inequity in use
if home care use correlates
with income when
controlling for needs
Income-related horizontal
inequity in use if LTC use
correlates with income
when controlling for needs
(2) Vertical inequity in
direct financing if effort
rate is non-increasing in
income
(3) Vertical inequity in use
if home care use of the
more severely disabled is
“too low” w.r.t home care
use of the less severely
disabled
Measure of
needs
Not explicit Administrative disability
groups (GIR)
CIZ-assessed entitlements
to publicly-subsidized LTC
I start this review with Chapter 4, as the Dutch institutional context and data offer a close
to ideal setting for the empirical assessment of horizontal equity in use. In this Chapter, we
assess whether the ETEN principle29 is respected, i.e. whether there is a correlation between
the monetary value of LTC services used and income, once we have controlled for system-
atic differences in LTC needs across the income distribution. We define LTC needs as the
monetary value of the entitlements for publicly-subsidized LTC decided upon by the CIZ
agency. Referring back to Figure 5 (page 32), our measure of needs corresponds to “eligible
needs” (highlighted in the purple box). Eligible needs in the Netherlands are the product of
3 main elements: (i) the functional status of the individual, and in particular her restrictions
in the activities of daily life, her health status, age and gender; (ii) the “conversion grid” that
CIZ workers have to rely on in order to map elements (i) into the types and quantities of
LTC services the individual should legitimately have access to; and finally (iii) the household
composition and potential supply of informal care. As explained in Section 2.3, the Dutch
social LTC insurance considers it legitimate that some amount of LTC services is provided by
household members: eligible needs are thus reduced by the expected supply of “usual care”
from co-residing family members.
29ETEN stands for “Equal treatment for equal needs” (cf. Section 2.2).
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In defining needs and a norm of vertical equity in use, Chapter 4 thus adopts the nor-
mative viewpoint of the CIZ agency and of its assessors, which have to abide by explicit and
strict guidelines. Given the independence of CIZ, eligible needs are not expected to depend
on budgetary considerations.
In the French APA scheme that I study in Chapters 2 and 3, there also exists an explicit
volume of home care up to which a beneficiary is entitled to receive an APA subsidy. The care
plan volume, which I observe in my data, is set by an evaluation team of the Departmental
Council. The law frames the mapping of individual activity restrictions and functional limi-
tations into 6 administrative disability groups (called GIR), by the means of a disability grid
(called AGGIR).30 If the claimant is classified in one of the 4 most severe disability groups,
she is eligible for APA.31 Until the 2016 APA reform, the law was relatively vague regarding
how information about the disability level, demographic characteristics and the living envi-
ronment should be converted into the care plan volume.32 Evaluation teams retain leeway in
this conversion and Departmental Councils may differ in the guidelines they provide to their
assessors. In particular, the incentive structure of the APA scheme (in which the Departmen-
tal Councils are both the need assessors and the marginal payers) and anecdotal evidence
make it reasonable to consider that budgetary constraints influence the levels of care plan
volumes.
The analysis conducted in Chapter 3 makes use of local data. Suppose budgetary con-
straints affect the aggregate volume of care plans of a department, but do not affect the care
plan of beneficiary A relative to that of beneficiary B. Then, if we believe that relative in-
equalities matter, the individual care plans might still provide a relevant measure of needs
for inter-individual comparisons. There are two reasons why I reckon this to be a debatable
assumption. First, the APA scheme comes with national ceilings that are binding and set at
relatively low levels, especially for severe disability. This may lead the evaluation teams to
truncate some care plan volumes and not others (Fontaine and Gramain, 2017). Second, it is
not clear how evaluation teams take into account household composition and informal care-
giving when setting the care plan volume. All in all, the care plan is better seen as a complex
policy tool, which reflects both normative needs for care and budgetary targets.
For these reasons, I use the administrative disability group (GIR) as the measure of needs
for LTC in Chapter 3. I would conclude to the existence of income-related horizontal inequity
in use if, among the APA beneficiaries of a given disability group, there is a systematic corre-
lation between income and home care use. There are yet two shortcomings associated with
30Article R232–3 du Code de l’Action sociale et des familles.
31Article R232–4 du Code de l’Action sociale et des familles.
32Articles R232–7 et L232–6 du Code de l’Action sociale et des familles. The 2016 APA reform provides that
national guidelines released by the Ministry of Old-Age have now to be used by the evaluation teams. In this
discussion, I focus on the pre-reform situation.
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using the disability group as a measure of needs. First, as a 4-category discrete variable, it is a
rough measure; second, although I try to address recording issues in my dataset, there might
be residual measurement error. May we additionally suspect the administrative groups to be
influenced by local factors, as care plans probably are? We observe high inter-departmental
variability in the share of the population aged 75 or more who is assessed to be in GIR 4
(least severely disabled individuals among those eligible for APA) (HCFEA, 2017). Together
with ethnographic evidence, this suggests that Departmental Councils are able to manipu-
late the disability assessment grid (AGGIR) to influence the number of individuals that are
made eligible for APA support (Billaud et al., 2012). If this is the case, then I may miss indi-
viduals with zero eligible needs for LTC but with non-zero normative needs. Without general
population data, there is probably no way to go round this issue, which also arises if there is
an income gradient in the non-take-up of LTC benefits.
The empirical strategy I adopt in Chapters 3 and 4 does not allow to control for systematic
differences in unobserved preferences for LTC across the income distribution. If we adopt a
strict egalitarian view, in the Marxist tradition, then any deviation from the principle that
the allocation of LTC services should be made according to needs is a sufficient condition
for the existence of inequity in use — even if preferences alone would explain this deviation.
Even though I do not formally test an alternative normative framework, I provide elements
of discussion of the interpretation of the results of Chapter 4 in light of equity definitions that
better accommodate the respect of preferences.
In Chapter 3, I also investigate into vertical inequity in the use of home care among APA
beneficiaries. To avoid making an arbitrary assumption regarding how much beneficiaries
with higher needs are expected to consume more, I assume that prior to the 2016 APA reform
the system was inequitable. I then conclude to an improvement in the vertical equity in use
if the increase of home care use following the APA reform turns out to be higher for those
with disability is more severe.
The last dimension of equity I study in Chapter 3 is equity in financing. I conclude to the
existence of vertical inequity in direct financing of home care use if the ratio of out-of-pocket
payments to income (the effort rate) is non-increasing in income. I thus take a fair system
to be one ensuring progressivity in the financing of care. I also document how out-of-pocket
payments evolve with income to leave the door open to an alternative criterion of equity in
financing.
For all the equity principles that I study but one, the definition and measurement of in-
come are critical. For the assessment of income-related horizontal equity in use, income is
used to rank individuals; for the assessment of equity in financing, income should capture
the contributory capacity of individuals. Across all Chapters, I take income to be the equiv-
alized household income. The choice of the equivalence scale is not innocuous; in Chapters
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2 and 3, we stick to the scale used in the APA program to define the co-payments; in Chapter
4, we use the more common square-root scale.
Chapter 1 proposes a different approach to inequity: the aim is to assess the causal im-
pact of the age 60 threshold in LTC policies on the existence of age-related horizontal inequity
in the use of LTC. Instead, in Chapters 3 and 4, I do not assess whether income causally in-
duces inequity. Put if differently, the question I tackle in Chapter 1 is not: “is there a system-
atic difference in the care received by the handicapped adults and the dependent elderly,
once we control for legitimate needs for care?”; it is instead: “is there a systematic difference
in the care received by the handicapped adults and the dependent elderly, once we control
for all the potential determinants of LTC use but eligibility for public LTC support?”. Note that
the Regression Discontinuity approach offers a way to control for age-related differences in
the unobserved preferences for LTC, provided they do not vary discontinuously at age 60.
The approach adopted in Chapter 1 implies two things. First, detecting an effect of the
age 60 threshold is a sufficient condition for age-related horizontal inequity in the use of
care, not a necessary one. Second, I do not have to classify the determinants of LTC use into
needs versus non-need factors.
I believe the reader has now all the relevant elements at hand to grasp the contributions
brought by my four empirical analyses and how they connect with each other.
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Chapter 1
Being dependent rather than handicapped
in France: Does the institutional barrier at
60 affect care arrangements?
Summary of the chapter
Individuals having difficulties to perform the activities of daily living may benefit from public
long-term care (LTC) support. France distinguishes between handicap benefits, accessible
to individuals below 60, and dependence schemes, for individuals aged 60 and older. This
paper assesses the effects of the age 60 threshold in the French LTC policies using the French
Health and Disability Survey (HS 2008–2009) in two ways. First, we estimate the effect of be-
ing 60 and older on the probability to receive non-medical formal care and informal home
care, controlling for a rich set of socio-demographic characteristics and age effects. Being a
“dependent elderly” rather than a “handicapped adult” little affects the probability to receive
home care; however, it increases formal care utilization and, to a lesser extent, decreases the
probability to receive informal care. Second, we implement a Regression Discontinuity (RD)
approach and provide evidence that the institutional age threshold affects living arrange-
ments, as individuals above age 60 are more likely to be recorded as living in an institution.
The architecture of LTC policies affects the way individuals’ day-to-day difficulties are being
compensated, thereby undermining horizontal equity in the use of formal LTC.
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1 Introduction
In France, about 12% of the adult population has difficulties to perform one or more
activities of daily living, due to physical or cognitive limitations (Drees, 2008b). Developed
countries have implemented public transfers and specific regulation aiming at compensat-
ing such difficulties. Besides accessibility obligations and the provision of income replace-
ment for those who cannot work because of their disability, most countries offer cash or
in-kind transfers to help individuals paying for the assistance in daily life required on a long-
term basis. In economic terms, these long-term care (LTC) programs aim at covering part
of the expenditure costs of disability, which can be loosely defined as the extra expenditures
incurred by a disabled person to reach the situation of an individual similar in all regards but
with no disability (Stapleton et al., 2008).
About 1.9 million individuals (3.6% of the adult population) benefited from public LTC
benefits in France in 2014, for a public spending of 18 billion euros, or 0.6% of GDP (Amar
et al., 2016; Amar, 2016; Drees, 2016b).1 One remarkable feature of the French LTC policies
is that the schemes vary with the age of individuals. A person aged less than 60 with restric-
tions in the activities of daily living will be considered as “handicapped”, while she will be
classified as a “dependent elderly” if she is 60 and older. The administrative threshold of age
60 creates two groups for public action: belonging to one population rather than to the other
has consequences upon eligibility to LTC subsidies and their generosity.
In 2005, a law was passed2 in response to the new conception of disability endorsed by
the World Health Organization3 and to the numerous voices calling for a universal right to
disability compensation (Bonnet, 2004; Frinault, 2005). The 2005 law announced the con-
vergence of handicap and dependence schemes. Unification has not been implemented so
far, partly because of the public finance crisis; nonetheless, the law has reinforced the de-
bate around the “barrier of age 60” (Weber, 2011). Little is known though about the effects
it induces. Because of lack of appropriate data, few quantitative studies include both the
“handicapped adults” and the “elderly dependent”. Yet, in order to assess the fairness of the
system and calibrate a possible reform, it is necessary to evaluate whether current schemes
cause an “elderly dependent” to be compensated differently from a “handicapped adult”
with similar needs.4
1This figure does not take into account the transfers or in-kind care provided to children. It includes public
spending covering either disability compensation or the boarding and lodging costs for individuals residing in
an institution. It does not include nursing services provided in the community nor medical care provided in
institution.
2Loi 2005-102 du 11 février 2005 pour l’égalité des droits et des chances, la participation et la citoyenneté des
personnes handicapées, JORF du 12 février 2005.
3The International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health, or ICF, was officially adopted in 2001
(WHO, 2002). In particular, it states that disability compensation should not be based on age.
4Following the economic theories of responsibility, we may reject the consequentialist approach to disabil-
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In this paper, we estimate the impact of the institutional threshold at age 60 on the LTC
received by individuals with restrictions in the activities of daily living. What we aim at cap-
turing is the effect of falling within a regime of social rights (dependence schemes) rather
than within another (handicap policies), on the probability to use LTC. Our outcomes of
interest include both formal care and informal care utilization. Indeed, the bulk of daily as-
sistance to the disabled is provided under the form of human care, as opposed to technical
assistance. Most LTC schemes subsidize professional care and disabled individuals often
also receive the help of relatives, especially when they keep living in the community. In ad-
dition, informal care use may also benefit from some financial compensation in France and
its provision may thus be directly affected by the age 60 threshold.
We use the 2008 French Disability and Health Survey on Households (HSM) to get a sam-
ple of 3,121 community-dwelling individuals aged 50 to 74 years-old with activity restric-
tions. A bivariate probit is used to take into account both the binary nature of our outcomes
and the simultaneity of the decisions of formal home care utilization and informal care pro-
vision. We control for a rich set of socio-demographic and family characteristics that may
affect home care use and include age effects.
We find that individuals who are considered to be “dependent elderly” have a higher
probability to receive formal care, without changes in epidemiological conditions and in
other factors influencing home care use fully explaining the observed pattern. Conversely,
they have a lower probability to be provided assistance with the activities of daily living by
their relatives, although this effect is less robust. Our results suggest that belonging to the
policy perimeter of “dependence” policies increases access to professional home care ser-
vices, which then partly substitutes for informal care provision. This pattern is consistent
with evidence showing informal care and non-medical formal home care being substitutes
(Bonsang, 2009; Van Houtven and Norton, 2004).
These effects hold conditional on living in the community. Complementing our data with
a small dataset gathering community-dwelling and institutionalized individuals (N=12,784),
we implement a sharp Regression Discontinuity Design strategy and find that the age 60
institutional threshold also affects the probability to live in an institution on a permanent
basis.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, it stands as the first
quantitative evaluation of the age 60 threshold embedded in the French LTC design. It thus
provides empirical elements currently missing in the debate around LTC policies, above and
beyond the results of the two existing studies that documented the impact of LTC public
support on home care use among either the dependent elderly (Fontaine, 2012) or the hand-
ity, and imagine social justice criteria that would justify differential rights to compensation. To our knowledge,
such criteria have not been put forward yet in the French debate; we thus consider here that compensating
expenditure costs associated with handicap and dependence at different levels is a priori not a fair policy.
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icapped (Espagnacq, 2013).
Second, we add to the recent studies of the impact of the architecture of social policies
on care arrangements. By comparing the LTC policies in different countries, recent studies
have shown that the design of LTC schemes not only influences formal care use, but also
has an impact on the relationship between professional care and informal care provision
(Motel-Klingebiel et al., 2005; Bakx, de Meijer, Schut and van Doorslaer, 2015).
Third, our article contributes to the literature more specifically interested in the effects
of home care subsidies on formal and informal care utilization. Overall, past studies have
evidenced a substantial effect of home care programs on the use of professional care for
community-dwelling disabled elderly (Christianson, 1988; Ettner, 1994; Pezzin et al., 1996;
Stabile et al., 2006; Rapp et al., 2011; Fontaine, 2012). Whether an increased use of formal care
crowds-out informal care provision is less clear-cut, depending on the types of tasks that are
considered and whether effects are investigated at the extensive or intensive margin. Given
the substantial impacts institutional contexts were found to have on LTC arrangements, it
is important to assess whether existing evidence is robust across time and countries. By
exploiting variation in individual benefits due to an arbitrary institutional rule, we provide
credible evidence that, in France, not only the use of home care but also living arrangements
are sensitive to the design of LTC policies and the underlying financial incentives and charac-
teristics of LTC services being supplied. Though in an indirect way, our results also confirm
that professional care consumption is price-elastic, as demonstrated by Bourreau-Dubois,
Gramain, Lim and Xing (2014); Hege (2016); Non (2017) and Roquebert and Tenand (2017)
[Chapter 2 of this thesis].
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the French LTC schemes
for individuals living in the community. After presenting the data (Section 3), we explain
our empirical strategy (Section 4) and present the set of results on home care use (Section
5). Section 6 discusses the interpretation of the results and assesses the impact of the age
threshold on living arrangements. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional context
2.1 The age 60 barrier in the French LTC schemes
In France, national solidarity towards disabled individuals is part of the Welfare State,
which provides tax- and contribution-funded LTC support. In 1975, a law gave the “disabled
persons” an official recognition and created the first public scheme intended to help indi-
viduals getting assistance with the activities of daily living.5 Although eligibility rules were
5Loi 75-534 du 30 juin 1975 d’orientation en faveur des handicapés, JORF du 1er juillet 1975.
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very restrictive, the Allocation compensatrice pour tierce-personne (ACTP) was the first insti-
tutional recognition of the needs of a regular human assistance induced by disability.
The 1970s and 1980s also witnessed the emergence of a medical conception of aging.
The expression of “dependent elderly” was coined by geriatricians who argued that elderly
individuals’ physical and cognitive decline makes them essentially “dependent” on others
(Delomier, 1973). Combined with growing concerns over population aging and the sustain-
ability of the welfare system, this conception gave rise to the creation of a program specific
to the elderly in 1997. Since then, the threshold of age 60, which was chosen in reference to
the minimum retirement age at the time, has shaped LTC public schemes. As displayed in
Figure 1.1, for individuals below 60, handicap policies apply, while individuals 60 and older
may benefit from old-age and dependence schemes.6
Figure 1.1 – LTC schemes in France, for individuals living in the community: Age thresholds
of ages 60 and 65.
NOTES: “HA” stands for handicapped adults, “DE” stands for dependent elderly. Schemes
listed in the blue box are accessible to handicapped adults, while schemes listed in the green
box are open to the dependent elderly. The figure describes the schemes applying since the
creation of PCH in 2006.
2.2 The existing at-home LTC schemes
Overview of the schemes
In the 2000s, both handicap and dependence schemes were reformed, so as to benefit
more individuals. In 2002, the Allocation personnalisée d’autonomie (APA) was created as
the new LTC scheme targeted to the elderly. Accessible to individuals with a certain severity
6A more detailed history and institutional analysis of French LTC schemes can be found in Bonnet (2004);
Frinault (2005); Ennuyer (2013); Capuano and Weber (2015); Capuano (2017b).
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of disability, no matter their income, APA subsidizes home services that make possible for
individuals aged 60 and older who live in the community to “age in place”.7
In 2014, about 1,1 million individuals living in the community benefited from the LTC
benefits managed by the departments. The majority of recipients (77%) are aged 60 and
older. APA is the largest scheme, with 740,000 beneficiaries. About 240,000 individuals aged
less than 60 received either PCH or ACTP (respectively 83% and 17%). As shown by Table
1.1, more public money is spent on the elderly than on the handicapped adults, but the
average benefit of recipients under 60 is 50% higher. Of course, this is only weak evidence of
differences in schemes’ generosity.
Table 1.1 – LTC schemes: Spending and number of community-dwelling recipients in 2014.
Total spending, in
million euros over
the year
Number of
recipients
Average benefit, per
recipient, in euros
per month
LTC transfers for beneficiaries
with age below 60
Me1,636 255,386 e562
LTC transfers for beneficiaries
aged 60 and older
Me3,843 837,387 e382
SOURCE: Drees, La protection sociale en France et en Europe en 2014 (Drees, 2016b).
NOTES: “M” stands for million. Figures do not include domestic help provided to the elderly by pension funds,
nor specific transfers available to juveniles. Figures only include community-dwelling beneficiaries of LTC
schemes and associated spending. In 2014, 9% of LTC beneficiaries aged 60+ benefit from handicap schemes
given that their handicap was recognized before age 60.
Eligibility conditions
Eligibility is defined thanks to a standardized disability scale: combining the restric-
tions in the Activities of Daily Living (ADL) and in the Instrumental Activities of Daily Living
(IADL),8 the AGGIR scale defines 6 groups of dependence, 4 of which granting eligibility for
APA. For each potential beneficiary, a personalized assessment of needs is organized at the
house of the individual: a team made of nurses and social workers evaluates what types of
activities the beneficiary requires assistance with and at what frequency.
7The idea that dependent elderly should be “maintained at home” is a guideline of dependence policies in
France as in most countries. This can be explained by budgetary reasons, but also because aging in place is
the option that is generally preferred by individuals and their families (Colombo et al., 2011). Nonetheless, in
France public schemes exist also for individuals receiving institutional care, but they do not work the same. As
we focus primarily on community-dwelling individuals, we describe only LTC schemes available to this popu-
lation (they represent 60% of LTC policy beneficiaries in France).
8Conventionally, seven activities are listed as ADL: bathing or showering, personal hygiene and grooming,
toilet hygiene, dressing, serving one’s food and drink, self-feeding, getting in and out of the bed, sitting and
getting up (Katz et al., 1970). IADL correspond to the Instrumental Activities of Daily Living: they designate
activities that are not essential to the survival of an individual but that need to be performed on a daily basis
for an individual to live in the community (Lawton and Brody, 1969).
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As to regard handicap schemes, in 2006 a new benefit, the Prestation de compensation
du handicap (PCH), was created to progressively replace ACTP for individuals below age 60.9
PCH works similarly to APA, but co-payment schedule and disability conditions for eligibility
differ. Eligibility is granted if the individual cannot perform at all one or more of a list of 19
essential activities (physical mobility, personal care, administrative tasks, communication
or basic social relationships), or when the person cannot perform without major difficulties
two or more of these activities. The applicant must be aged less than 60, or show that her
disabilities were anterior to her 60th birthday.
Departmental Councils, which are the entities in charge of LTC policies,10 may also sub-
sidizes means-tested domestic help to individuals aged less than 60 who did not get access
to PCH, and to individuals aged 65 or over who could not obtain APA. Finally, pension funds
may grant their retired affiliates aged 65 or more who do not meet the disability criteria to
get access to APA with a subsidy on home care services.
Content of the schemes
APA can be used to finance housing adaptation or some technical assistance devices; the
bulk of transfers (93% in 2014, Amar et al. (2016)) is however used to pay for professional
home care services. This is also true for PCH, albeit specific credits, not fungible with those
intended to human care subsidies, are open for technical assistance devices, housing adap-
tation, transportation or animal assistance. PCH-financed human care, which amounts to
92% of PCH spending (Amar et al., 2016), is mainly provided by professional workers or, in
some cases, by relatives, as APA and PCH can be used to financially compensate or even em-
ploy informal caregivers under restrictive conditions. Contrary to APA though, PCH cannot
be used to pay for domestic help: PCH-financed professional caregivers must deliver per-
sonal care, monitoring or IADL support other than housekeeping.
Benefits and co-payments
When used to pay for professional care, all schemes except for ACTP work as an hourly
subsidy on the price of care services: on each hour for which she is entitled to public support,
the beneficiary must pay an out-of-pocket price that depends on the home care provider
price and on the individual co-payment rate.11 With APA, PCH and domestic help programs,
beneficiaries are required to pay a financial participation equal to a certain share, set by a
national co-payment schedule, of either the actual price charged by their care provider or a
9ACTP has not been granted to new recipients since 2006, but still benefits surviving recipients.
10LTC schemes in France are not part of the social insurance system (Sécurité sociale), but are considered as
social transfers. Although they are defined at the national level, they are organized at the departmental level
(by Conseils départementaux).
11See Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis for more information on the APA co-payment schedule.
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lump-sum tariff.12 In practice, the co-payment rate of PCH beneficiaries is zero except for
those with high assets, while the co-payment rate set by APA varies from 0 to 90% depending
on the beneficiary’s income.
For APA, PCH and departments’ or pension funds’ domestic help, the maximum num-
ber of hours eligible for the subsidy is set at the moment of the needs assessment visit. For
APA, the volume eligible to a subsidy must lay below the dependence group-specific ceiling,
which is higher for individuals with more severe disability. Ceilings also apply for domestic
help subsidized by pension funds and means-tested domestic help schemes financed by De-
partmental Councils. On the contrary, the pre-set ceiling for human care subsidized by PCH
is not binding.
2.3 Comparing handicap and dependence schemes
We will not dig further into the differences between the schemes.13 The three important
points to bear in mind are: first, there exist public subsidies to foster home care utilization
by individuals with ADL/IADL restrictions. Second, home care subsidies are not the same if
you are 60 or over, or if you are under this age threshold. Third, an a priori assessment of
the effects of this institutional distinction is hard to make, because of the many differences
in eligibility rules, conditions, contents and ceilings.
As a consequence, deriving precise predictions on the relative advantages of handicap
schemes over dependence policies is especially difficult to achieve for two main reasons.
First, eligibility criteria in terms of disability are fairly different for APA and PCH and eligibil-
ity decisions are not processed by the same entities. Second, documenting the differences
in the out-of-pocket price of care between an APA recipient and a PCH beneficiary is made
difficult by the substantial leeway that Departmental Councils retain in defining the APA and
PCH policy parameters, and by the local variations in the characteristics of home care supply.
Nonetheless, we may tentatively predict two things: first, an elderly dependent is expected
to get better access to domestic help than a handicapped adult, all other things being equal,
given that PCH does not subsidize this type of care. On the contrary, the use of personal care
and monitoring should benefit from higher subsidies with PCH than with APA, except for
low-income individuals.
Rather than relying on ad hoc case studies, our paper proposes to use quantitative meth-
ods to assess whether LTC utilization is, overall, affected by the discontinuity of public poli-
cies at age 60. We will compare individuals with ADL or IADL restrictions, below and above
12For PCH, lump-sum tariffs are used when beneficiaries receive care from an over-the-counter worker or
from a home care structure that is not “authorized” (prestataire agréé non autorisé). These tariffs are defined at
the national level. For APA, Departmental Councils are free to choose how they want to apply the co-payment
schedule and to set their level of lump-sum tariffs.
13Further details can be found in Appendix 1.A.
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age 60. Those individuals are not necessarily recipients of or even eligible for a subsidy. This
way, we intend to capture the aggregation of different potential effects: the institutional dif-
ference between handicap and dependence policies may induce individuals 60 or older to be
more likely to be eligible for and to claim home care subsidies (or the reverse); then, condi-
tional on receiving the subsidy, belonging to one population rather to the other may induce
differential care utilization because of differential generosity or content of the subsidy. Em-
pirically, this will amount to estimating an Intention To Treat (ITT) effect.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 HSM survey
We first use the French Disability and Health Survey on Households (Enquête Handicap–
Santé–Ménages, or HSM). The survey was conducted by the French National Institute of
Statistics (Insee) and the Statistical Direction of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs
(Drees) in 2008, and is representative of the French population living in the community.14
This dataset contains detailed information about the restrictions in the ADL/IADL experi-
enced by the respondents and their socio-demographic characteristics and family setting. It
also includes information about the nature of home care provided (informal or formal care,
activities the individual is assisted with), as well as about caregivers.
Since the survey sample includes both individuals below age 60 and “elderly” respon-
dents, it allows us to compare the care arrangements in the sub-populations on the two
sides of the age 60 threshold.15 Furthermore, individuals affected by disabilities and health
problems were over-sampled in the survey design, enabling to work on handicap and de-
pendence questions with reasonable sample sizes.16
3.2 Sample selection
Our population of interest includes all individuals that potentially require assistance to
perform the tasks of everyday life. We drop individuals that can perform alone the entire
set of ADL and IADL with no difficulties. We retain only individuals aged 50 to 74 to study
what happens around the threshold of age 60. From an epidemiological point of view, the
prevalence of functional limitations tends to increase for individuals in their fifties (Cambois
14The institutionalized population (living in a nursing homes, handicap centers, rehabilitation centers and
psychiatric hospitals) was the target of a companion survey, Handicap–Santé–Institutions (HSI, 2009).
15This is an important advantage of HSM over administrative datasets or elderly–specific surveys. As under-
lined by Colvez and Villebrun (2003), assessing the inconveniences of institutional age barriers cannot be done
with administrative data that are collected on the beneficiaries of a given public transfer.
16HSM sample was drawn using the results of a preliminary survey, Enquête Vie quotidienne et santé (VQS).
See Appendix 1.B for additional information on the sampling design and the implications for inference.
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et al., 2013), but the prevalence of severe activity restrictions markedly increases only after
age 80, when severe cognitive limitations come along severe difficulties to perform some
basic physical activities (Dos Santos and Makdessi, 2010). We end up with a sample of 3,121
individuals.17
Individuals with ADL or IADL restrictions represent 10.9% of the 16.8 millions people
living at home aged 50 to 74. Among individuals who are aged 50 to 60, the proportion of
those with ADL or IADL restrictions is lower than 10%; this proportion rises steadily from
10% to 15% between age 60 and 65, and reaches 25% before just before age 75.
3.3 Formal and informal care use
Definition of outcomes
We focus on two types of home care: domestic help, personal care and other assistance
with ADL/IADL provided by professional workers of the socio–medical sector, and care pro-
vided by relatives. HSM provides information on the types of tasks performed by all the care-
givers declared by a respondent. We consider that an individual receives informal care if at
least one of her relatives assists her with the activities of daily living. If the individual “only”
gets material and financial help or psychological support from her family, we consider she
does not receive informal care.18
Regarding professional care, it is important to distinguish between cure and care: an in-
dividual who has a temporary health problem may receive the frequent visits of medical and
para-medical professionals (doctors, nurses, physiotherapists, etc.), and will be recorded in
HSM as receiving professional care. However, this type of formal care does not relate to LTC
schemes: in France, medical services are paid by public and private health insurances or
out-of-pocket, and cannot be financed through home care programs.19 Thus, an individual
is said to receive formal care if she is assisted by a professional worker with ADL and IADL;
she is considered as not receiving formal care if she receives only frequent cure,20 without
any informal or formal care.
The dataset contains also information on the frequency of caregivers’ interventions and
the average hours of care received by each formal or informal caregiver. However, volume of
care is often missing for informal caregivers in the survey.21 In order to retain in our sample
17The initial sample of individuals aged 50 to 74 unable to perform alone at least one ADL or IADL was made
of 3,132 individuals. We dropped 11 individuals for which some information was missing. See Appendix 1.B.
18On the other hand, (the few) relatives who are declared as paid caregivers are considered as providing in-
formal care.
19In addition, nursing care and some personal care are provided to the disabled by nurses. Although they
may be regarded as LTC, these services are considered as health care and paid by health insurances.
20For details on the way we defined “frequent cure”, see Appendix 1.C.
21This is not a specific weakness of HSM: informal caregivers are often reluctant or simply unable to estimate
the number of hours they spend assisting their relatives (Paraponaris et al., 2012), and similarly individuals
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those individuals co-residing with their spouse, parents, children or other relatives, who are
often not responding to questions about volume of care provided, we chose to study infor-
mal care utilization at the extensive margin only. Both our informal care and formal care
utilization variables are thus binary.
Home care utilization around the age 60 threshold
Figure 1.2 (Panel A) displays care utilization rates as estimated for the two sub-
populations of interest. Predominance of informal care is visible in the two groups (about
60% of our population of interest is helped by relatives). This pattern is also observed in
most other OECD countries (Fujisawa and Colombo, 2009). Yet the 50–59 year-old are less
likely to receive any LTC, by about 7 percentage points. They more frequently receive the
assistance of informal caregivers only (49% versus 42% for individuals 60 and older). On the
contrary, they are much less likely to receive professional home care: while 31% of the 60–74
years old receive the assistance of a professional LTC worker at home, it is only the case
of 18% of the individuals in the younger sub-population. A χ2 test leads to reject that the
distribution of LTC arrangements is the same in the two sub-populations (p < 0.001).
[Figure 1.2 to be found on the following page.]
Among those receiving professional home care, individuals aged 60 and older are less
likely to have been receiving formal LTC for less than 5 years (40%, against 50%). Among
those receiving informal assistance with the activities of daily living, individuals aged 60–74
are less likely to have been provided help for less than a year (4% against 8%) and more likely
to have been helped for more than 5 years (65% against 60%). However, these figures take
into account the financial help and psychological support that may be provided by relatives:
assistance with ADL and IADL may be more recent. In addition, for both formal and informal
care, we cannot reject that the conditional distribution of the age of assistance is the same in
the two sub-populations.
The comparison of Panels B and C of Figure 1.2 shows that care arrangements are sub-
stantially different for women and men. Men and women are equally likely to receive pro-
fessional and informal care before age 60; however, the utilization rate of professional care
becomes much higher for women than for men after age 60 (35% versus 24%). Men are
much more likely to be provided informal care without any professional home care, espe-
cially when they are 60 or more. Demographics may partly explain this pattern, as elderly
who receive help from their relatives are not necessarily able or willing to “count”. It is especially problematic
for spouses and, more generally, co–residing relatives, for who the frontier between regular domestic work
and assistance to a disabled relative may be blurred. For that reason, the designers of HSM survey filtered the
questions asked about co–residing caregivers: for those relatives, frequency and volume of care are not asked.
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women are less likely to have a partner at home or children (Gaymu et al., 2008); yet gender
differences in terms of caregiving implication are also likely to play a role.
These figures highlight the necessity to control for differences in the demographic and
socio-economic composition of each subpopulation to identify the effect of LTC policies on
care arrangements separately from that of other determinants of LTC policies; they also pro-
vide a rationale for investigating into potential differential effects by gender.
Figure 1.2 – Home care use among disabled individuals, population aged 50–74.
Panel A: Individuals aged 50–74.
Panel B: Women aged 50–74. Panel C: Men aged 50–74.
POPULATION: French population aged 50 to 74, having difficulties to perform alone one
or more ADL or IADL and living in the community (N=3,121 individuals). Statistics are
computed using survey weights.
SOURCE: Insee–Drees, HSM 2008.
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To get a more precise idea of how LTC utilization evolves around the age 60 threshold, Fig-
ures 1.3 to 1.5 display population-average LTC utilization rates by civil age. On each graph,
we add two fitted lines to capture an age trend in LTC utilization: to allow this trend to differ
before and after the age 60 threshold, we regress LTC utilization first on individuals below
age 60 and second on individuals above age 60.22
The probability to receive home care, either formal or informal, tends to increase with
age. However, there seems to be a break in the trend at age 60 in all Figures. In addition, we
notice a “negative jump” at 60 in the probability to receive informal care (Figure 1.4, Panel A):
although the probability to receive assistance from relatives increases with age, individuals
just above the age 60 threshold are less likely to receive informal care than individuals just
below the threshold. We do not observe a positive jump in the probability to receive formal
home care at age 60 (Figure 1.4, Panel B).
[Figures 1.4 and 1.5 to be found on pages 71 to 73]
Figure 1.3 – Care utilization around the discontinuity: Proportion of individuals receiving
some home care (formal or informal).
SAMPLE: French population aged 50 to 74, having difficulties to perform alone one or
more ADL or IADL and living in the community (N=3,121 individuals).
NOTES: Dots represent average care utilization rate by civil age and include varying num-
bers of individuals. Linear trends in age are fitted using individual observations (either
below or above age 60) and survey weights.
SOURCE: Insee–Drees, HSM 2008.
Systematic differences in population-average LTC utilization rates by age should be in-
terpreted with caution: they may hide systematic differences in the individual determinants
of LTC utilization across the age distribution.
22The fitted lines are obtained by taking into account survey weights. We exclude age 60 when fitting the line
on individuals 60+, to account for the possibility that effective access to dependence schemes may take some
time.
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Figure 1.4 – Care utilization around the discontinuity: Proportion of individuals receiving
informal or formal home care.
Panel A (top): Share of individuals receiving informal
care.
Panel B (bottom): Share of individuals receiving formal
care.
NOTES: SAMPLE: French population aged 50 to 74, having difficulties to perform alone
one or more ADL or IADL and living in the community (N = 3,121 individuals).
NOTES: Dots represent average care utilization rate by civil age and include varying num-
bers of individuals. Linear trends in age are fitted using individual observations (either
below or above age 60) and survey weights.
SOURCE: Insee–Drees, HSM 2008.
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Figure 1.5 – Care utilization around the discontinuity: Proportion of individuals receiving
both formal and informal home care.
SAMPLE: French population aged 50 to 74, having difficulties to perform alone one or
more ADL or IADL and living in the community (N = 3,121 individuals).
NOTES: Dots represent average care utilization rate by civil age and include varying num-
bers of individuals. Linear trends in age are fitted using individual observations (either
below or above age 60) and survey weights.
SOURCE: Insee–Drees, HSM 2008.
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3.4 Socio-demographic and family characteristics
HSM provides a rich set of individual characteristics likely to correlate with both age and
care settings. Based on previous literature, the covariates we retain are of three types: health
and disability variables, socio-demographic characteristics (including gender) and family
resources.
Severity of disability is likely to affect the demand for paid home care services and the
propensity of relatives to provide some assistance. We compute a dummy equal to 1 if the
individual has ADL restrictions, the number of ADL and the number of IADL the individual
has difficulties to perform alone. More precisely, following Arnault (2015), we distinguish be-
tween non-cognitive and cognitive IADL and compute two separate indexes. Are considered
as “cognitive IADL” using a telephone, completing routine administrative processes, taking
medication23 and finding route. This allows to control more accurately for differences in the
type of disabilities on both sides of the age 60 threshold, as Dos Santos and Makdessi (2010)
have shown that severe cognitive limitations are rare before 60 but becomes much more fre-
quent for individuals aged 60 to 79.
Although the various ADL and IADL may not induce the same need for compensation,
the total numbers of restrictions in ADL and of restrictions in IADL is likely to provide a
good indicator of the severity of an individual’s disability.24 To better account for potential
heterogeneity in care needs, we control also for physical, sensory and cognitive functional
limitations (Cambois and Robine, 2003). Lastly, we include a dummy equal to 1 if the in-
dividual has absolute restrictions in one of the 3 “essential” ADL: feeding oneself when the
food is ready, going to the restroom, and sitting and getting up. As shown by epidemiological
longitudinal studies, these ADLs tend to be chronologically the last ones to be affected in the
disablement process (Edjolo et al., 2016). They induce an intensive demand for LTC services.
We additionally take into account the self-assessed health status, coded in three levels and a
dummy for having declared any chronic condition.
A second range of individual characteristics include the level of education and the
monthly household income per consumption unit, as well as dummies for retirement
and employment status. To take into account potential differences in the local supply of
professional home care services, area of residence is included, coded in 5 categories.25 As
23Barberger-Gateau et al. (1993) find that these 3 IADLs are strong predictors of one-year incident dementia.
The IADL “having difficulties in taking a means of transportation” is also a predictor but since such difficulties
may also arise due to physical limitations, we exclude them from our index of cognitive limitations.
24We do not consider the possibility of the possible endogeneity of restrictions in ADL and IADL. As pointed
out by Cambois and Robine (2003), restrictions in everyday life activities may arise because of a misappropriate
compensation of functional limitations. Stabile et al. (2006); Rapp et al. (2011); Barnay and Juin (2016) find that
increased availability of (publicly-financed) home care has a positive effect on the physical and mental health,
which may in turn affect activity restrictions.
25These 5 categories are: living in a rural area, living in a urban area with less than 20,000 inhabitants, living
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handicap and dependence policies are implemented at the local level in France, we include
a dummy for each department (département).26 We also include a dummy for living oversea,
as public schemes and the organization of professional LTC, as well as family and social
norms, may differ from the situation in metropolitan France.
We then include some family characteristics that reflect the presence of potential care-
givers and could explain differences in home care utilization. Having children is expected to
increase the likelihood of receiving informal care; so is the proportion of daughters, as girls
are more likely to assist their parents with day-to-day the activities (Horowitz, 1985; Bonnet
et al., 2013).27 We also control for the fact of having any siblings alive, and we add a dummy
equal to one if individual has at least one sister. Having a partner alive may increase informal
care utilization while decreasing formal home care utilization.
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics on the individual and family characteristics of the
two sub-populations of interest. Among the 60+, we find a higher proportion of women
than in the subgroup aged less than 60, which is consistent with the lower life expectancy of
men. While functional limitations are barely more prevalent in the eldest sub-population,
the number of IADL individuals have difficulty to perform increases with age. Surprisingly,
the share of individuals with ADL restrictions is higher among individuals aged less than
60. To interpret this fact, remember that we retain in our sample only individuals with IADL
and ADL restrictions (living in the community). The higher prevalence of ADL restrictions
among the youngest group would certainly not hold in the general population. It is probably
due to the fact that the individuals with more severe health conditions and disability levels
are less likely to age in place or have a reduced life-expectancy.28 As expected, the share of
individuals with absolute restrictions in one of the 3 essential ADL is very low in our sam-
in a urban area with more than 20,000 inhabitants and less then 100,000, living in a urban area with more than
100,000 inhabitants but not in Paris, living in Paris.
26Field observations (Billaud et al., 2012) and a quantitative survey on local governments (Enquête Territoire,
LEDa-LEGOS and CES (2012)) surveyed French metropolitan Conseils départementaux in 2012 to collect in-
formation on the implementation of the APA policy on their territory. These studies have shown that access
to APA, evaluation of needs and computation of the co-payment vary from one department to the other. Al-
though the main parameters of the APA subsidy are defined at the national level, local governments retain
substantial leeway in its attribution and calculus, affecting the insurance and distributive properties of the pol-
icy (Bourreau-Dubois and Gramain, 2014; Bourreau-Dubois et al., 2015). Similarly, practices of assessment and
complementary fundings for PCH may vary from a department to another. Moreover, regulation of home care
services is also organized at the local level, and local authorities’ decisions have a direct influence on the price
level of the available services (Hege et al., 2014). As a consequence, department of residence is likely not only
to influence formal home care utilization, but also to affect the effective differences between handicap and
dependence schemes.
27Note that the gender of children may not play at the extensive margin: Fontaine (2010) shows that daugh-
ters provide on average more hours of care to their elderly parents, but represent just a little more than half
of caregivers. Our definition of assistance in the activities of daily living include punctual help with home
improvements and administrative tasks that sons are more likely to perform, while daughters provide more
personal care and regular domestic work (Pennec, 2009).
28Given that our data are cross-sectional, this counter-intuitive pattern may also reflect the lower mortality
from chronic conditions and disabling diseases observed in younger generations due to medical progress.
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ple: most individuals with such a low functional status are supposedly living in a specialized
institution.
Education levels reflect generational effects: the French born in the 1950s were more
likely to complete primary and secondary education than those born ten or fifteen years
earlier. Income distribution is more concentrated among the 60–74 years-old: this is con-
sistent with the fact that most individuals after 60 receive pension benefits, which are less
unequally distributed than salaries and social allowances in the active age population (Insee
et al., 2013).29 No marked difference shows up in the area of residence — except for the fact
that oversea departments tend to be older.
In terms of family characteristics, the two sub-populations are similar: about 2/3 of indi-
viduals have a partner alive, and more than 85% have at least a child alive. Individuals who
are less than 60 have yet a higher probability to have brothers and sisters alive.
[Table 1.2 to be found on the following page]
3.5 Individual information on LTC benefits
One shortcoming of HSM is that information on LTC benefits is of poor quality. Con-
sidering the entire population of individuals aged 60 and older, the number of individuals
reporting APA benefit is estimated to be 330,000, twice less than what administrative records
show. Undereporting of PCH benefits is also observed, while the survey indicates slightly
more ACTP beneficiaries than administrative records do (Appendix 1.A). As we may not ex-
clude that the institutional threshold at age 60 also affects the probability to misreport LTC
benefits, we will not attempt to relate self-reported declaration of LTC benefits with LTC uti-
lization.
29Educational attainment and income may also have been influenced by individual disability, especially in
the 50–59 years-old group, for which disability is more likely to have affected the labor market participation.
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Table 1.2 – Population descriptive statistics.
Individuals Individuals Difference
less than 60 60 and older 60+−60−
[1] [2] [3]
Average age 54.7 67.7 +12.9∗∗∗
Woman 61.2% 70.1% +8.9∗∗∗
Self-declared health status
Health status: bad 55.6% 51.1% -4.5n.s.
Health status: average 30.2% 35.8% +5.6∗
Health status: good 14.1% 13.2% -0.9n.s.
Has a chronic condition 87.4% 89.5% +2.1n.s.
Functional limitations and activity restrictions
Has physical functional limitations 81.3% 87.0% +5.7∗
Has sensory functional limitations 46.6% 49.4% +2.8n.s.
Has cognitive functional limitations 51.2% 54.1% +2.9n.s.
Has ADL restrictions 37.2% 32.7% -4.5∗
Has absolute restrictions in 1 of the 3 key ADLs 2.6% 3.1% +0.5n.s.
Average number of non-cognitive IADL 1.9 2.3 +0.3∗∗∗
Average number of cognitive IADL 0.6 0.7 +0.1∗∗
Average number of ADL restrictions 0.9 0.8 -0.1n.s.
Education level
No degree 34.0% 37.2% +3.2n.s.
Primary education degree 21.7% 32.9% +11.2∗∗∗
Secondary education degree 37.7% 21.4% -16.3∗∗∗
College or university degree 6.6% 8.4% +1.8n.s.
Monthly household income (per c.u.)
Income quartile 1 (poorest) 24.9% 18.5% -6.4∗∗
Income quartile 2 20.9% 28.3% +7.4∗∗∗
Income quartile 3 23.6% 26.4% -2.8n.s.
Income quartile 4 (richest) 30.4% 26.8% -3.6n.s.
Work status
Is employed 25.9% 2.8% -23.1∗∗∗
Is retired 5.7% 84.0% +78.2∗∗∗
Area of residence
Lives in a rural area 25.0% 23.9% -0.1n.s.
Lives in a small urban area 18.7% 17.9% -0.8n.s.
Lives in a medium urban area 12.4% 14.7% +2.3n.s.
Lives in a large urban area 30.4% 30.5% 0.1n.s.
Lives in Paris 13.5% 13.1% -0.4n.s.
Lives oversea 2.7% 3.6% +0.9n.s.
Family characteristics
Has a partner 65.4% 61.8% -3.5n.s.
Has at least a child alive 85.6% 86.6% +1.0n.s.
Number of children 2.3 2.5 +0.2n.s.
Proportion of girls 40.7% 42.4% +1.6n.s.
Has any brother or sister alive 91.8% 80.4% -11.4∗∗∗
Has a sister alive 76.2% 65.1% -11.0∗∗∗
N (sample) 1,393 1,728 -
NOTES: For statistics displayed in percentages in Columns [1] and [2], the differences in Column [3]
are expressed in percentage points. Statistics computed on the baseline sample (3,121 individuals),
using survey weights. n.s. p≥0.10, ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01. The Student test of differences
between the two sub-populations takes into account the sampling design.
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4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Empirical specification
Home care utilization
As a starting point, we disregard the distinction between formal and informal care. We
define Y∗i a continuous variable of home care use for individual i , including both profes-
sional care and the care provided by relatives. We assume that Y∗i is a linear function of some
individual characteristics Zi , of the institutional environment and of an idiosyncratic factor
ui , according to the following Equation:
Y∗i = α+β.60+i +Z′iθ+ui (1.1)
where 60+i is a dummy equal to one if individual i is aged 60 and older and α is a constant.
Conditional on an unconfoundedness assumption and the model being well-specified, coef-
ficient β in Equation (1.1) captures the impact of belonging to the perimeter of dependence
policies rather than of handicap schemes. If β were positive, this would mean that the in-
stitutional barrier in LTC policies causes the dependent elderly to be more likely to receive
home care than the handicapped adults.
Formal and informal care utilization
If informal care utilization and formal care consumption result from simultaneous deci-
sions,30 estimating Equation (1.1) by a Probit with formal (alternatively, informal) care uti-
lization as the dependent variable will give incorrect standard errors. To achieve correct in-
ference given our nonlinear econometric model, it is necessary to estimate the impact of the
institutional age threshold on formal and informal care utilization in a simultaneous equa-
tion setting. We estimate the following model:31
Y
∗
I = αI +βI.60++Z′θI +uI
Y∗F = αF +βF.60++Z′θF +uF
(1.2)
Coefficients have the same interpretation as in Equation (1.1) but are now equation-
30To model the provision of informal care and professional care services utilization, previous literature has
made use of family decision models, with two different conceptual choices: either a unique family utility func-
tion is assumed (Stern, 1995; Stabile et al., 2006); or it is supposed that the disabled individual and her relatives
have different, potentially diverging preferences (Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Van Houtven and Norton, 2004;
Bolin et al., 2008). The second approach has been shown to be more consistent with empirical observations
(Pezzin and Schone, 1999).
31We drop the subscript i to make notations easier.
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specific; they are thus indexed by I (respectively by F) in the equation of determination of in-
formal (resp. formal) care utilization. The coefficient of correlation between the error terms
uI and uF, denoted ρ, can differ from zero: unobserved determinants of informal care and
formal care use may correlate.
4.2 Identification assumption
For our estimate of β (resp. β j , j = I,F) to be consistent, we have to assume that
E[u|Z,60+] (resp. E[u j |Z,60+], j = I,F) is constant. This is the most standard assumption of
unconfoundedness: it imposes that there is no endogeneity bias, no reverse causality and
no omitted variable.
Concerns about endogeneity and reverse causality of our dummy of interst, 60+, are easy
to dimiss, as civil age is arguably exogenous. Omitted variable bias is a more serious threat
to identification here. In the set of covariates Z, we include the individual characteristics
presented in Table 1.2 as well as departmental fixed effects.
We may yet wonder whether there are some unobserved determinants of LTC use corre-
lating with age. Household wealth and housing assets, for example, are not observed, while
they correlate with age in the general population (Insee, 2016). Preferences for LTC may also
vary with age or be generational. To decrease the risk of omitted variable bias, we allow LTC
use to depend on age independently from the institutional age threshold in LTC schemes.
Empirically, we include age effects, through a linear trend in our baseline specifications. To
give more flexibility to the model, we allow the trend in age to be different before and after
the threshold of age 60. In practical terms, the set of covariates Zi we include in the model
writes as:
Zi =
(
(Ag ei −60),60+i .(Ag ei −60),Xi
)
where Xi is the set of covariates other than age. If LTC use truly depends on age (in a linear
way) conditional on the observable characteristics Xi , our specification will ensure that we
do not confound the effect of the institutional threshold at age 60 with that of age itself.
4.3 Estimation method
Observational scheme
Since our variables of formal and informal care use are binary, we have the following
observational scheme, for y = Y,YI,YF:
y =
1 if y
∗ > 0
0 else
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We estimate Equation (1.1) by Maximum Likelihood running a univariate probit, assum-
ing u follows a normal distribution with zero conditional mean. Similarly, System (1.2) is
estimated by a bivariate probit, with the assumption that (uI,uF) follows a bivariate nor-
mal distribution. To ease the interpretation of results, we provide the average partial effects
rather than the raw coefficients from the Probit.
Unweighted versus weighted regressions
The debate about the role of sampling weights in uncovering causal relationships is a
longstanding one (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) and is all the more relevant here as the cross–
sectional variation in survey weights in HSM is high. When the theoretical grounds for run-
ning weighted regressions are not clearly applying, Solon et al. (2015) advise to report both
weighted and unweighted estimates and discuss their potential differences.32 In all speci-
fications we have tested, standard errors are extremely high when we take into account the
survey sampling design; this may reflect the unaccounted for clustered structure of the error
terms (Dickens, 1990). In particular, clustering on age, as we believe is warranted given our
model, cannot be achieved when we take into account the weights and the stratified struc-
ture of the sample.33 We thus choose to report only estimates from the unweighted regres-
sions, bearing in mind that they are consistent only if there is no unmodeled heterogeneity.
When deriving the average partial or marginal effects, we plug back in the survey weights, in
order to obtain the population average effects and not the sample average effects.
32Solon et al. (2015) discusses three reasons why an applied economist would run weighted regressions. First,
weights may allow to correct for heteroscedasticity; in practice yet, the increase in precision thereby achieved
highly depends on the structure of the error term. Second, weights may correct for endogenous sampling —
an issue that we do not face while using HSM data. Finally, in the case of heterogeneous effects, weighted
regression may help to identify unbiased average partial effects. In the general case though, it will not make up
for not modeling adequately heterogeneity of effects.
33In Stata, we add the prefix svy to the probit or biprobit regression commands; the prefix does not sup-
port the option vce(cluster varname ).
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5 Results
5.1 Baseline results
Table 1.3 presents the results from univariate probit estimations of Equation (1.1).34
Specification (1) regresses the probability of receiving any care (be it informal or formal care)
on the dummy “being 60 and older” and all covariates but age. The coefficient is positive
and significantly different from zero at the 5% level. When adding a linear age trend, in
Column (2), the coefficient decreases and statistical significance vanishes. We find a similar
result when allowing the age trend in LTC utilization to be different before and after age 60
(Column (3)).
Table 1.3 – Home care utilization: Estimation results.
Outcome: P(Y = 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
60+ 0.033∗∗ 0.003 0.015 0.030∗ -0.008 -0.001
(0.015) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.021) (0.018)
(Age - 60) 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
60+.(Age - 60) 0.006∗ 0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample (ages included) 50–74 50–74 50–74 50–74 w/o
age 60
50–74 w/o
age 60
50–74 w/o
age 60
Observations 3100 3100 3100 2964 2964 2964
Clusters 25 25 25 24 24 24
AIC 2434.0 2432.3 2430.3 2309.9 2308.1 2305.6
BIC 2579.0 2577.3 2575.3 2447.8 2445.9 2443.4
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Population-
average partial effects (APE) for binary variables are computed using the finite-difference method. Aver-
age marginal effects (AME) for continuous variables are computed using the delta method. Unweighted
estimations by a Probit model, data from HSM 2008. Specifications include department fixed effects. 21
individuals had to be withdrawn from the baseline sample, as no within–department variations in the
outcome variable was observed for these observations.
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) are
reported (Akaike, 1998; Schwarz, 1978). Both AIC and BIC indicate that the best fit of the
34The sample used in estimations of Table 1.3 is slightly smaller than our baseline sample: it contains 3,100
individuals instead of 3,121. This is because within a few departments, either all observations are receiving
care, or all individuals receive no assistance at home. Such a pattern is mainly due to the sampling design of
the survey: in order to minimize collection costs, not all the departments were equally intensively surveyed.
As this technical selection appears to be essentially random, we chose to run our estimations on the entire
sample of 3,121 individuals when estimating System (1.2) to maximize the precision of our results, and to use
the sub-sample of 3,100 individuals when estimating Equation (1.1).
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model to the data is obtained when an age effect is included with different slopes on both
sides of the discontinuity (Column (3)).35 This is our preferred specification.36
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 1.3 replicates Columns (1) to (3) on the sample excluding in-
dividuals who are aged 60 at the time of the survey. Applying for and being granted LTC
benefits may take time: time to get aware of one’s eligibility to the program, time to gather
information and prepare an application, and time for the administration to process the ap-
plication and implement the transfer or subsidy.37 The effects of the change in accessible
public schemes may not be detectable when individuals turn 60, but only later on. We thus
check the robustness of our results to the exclusion of those individuals who are located just
at the institutional discontinuity. The results are qualitatively similar: when we do not con-
trol by age itself, being 60 or more is associated with a higher probability to receive home
care, but this effect vanishes when we control (linearly) for age.
Given the very small and statistically non-significant coefficient we find for the 60+
dummy, we cannot reject that the age threshold in LTC policies has no effect on the
probability of receiving some home care.
We now turn to the estimation of the bivariate model of Equation (1.2). Specifications
(1) to (3) of Table 1.4 are similar to the first three specifications of Table 1.3, but we consider
now several outcomes: we estimate the effect of being considered a dependent elderly rather
than a handicapped adult on (i) the probability to receive informal care, (ii) the probability
to use formal care, and (iii) the probability of joint utilization.
[Table 1.4 to be found on the following page.]
As shown by Column (1), if we do not control by age itself, the model suggests that being
a dependent elderly rather than a handicapped adult is associated with a lower probability
to receive informal care and a — much — higher probability to receive formal home care.
The magnitude of the effect on professional care is high (+11pp.) given that the population-
average utilization rate of formal care is about 25%.
However, when we include age trends in LTC utilization, the point estimates decrease
in absolute value and statistical precision diminishes. In our favorite specification (Column
(3)), we find that being a dependent elderly rather than a handicapped adult is associated
35As these information criteria relates negatively to the log-likelihood, a smaller AIC (alternatively, a smaller
BIC) points out to a better model. These statistics balance the gain in likelihood with the increase in the number
of parameters to be estimated: when an additional control adds very little in terms of likelihood, AIC and BIC
decrease. By construction, AIC gives less penalty to additional controls.
36We have also tested specifications including quadratic and cubic age effects. The fit of the model increases
only slightly when we include higher order polynomial terms in age. The coefficient of the 60+ dummy remains
positive but practically negligible. Statistical precision decreases dramatically, as age polynomials strongly cor-
relate with the 60+ dummy.
37In the case of APA, field observations show that several months may go by between the date an individual
sends her application file and the moment she eventually receives notification of acceptance.
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Table 1.4 – Informal care and formal care utilization: Estimation results.
Average partial effect of being 60+
Outcomes (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pr (YI = 1) -0.054∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.029 -0.046∗∗
(0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Pr (YF = 1) 0.111∗∗∗ 0.037∗ 0.036∗ 0.037
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.027)
Pr (YI = 1,YF = 1) 0.043∗∗∗ 0.010 0.012 0.007
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
ρ -0.437∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗∗
(-8.62) (-8.39) (-8.39) (-8.02)
Age effects None Linear;
common
slope
Linear;
different
slopes
Linear;
different
slopes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample (ages included) 50–74 50–74 50–74 50–74 w/o
age 60
Observations 3121 3121 3121 2985
Clusters 25 25 25 24
AIC 5923.5 5901.1 5900.7 5635.0
BIC 6074.6 6052.3 6051.8 5779.0
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p <
0.01. Population-average partial effects (APE) for binary variables are computed using finite-
difference method. Unweighted estimations by a bivariate Probit model, data from HSM 2008.
Specifications include department fixed effects.
with a 3.6pp. higher probability to use formal care (statistically significant at the 10% level).
The point estimate suggests a negative effect on the probability to be provided informal as-
sistance with the activities of daily living (−2.9pp.), but the effect is not statistically significant
at conventional levels. When we exclude those individuals just at the discontinuity (aged 60
in 2008), in Column (4), the negative effect on the informal care utilization rate becomes
statistically significant. Overall, our estimates suggests that being 60 and older would cause
the probability of receiving help from professionals to increase and the odd to be assisted by
relatives to decrease, leaving the utilization rate of home care unchanged.
The correlation between the error terms uI and uF, ρ, is estimated to be negative, highly
significant in statistical terms and practically important. This implies that the unobserved
factors that increase the propensity to use professional home care services are negatively
correlated with those factors that increase the propensity to receive informal care.
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5.2 Results on covariates
Overall, results obtained on covariates are consistent with previous works on the deter-
minants of home care utilization. They are displayed in Tables 1.5 and 1.6.
[Tables 1.5 and 1.6 to be found on the following pages.]
Being a woman increases the propensity to use formal care, consistent with Katz et al.
(2000). Declaring a good health status has, paradoxically, a positive effect on professional
care utilization, but this effect holds for a given functional status. Having ADL restrictions
seems to decrease formal care utilization, but the probability to receive some professional
care increases with the number of ADLs affected. The effect is opposite for informal care
utilization. Having cognitive limitations increases professional care utilization.
The area of residence has only limited effects on care utilization rates, possibly because
much of the territorial variation in care provision patterns is absorbed by the departmental
dummies. These dummies (not reported in results tables) are jointly significant, confirming
the existence of inter-departmental differences. Having a tertiary education increases the
use of formal care, which may reflect different social norms towards paid domestic help. Be-
longing to the top income quartile also has a strong and statistically significant effect on the
probability to use formal care. Being employed has an effect on informal care utilization (5%
level), maybe because of the time constraints it imposes on caregivers or because individuals
who are working in spite of their disability are less able to rely on family solidarity.
Consistently with past literature, informal care provision is positively associated with
having daughters or sisters (Bonsang, 2009; Horowitz, 1985), having a partner alive, or hav-
ing a child or a parent co-residing. Interestingly, the effects of these same variables on the
propensity to use formal care are usually of the opposite sign.
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Table 1.5 – Informal care and formal care utilization as simultaneous decisions: Results on
covariates (1/2)
Average partial or marginal effects
Univariate Probit Bivariate Probit
Outcome: Home care Informal care Formal care
(1) (2) (3)
60+ 0.015 -0.029 0.036∗
(0.019) (0.022) (0.020)
Woman 0.007 0.008 0.051∗∗
(0.015) (0.019) (0.017)
Self-assessed health: bad 0.012 0.016 -0.014
(0.013) (0.019) (0.020)
Self-assessed health: fair Ref. Ref. Ref.
Self-assessed health: good 0.032 0.000 0.063∗∗
(0.026) (0.034) (0.030)
Has a chronic condition 0.043 0.057∗ -0.004
(0.033) (0.033) (0.029)
Has ADL restrictions 0.077∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ -0.028
(0.027) (0.028) (0.022)
Has restrictions with most -0.126 -0.072 0.135∗∗
essential ADLs (0.091) (0.059) (0.043)
Has physical functional limitations 0.053∗∗ 0.053∗ 0.017
(0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
Has cognitive functional limitations 0.008 -0.018 0.043∗∗
(0.018) (0.021) (0.015)
Has sensory functional limitations -0.028∗ -0.004 -0.003
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013)
Number of ADLs -0.005 -0.015 0.007
restrictions (0.012) (0.010) (0.006)
Number of non-cognitive IADLs 0.098∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
restrictions (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Number of cognitive IADLs 0.020∗∗ 0.015 0.002
restrictions (0.008) (0.012) (0.009)
Lives in a rural area -0.010 0.030 0.014
(0.025) (0.026) (0.017)
Lives in a small urban area -0.015 -0.013 -0.016
(0.039) (0.036) (0.031)
Lives in a medium–size urban area Ref. Ref. Ref.
Lives in a large urban area -0.006 0.040 -0.044∗∗
(0.029) (0.026) (0.021)
Lives in the Paris region -0.021 -0.058 0.059
(0.092) (0.103) (0.078)
End of covariates in following table
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Table 1.6 – Informal care and formal care utilization as simultaneous decisions: Results on
covariates (2/2)
Average partial or marginal effects
Univariate Probit Bivariate Probit
Outcome: Home care Informal care Formal care
(1) (2) (3)
Beginning of covariates in previous table
Diploma: none -0.005 0.010 -0.025
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Diploma: primary education Ref. Ref. Ref.
Diploma: secondary education -0.021 -0.013 0.021
(0.023) (0.025) (0.023)
Diploma: higher education 0.067∗∗ -0.034 0.160∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.033) (0.034)
Income quartile: 1st (poorest) 0.040∗ 0.023 0.001
(0.022) (0.019) (0.018)
Income quartile: 2nd Ref. Ref. Ref.
Income quartile: 3rd 0.004 0.020 -0.005
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Income quartile: 4th (richest) 0.050∗∗ 0.012 0.090∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.017)
Works -0.031 -0.045 -0.032
(0.034) (0.035) (0.030)
Has a partner 0.110∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.011)
Has children alive -0.092∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.036
(0.020) (0.025) (0.027)
Number of children alive 0.011∗∗ 0.018∗∗ -0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Proportion of daughters among 0.000 0.048∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗
children (0.022) (0.023) (0.018)
Has any brother or sister -0.013 0.009 -0.007
(0.028) (0.029) (0.026)
Has a sister alive 0.016 0.057∗∗ -0.034∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.019)
ρ – -0.438∗∗∗
(-8.39)
Age effects Linear, different trends
Observations 3121 3036
Clusters 25 25
AIC 2430.3 5900.7
BIC 2575 6051.8
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Average partial effects (APE) for binary variables are computed using finite-difference method.
Average marginal effects (AME) for continuous variables are computed using delta method.
Estimation by a univariate or bivariate Probit model, data from HSM 2008. The specification
includes departmental fixed effects (F–test of joint significance: p < 0.01).
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5.3 Heterogeneity analysis
We test whether the effects of the institutional age thresholds differ by gender and dis-
ability level. In Table 1.7, Column (1) replicates our preferred specification from the baseline
univariate Probit and bivariate Probit estimations. Column (2) (resp. Column (3)) replicates
the analysis on the sub-sample of women (resp. men). Column (4) (resp. Column (5)) run
the same estimations on the sub-sample of individuals with ADL restrictions (resp. with no
ADL restriction).38
[Table 1.7 to be found on the following page.]
Men are found to be more likely to receive some home care when they are dependent
elderly (Panel A of Table 1.7, Column (3)). The probability to receive informal home care is
about 6pp. higher for men when they are 60 and older; in addition, those are 7pp. more likely
to be helped by professionals (Panel B). On the contrary, women seem much less affected by
the age 60 threshold: the bivariate probit estimation (Panel B, Column (2)) suggests that
being a dependent woman decreases the probability to receive informal home care relative
to a handicapped woman, but the univariate probit does not find any significant effect of the
age 60 threshold on the probability to receive any home care.39
When testing heterogeneity by disability level, we find that the probability to receive
some assistance in the activities of daily living is higher for individuals aged 60 and older
among the sub-population with ADL restrictions (i-e with severe disability) (Column (4),
Panel A). The probabilities of receiving care from relatives and from professional caregivers
increase substantially (+6pp and +8pp). On the contrary, among individuals with a more
moderate disability level (IADL restrictions only), falling into the perimeter of dependence
policies decreases the probability to receive professional assistance. These results suggest
that becoming eligible for APA — as individuals with ADL restrictions are expected to be
when they are 60 or more — increases the access to professional care for individuals with
severe disability.
38Running sub-sample estimations rather than adding an interaction term to the baseline specification in-
duces a loss of statistical power. However, the inclusion of interaction terms in probit models raise estimation
issues (Ai and Norton, 2003). In addition, running sub-sample regressions allows to better take into account
potential heterogeneity in the effects of the covariates.
39Had we not controlled for age effects, our estimates might have captured generational effects — for exam-
ple, a woman born in the 1930s may have been more reluctant to have a professional worker coming at her
house than a woman born in the 1950s.
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Table 1.7 – Informal care and formal care utilization:: Heterogeneity of effects by gender and
disability level.
Average partial effect of being 60+
All Women Men ADL
restrictions
No ADL
restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Univariate probit estimation
Pr (YI = 1 or YF = 1) 0.015 -0.010 0.103∗∗ 0.094∗∗ -0.032
(0.019) (0.025) (0.035) (0.029) (0.031)
Observations 3100 1955 997 1145 1761
Clusters 25 25 25 25 25
AIC 2430.3 1540.3 777.5 620.5 1679.4
BIC 2575.3 1674.1 895.2 741.5 1810.8
Panel B: Bivariate probit estimation
Pr (YI = 1) -0.029 -0.075∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.063∗∗ -0.091∗∗
(0.022) (0.033) (0.024) (0.031) (0.036)
Pr (YF = 1) 0.036∗ 0.027 0.071∗∗ 0.082∗∗ -0.011
(0.020) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.043)
Pr (YI = 1,YF = 1) 0.012 -0.008 0.050∗∗ 0.081∗∗ -0.027
(0.011) (0.017) (0.019) (0.027) (0.020)
Observations 3121 2001 1120 1337 1784
Clusters 25 25 25 25 25
AIC 5900.7 3806.2 1804.0 2149.2 3464.0
BIC 6051.8 3946.3 1929.5 2279.2 3601.2
Age effects Linear, different slopes
Other controls Yes
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Population-
average partial effects (APE) for binary variables are computed using finite-difference method. Unweighted
estimations by a univariate probit (Panel A) or a bivariate Probit model (Panel B), data from HSM 2008. Spec-
ifications include department fixed effects. The sample sizes of Columns (2) and (3) (resp. (4) and (5)) do not
sum up to the size of the entire sample (Column (1)): in some sub-samples, there is no variation in the outcome
variable within a department, due to the sampling design. Observations from those departments are dropped
from the estimation.
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6 Dicussion
6.1 Robustness of the identification strategy
As discussed in Section 4.2, we include linear controls for age on each side of the age 60
threshold to capture some unobservable trends in home care use that would correlate with
age.
The idea behind the inclusion of age effects bears resemblance with the identification
philosophy of the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) approach (Lee and Lemieux,
2010). As the institutional threshold at age 60 provides an exogenous source of variation
in benefit coverage around that age, an RDD approach would offer the potential for an
identification based on a quasi-experimental setting. Identification would rely on the
relatively weak assumption that home care use is a smooth function of age, continuous at
age 60. Using a parametric implementation (Lee et al., 2004), we would be able to estimate
the effect of the age 60 threshold by regressing our outcomes on the 60+ dummy while
controlling for age through polynomial terms. In such a setting, the inclusion of control
variables other than age would essentially affects statistical precision.
There are yet several reasons to doubt that an “authentic” RDD approach would, in our
context, sustain the level of proof it normally ensures. Firstly, RDD identification is all the
more credible as the number of observations near the threshold is high. Our survey data
leave use with a relatively small sample size. In addition, the number of individuals in the
sample who are at the right of age 60 is particularly low (Figure 1.D.1, Appendix 1.D).40 To
obtain sufficient statistical precision, we would need to include in the estimation sample
individuals relatively far away from the threshold, thus increasing the risk of bias in the esti-
mator of β (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). Secondly, given that the treatment status is entirely
determined by age, clustering on age is warranted. Low statistical precision is further accen-
tuated by the fact that age is measured in years and not in months. Thirdly, RDD identifi-
cation requires that no other institutional discontinuity potentially affecting the use of LTC
takes place right at age 60. Individuals aged 60 in 2008 had their minimum retirement age
precisely at age 60 and the probability to retire in the general population exhibits a spike at
this age (Blanchet and Mahieu, 2004). Although we rule out several channels through which
retirement could affect LTC use in our population of interest,41 the fact that age 60 is con-
ventionally seen as the kick-off of “old-age” in France may have an effect of the use of LTC
and on the involvement of the relatives, above and beyond LTC policies.
Although it leaves us with a stronger unconfoundedness assumption, we have deemed
40This is due both to the complex design of the survey and to the demographic structure of the French pop-
ulation: the cohorts aged 63 to 68 in 2008 were born during the WWII (Figure 1.D.2, Appendix 1.D).
41For the full discussion, see Appendix 1.E.
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the classical regression approach to be more robust given the data limitations and the insti-
tutional context. This implies that, even though we include age effects in the list of controls,
we do not claim that our identification strategy is as compelling as a quasi-experimental,
RDD-type identification would be.
We have tested whether our estimates are robust to the inclusion of non-linear trends
in age and to the restriction of our sample to individuals closer to age 60. The signs of the
point estimates do not change when we include quadratic and cubic polynomials in age as
covariates, although the precision becomes much lower (as we add controls that are highly
correlated with our dummy of interest). When we replicate our estimations on the samples
of individuals aged 50 to 69, or even 55 to 64, results become inconclusive: given the much
reduced number of observations, standard errors increase substantially.42
6.2 Interpretation of the results
Our results suggest that belonging to the institutional perimeter of dependence policies,
as opposed to standing below the threshold of age 60, tends to increase formal care utiliza-
tion and decrease the probability to be helped by relatives, for individuals who do not live in
a specialized institution on a permanent basis. Due to relatively small sample sizes, statis-
tical precision is low, making it difficult to quantify the effects on formal care and informal
care utilization propensities. Yet, one salient feature is that effects are heterogeneous: on
average, men and individuals with ADL restrictions appear more likely to benefit from infor-
mal care when they are elderly dependent. Only individuals with ADL restrictions (on top
of IADL restrictions) have a higher utilization rate of professional home care when they are
dependent elderly.
One interpretation is that, on average, the elderly with moderate to severe activity restric-
tions are more likely to receive APA than they would be to receive PCH, were they younger
than 60.43 The fact that APA allows individuals 60 and older with ADL restrictions to ben-
efit from some subsidized domestic help might contribute to the observed increase in for-
mal care utilization among individuals with ADL restrictions. It may indeed be the case that
individuals who are reluctant to being provided personal care by professional caregivers ac-
cept more easily professional domestic help. As PCH cannot be used to pay for domestic
42Results are available on demand. Restricting the sample in terms of the age range reduces the number of
clusters, which may threaten the validity of inference as we cluster our standard errors on age.
43Such an interpretation seems consistent with earlier results presented in Tenand (2016). Exploiting HSM
information on self-reported benefits, we found that the probability to report benefiting from home care sub-
sidies is practically and statistically significantly higher among individuals aged 60 and older, even when we
control for functional limitations, activity restrictions, socio-demographic characteristics and family resources.
If the self-reported LTC beneficiaries were a random draw from the true population of LTC beneficiaries, then
these results would suggest that the institutional at age 60 makes individuals in the perimeter of dependence
policies more likely to benefit from a public scheme. Yet, again, we cannot rule out that under-reporting of LTC
benefits correlates with the features of LTC schemes we are interested in.
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help, individuals below age 60 have to rely on their family for house chores, unless they pay
out-of-pocket the full price for professional domestic help or can benefit from means-tested
domestic help provided by the departments.
We tested this assumption by replicating our probit estimation on six different outcomes,
indicating whether individuals received (i) domestic help, (ii) monitoring, or (iii) personal
care, provided either by professionals or by relatives.4445 Focusing on individuals with ADL
restrictions, we find a positive point estimate for the effect of the age 60 threshold on the
probability to receive professional domestic help (+3.7pp), but it is not statistically signifi-
cant at the 10% level. On the contrary, the probability to be provided with domestic help by
relatives increases by 8.4pp. The probability to be provided monitoring by either relatives
or professionals does not change. When we look at the rate of personal care utilization, we
find that being a dependent elderly increases the probability to be provided such care by
professionals (+8pp, p < 0.05).
Although it contradicts our earlier assumption, this last effect may reflect another dif-
ference in the schemes accessible to disabled individuals depending on their age. Indeed,
another type of care providers may intervene with disabled individuals: the “At-Home Nurs-
ing Care Services” (Services de soins infirmiers à domicile, SSIAD). These services have an
ambiguous status: they are financed on the public health care insurance budget and are
meant to provide individuals with chronic conditions with at-home nursing care. Yet certain
caregivers of SSIADs are also given the task to provide patients with personal care; under that
regard, SSIADs can be considered as part of the disability-compensating policies. Until 2004,
SSIADs were accessible only for individuals 60 and older; this officially changed then, but it
took time for the services to actually open “slots” for the handicapped adults.46 The fact that
an individual 60 or older experiences a lower constraint on the supply of care by SSIADs may
explain why the use of professional personal care is higher after 60. In addition, our esti-
mates suggest that the effect of the age 60 threshold on personal care use is higher for those
with income higher than the top income quartile, i-e for individuals with a non-negligible co-
payment on APA. As SSIADs are paid by the national health insurance, they basically come
at a zero out-of-pocket cost for the patients, whatever their income, provided their GP has
issued a prescription for at-home personal care. The relative cost of SSIAD is therefore lower
for richer individuals, who are provided an incentive to substitute APA-subsidized care for
SSIAD services.
Our estimates also suggest that, for women, there is some crowding-out of informal care
provision by (a slightly increased) formal home care utilization after age 60. This is consistent
44Appendix 1.C provides the description of these categories.
45We ran univariate probits for each of the six outcomes.
46In 2008, when the survey was conducted, less than 4,000 slots were available to the handicapped adults,
while 93,000 dependent elderly were able to be served by SSIADs (Bertrand, 2010; Drees, 2016b).
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with Fontaine (2012) who uses the HSM sample of individuals aged 60 and older and finds
that publicly-funded formal home care provided to the 60+ has a small crowding-out effect
on informal care provision.47 When focusing on men, our estimates rather suggest some
form of complementarity between informal care and (unskilled) formal care.
Note that, contrary to Fontaine (2012) who study the volumes of care, we only look at
the extensive margin of home care provision. The fact that our outcomes are care utiliza-
tion rates and not volumes is an important point to bear in mind when drawing implications
from our results. It is well possible that we would observe different patterns, were we to study
the intensive margin. Indeed, the co-payment schedule associated with PCH is on average
more generous than the cost-sharing rule of APA. Recent works using French data have con-
firmed that the consumption of formal care is price-elastic not only at the extensive margin
(Arrighi et al., 2015), but also at the intensive margin (Bourreau-Dubois, Gramain, Lim and
Xing, 2014; Hege, 2016; Roquebert and Tenand, 2017). Differences in cost-sharing rules and
amounts of care to be subsidized may affect the volume of publicly-funded professional care
consumed; in turn, this may lead the relatives of dependent elderly and handicapped adults
to adjust the assistance with ADL and IADL they provide.
6.3 Data limitations
Despite its attractive features, the HSM survey presents some limitations for the purpose
of our study. Our identification strategy hinges on the absence of omitted variable bias. We
have included a set of covariates relating to family composition and characteristics but they
may be insufficient to capture the full relevant heterogeneity in family structures. HSM con-
tains rich additional information on the respondents’ relatives (e.g. place of residence48 or
marital status of children, age of relatives); yet this information is available only for individu-
als who declared they do not need assistance in the activities of daily living. The proportion
47Activities performed by caregivers are also found to change in reaction to increased formal care consump-
tion subsidized by APA: relatives perform less household chores and personal care (Fontaine, 2012).
48From a theoretical point of view, when relatives live closer, informal care can be provided at a lesser cost
(Hoerger et al., 1996). Empirically, Stern (1995) and Charles and Sevak (2005) have shown that geographical
distance from children is an important determinant of informal care provision to the elderly; this variable may
also have an (indirect) effect on formal home care utilization. Moreover, co-residence is likely to correlate
with home care public subsidies: using US panel data, Hoerger et al. (1996) show that Medicaid home health
care subsidies increase the probability for a dependent elderly to live independently, relative to living in an
inter-generational household. Omitting relatives’ residence from the controls may thus bias the estimates.
On the other hand, residence of relatives may well be endogenous to informal and formal care utilization: a
relative may choose to live close to her parent in order to provide assistance more frequently if she observes
her parent is feeling tired or low. Even in the case the individual receives the services of professional caregivers
only, relatives may decide to live close, or not to move away, in order to assist the impaired individual with
paperwork or exert some surveillance. Many articles on LTC arrangements have chosen to work on a sample of
elderly living alone (see Bonsang (2009) and Arnault (2015)), thereby avoiding the endogeneity issue raised by
the co-residence status. Some empirical results suggest that the endoegeneity bias is limited (Bolin et al., 2008;
Charles and Sevak, 2005; Stern, 1995).
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of such individuals being significantly lower in our sub-sample of individuals aged 50–59
than in the older sub-sample, we chose not to exclude these individuals from our sample
of interest. As the perception of the need for assistance may be influenced by the public
schemes an individual has access to, and therefore by the age 60 threshold, we suspect that
the sample selection would have been endogeneous, had we kept only individuals with self-
assessed needs of assistance.
The absence of a longitudinal dimension comes with several limitations. First, it makes
it necessary to rule out cohort effects for identification. Second, it prevents from including
individual fixed effects in the specifications, which would reduce the risk of omitted variable
bias. Third, it makes it practically impossible to identify and take into account the specific
case of the “aging handicapped " (personnes handicapées vieillissantes). Individuals who
were granted a handicap benefit (PCH or ACTP) before they turned 60 can choose to remain
in the regime of the “handicap policies” or to shift to the dependence policies. Given this
derogation, the dummy for being 60 and older indicates whether the individual has access
to the dependence schemes, but does not necessarily mean that the individual has no access
to the handicap schemes. The impossibility to identify the “aging handicapped " may lead
to under-estimate the impact of the differences between the two schemes; yet, given that
less than 20% (15%) of ACTP (PCH) beneficiaries were 60 or older in 2008 (Drees, 2008a), the
under-estimation should be limited.49
Finally, the absence of a follow-up wave does not allow us to take into account differ-
ential institutionalization rates, which would translate into differential sample selection on
both sides of age 60. Yet the age 60 threshold itself may affect the probability to live in the
community.
6.4 Differential institutionalization rates?
Existing studies, based on US data for the most, mainly suggest that home care subsidies
impact institutionalization patterns. Ettner (1994); Pezzin et al. (1996) and Guo et al. (2015)
find a significant, negative impact of more generous public home care programs on the prob-
ability to enter a nursing home.50 Differences in reimbursement rates for elderly nursing
homes and for handicapped adults specialized institutions could also induce differential se-
49Given the low quality of data on LTC benefits in surveys in general, and in HSM in particular (cf. Appendix
1.A), relying on whether an individual who is less than 60 declares receiving PCH or ACTP is not a reliable way of
identifying the “aging handicapped ” in the sample. The section of the questionnaire documenting the chronic
conditions and major health events include questions about the year in which the health issue emerged or the
health event happened. However, such questions do not provide information precise enough to infer the age
of the onset of functional limitations and activity restrictions.
50Earlier works by Hoerger et al. (1996) and Christianson (1988) concluded to the absence of such an effect
(for individuals aged 65 or more). The approach of Ettner (1994) and Pezzin et al. (1996) is however more
credible since these papers model living arrangements jointly with formal and informal care provision.
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lection, as looser Medicaid eligibility rules and greater reimbursement for nursing home care
were shown to increase institutionalization rates (Hoerger et al., 1996). As pointed out by
Weber (2011) and Ramos-Gorand and Rapegno (2016), in France, out-of-pocket payments
in elderly dependent nursing homes (EPHAD) are on average far higher than the amounts
paid by residents of handicap centers.51
Differential financial incentives to institutionalization may be counterbalanced by the
characteristics of the supply. Availability of beds for handicapped adults and dependent
elderly needs not be the same, as suppliers may adjust to the differences in LTC schemes
and in national and local regulations. Ramos-Gorand and Rapegno (2016) document that
nursing homes are more homogeneously distributed on the territory than handicap centers,
mainly because the latter are less numerous while tending to be larger. Institutions for the
handicapped tend to welcome specific sub-populations, as each handicap center needs to
receive a certification to host individuals with a given type of disabilities. There is no such
requirement for nursing homes, although a substantial share of EHPADs declare having re-
fused to host patients with dementia or requiring intensive medical care (Ramos-Gorand
and Rapegno, 2016). Overall, depending on one’s type of disability, health status and area
of residence, access to an institution may be more or less difficult when being a dependent
adult rather than a handicapped adult.
HSM was conducted together with a companion survey, HSI, which collected informa-
tion on individuals living in an institution permanently. Because of differing methodologies
and questionnaires, merging the two surveys is not possible. However, a small dataset with
basic individual information on individuals surveyed in HSI and on those interviewed in
HSM is available. It contains age, sex, self-assessed health (coded in 5 levels), a dummy for
chronic disease, as well as a categorical variable on functional limitations.
Figure 1.6 represents the proportion of the French population living in an institution by
civil age. Linear fits of the relationship between institutionalization and age suggest that the
trend changes after age 60: while the institutionalization rate tends to decrease for individu-
als in their 50s, it increases after age 60. In addition, if we exclude individuals right at age 60,
we observe a positive jump in the institutionalization rate just after 60.
[Figure 1.6 to be found on the following page.]
To formally identify the effect of the age 60 threshold in LTC policies on the probability to
live in an institution, we implement a RDD strategy. Given the limited list of control variables
available, it is unlikely that the coefficient obtained from a simple multivariate regression of
51Most of the fees in handicap centers are covered by the national Health Insurance or social benefits non
recoverable on succession. On the contrary, social financial support accessible to the dependent elderly to pay
for board and lodging can be deducted from their succession, and a co-payment is asked on the fees covering
institutional care provision (Ramos-Gorand and Rapegno, 2016).
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Figure 1.6 – Probability of living in an institution, by civil age.
SAMPLE: Sample of the French population aged 50 to 74 in 2008 (N = 12,784 individuals).
Institutionalization rates per age and linear fits are computed by taking into account survey
weights.
SOURCE: Insee–Drees, HSM–HSI 2008/2009 matched survey.
living arrangement (being institutionalized or not) on the dummy “being 60+” will provide
an unbiased estimate of the effect of the institutional threshold in LTC policies. Selecting
individuals aged 50 to 74 in the matched HSM–HSI dataset, we obtain a sample of 12,784 in-
dividuals. We consider the sample size around the age 60 threshold to be reasonable enough
to derive convincing evidence from a RDD strategy.52 Following Lee et al. (2004), we imple-
ment a parametric approach based on the following specification:
I∗i = α′+β′60+i +
J∑
j=1
δ′j .(Ag e −60) j +
J∑
j=1
µ′j .60
+.(Ag e −60) j +Z′iθ′+u′i (1.3)
where I∗i is a latent variable measuring the propensity of individual i to live in institution
on a permanent basis. Given that we observe a binary outcome (the individual is recorded
as living either in institution or in an ordinary setting), Equation (1.3) is estimated by a uni-
variate probit.
52Moreover, differential sample selection on the two sides of the age threshold is not a threat to RDD iden-
tification anymore, as we work on a sample representative of the entire French population. In addition, the
potential confounding effect of retirement is not a concern when the outcome is institutionalization: individ-
uals who may enter a specialized institution are unlikely to be on the labor market (a further discussion and
formal tests can be found in Appendix 1.F.)
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With a parametric approach, RDD identification hinges on the functional form of age
effects that is assumed. Empirically, we select the degree J of the polynomial terms in age by
comparing the information criteria (AIC and BIC) obtained with linear, quadratic or cubic
age effects. As the RDD essentially compares population averages of the outcome variable
just below and just above the threshold in the forcing variable, it is important to take into
account survey weights when estimating the model.
The best fit of the model (both AIC and BIC are minimized) is obtained when including
cubic trend in age (J = 3 in Equation (1.3)). Probit estimates in Table 1.F.1 (Appendix 1.F)
show that being 60 and older increases the probability to live in an institution by around 0.4
percentage points. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level; in practical term, it is
fairly high, as the population institutionalization rate in the French 50–74 years-old popula-
tion is of 0.6%.
We assess the robustness of our result in two ways. Firstly, we exclude individuals who are
60, again considering that it may take time for individuals to change or benefit from newly
accessible LTC schemes. Secondly, we exclude individuals who are 70 or more, to check that
our estimates are not driven by individuals far away from the discontinuity. As presented in
Table 1.F.2 (Appendix 1.F), the positive effect of being a dependent elderly on the probability
to live at home keeps holding.53
The construction of HSM and HSI samples is key to interpreting the estimated pattern. In
the HS surveys, the population living in the community includes all individuals who go back
home at least once a year. Thus, it includes the patients of centers for the handicapped that
may welcome their patients overnight during the week, but tend to allow or even encourage
families to host their relatives during the weekend. On the contrary, nursing homes acces-
sible to dependent elderly are generally conceived as permanent residences, and daycare
facilities for the elderly were still scarce at the time of the survey.54 The positive coefficient
we estimate thus partly reflects the definition of “living in the community” retained in the
survey sampling design.
Interestingly, the differential selection of the dependent elderly versus the handicapped
adults in the HS surveys should not be regarded as a mere sampling bias. The fact that the
60+ are more likely to be considered as living in an institution than individuals below 60
stems from the very institutional distinction made between dependency and handicap pro-
grams we are interested in.
To fully assess disability compensation and potential horizontal inequity, it would be rel-
53This effect is also found when we restrict the sample to individuals who have some functional limitations.
The results are available on demand. In our baseline specification, we prefer not to do any sample selection, as
the only variable on functional limitation provided in the HSM–HSI matched dataset is fairly crude.
54Instructions given to interviewers explicitly mention nursing homes as an example of an institutional living
setting and explain that individuals living in centers for handicapped persons should be considered as living in
an ordinary house.
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evant to know whether individuals included in the HSM sample are actually receiving formal
care from professional workers in handicap centers. As we lack such information, the effect
of the institutional age discontinuities we have found on formal home care utilization rate
should be read along with the fact that the individuals below 60 in our estimation sample are
also more likely to receive some unobserved professional LTC.
7 Conclusion
This paper attempted to answer the following question: when you have difficulties in
performing alone the activities of daily living, does it make a difference for you to be consid-
ered a “dependent elderly” rather than a “handicapped adult” by the French Welfare system?
Our results suggest the answer is yes. Among individuals who live in an ordinary setting on a
permanent basis, the “dependent elderly” are more likely to receive professional home care
and less likely to be provided assistance with the activities of daily living by their relatives. We
thus provide evidence that two sub-groups of the population with arguably equal “needs” for
LTC are less likely to receive formal care due to their age. This situation contrasts with the
position of the European Court of Justice, according to which age per se is not a legitimate
criterion to define entitlements to disability-compensation.
Our second set of results, derived from an RDD strategy, provides original and robust ev-
idence that the probability to be recorded as living in an institution positively jumps at age
60. On the face of it, our estimates suggest that dependence schemes are more effective in
allowing disabled individuals to access formal LTC services, either at home or in institutions.
Interpreting our results in terms of horizontal inequity should be made with caution for two
reasons. First, we find evidence of substantial heterogeneity of effects with respect to the dis-
ability level and gender. Second, interpreting our results as evidence that the handicapped
are put at disadvantage is made difficult by the fact that the French Disability and Health
Survey did not survey all types of LTC services being used. The formal LTC services provided
by professional workers inside the institutions in which handicapped adults can stay for the
day or the week (while those aged 60 and older can hardly access those types of care without
living in a nursing home on a permanent basis) do not show up anywhere in the collected
data. It is thus possible that our estimates signal the substitution of formal home care to pro-
fessional care provided in an institution. Presumably, our results partly capture the fact that
the survey data collection was influenced by the architecture of LTC policies.
While this loophole in the survey is itself a consequence of the age threshold in LTC poli-
cies we investigated into, it translates into a limitation for our empirical analysis. Several
lessons can be gleaned for future survey data collection on disability and health. First, the
sampling design should be made robust to institutional differences in the treatment of vari-
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ous sub-groups. In particular, the definition of living arrangements should be made as little
dependent on the specific features of LTC policies as possible. Second, the content of the
survey (e.g. which types of care are being asked about) should be comprehensive enough to
ensure that there is no hole in the dimensions the survey aims at documenting (e.g. care ar-
rangements). Third, questions about the types of care received should be made so that differ-
ent payers (e.g. health insurance versus LTC schemes) can be identified. As this is challeng-
ing for respondents to report correct information when they receive multiple subsidies, one
promising way to go is to push forward the matching of surveys with administrative records
of social transfers and health care claims. This will also be a way to overcome the reporting
bias survey data on incomes and transfers surveys are plagued with. Next, over-sampling
individuals around age discontinuities would be a cost-efficient way to increase statistical
power while allowing robust identification methods (e.g. RDD) to be implemented. Finally,
variation in sampling probabilities with age would also be a way to smooth out the effects
of demographic booms and busts on sampling sizes, which can undermine some powerful
identification strategies.
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Appendix
1.A LTC schemes in France: additional information and
quality of self-reported benefits
1.A.1. Legislation
The institutional landscape of handicap and dependence compensating public schemes
is quite complex in France. This Appendix aims at providing the key features of each scheme.
As explained in Section 2, those schemes fall into two official categories: handicap subsidies
on one hand, dependence or old-age subsidies on the other. Table 1.A.1 on page 101 presents
the main handicap and dependence schemes for individuals living in the community:
• Allocation compensatrice pour tierce-personne (ACTP);
• Prestation de compensation du handicap (PCH);
• Allocation personnalisée d’autonomie (APA);
• Prestation sociale d’aide ménagère aux personnes handicapées (means-tested domestic
help to handicapped individuals);
• Prestation sociale d’aide ménagère aux personnes âgées (means-tested domestic help
to the elderly);
• Prestation d’aide ménagère aux personnes âgées des caisses de retraite (domestic help to
the elderly provided by pension funds).
These different transfers are mutually exclusive. Only means-tested domestic help to the
handicapped may be granted as a complement to PCH.
In this presentation, we deal exclusively with the component of these schemes that sub-
sidizes human care utilization. Depending on the scheme considered, departments, Local
Houses for Handicapped Persons (MDPH) or general practitioners proceed to an assessment
of needs of applicants. For all schemes but ACTP, a maximum number of hours eligible to the
subsidy, hi , is defined for each recipient i . For APA and PCH, the maximum amount of trans-
fer for individual i , Ai , is defined as Ai = hi × t , where t is the tariff of reimbursement. In the
case of APA, this tariff is set at the local level, by Conseils départementaux and varies with the
type of caregiver (employed over-the-couner or through home care services). In the general
case, the price charged by the care provider exceeds the tariff of reimbursement.
In the case of APA, if Ai exceeds the dependence group (GIR)-specific ceiling, hi is re-
duced accordingly. Usually, amount Ai is directly transferred to PCH recipients after deduc-
tion of the co-payment, while for APA, the subsidy is usually paid on an hourly basis, directly
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to the home care provider. For ACTP, the amount of transfer is defined according to individ-
ual needs in terms of human care, but no control of effective spending is made.
ACTP, PCH and APA can also be used to pay relatives providing care with the activities of
daily living, under some strict conditions. For individuals receiving PCH, relatives other than
children, parents and partner can be employed as over-the-counter workers. The salary paid
is eligible to the social security contributions and income tax rebates applied to over-the-
counter home care employees; in addition, PCH beneficiaries may then receive a subsidy on
the hourly price paid to their relative. Children, parents and partners who provide care on
a regular basis can receive a salary only if they are not retired or full-time employed, and if
the PCH recipient requires constant surveillance. For lowest degrees of disability, caregivers
can receive an hourly compensation; however, the rate is very low (e3.67 per hour, while the
French hourly net minimum wage ise7.51). To lower the opportunity cost of informal care-
giving for close relatives, the indemnity is increased toe5.51 when the caregiver has to stop
her professional activity to assist her disabled relative. In any case, the monthly indemnity is
capped at 940 euros per month (aboute200 less than the monthly net minimum salary).55
For individuals receiving APA, the transfer may be used to employ a relative as a family
caregiver, except for one’s partner. The reimbursement tariff, TR, which is applied to com-
pute amount Ai , is the same as for regular over-the-counter home care providers.
In the case of APA and PCH, employing a relative as a family caregiver reduces the num-
ber of hours of formal care eligible to a subsidy, since the maximum number of subsidized
hours allocated through the assessment of needs include both informal and formal care
hours.
On the contrary, domestic help subsidies from departments or pension funds cannot be
used to compensate a family caregiver. Means-tested domestic help given by departments
is even conditional on not having any close relative able to perform domestic tasks for the
individual (“subsidiarity principle”).
On the supply side, home care services are regulated by local authorities. As regulations
of home care services provided to the handicapped and to the elderly dependent differ, reg-
ulated prices of the services offered to the two sub-populations can differ as well. However,
centrally available individual-level statistical information on both reimbursement tariffs and
home care services’ prices is poor, making it impossible to assess out-of-pocket payment dif-
ferentials between handicapped and dependent beneficiaries.
55In this Section, all values are of 2015.
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Table 1.A.1 – Long-term care schemes for individuals living in the community
Transfer Age eligibility Disability criteria Type of
transfer
Means-
tested
Amount and ceilings Co-payment rate
ACTP Under 60 OR 60 or
older, with disabilities
present since before
60th birthday
80% incapacity rate, with
needs of assistance with ADL
and IADL (evaluation by
National Health Insurance
workers)
Monetary
transfer
Yes
(income
below
e9,605 for
singles)
Number of hours granted ×
hourly reimbursement
price. Minimum ofe441,
maximume882
No
PCH Under 60 OR 60 or
older, with disabilities
present since before
60th birthday
Absolute restriction in one
essential activity or two major
restrictions in two essential
activities (evaluation by
Departmental Handicap
Houses (MDPH))
In-kind
transfer
No Number of hours granted ×
hourly reimbursement
price. Non-binding limit of
6.05 hours a day.
20% for income
(from assets) above
e25,978, 0%
otherwise
Domestic help
for the
handicapped
(departments)
Under 60, with needs of
assistance with
domestic chores and no
relative around able to
provide it
80% incapacity rate and
unable to work (evaluation by
Local Handicap Houses
(MDPH) and departments)
In-kind
transfer
Yes
(income
below
e9,605 for
singles)
Number of hours of
assistance granted times
hourly reimbursement
price, up to 40 hours (for
singles)
5%
APA 60 and over, with needs
of assistance with ADL
and IADL
Dependence groups (GIR) 1 to
4 (evaluation by departments)
In-kind
transfer
No Number of hours granted ×
hourly reimbursement
price, with ceilings ranging
frome563 for GIR 4 to
e1,313 for GIR 1 (about 4
hours a day at max.)
From 0% (income
belowe8,870) to
90% (income above
e35,342)
Domestic help
for the
dependent
(departments)
65 or older (60 or older
in some departments
and if unable to work)
Needs of assistance with
domestic chores and no
relative around able to provide
it (evaluation by departments)
In-kind
transfer
No Number of hours granted ×
hourly reimbursement
price, up to 30 hours (for
singles)
5%
Domestic help
for the
dependent
(pension
funds)
65 or older (60 or older
in some departments
and if unable to work)
Needs of assistance with
domestic chores (evaluation
by departments)
In-kind
transfer
No Number of hours granted ×
hourly reimbursement
price, up toe3,000 per year
From 10% (income
belowe9,605) to
73% (income above
e18,336)
NOTES: Transfers amounts and ceilings are expressed in euros per month, unless otherwise mentionned. All figures are of 2015. Income conditions are expressed in
terms of net annual income for a single. These conditions are adjusted when the applicant lives in a couple. In the case of PCH, the ressources taken into account
mainly consist of income derived from assets: labor income, pension benefits, social insurance and protection benefits are excluded. The co-payment rate schedule
for pension-funds’ domestic help is specific to each fund. Here, the schedule of the general fund (Cnav) is reported.
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1.A.2. Information on LTC benefits around the age 60 threshold: HSM lim-
itations
In 2008, at the time the HSM survey was conducted, about 850,000 million individuals liv-
ing in the community benefited from the LTC benefits managed by the Departmental Coun-
cils. The majority of recipients (80%) were aged 60 and older.56
Table 1.A.2 – Declarations of handicap and dependence benefits in HSM 2008: Comparison
with administrative records.
PCH ACTP APA
beneficiaries beneficiaries beneficiaries
Population below 60
Estimation using HSM (2008) 13,000 59,000 22,000
[7,000;18,000] [45,000;73,000] [2,300;43,000]
Administrative records (2008) 63,766 66,850 0
Population 60 and more
Estimation using HSM (2008) 3,000 27,000 327,000
[1,000;6,000] [18,000;37,000] [293,000;362,000]
Administrative records (2008) 11,488 17,808 671,000
NOTES: Administrative records (Drees, 2008a). Only beneficiaries living in the community are retained in
the computation. Estimations using HSM data take into account survey weights; the 5% level confidence-
intervals are displayed in brackets.
Table 1.A.2 compares the number of beneficiaries of each LTC scheme as estimated us-
ing the answers to HSM survey with the administrative records. Self-reported information on
LTC benefits is poor in HSM; this drawback of the survey was also documented by Eghbal-
Téhérani and Makdessi (2011) in the case of APA. Based on the answers to the survey, we
would under-estimate by two the number of APA beneficiaries (327,000 against 671,000 ben-
eficiaries). This is also true for PCH benefits, although not for ACTP. The poor quality of the
variables relating to benefits in HSM is also suggested by the very high number of respon-
dents who refused to answer the question or declared that they did not know (in our baseline
sample, the number of such respondents is about as high as the number of individuals who
declared benefiting from such a benefit).
Focusing on the administrative figures, we note that PCH was a smaller scheme than
ACTP in terms of number of beneficiaries. This is no longer the case: in 2014, ACTP bene-
ficiaries represented 19% of combined ACPT and PCH beneficiaries. This is due to the fact
that ACTP benefit was no longer granted after 2005, although surviving beneficiaries are al-
lowed to stay in the scheme. On the contrary, the PCH scheme grew larger: between 2008
and 2014, the number of beneficiaries has been multiplied by 3.
56Table 1.A.1 in Section 2 provides similar figures for year 2014.
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An attempt to get round the reporting errors on LTC benefits is to use the questions about
potential applications to the schemes. In HSM, respondents were asked whether they ap-
plied for APA and what was the most recent decision made by the Departmental Council
regarding the application. Using these additional questions, we obtain 1,078 individuals in
the survey who are supposedly receiving the APA benefit at home.57 The assumption is that
individuals who were granted the APA at some point will keep receiving it until they die or
enter a nursing home. The alleged APA beneficiaries (aged 60 and older) represent 513,000
individuals in the French population; a figure now reasonably close to the one provided by
administrative records, although still lower. Nonetheless, we deemed the quality of this in-
formation not reliable enough to make our identification strategy rely on it.
57In an ongoing study on out-of-pocket payments on health care incurred by the disabled, a team from Irdes
(Anne Penneau, Sylvain Pichetti and Maude Espagnacq) uses this question to identify who receives APA or PCH
benefits in the survey.
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1.B Sampling design and sample selection
1.B.1 Sampling design
HSM sample was drawn using the results of a preliminary survey, Enquête Vie quotidi-
enne et santé (VQS). VQS collected basic information on the demographics and health con-
ditions of over 200,000 households in 2007.58 Respondents were grouped in 4 different cate-
gories based on their health and disability condition. This ancillary survey was used to form
the sampling frame of HSM: the 4 disability groups of VQS were interacted with the French
departments or regions to produce 45 different strata. The sample was stratified to over-
sample individuals with low functional levels and those living in some specific regions. This
results in a relatively high dispersion of survey weights, with a ratio D9/D1 equals to 40 in
the entire HSM sample (Bouvier, 2011).
At the level of the HSM survey, the primary sampling unit is the individual — although
there might be several individuals from the same household in the final sample. To derive
correct inference, we specify to our statistical software (STATA) that the sample follows a
single-stage design with stratification.59
1.B.2 Sample selection
After having deleted all individuals who are aged less than 50 or 75 and older and individ-
uals with no restriction in any ADL or IADL, we are left with 3,132 individuals in our sample,
representing about 1.8 million individuals. 11 individuals have to be dropped because of
missing information on health status and income.
Table 1.B.1 – Sample selection (baseline sample from HSM)
Sample size Share of
previous
sample
Population
size
Share of
previous
population
Population aged 50–74 10,672 – M16.8 –
Keeping individuals with IADL or ADL
restriction
3,132 29.3% M1.8 10.9%
Keeping individuals with full information on
covariates
3,121 99.6% M1.8 ≈ 100%
58More information on the design of HSM (in French) can be found at http://www.drees.sante.gouv.
fr/les-enquetes-handicap-sante,4267.html.
59We specify: svyset ident_ind [pweight = poids_hsm], strata(stratehs), where ident_ind is
the individual identifier, poids_hsm the survey weight and stratehs the stratum.
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1.C Construction of home care utilization variables
HSM provides rich data on the caregivers declared by the survey respondents. Our out-
come variables of formal and informal home care utilization were thus constructed using
information available at the caregiver level. For each caregiver of a given respondent, we
know either the profession (in the case she is a formal caregiver) or the family tie with the
respondent (for an informal caregiver), as well as the types of tasks performed in assistance
to the respondent.
1.C.1 Informal care
In the HSM questionnaire (module G, “family environment and help”), a specific ques-
tion is asked to identify any potential relative or friend providing care to the respondent in
an informal way. If the respondent declares any, she is then asked to provide a list of all her
friends or relatives helping her. Then, for each of her informal caregivers, the respondent is
asked to report the type of tasks her informal caregiver assists her with. The two questions
are detailed in Table 1.C.1.
Thus, for every respondent in the survey, we are able to know whether a person who is not
a professional caregiver assists her with the activities of daily living. In our analysis, an indi-
vidual is considered as receiving informal care (the informal home care utilization dummy,
YI, equals one) if she declares one or more non-professional caregiver(s) who are providing
at least assistance with the tasks of daily living. An individual with no caregiver at all, or with
no caregiver providing assistance with the activities of daily living, will be considered as not
receiving any informal care (YI = 0). In our sample of 3,121 individuals, 2,106 (67.5%) are
coded as receiving informal care (YF = 1).
1.C.2 Formal care
In HSM survey, each individual is asked about her difficulties in performing the activities
of daily living (ADL and IADL), and about the utilization of human or technical assistance
to perform these activities (module F, “activity restrictions”). When a respondent declares
resorting to the services of a professional worker to perform at least one ADL or IADL, she
is considered in the survey as “receiving some professional assistance”. She is then asked to
establish the list of all the professional workers who are providing her with care at her house.
The respondent is asked about the profession of each formal caregiver she has declared.
As shown in Table 1.C.2, several categories were proposed to respondents. The delimitation
between the different categories may be quite difficult to draw (e.g., categories 2 and 3 over-
lap), and it is likely that some respondents were not aware of the exact occupation of their
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Table 1.C.1 – Informal caregivers in HSM survey
Original question English translation
(in French)
1) Screening of informal caregivers
“Y-a-t-il des personnes (famille, amis,. . . ) non
professionnelles qui vous aident régulièrement
pour accomplir certaines tâches de la vie
quotidienne (ménage, repas, toilette, présence,
. . . ), ou qui vous aident financièrement, ou
matériellement ou bien encore qui vous
apportent un soutien moral en raison d’un
problème de santé ou d’un handicap, et y
compris les personnes qui vivent avec vous ?”
Are there any non-professional persons
(family, friends,...) who are helping you to
perform some tasks of daily living (house
chores, meals, toilette, presence) on a regular
basis, or who help you financially, or
materially, or that provides you with moral
support because of a health condition or a
handicap, including those persons living with
you?”.
2) Type of assistance provided by informal caregivers
“[prénom de l’aidant informel] vous aide-t-il
(elle) pour:
• les tâches de la vie quotidienne comme
l’aide à la toilette, à l’habillage, l’aide
aux tâches ménagères, . . . ;
• par une aide financière ou matérielle ;
• en vous apportant un soutien moral.”
(les réponses multiples étant autorisées)
“[name of the informal caregiver] helps you:
• with the tasks of daily living, like
assistance with bathing, with dressing,
help with house chores, ...;
• with a financial or material assistance;
• by providing you with some moral
support.”
(multiple answers are allowed)
SOURCES: HSM 2008 questionnaire. Author’s own translation.
formal caregivers. Respondents were also offered the possibility to fill the profession in clear,
with their answers being coded back to the pre-defined categories of professions.
For the purpose of our analysis, it is important to distinguish between those professional
workers who provide care (i-e, assistance with the activities of daily living) and the profes-
sional workers providing some type of medical or paramedical cure. In France, handicap
and dependence schemes are distinct from the Health insurance system. Individuals with
disabilities may receive some health care at their house: diabetic individuals would receive
the regular visit of a nurse, an elderly with chronic bronchitis may call home a physiothera-
pist, etc. Nurses may also intervene at home to assist disabled individuals with personal care
activities.60 Although in such a case they provide assistance with the activities of daily living,
nursing services are not considered as home care workers, and thus cannot be subsidized
through LTC schemes in France.
In order to separate cure from care, we follow Gramain (2011). Some of the professional
60In France, there are two regimes under which nurses can provide care at the home of their patients: they
can be either community nurses (infirmiers libéraux) or work in a at-home nursing service (Service de soins
infirmiers à domicile, SSIAD).
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categories for formal caregivers that could be reported in HSM unambiguously refer to the
non-medical sector; however, some categories may include both home care workers and
health care workers. We thus exploit additional information contained in HSM on the type of
tasks every formal caregiver assists a respondent with, through the second question reported
in Table 1.C.2.
We code an individual as “receiving cure” if at least one of her professional caregivers is
assisting her with personal care activities (grooming or dressing), with going to the doctor
or by taking care of health problems. We code the individual back to “not receiving cure”
when all caregivers performing such tasks for a given respondent belong to the categories
of domestic help workers or home care services, as these workers are legally not allowed to
perform health care tasks. Our implicit assumption then is that the beneficiaries identify
correctly these caregivers as non-medical workers. In a second step, we use information on
the frequency of intervention to construct a dummy equal to one if the individual receives
frequent cure at home. We consider that a given caregiver provides frequent cure when she
comes more than once a day, 5 times a week or 22 times a month.61 If an individual receives
the frequent visit of a professional assisting her with personal care activities and medical vis-
its, but does not receive any assistance to perform other activities of daily living (like moving
around or doing house chores), it is most likely that she has a health condition requesting
the frequent intervention of a nurse, but no disabilities whose impacts on daily life would
need to be compensated for. We then consider that the professional assistance received by a
respondent is cure only if the respondent receives the assistance of at least one frequent cure
provider, without receiving any other form of assistance with the activities of daily living.
In addition, the data provide also a way to deal partially with the fact that some individ-
uals may declare caregiving relatives with a job in the field of medicine or long-term care as
formal caregivers, while we should regard them as informal caregivers. Close relatives can
be paid for providing care to a disabled elderly only under specific rules and following a spe-
cific schedule. Among the so-declared professional caregivers whose profession is declared
in clear by a respondent, we find individuals who are said to be “friends or relatives” of the
respondent. We code back those caregivers (only 4 of them in the population of interest) as
informal caregivers.62 We end up with 887 individuals (28.4%) who receive formal home care
(YF = 1) in our sample.63
61In addition, we assume that the caregivers whose frequency of intervention was not reported are not fre-
quent curers: had it been the case, we believe the respondent would have been able to give a response on the
frequency of visit of the caregiver.
62In practice, a friend who is a home care worker may well be employed as a regular formal caregiver and sub-
sidized as such through home care subsidy schemes. Conversely, some informal caregivers with professional
medical or paramedical skills may have been declared as professional caregivers without the respondent men-
tioning their family or friendship ties. We believe these situations are rare enough not to affect our results.
63We checked that this number was not excessively sensitive to the definition used to define a “frequent”
intervention.
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Table 1.C.2 – Formal caregivers in HSM survey
Original question English translation
(in French)
1) Professions of formal caregivers in HSM survey
“De qui s’agit-il ?
1. un (une) infirmière, un service de soins
infirmiers ;
2. un(e) aide-soignant(e) ;
3. un autre professionnel paramédical
(aide-soignante, ergothérapeute,
kinésithérapeute, orthophoniste,...) ;
4. une aide à domicile, une aide ménagère,
une auxiliaire de vie, garde à domicile,
service de portage ;
5. un intervenant social (assistante sociale,
éducateur spécialisé,...) :
6. un psychologue, psychomotricien,... ;
7. autres.”
“Who is she?:
1. a nurse, a nursing care service;
2. an auxiliary nurse;
3. another paramedical professional
(auxiliary nurse, occupational therapist,
physiotherapist, speech therapist,...);
4. a home care worker, a domestic help
worker, a home care assistant, an
at-home delivery service;
5. a social worker (social caseworker,
specialized teacher,...);
6. a psychologist, psycho-motricity
specialist,...;
7. others.”
2) Types of tasks performed by formal caregivers in HSM survey
“Vous aide-t-il... (plusieurs réponses possibles)
1. pour les soins personnels (toilette,
habillage, repas) ;
2. pour les tâches ménagères (faire le
ménage, préparer les repas) ;
3. pour gérer votre budget, s’occuper des
papiers et des démarches
administratives ;
4. pour assurer une présence, une
compagnie ;
5. en vérifiant ce que vous faites ;
6. pour aller voir le médecin, s’occuper de
vos problèmes de santé ;
7. pour faire les courses, acheter les
médicaments ;
8. dans d’autres activités (lecture pour les
aveugles, traduction pour les sourds...).”
“Does she help you...?:
1. with personal care activities (grooming,
dressing, meals);
2. with house chores (cleaning up,
preparing meals);
3. to manage your budget, take care of
paperwork and administrative
procedures;
4. to ensure a presence, some company;
5. by cheeking what you do;
6. to go and visit the doctor, by taking care
of your health problems;
7. by doing the shopping, buying your
drugs;
8. with other activities (reading for the
blind, translating for the deaf...).”
SOURCES: HSM 2008 questionnaire. Author’s own translation.
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1.C.3 Types of care received
The different schemes do not necessarily subsidize the same types of care, we create three
categories to reflect the tasks performed by professional and informal caregivers. We use the
questions that were asked about professional caregivers and those informal caregivers who
provide an assistance with the activities of daily living.
• An individual is said to receive informal (formal) personal care if at least one informal
(formal) caregiver helps her grooming, dressing or eating;
• An individual is said to receive informal (formal) domestic help if at least one informal
(formal) caregiver helps her by doing house chores, preparing meals, shopping, buying
medicines, filling administrative forms and managing her finances;
• An individual is said to receive informal (formal) monitoring if at least one informal
(formal) caregiver intervenes to monitor what she does or provides her with a sup-
porting presence.
Table 1.C.3 – Home care in HSM survey: Types of assistance provided by formal or informal
caregivers.
Original question English translation
(in French)
1) Personal care
Pour les soins personnels (toilette, habillage,
repas)
For personal care (grooming, dressing, eating)
2) Domestic help
Pour les tâches ménagères (faire le ménage,
préparer les repas)
For house chores (clean the house, prepare the
meals)
Pour gérer votre budget, s’occuper des papiers
et des démarches administratives
To manage your finances, take care of
adminsitrative procedures
Pour faire les courses, acheter les médicaments To do the shopping, buy medications
3) Monitoring
Pour assurer une présence, une compagnie To provide you with a supportive presence
En vérifiant ce que vous faites By monitoring what you do
Pour aller voir le médecin, s’occuper de vos
problèmes de santé
To go and visit the doctor, take care of your
health issues
Unclassified
Dans d’autres activités (lecture pour les
aveugles, traduction pour les sourds...)
In other activities (reading for the blind,
translation for the deaf...)
SOURCES: HSM 2008 questionnaire. Author’s own translation.
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1.C.4 Data limitations on care received
The lack of precision of the regime within which professional caregivers intervene (home
care versus medical care) imposes some limitations to the empirical analysis and caution in
the interpretation of some results.
First, it is difficult to isolate those individuals who receive assistance in the activities of
daily living activities exclusively from nurses. Think about the case of a nurse coming every
day at the individual’s house to help her grooming. If the individual does not receive any
other form of professional assistance with ADL or IADL, she will be considered in our anal-
ysis as not receiving disability-compensating assistance. If we are interested in the care that
can be subsidized by disability-compensating schemes such as APA and PCH, this seems
a sound way of constructing our dependent variable of formal care utilization. Nonethe-
less, in our empirical strategy, we might still need some information about the availability or
consumption of potential substitutes. Personal care delivered by private nurses or at home
nursing services (SSIADs) may indeed partially substitute for some formal home care. Fail-
ure to account for such substitutions may be all the more a concern as supply from SSIADs
for the handicapped adults was still substantially rationed in 2008, while these services have
been available for the 60+ for long (cf. Section 6.2).
Substitution of nursing care for formal home care is relatively more likely for individuals
who do not have access to home care subsidies or who incur a high co-payment rate on sub-
sidized formal home care: as nursing care is paid for by the Health Insurance system, out-of-
pocket payments on this type of care are generally low. Such a difference in out-pocket-costs
thus provide a financial incentive to patients and their general practioners to claim at-home
nursing care rather than home care for assistance with personal care. As shown by Ramos-
Gorand (2015), there are substantial differences across departments in the supply of SSIADs,
community nurses and home care services. Our dummy variables may partly capture these
systematic differences and thus should decrease, though not erase, the potential bias in the
60+ coefficient due to the care provided by at-home nursing services being unobserved.
Yet an alternative way to interpret our results is to consider that the systematic differ-
ences in the supply and demand of at-home nursing services between the handicapped
adults and the dependent elderly, holding individual characteristics constant, are also part
of the age 60 barrier. Although SSIADs are formally part of the health care system, their
missions connect them to long-term care policies. In this approach, we should read our
estimates of the 60+ dummy as the effect of the age threshold in disability-compensating
policies at large.
A second limitation due to the lack of precision on the professional care received is that it
makes it impossible to quantify the volume of formal home care, distinctly from the volume
of medical care received at home by an individual. These two issues limit our empirical
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strategy. As we restrict our analysis to home care utilization rates, our results are valid at the
extensive margin, but provide no information on the influence of the age 60 barrier on home
care consumption at the intensive margin.
In 2018, the French Ministry of Health will release a national survey on Capacities, Helps
and Resources (CARE). The survey will be matched with administrative data (APA and PCH
records, national health insurance claims, etc.). It should thus contain richer information
on the types of care received by disabled individuals, the benefits received and their out-
of-pocket payments. Unfortunately, only individuals aged 60 and older will be surveyed.
The institutional barrier at 60 has also effects on the data available on the population, as
administrative and survey data collection tend to be done separately for the handicapped
adults and for the dependent elderly (Colvez and Villebrun, 2003).
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1.D Density of the age distribution around the threshold
Although there is little scope for civil age manipulation in a national survey, we investi-
gate the existence of any discontinuity in the density of age. This is a critical aspect of an RRD
identification, as discontinuities in the running variable may undermine statistical precision
or undermine identification altogether.
Figures 1.D.1 and 1.D.2 respectively display the sample and the population size by age
of community-dwelling individuals aged 50 to 74 in 2008, with restrictions in the activities
of daily living. Similarly, Figures 1.D.3 and 1.D.4 respectively represent the sample and the
population size by age of the entire population aged 50 to 74 in 2008/2009.
The age distribution in the two samples (Figures 1.D.1 and 1.D.3) exhibits large variations.
In particular, we notice a drop of the sample size between age 59 and age 60, and a “missing
mass” at ages 65 to 67. Population size in both Figure 1.D.2 and 1.D.4 exhibits a spike at age
59, and a marked drop at age 67. Some explanation for these discontinuities dates back to
World War II: individuals aged 67 in 2008 were born in 1941, a year in which the number of
births fell dramatically in France. On the contrary, individuals aged 59 in 2008 were born in
1949, in the wave of the baby-boom. But the baby-boom had actually started 3 years earlier:
the age pyramid of the French population at the time of the survey actually exhibits a sharp
decrease in the population size between individuals born in 1946 (aged 62 or 61 in HSM, de-
pending on their exact birthday) and individuals born in 1945 (aged 63 or 62 in the survey).64
We actually observe a decrease in the population size around those ages. We can difficulty
explain the spike at age 59, which might be possibly accounted for by some sampling design
imprecision. However, what is important for a RDD identification strategy is that any dis-
continuity in the age density is exogenous to the outcomes of interest. We believe this is a
reasonable assumption here.
HSM being cross-sectional, we have to rule out cohort effects in our identification strat-
egy. The “WWII cohorts” may appear specific a priori; in terms of retirement decisions
though, the cohorts born before, during and just after WWII have similar behaviors. Rul-
ing out cohort effects in terms of care arrangements may not be such a strong assumption
then.
64The French legal population by age is provided by Insee: http://www.insee.fr/fr/ppp/
bases-de-donnees/donnees-detaillees/bilan-demo/pyramide/pyramide.htm?lang=fr&champ=fe.
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Figure 1.D.1 – Sample size in the community sample of interest, by civil age
SAMPLE: Sample of the French population aged 50 to 74 in 2008, living in the community, with
restrictions in the activities of daily living (N = 3,121 individuals).
SOURCE: Insee–Drees, HSM 2008.
NOTES: The dashed and solid lines respectively signal the cohorts affected by beginning of the
baby-boom and by the drop in the number of births due to World War II.
Figure 1.D.2 – Population size corresponding to the community sample of interest, by civil
age
SAMPLE: Sample of the French population aged 50 to 74 in 2008, living in the community, with
restrictions in the activities of daily living (N = 3,121 individuals). Population size computed
using survey weights.
SOURCE: Insee–Drees, HSM 2008.
NOTES: The dashed and solid lines respectively signal the cohorts affected by beginning of the
baby-boom and by the drop in the number of births due to World War II.
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Figure 1.D.3 – Sample size in the matched institution/community survey, by civil age
SAMPLE: Representative sample of the French population aged 50 to 74 in 2008 (N = 12,784
individuals).
SOURCE: Insee–Drees, HSM–HSI 2008/2009 matched sample.
NOTES: The dashed and solid lines respectively signal the cohorts affected by beginning of the
baby-boom and by the drop in the number of births due to World War II.
Figure 1.D.4 – Population size in the matched institution/community survey, by civil age
SAMPLE: Representative sample of the French population aged 50 to 74 in 2008 (N = 12,784
individuals). Population size computed using survey weights.
SOURCE: Insee–Drees, HSM–HSI 2008/2009 matched sample.
NOTES: The dashed and solid lines respectively signal the cohorts affected by beginning of the
baby-boom and by the drop in the number of births due to World War II.
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1.E Density of some control variables
1.E.1 Functional status around the age 60 threshold
In what follows, we display the conditional expectation of some covariates likely to have
an important effect on home care arrangements, as a function of age. This may help to detect
a potential differential selection of our population of interest before and after age 60, the
existence of which is critical for the interpretation of our results.65
As differential utilization rates around the age threshold may arise because of differential
epidemiological conditions, we study the evolution of the prevalence of restrictions in ADL
and IADL around age 60. Figure 1.E.1 displays the average number of ADL individuals have
difficulties to perform alone by civil age groups. We depicts linear fits of the observations
on each side of age 60 to give a visual impression of what the potential discontinuity in the
prevalence of ADL restrictions at age 60 may be (if the prevalence of ADL restrictions indeed
evolves linearly with age).
The number of ADL restrictions increases with age on both sides of the institutional dis-
continuity of age 60, but Figure 1.E.1 suggests that this number decreases discontinuously at
age 60. This finding holds even when controlling for quadratic age effects (Table 1.E.1): both
Columns (1) and (2) find the coefficient of the 60+ dummy to be negative and statistically
significant in the regression of the number of ADL restrictions on our dummy of interest and
linear or quadratic age effects.
As documented empirically, retirement, which usually happens between 60 and 65 in
France (cf. Appendix 1.E), may also have adverse consequences on physical and mental
health (Dave et al., 2006; Godard, 2014). However, it is unlikely that these effects are suffi-
ciently strong to translate into ADL restrictions: we would rather expect IADL restrictions
and self–assessed health status to be affected. Yet we cannot detect any such discontinuity
neither in the number of cognitive and non-cognitive IADL restrictions nor in the share of
individuals declaring being in bad health (Table 1.E.1, Columns (3) to (8)).
Another assumption is that the discontinuous drop in the number of ADL restrictions at
age 60 within the population living in an ordinary setting reflects the differential selection
of the HSM sample on each side of the institutional discontinuity of age 60: as shown in
Section 6.4 and Appendix 1.F, the probability to be recorded as living in an institution on
65The results from this section were also used to assess the robustness of the RDD identification strategy (Im-
bens and Lemieux, 2008), which we have finally not retained. If some covariates exhibit a discontinuity right
at the age threshold we are interested in, this may be suggestive of the covariates not being exogenous to the
treatment. It may also signal that some unobserved factors correlating with the covariates, and potentially with
the outcomes of interest, change discontinuously at the age threshold. If this is the case, the effect of the insti-
tutional difference between dependence and handicap schemes may be confounded with the effect of another
unobserved change happening at age 60. As reminded by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) though, “a discontinuity
in the conditional expectation of the covariates does not necessarily invalidate the [RDD] approach.” (p. 18).
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a permanent basis increases discontinuously at age 60. When focusing on individuals who
live in an ordinary setting on a permanent basis, we “lose” relatively more individuals with
severe activity restrictions on the right-hand side of the discontinuity than on the left-hand
side, as those are more likely to live in an institution.
Figure 1.E.1 – Severity of disability around age 60: Average number of ADL individuals have
difficulties to perform, by civil age
SAMPLE: French individuals aged 50 to 74, living in the community and having difficulties to
perform alone at least one ADL or IADL (3,121 individuals).
SOURCE: Insee–Drees, HSM 2008.
NOTES: Dots represent average number of ADL by civil age and include varying numbers of
individuals. Linear fits are obtained using individual observations and survey weights.
Table 1.E.1 – Robustness checks: Functional limitations and health around age 60.
Dependent variable:
ADL restrictions Non-cognitive Cognitive Bad or very bad
IADL restrictions IADL restrictions health
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
60+ -0.122∗∗ -0.178∗∗ 0.009 0.079 -0.029 -0.025 -0.098 -0.127
(0.052) (0.078) (0.054) (0.077) (0.060) (0.089) (0.061) (0.090)
Age effects Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Observations 3121 3121 3121 3121 3121 3121 3121 3121
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Population-average partial effects
(APE) for binary variables are computed using the finite-difference method. Weighted estimations by a Probit
model. Data from HSM 2008. The outcome “ADL restrictions” corresponds to the number of ADL the individ-
ual has restrictions with; the outcome “non-cognitive IADL restrictions” (resp. “cognitive IADL restrictions”)
corresponds to the number of non-cognitive (resp. cognitive) IADL the individual has restrictions with.
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1.E.2 The age 60 threshold in the retirement legislation
The ages of 60 and 65 are common ages for retirement for French people;66 age 60 (and
to a lower extent, age 65) is associated with a positive “jump” in the probability of retirement.
This pattern has been documented in the French general population (Blanchet and Mahieu,
2004), but is also visible on our sample. Figures 1.E.3 and 1.E.2 show that the probability
to work decreases substantially with age before age 60 and gets close to zero after age 67.
There is however no marked jump at age 60. On the contrary, the probability to be retired
increases abruptly at that age, from less than 20% to about 70%. This dual pattern implies
that most individuals in our population of interest had withdrawn from the labor market
ahead of reaching the minimum retirement age (less than 20% of individuals aged between
55 and 59 were employed). This can be explained by the specificity of our population of
interest: it is difficult for individuals with IADL or ADL restrictions to remain active on the
labor market until they can claim pension benefits.
One first reason why the jump in the probability to be retired may influence the opti-
mal mix between formal care and informal care utilization is that household resources may
change discontinuously at age 60, as a consequence of the change in employment and re-
tirement status. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 1.E.2 show that this does not happen in our
population of interest: when regressing equivalized household income on the 60+ dummy
and (linear or quadratic) age effects, we cannot reject that being just older than 60 rather
than being just below the institutional threshold has no effect on income.
It might still be the case one’s own retirement and retirement of one’s partner may in-
duce significant changes in time allocation, and could well influence home care utilization
rates. Recent evidence on French data suggests that own retirement increases home pro-
duction (including cooking, doing household chores, caring for adults and children). Fitting
a simultaneous equations model with both spouses’ retirement decisions and hours dedi-
cated to household chores, Stancanelli and Van Soest (2012) additionally find that partner’s
retirement tend to decrease men’s home production (but to increase hours spent by women
on house chores. Overall, household home production remains stable when the wife retires
while it increases when the husband does so. Assuming these effects — which were esti-
mated on a sample excluding individuals that could not participate into the labor market
because of disabilities — extend to our population of interest, they would not go against our
results. If anything, the effect of own retirement and of one’s partner’s retirement on formal
care utilization would be negative.67
66Individuals aged 60 to 67 in HSM survey were born between 1948 and 1955. Given progressive changes
in retirement rules, their minimum retirement age was set between 60 and 62, and the full retirement age for
these cohorts spread from age 65 to age 67 (Rabaté and Rochut, 2017).
67In our different specifications, the dummy variable for being retired adds no explanatory power to the
model when we already control for the employment status.
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Figure 1.E.2 – Work status around the age 60 threshold: Proportion of individuals working,
by civil age
SAMPLE: French individuals aged 50 to 74, living in the community and having difficulties to
perform alone at least one ADL or IADL (3,121 individuals).
SOURCE: Insee–Drees, HSM 2008.
NOTES: Dots represent average number of ADL by civil age and include varying numbers of
individuals. Linear fits are obtained using individual observations and survey weights.
Figure 1.E.3 – Retirement status around the age 60 threshold: Proportion of retired individu-
als, by civil age.
SAMPLE: French individuals aged 50 to 74, living in the community and having difficulties to
perform alone at least one ADL or IADL (3,121 individuals).
SOURCE: Insee–Drees, HSM 2008.
NOTES: Dots represent average number of non-cognitive IADL by civil age and include vary-
ing numbers of individuals. Linear fits are obtained using individual observations and survey
weights.
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Table 1.E.2 – Robustness checks: Work, retirement and income around age 60.
Dependent variable:
In employment Retired Equivalized income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
60+ -0.028 -0.048 0.459∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ -6.215 188.167
(0.037) (0.056) (0.068) (0.096) (84.135) (125.929)
Age effects Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Observations 3121 3121 3121 3121 3121 3121
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Population-
average partial effects (APE) for binary variables are computed using the finite-difference
method. Weighted estimations by a Probit model (Columns (1) to (4)) or by a linear regres-
sion model (Columns (5) and (6)). Data from HSM 2008. Equivalized income corresponds to
the household equivalized income.
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1.F Probability of living in an institution
1.F.1 HSM–HSI matched sample
The HSM–HSI matched sample brings together the HSM sample (cf. Appendix 1.B) and
the sample of individuals included in the companion survey on the population living in an
institutional setting, HSI.
The HSM–HSI matched dataset (N=39,035) is provided together with a weight variable to
make the sample representative of the total French population in 2008 (64 million individu-
als). Although each of HSM and HSI samples were stratified, information about the strata is
not reported in the matched sample. We could have imported this piece of information from
each of HSM and HSI surveys and assumed that the sampling design followed a 2-stage de-
sign, the total sample being first stratified by living arrangements (strata 1: individuals living
in the community; strata 2: individuals living in an institutional setting), and then stratified
by either institution type (for HSI) or by regions and level (for HSM; cf. Appendix 1.B). Yet
we are uncertain that this would correctly reflect the sampling design.68 For this reason, we
have preferred not to use any information about the survey structure but the survey weights
when computing descriptive statistics and running the weighted estimations presented in
the following subsections.69
To analyze the impact of the age 60 threshold on the probability to be recorded as living
in an institution setting, we keep all individuals aged 50 to 74 at the time of the survey with
no missing information on covariates70 (12,784 individuals, representing 17 million individ-
uals).
1.F.2 Impact of the age 60 threshold on the probability to live in an institu-
tion
Tables 1.F.1 and 1.F.2 present the results from regressions run on the entire sample of
individuals aged 50–74. We checked that the results are robust to running the regressions on
the sample of individuals with severe functional limitations only (those who are most likely
to enter a specialized institution).
68The sampling for HSI itself actually followed a 2-stage design: some institutions were drawn in a first stage,
and then some individuals were drawn from the selected institutions in the second stage
69We believe this leads to over-estimate the standard errors as the survey strata, which we do not take into
account, were designed to increase statistical precision.
7052 individuals (0.4% of the sample of interest) are discarded because of missing values.
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Table 1.F.1 – Probability of living in an institution around age 60.
Dependent variable: Lives in an institution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
60+ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
(Age - 60) -0.000∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
60+.(Age - 60) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
(Age - 60)2 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
60+.(Age - 60)2 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(Age - 60)3 0.000∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
60+.(Age - 60)3 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Woman -0.001∗∗
(0.000)
Has a chronic disease -0.001
(0.001)
Self-assessed health: very bad -0.003∗∗
(0.001)
Self-assessed health: bad -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
Self-assessed health: fair Ref.
Self-assessed health: good 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
Self-assessed health: very good -0.000
(0.001)
No limitations Ref.
Mild limitations 0.009∗∗∗
(0.001)
Strong limitations 0.042∗∗∗
(0.004)
Constant -2.637∗∗∗ -2.706∗∗∗ -2.763∗∗∗ -2.897∗∗∗ -3.207∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.045) (0.066) (0.058) (0.073)
Age effects None Linear Quadratic Cubic Cubic
Observations 12784 12784 12784 12784 12784
AIC 1.272e+06 1.264e+06 1.264e+06 1.263e+06 1.151e+06
BIC 1.272e+06 1.264e+06 1.264e+06 1.264e+06 1.152e+06
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The specification of age effects
allows for different trends before and after age 60. Population-average partial effects (APE) for binary variables
are computed using the finite-difference method. Weighted estimations by a Probit model. Data from HSM–
HSI 2008–2009.
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1.F.4 Robustness checks
Estimation on alternative samples
Table 1.F.2 – Robustness checks: Probability of living in an institution around age 60 — alter-
native windows.
Dependent variable: Lives in an institution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
60+ 0.003∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Age effects Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Cubic Cubic Cubic
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Window (ages included) 50–74 50–74 w/o
age 60
50–69 w/o
age 60
50–74 50–74 w/o
age 60
50–69 w/o
age 60
Observations 12784 12211 10116 12784 12211 10116
AIC 1.152e+06 1.120e+06 807186 1.151e+06 1.120e+06 806595
BIC 1.152e+06 1.120e+06 807287 1.152e+06 1.120e+06 806710
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The specification of age effects
allows for different trends before and after age 60. Population-average partial effects (APE) for binary variables
are computed using the finite-difference method. Weighted estimations by a Probit model. Data from HSM–
HSI 2008–2009.
Health and functional status around the age 60 threshold
As discussed in Appendix 1.D, discontinuities in the density of covariates right at age
60 may weaken the RDD approach, if it suggests that other institutional change potentially
affecting the institutionalization rate may take place at age 60. In this Appendix, we test
whether we can detect any discontinuity in three key covariates: (1) having severe functional
limitations, (2) having a chronic condition, and (3) having a bad or very bad self-assessed
health. Such a test is achieved by regressing each of these covariates on the 60+ dummy and
on (linear or quadratic) age effects (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
As suggested by Columns (1) and (5), the probability to suffer from severe functional
limitations and of having a bad health status exhibits a discontinuity right at age 60. The
point estimates are negative, statistically significant at the 5% level when we control linearly
for age; statistical significance vanishes when we control for age in a quadratic way. Given
that our sample is representative of the entire French population, and that the probability
to retire exhibits a spike at age 60, what these estimates may pick up is a positive effect of
retirement on functional status and health. When running the same regressions on the sub-
sample of individuals with severe functional limitations (those who may effectively enter a
specialized institution), we do not find any discontinuity in functional and health status at
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age 60. This finding supports the robustness of the RDD identification of the effect of the age
60 threshold on living arrangements.
Table 1.F.3 – Robustness checks: Functional limitations and health around age 60 in the en-
tire population (HSM–HSI).
Dependent variable:
Severe functional Chronic Bad or very bad
limitations condition health
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
60+ -0.036∗∗ -0.012 -0.021 -0.040 -0.043∗∗ -0.034
(0.014) (0.021) (0.029) (0.045) (0.015) (0.023)
Age effects Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Observations 12784 12784 12784 12784 12784 12784
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The specification of age effects
allows for different trends before and after age 60. Population-average partial effects (APE) for binary variables
are computed using the finite-difference method. Weighted estimations by a Probit model. Data from HSM–
HSI 2008–2009.
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1.G Publication relating to this Chapter
A set of the results from this Chapter was published in Revue française des affaires sociales
(RFAS), a French journal published by the Ministry of Health.71 The aim of this journal is
to foster the dissemination of the results of academic works dealing with health and social
policies.
Compared to the Chapter included in this thesis, the RFAS paper puts more emphasis on
the institutional aspects of the French disability-compensating policies. It also provides an
insight into what would be a simple economic approach to disability-compensation and to
the question of the fairness of age thresholds. The empirical analysis focuses on individuals
living in the community and the econometric model does not include age effects, so that
we basically compare home care utilization rates among individuals aged 50–59 and among
individuals aged 60–74, while controlling for differences in individual characteristics other
than age.
The analysis published in RFAS suggested that the use of informal care was little affected
by the age 60 threshold; in this Chapter, we present alternative results that suggest that the
probability to be helped by relatives is lower for the dependent elderly. We believe this dif-
ference is due to both the refinement in the econometric analysis and a slight change in the
definition of our sample of interest. Indeed, in the RFAS paper we decided to keep individ-
uals for who we had complete information on their family composition (including age of
parents and siblings, distance of the residence of the children, etc.) to include additional
control variables. Some questions were not asked to those individuals who declared they did
not need any assistance with the activities of daily living, and thus we dropped such individ-
uals. In this Chapter we take a different methodological stance. If not declaring any needs
for assistance correlates with benefit receipt and the age 60 threshold we are interested in,
dropping individuals who declare they are in need of care may induce a non-random dif-
ferential selection on both sides of the age 60 threshold. We finally deemed that this issue
would probably cause a higher bias in our estimates that failing to account for additional
family characteristics.
Our stronger result — that the utilization rate of formal home care is higher for the de-
pendent elderly than for the handicapped adults — is robust to our methodological choices.
The RFAS paper also includes an analysis of the recipiency of disability-compensating
benefits (APA, PCH and ACTP), based on the declarations made by the survey respondents.
We find the dependent elderly are more likely to declare they benefit from a transfer. Yet,
given the low reliability of information relating to benefits in HSM, we remain cautious on
this set of results.
71The article is made available on the academic repository Cairn.
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Pay more, consume less?
The price elasticity of home care for the dis-
abled elderly in France
This chapter was co-authored with Quitterie Roquebert.
Summary of the chapter
Little is known about the price sensitivity of demand for home care of the disabled elderly.
We partially fill this knowledge gap by using administrative data on the beneficiaries of the
main French home care subsidy program in a department and exploiting inter-individual
variation in provider prices. We address the potential endogeneity of prices by taking ad-
vantage of the unequal spatial coverage of providers and instrumenting price by the number
of municipalities served by a provider. We estimate a price elasticity of around –0.4 that is
statistically significantly different from both 0 and –1. This less than proportionate response
of consumption to price has implications for the efficiency and redistributive impact of vari-
ation in the level of co-payments in home care subsidy schemes.
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1 Introduction
Like most developed countries, France is facing the aging of its population: due to the
increase in life expectancy and the advance in age of baby-boomers, the share of the popu-
lation above 75 is predicted to grow from 9.0% in 2013 to 17.2% in 2060 (Blanpain and Buis-
son, 2016a). As the rise in disability-free life expectancy falls short of the increase in life
expectancy (Sieurin et al., 2011), the number of the elderly needing assistance to perform
the activities of daily living is expected to grow substantially. Most disabled elderly keep on
living in the community rather than entering specialized institutions (Colombo et al., 2011).
Besides medical and nursing care, they are often provided with domestic help and personal
care. Assistance may be provided by relatives (informal care) and also by professional ser-
vices (formal care), whose utilization is increasing. In most countries, public policies foster
the utilization of formal home care by subsidizing its consumption. These programs, how-
ever, only partially cover the cost of professional home care and the disabled elderly often
bear non-negligible out-of-pocket (OOP) costs. In France, the average monthly OOP pay-
ment for home care was estimated to be e300 in 2011 (Fizzala, 2016); over one fifth of the
average pension (Solard, 2015).
We address the following question: how sensitive to price are the disabled elderly when
consuming professional home care? Besides concerns regarding the financial accessibil-
ity of long-term care services, OOP payments raise efficiency issues. As in the health care
context, generous home care subsidies may induce over-consumption and a welfare loss,
while insufficient coverage could have adverse health effects (Stabile et al., 2006; Rapp et al.,
2015; Barnay and Juin, 2016) or induce beneficiaries to substitute home care for more expen-
sive institutional care (Ettner, 1994; Guo et al., 2015). Uncovering the impact of OOP price
on home care consumption is crucial to designing an optimal subsidy policy. Such a pol-
icy would achieve ex ante insurance of uncertain LTC costs and allow ex post welfare gains
through the transfer of resources towards the beneficiaries of the scheme. It would also limit
ex post moral hazard arising if formal care substitutes for other consumption goods (Zeck-
hauser, 1970; Nyman, 1999; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000; Bakx, Chernichovsky, Paolucci,
Schokkaert, Trottmann, Wasem and Schut, 2015). Our paper brings evidence on this em-
pirical question by estimating the price elasticity of the demand for non-medical home care
services of the disabled elderly, at the intensive margin.
We focus on the French home care scheme targeted to the disabled elderly, the APA (Allo-
cation personnalisée d’autonomie) policy, which counted 738,000 community-dwelling ben-
eficiaries in 2014 and amounted to a spending of 3.1 billion euros in 2013 (0.15% of GDP).1
Administrative records of the scheme provide detailed information on home care consump-
1Drees (2013, 2014). The APA program also has a component for the elderly living in nursing homes.
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tion and OOP payments of APA beneficiaries but they are available only at the local level.
We use an original dataset made of the individual records we collected for the beneficiaries
of a given Departmental Council (Conseil départemental). We exploit inter-individual vari-
ations in provider prices to identify consumer price elasticity. Price endogeneity may arise
if APA beneficiaries non-randomly choose their home care provider. To address this issue,
we exploit the unequal spatial coverage by providers in the department. We fit a censored
regression model to deal with observational issues and control for disposable income and
other individual characteristics likely to affect the consumption of home care.
Our results indicate a negative price elasticity, with point estimates ranging from −0.5
to −0.1. According to our favoured estimation, an increase of 10% of the hourly OOP price
would reduce total hours consumed by 4% on average, or 70 minutes per month for a benefi-
ciary consuming the median monthly volume of 18 hours. Although confidence intervals are
relatively large, we statistically reject a price elasticity of both 0 and−1 in most specifications.
Our paper provides one of the very first estimates of the price elasticity of the demand
for home care services of the disabled elderly. Despite the growing concern about the fi-
nancing of long-term care, the impact of OOP payments on the consumption of home care
has been little investigated in the economic literature. A few papers tested for the effect of
benefiting from subsidies on the utilization of paid home care (Coughlin et al., 1992; Ettner,
1994; Pezzin et al., 1996; Stabile et al., 2006; Rapp et al., 2011; Fontaine, 2012); because of
data limitations, they were not able to quantify the price sensitivity. To our knowledge, the
only existing studies addressing this gap in the literature exploit French data. Using national
survey data, Hege (2016) makes assumptions on unobserved OOP prices and estimates a
price elasticity of −0.16. Bourreau-Dubois, Gramain, Lim and Xing (2014) use APA records
from a department to observe exact home care prices, as we do, and estimate an elasticity of
−0.55. We use a different, original dataset and propose an instrumental variable strategy to
deal with potential price endogeneity.
Our results entail important policy implications, as home care subsidy schemes are
expanding with population aging. Home care consumption is found to be price sensitive
through both substitution and income effects, meaning that home care support programs
taking the form of unit subsidies on the price of care induce gross efficiency loss. Moreover,
since consumption of home care reacts less than proportionately to a price change, home
care subsidies should be regarded as a tool to reduce OOP spending on long-term care and
achieve redistribution of consumer surplus from taxpayers to the disabled elderly.
The Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the APA scheme and how it affects
the demand for home care. Sections 3 and 4 present the data and the empirical strategy. The
results and their discussion are reported in Section 5; Section 6 concludes.
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2 Institutional context and demand for home care
2.1 The APA program
The French APA program aims at fostering the utilization of professional care services
by the elderly requiring assistance in the activities of daily living (household chores, meal
preparation or personal hygiene). The APA policy is established at the national level and
implemented at the departmental level.2 To be eligible, an individual must be at least 60
years-old and recognized as disabled. This second condition requires a specific assessment
from a team managed by the Departmental Council, called the evaluation team, made of
medical professionals (nurses, doctors) and/or social workers. The evaluation team visits
each APA applicant to evaluate her needs of assistance using a national standardized scale.
The applicant is thus assigned a disability group (Groupe Iso-Ressources, or GIR). Individuals
found to be moderately (GIR–4) to extremely disabled (GIR–1) are eligible for APA, while the
least severely disabled (GIR–5 or –6) are not.
The evaluation team then establishes a “personalized care plan”. This document lists the
activities for which the individual needs assistance and sets the number of hours necessary
to their realization. It gives the maximum number of hours eligible for APA subsidies of each
beneficiary, called the care plan volume.3 Up to the care plan volume, the OOP price of each
hour of care is lowered by the APA subsidy. The beneficiary is free to consume hours beyond
the care plan volume but there are no more subsidies.
2.2 Computation rules of APA subsidies
For subsidized hours, the APA beneficiary is charged an hourly OOP price that depends
on both the provider price and a co-payment rate, increasing with disposable income. For
low-income individuals (below e739 per month at the end of 2014) the co-payment rate is
zero, while it reaches 90% for the richest beneficiaries (monthly income above e2,945). In
between the two, the co-payment rate is an increasing linear function of disposable income.4
If the provider chosen by the beneficiary is authorized, then the hourly OOP price is
given by applying the co-payment rate to the regulated price charged by the provider.5 For
2Metropolitan France is divided into 95 departments.
3The monetary valuation of the care plan volume must not exceed a legal ceiling, which depends on the
disability level. At the end of 2014, the ceiling was e1,313 (resp. e563) per month for GIR–1 (resp. GIR–4).
Appendix 2.D provides more elements on the set up of the care plan volume.
4The schedule of APA co-payments was substantially reformed in 2016. We describe the pre-reform sched-
ule.
549 metropolitan Departmental Councils out of the 73 that answered a national survey conducted in
2012 applied this computation rule (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012; Bourreau-Dubois et al., 2015). Authorized
providers are generally priced by the Departmental Councils.
132
THE PRICE ELASTICITY OF HOME CARE USE
“non–authorized” providers,6 the co-payment rate is applied to a lump–sum price to get the
OOP price. This distinction has important implications for what can be known of benefi-
ciaries’ OOP payments, since Departmental Councils usually keep track only of the prices of
authorized providers.
2.3 Modeling demand for home care with APA
We write the Marshallian demand for professional home care assuming a heterogeneity-
only model (Moffitt, 1986):
h∗i = g (CPi , Îi ;Xi )+νi (2.1)
where h∗i is the number of hours of home care consumed by individual i and g (.) denotes
the demand function. Care consumption depends on the consumer (or OOP) price for one
hour of home care, CPi , on the total disposable income available for consumption Îi , and on
individual socio-demographic characteristics, Xi . νi is an individual preference shifter.
With APA, up to the care plan volume denoted h̄i , the hours consumed are subsidized.
The consumer price is CPi = c(Ii )pi , where pi is the provider price for individual i and the
co-payment rate ci is a function of individual i ’s monetary disposable income: ci = c(Ii ),
with c(.) a linear function.
Beyond the care plan volume h̄i , the consumer price equals the full provider price as
there is no APA subsidy any more. The budget constraint is:{
Ii = ci pi h∗i +Yi if h∗i ≤ h̄i
Ii = ci pi h̄i +pi (h∗i − h̄i )+Yi ⇐⇒ Ii + (1− ci )pi h̄i = pi h∗i +Yi if h∗i > h̄i
where Y denotes the composite good, with price set to 1. The APA program creates a kink
in the budget constraint of the beneficiary (Figure 2.1 on the following page).
As shown by the previous system, when deciding upon an increase in home care con-
sumption beyond h̄i , the individual should take into account not only her monetary dispos-
able income Ii but also the subsidies received on the first h̄i hours of care she has consumed.
Denoting Ĩi = Ii + (1− ci )pi h̄i the “virtual” income of individual i (Moffitt, 1986, 1990), we
rewrite the demand function specified in Equation (2.1) as follows:
h∗i = g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )+νi if h∗i < h̄i
g (pi , Ĩi ;Xi )+νi ≤ h̄i ≤ g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )+νi if h∗i = h̄i
h∗i = g (pi , Ĩi ;Xi )+νi if h∗i > h̄i
6It can be either a non-authorized structure (service agréé non-autorisé) or an over-the-counter worker (gré-
à-gré or mandataire). See Appendix 2.E for more details on the French home care sector.
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Figure 2.1 – Budget constraint for home care under the APA program
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The objective of the paper is to obtain an empirical estimate of the following quantity,
which is the point price elasticity:
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3 Data
3.1 Administrative data from a Departmental Council
In France, there is no national survey or administrative data set that provides precise in-
formation on both the OOP payments and the formal home care use of the disabled elderly.7
We collected data from one Departmental Council that uses the most frequent APA subsidy
computation rule. We selected a department with demographic characteristics close to the
national averages, although its population has higher than average incomes (Appendix 2.A).
7This will no longer be the case as of the Summer 2018, when a new survey (CARE) collected by the French
Ministry of Health is released. The CARE survey precisely aims at filling the informational gap relating to the
out-of-pocket payments on formal care use incurred by the disabled elderly.
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Data were collected for every month in 2012–2014. Since within year variation in provider
prices is negligible, we only use data for the month of October,8 when home care consump-
tion is less likely to be affected by temporary shocks (like holidays and visits from children).
3.2 Sample selection
To ensure clean identification, we focus on APA beneficiaries served by an authorized
home care provider for which the provider price is observed: we exclude 23% of beneficiaries
of the initial sample as they receive care from other providers. We also exclude beneficiaries
with missing information on subsidized consumption around the month of interest, so as
to limit the risk that unobserved shocks (temporary absences or hospitalizations) could bias
the estimates.
In addition, we exclude beneficiaries whose co-payment rate is zero: their OOP price on
subsidized hours is zero. We also exclude beneficiaries whose co-payment is equal to 90%:
the relationship between their disposable income and their co-payment rate is not linear
and this makes identification more complex. We end up with 8,190 individuals, or about
2,700 per year, representing 51% of the initial sample.9
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Columns [3] and [4] of Table 2.1 describe our estimation sample for October 2014.10 The
typical individual is a woman, in her mid-80s and living alone. Six APA beneficiaries out of
ten do not consume their full care plan volume; price sensitivity is one possible candidate to
explain part of this high figure.
Columns [1] and [2] present the same statistics for two larger populations we selected
our final sample from (all APA beneficiaries / all beneficiaries with an authorized provider).
The last two columns indicate whether our sample and the larger samples differ in statistical
terms. Differences are significant in terms of income and disability level, translating into
differences in co-payment rate and care plan volume and value.11
8Averaging consumption and OOP prices on an annual basis would hamper identification by blurring the
true empirical relationship between price and consumption.
9Appendix 2.A provides more details.
10We present the data of October 2014 to draw a better picture of the population of interest. Table 2.A.3 in
Appendix 2.A replicates these statistics for the pooled sample.
11Implications for the external validity of the analysis will be discussed in Section 5.
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Table 2.1 – Descriptive statistics for estimation sample and all program beneficiaries (Octo-
ber 2014)
All benefi-
ciaries
Beneficiaries
with an
authorized
provider
Estimation sample Differences
between
samples
Mean Mean Mean Std-dev. P-value
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [1]− [3] [2]− [3]
Care plan volume [a] n.a. 21.9 20.5 10.7 n.c. 0.00
Care plan monetary value [b] n.a. e471.7 e455.5 e238.3 n.c. 0.00
Hours effectively subsidized [c] n.a. n.a. 17.7 10.9 n.c. n.c.
Amount of effective subsidies [d] n.a. n.a. e300.8 e201.4 n.c. n.c.
[c] inferior to [a] n.a. n.a. 59.8% - n.c. n.c.
Ratio [c]/[a] n.c. n.c. 85.0% 20.7 pp. n.c. n.c.
Ratio [d]/[b] n.c. n.c. 65.1% 22.2 pp. n.c. n.c.
Individualized income e1,324.5 e1,264.6 e1,315.8 e422.5 0.00 0.00
Co-payment rate 24.4% 22.3% 23.7% 17.3pp. 0.01 0.00
Authorized provider price n.a. e22.2 e22.2 e1.3 n.c. 0.04
Hourly OOP price n.a. e4.9 e5.2 e3.8 n.c. 0.00
Total OOP payments n.a. e84.5 e91.3 e98.6 n.c. 0.00
on subsidized hours
Age n.a. 84.1 84.2 7.4 n.c. 0.29
Women 76.7% 73.8% 74.0% - 0.03 0.76
Disability level 1 (most severe) 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% -
0.00 0.00
Disability level 2 14.5% 13.8% 12.5% -
Disability level 3 21.2% 21.0% 19.6% -
Disability level 4 (least severe) 62.8% 63.9% 66.7% -
100% 100% 100%
Living with a spouse 32.1% 31.0% 33.8% -
0.00 0.00Living alone 66.6% 67.5% 65.6% -
Spouse in institution 1.3% 1.6% 0.6% -
100% 100% 100%
Number of individuals 5,486 4,199 2,862 - -
Number of households n.a. n.a. 2,785 - -
SAMPLES: [1]: sample of all at-home APA beneficiaries of the department; [2]: sample of beneficiaries who
receive care, but not necessarily exclusively, from an authorized provider; [3] and [4]: estimation sample.
NOTES: “pp.” stands for percentage points, “n.a.” for “not available”, “n.c.” for “not computable” (available
information is insufficient). Information on care plan volume, effective consumption and provider price is not
available when the beneficiary receives care from a non-authorized provider. Care plan volume and effective
home care consumption are expressed in hours per month; income, subsidies and total OOP payments are
expressed in euros per month. Data from October 2014.
TESTS: The last two columns present the p-values from the tests of difference between the estimation sample
and non-selected beneficiaries. The test performed is a Student (resp. Pearson χ2) test if variable is binary or
continuous (resp. categorical). The tests compare the mean or distribution in the estimation sample with the
reference sample ([1] or [2]) excluding the estimation sample.
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4 Empirical strategy
4.1 A censored measure of home care consumption
APA files register the individual number of home care hours that are charged by the
provider to the Departmental Council or, equivalently, the subsidized hours of home care.
However, we do not observe the total volume of home care consumed by each APA benefi-
ciary. For the beneficiaries whose recorded consumption equals their care plan volume (40%
of our sample), our measure of home care consumption is then right-censored.12
Denote hi the number of home care hours billed to the Departmental Council for bene-
ficiary i . We observe:{
hi = g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )+νi if g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )+νi < h̄i
hi = h̄i if g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )+νi ≥ h̄i
(2.2)
Hence, the parameters of the demand function g (.) can only be identified from informa-
tion relating to the first segment of the budget constraint. For individuals with the maximum
number of billed hours h̄i , the only information we can use is that their demand is at least as
high as this number.13
4.2 Econometric specification
Since the distribution of (observed) home care consumption is slightly skewed, we as-
sume a log-linear specification of g (.), as follows:
ln(h∗i t ) = β0 +β1.ln(ci t .p ji t )+β2.ln(Ii t )+X′i t .θ+λt +εi t (2.3)
where p ji t denotes the price charged by provider j chosen by individual i in year t
14 and
λt are year fixed effects. Both price and income are included in log so that β1 represents the
consumer price elasticity and β2 captures the income elasticity of the demand for home care
12No public source, at either the departmental or the national level, provides information on home care con-
sumption beyond the care plan volume. However, data collected on a large provider operating in a French de-
partment (and used in Chapter 3 of this thesis) show that 17% of its customers receiving APA consume strictly
more than their care plan volume, with a median “over-consumption” of 1.5 hour per month (Fontaine and
Gramain, 2017).
13Appendix 2.C provides more details.
14All beneficiaries with the same provider are charged the same provider price, before APA co-payment rate
applies.
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services. As c(.) is fully linear in income in the sample,15 Equation 2.3 can be rewritten as:
l n(h∗i t ) = γ0 +β1.ln(p ji t )+ (β1 +β2).ln(Ii t )+X′i t .θ+λt +εi t (2.4)
Equation (2.4) makes it clear that the income variations identify the empirical income
effect within the APA framework. With APA, any marginal increase in the disposable income
has two effects. First, it increases home care consumption, provided home care is a normal
good (standard income effect). Then, it induces the reassessment of the co-payment rate,
which may further affect home care consumption through an increased OOP price (price
effect).
As System (2.2) corresponds to the typical observational scheme underlying censored re-
gression model, β1 and β2 can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood after making a paramet-
ric assumption on ε (Tobit model).16 Our favoured specification though, is a more flexible
version of Equation (2.4). In Equation (2.5), we take as dependent variable the log-share of
the care plan volume consumed by the individual, h∗i t /h̄i t (call it “relative consumption")
and include the care plan volume h̄i t as a control. Equation (2.4) is nested in Equation (2.5)
and β̃1 can still be interpreted as a price elasticity.17
ln(h∗i t /h̄i t ) = γ̃0 + β̃1.ln(p ji t )+ (β̃1 + β̃2).ln(Ii t )+ β̃3.ln(h̄i t )+X′i t .θ̃+ λ̃t + ε̃i t (2.5)
This specification comes with several advantages. First, it includes h̄i t as a control, which
might be a proxy of the unobserved determinants of consumption.18 Technically, relative
home care consumption has a better-behaved distribution than absolute consumption,
making parametric estimates more likely to be consistent.19 Its censoring point is unique
(equal to 0), which eases the implementation of the estimation.
Our baseline estimates are obtained fitting a population-average20 censored regression
estimation of Equation (2.5) assuming that:
ε̃ | p, I, h̄,X, λ̃∼N (0, σ̃2). (2.6)
15The relationship between ci t and Ii t depends on the year the co-payment rate was set. We control for this
source of inter- and intra-individual variation in our estimations. Appendix 2.B provides more details.
16Appendix 2.C derives the Maximum Likelihood function.
17Appendix 2.B provides more details.
18The care plan volume is supposedly based only on the specific activity restrictions of the beneficiary; but
qualitative studies have shown that the evaluation team is likely to take into account additional characteristics
of the individual, such as the informal care she receives (Billaud et al., 2012).
19See Figures 2.B.1 and 2.B.2 in Appendix 2.B.
20We use the unbalanced sample: selecting individuals staying in the APA program for three years would raise
additional selection issues.
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4.3 Identification using cross-sectional variations in prices
As suggested by Equations (2.4) and (2.5), the consumer price elasticity of demand is iden-
tified by the cross-sectional variation in provider prices. In the department, there are 28 au-
thorized providers. Each provider price is reassessed every year. In the panel, provider prices
range frome19.35 toe23.50, with an average ofe21.8 and a standard-deviation ofe1.3. As
yearly variation in prices was small between 2012 and 2014, most of the price variation is
cross-sectional.21
To get unbiased estimates, the provider price charged to individual i must be uncorre-
lated with the unobserved factors affecting her home care consumption, εi . Supply-demand
simultaneity may violate this condition (Zhen et al., 2014), but it should be negligible in our
context. Indeed, although each provider is priced by the Departmental Council on the basis
of its average production cost of two years earlier, the pricing process largely depends on
administrative and political considerations (Gramain and Xing, 2012).
The risk of omitted variable biases is more difficult to dismiss. Beneficiaries may non-
randomly select their provider (price) on the basis of some unobservable individual charac-
teristics such as quality expectations, unobserved health condition or informal care provi-
sion (Billaud et al., 2012). Some sources of price variations can be documented and are un-
likely to be correlated with unobserved determinants of home care consumption (Appendix
2.F), but it is insufficient to rule out any price endogeneity induced by non-random provider
choice. To address this potential bias, we exploit the unequal spatial coverage by authorized
providers in the department.
4.4 An instrumental variable strategy
We propose to instrument the provider price by the number of municipalities in which
the provider serves APA beneficiaries and estimate an IV-Tobit. To be valid, our instrument
must first correlate with the price, conditional on the control variables. Second, it must be
uncorrelated with the unobserved determinants of professional home care consumption.
From a practical standpoint, serving more municipalities translates into higher trans-
portation and coordination costs for a provider. Exploiting the service files of a large French
home care provider, Roquebert (2018) gives an estimate for the travel costs incurred by a
given provider, for one hour of intervention. Their average value ranges between between 6%
and 8% of the provider price. This share is found to vary considerably with the organization
of caregivers’ rounds. For authorized providers, such costs are partially incorporated in the
price set by the Departmental Council (Gramain and Xing, 2012). Several public and research
21On average, provider prices increased by 1.9% between October 2012 and 2013 and by 1.3% between 2013
and 2014.
139
CHAPTER 2
reports on the French home care sector have insisted on the heterogeneity in transportation
costs borne by providers and the differences in prices it induces (Aube-Martin et al., 2010;
Vanlerenberghe and Watrin, 2014; Branchu et al., 2015; Garabige et al., 2015).
In our data, as is evidenced by Figure 2.G.4, the price charged by a given provider and
the number of municipalities in which it operates are positively correlated. The IV-Tobit first
stage (Table 2.2) shows that a one standard-deviation increase in the number of municipal-
ities served by the provider is associated with a 4.9% increase in its price. The F-statistic
associated with this estimate exceeds 143 - a figure far higher than the conventional thresh-
old used to assess the risk that the instrument is weak (Staiger and Stock, 1997).
Figure 2.2 – Correlation between provider price and number of municipalities served by the
provider
NOTES: The number of municipalities served by each provider is constructed us-
ing information on all APA beneficiaries receiving home care from an authorized
provider in October 2012, 2013 and 2014 (and not just the beneficiaries retained
in the estimation sample). The line is fitted using all three years of observation.
To make the graphical representation more readable, we excluded the largest
provider. With 199 municipalities served in October 2014, it charged the high-
est price over the 3 years of observation (e23.5 in 2014). The positive correlation
displayed by the graph is preserved when we include the largest provider.
A potential threat to the exclusion restriction is that the instrument may correlate with
individual consumption through another channel than the price charged by the provider.
In particular, it would be the case if the number of hours provided by a service systemati-
cally increases its provision costs due to decreasing returns to scale. Apart from transporta-
tion and coordination costs though, the care provision process may be assumed to exhibit
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roughly constant returns to scale, as most of the provision costs is made of caregivers’ wages.
The strong association between the price charged by a provider and its geographical area of
operation is thus unlikely to be driven by the volume of care it delivers.
5 Results and discussion
5.1 Main results
Table 2.2 presents our main results, obtained on the panel data.22 Column (1) presents
Tobit estimates of Equation (2.5). Column (2) presents the estimates we obtain when the
price is instrumented by the number of municipalities served by the provider.23 We cluster
the standard errors at the provider level since our “treatment” variable, p ji t , essentially varies
at the provider level (Moulton, 1990; Cameron and Miller, 2015).
[Table 2.2 to be found on the following page.]
When the provider price is considered as exogenous, the consumer price elasticity esti-
mate is about −0.45. When using our instrument, the coefficient is slightly lower in absolute
value. The difference between the two is not statistically significant, suggesting that the po-
tential bias due to non-random provider selection may be limited.24 Overall, price elasticity
estimates are negative, statistically significant, confirming that the disabled elderly are sen-
sitive to the price of professional home care. Our favoured estimation (Column (2)), which
instruments the price, gives a point estimate of −0.387, or about −0.4.
The income effect in the APA framework appears negative, but negligible and statistically
not different from zero. Richer APA beneficiaries do not tend to consume more formal care,
all other things being equal. With ˆ̃β1 + ˆ̃β2 close to zero, our estimations suggest that the
increase in the co-payment rate, induced by an increase in income, compensates for the
standard income effect. We also derive an estimate of the standard income elasticity β̃2. Both
the Tobit and the IV-Tobit give a value of about 0.4, statistically different from zero. Although
this income effect is imprecisely estimated,25 we are able to conclude that home care is a
necessity good for the disabled elderly.
22The coefficients displayed give the predicted impact of a marginal (or 0/1) change in a given explanatory
variable on the total, uncensored relative home care consumption.
23We use the parametric version of Stata command ivtobit. We thus assume the error terms of the first-
stage and second-stage equations are jointly normally distributed.
24We implement a cluster Bootstrap Hausman test. We cannot reject that the provider price is exogenous
(p = 0.88).
25 ˆ̃β2 corresponds to the difference between the empirical income elasticity with APA and the price elasticity
estimates; the associated standard error is high (around 0.19), due to the relatively large standard error of the
price elasticity estimate.
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Table 2.2 – Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours
Tobit IV-Tobit
(1) (2)
Panel A: Second stage Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h̄ (log)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.387∗∗
(0.181) (0.192)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008)
Care plan volume (log) 0.040∗ 0.040∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Woman 0.029∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
Age: 60–69 -0.124∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047)
Age: 70–79 -0.042∗∗ -0.042∗∗
(0.017) (0.017)
Age: 80–89 Ref. Ref.
Age: 90 or older 0.051∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)
Disability group: 1 (most severe) 0.154∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.057)
Disability group: 2 0.027 0.027
(0.022) (0.022)
Disability group: 3 Ref. Ref.
Disability group: 4 (least severe) 0.008 0.009
(0.012) (0.012)
Living with no spouse 0.107∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
Spouse receives APA 0.036 0.037
(0.034) (0.034)
Spouse in institution 0.170∗ 0.170∗
(0.095) (0.094)
Living with non-APA spouse Ref. Ref.
Constant 1.225∗∗ 1.032∗
(0.556) (0.592)
Panel B: First stage Dependent variable: provider price p (log)
Number of municipalities (std.) 0.049∗∗∗
(0.004)
F statistic 143.98
Observations 8190 8190
Censored observations 39.6% 39.6%
Number of clusters 28 28
AIC 11454 -22049
BIC 11644 -21860
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estimation of a Tobit or IV-Tobit
model by Maximum Likelihood. In the first stage (Panel B), the log-provider price is regressed
on the standardized number of municipalities served by the provider. All specifications include
year fixed effects, dummies for the year in which the co-payment rate was computed as well as
dummies for the year the latest plan was decided upon (in the first and second stages for the
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Individuals with a higher care plan volume tend to consume a larger share of their care
plan. For a given disability level, a higher care plan volume could be explained by a lower
provision of informal care. Alternatively, a higher care plan may also have a stronger pre-
scriptive effect.
As expected, the highly-disabled individuals consume relatively more than the benefi-
ciaries with mild to moderate disability, all other factors being equal. Even when controlling
for the disability level, age retains a significant effect on the consumption on home care ser-
vices. Being a woman increases the consumption of professional home care relative to the
care plan volume, by a small but statistically significant amount. Living alone (spouse in
institution or no spouse) increases the amount of professional assistance received, consis-
tently with previous works showing the importance of the co-residing spouse in providing
informal care substituting partly for formal home care services.
5.2 Further results and robustness checks
We replicate the estimations on each year separately (Appendix 2.G); price elasticity es-
timates are found to range from −0.54 to −0.13. Precision is low but we can reject that the
price elasticity is zero (except for 2014) or unity.26 We check our results are robust to the fact
that inference relies on a small number of clusters by implementing a cluster percentile-t
bootstrap (Appendix 2.G). Statistical significance of the price elasticity is preserved at the 5%
level on the pooled sample.
To investigate the potential heterogeneity in price sensitivity, we estimate the model in-
teracting the price with the disability level or the income level (Table 2.3).
[Table 2.3 to be found on the following page.]
A credible IV strategy would require to find an additional instrument for each interaction
term. As Table 2.2 suggests that the bias due to potential price endogeneity is limited, we
fit a simple Tobit model when adding the interaction terms. We expected more severely dis-
abled individuals to be less price sensitive, but we are not able to detect such an effect. Price
sensitivity is higher for individuals whose income is above the sample median income. This
result echoes Duarte (2012), who finds that higher income individuals are more price-elastic
in their medical care consumption. Richer individuals may be more able to understand the
health care system and cost-sharing schedules due to a higher financial literacy.
26Precision in 2014 is lower, as a provider closed down.
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As a robustness check, we implement an alternative identification strategy (Appendix
2.G). We estimate our equation of interest (without instrumenting the price) on the sub-
sample of APA beneficiaries who live in a municipality where a single authorized provider is
found to operate. In a context in which price selection is arguably limited, we find a price
elasticity estimate around –0.5 — not statistically different from our main result.
Table 2.3 – Price elasticity of home care by severity of disability and income
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.323 -0.446∗∗
(0.181) (0.236) (0.178)
Price (log) × disability group 4 (least severe) -0.190
(0.270)
Price (log) × income above median -0.019∗∗∗
(0.006)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.010 0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Observations 8190 8190 8190
Censored observations 39.6% 39.6% 39.6%
Number of clusters 28 28 28
AIC 11454 11453 11439
BIC 11643 11642 11629
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estimation of
Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. All specifications include as controls the care plan
volume, socio-demographic characteristics, year fixed effects, dummies for the year in
which the co-payment rate was computed as well as dummies for the year the latest plan
was decided upon.
5.3 Discussion
Our results confirm that the consumption of home care of the disabled elderly is sensitive
to the price they pay. Decisions relating to formal home care consumption are influenced by
a trade-off between the OOP price of an extra hour and its marginal value. Such a pecuniary
trade-off has been documented at the extensive margin, as the take-up of APA benefits is
affected by the average subsidy rate in the department (Arrighi et al., 2015). Originally, we
find evidence that the price elasticity of the demand for home care is seemingly lower than
unity at the intensive margin: the adjustment of consumption is proportionally lower than a
given change in price. This implies a positive price elasticity of OOP expenditures: a decrease
in the OOP price should lead to a decrease in total OOP payments.
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The price sensitivity we obtain is of an order of magnitude similar to the estimates found
for health care demand. Although the magnitude of the −0.2 estimate derived from the Rand
Health Insurance Experiment (Manning et al., 1987; Keeler and Rolph, 1988) is subject to
discussion (Aron-Dine et al., 2013), a large literature has confirmed that medical spending
is price-elastic, with price sensitivity varying with the type of care (Duarte, 2012; Fukushima
et al., 2016). Our paper provides interesting evidence that, at the intensive margin, home
care consumption is closer to acute care than to elective care in terms of price sensitivity.
Uncovering the welfare effects of home care subsidies yet requires to assess the extent to
which the adjustment of home care use to a change in the relative price of care is due to in-
come effects as opposed to substitution effects. Nyman (1999) has suggested that the trans-
fer of income achieved through an insurance scheme offering a price reduction on health
care may increase the willingness-to-pay for care, thus the surplus associated with care use.
However, any further increase in care consumption due to the change in relative prices alone
induces a loss in allocative efficiency, as the willingness-to-pay for care falls short of its rel-
ative costs at the margin. Transposing this framework to our analysis, we decompose our
estimated price effects into substitution and income effects. A back-of-the-envelope com-
putation suggests the price elasticity of the hicksian demand to be close to our estimated
price elasticity of the marshallian demand, around 0.3-0.4 in absolute value.27 Providing in-
surance against long-term care expenses through subsidies on the price of care thus comes
with some gross efficiency loss. Providing full estimates of the welfare gains or losses associ-
ated with the APA program would however require richer data and more extensive modeling,
and is beyond the scope of this Chapter.
The interpretation and implications of our results are contingent on several assumptions
and limitations. Our OOP price measure does not take into account possible tax reductions
on home care services, unobserved in the APA records. Without sufficient information to
simulate them, we implicitly assume APA beneficiaries to be sensitive to the “spot” price
(Geoffard, 2000). We also assume that APA recipients react in the same way to variations in
the co-payment rate and in the provider price. If salience differs (Chetty et al., 2009), impli-
cations of our results for the design of the co-payment schedule are less straightforward.
In our administrative data, information on family characteristics is poor. Receiving more
informal care has been found to decrease formal care use, both at the extensive and intensive
margins (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004; Bonsang, 2009). Omitting informal care provision
could bias the estimates of our entire set of coefficients. This is all the more of a concern
as the share of (self-declared) APA beneficiaries who declare receiving some informal help is
higher in the department than in the rest of France.28 As a robustness check, we include as
27See Appendix 2.H for details.
28Over four-fifths in the department, against 75% in metropolitan France (Insee-Drees, 2014).
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a control whether the individual receives formal home care during the weekend and public
holidays (Table 2.G.9, Appendix 2.G). We hypothesize that individuals not receiving profes-
sional home care over the weekend are more likely to receive assistance from their relatives.
Receiving formal care during the weekend is associated with more hours consumed during
working days; reassuringly though, it does not significantly affect the price elasticity esti-
mate.
Finally, external validity of our results should be qualified. Without data covering the en-
tire population eligible to APA, the potential bias induced by the differential take-up of APA
subsidies (Chauveaud and Warin, 2005) cannot be dealt with. Our sample is not nationally
representative and we focus on APA recipients who consume home care from authorized ser-
vices. As the department is slightly richer than France as a whole, and price sensitivity being
greater for richer beneficiaries, our estimates may be an upper bound (in absolute value). Yet
the department is reasonably close to “average France” in terms of other socio-demographic
characteristics and most APA beneficiaries in France receive care from authorized providers
(Couvert, 2017; Hege et al., 2014). Finally, our results are in line with the two available esti-
mates (Bourreau-Dubois, Gramain, Lim and Xing, 2014; Hege, 2016), which rely on different
estimation strategies and data.
6 Conclusion
This paper estimates the consumer price elasticity of the demand for professional home
care services of the disabled elderly benefiting from the French APA program. Our results
suggest this parameter is about −0.4, with point estimates statistically different from zero
and unity in absolute value.
Our findings pave the way for several policy implications. The income elasticity of the
structural demand for home care, holding the co-payment rate constant, is found to be pos-
itive, suggesting that the ex post transfer of income from the taxpayers to the disabled el-
derly enabled by the APA scheme results in some welfare gains. However, formal home care
displays some substitutability with other consumption goods, reducing the efficiency of a
long-term care scheme offering a price payoff rather than a lump-sum payment. From a
more dynamic perspective, that LTC use adjusts to the price of care may make home care
subsidy programs conducive to positive health effects for beneficiaries, if higher use of LTC
improves their health status. Given the relatively low price elasticity of demand, the generos-
ity of home care subsidies may also be seen as a tool achieving redistribution of consumer
surplus from taxpayers to the disabled elderly. Finally, as differences in income between APA
beneficiaries are found to little correlate with differences in care use, the design of the APA
co-payment schedule seems to ensure that the use of professional home care by the disabled
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elderly little depends on individual socio-economic status.
While remaining cautious regarding the external validity of the results, our estimates can
be used to discuss the effects of potential reforms of home care subsidies. The decrease
of co-payment rates enacted by the 2016 APA reform, higher for low- and middle-income
recipients, should reduce overall OOP expenses on professional home care of current APA
recipients, while having a limited volume effect.29
29This prediction abstracts from the increase in the national ceilings on care plan volumes that was also
decided by the 2016 APA reform. Chapter 3 assesses the effects of the full set of the measures of the reform.
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Appendix
2.A Additional information on the data
2.A.1. Comparison of the department studied with metropolitan France
Table 2.A.1 compares the department studied to metropolitan France. We use either ad-
ministrative sources ([A]: Insee et al. (2013); [B]: Insee (2014); [D]: Drees (2013)) or survey
data ([C]: Insee-Drees (2014)).
Column [1] gives descriptive statistics on metropolitan France while Column [2] focuses
on the department studied. Column [2] reports intervals around the true department value
to preserve its anonymity. Bounds are computed so that 20% of the French departments
closest to the department of interest (weighting by the size of the departmental population
aged 60 or more) have a value lying in the interval.30 If the department is located in the
bottom quintile, we report as a lower bound the minimum value observed across French
departments for the variable; similarly, when the department ranks in the top quintile, the
upper bound we report is the maximum value observed in metropolitan France.
The third column tests the significance of the differences between the first two columns.
For statistics computed using exhaustive administrative sources ([A], [B] and [D]), we test
whether the department population can be considered as a random draw from the French
metropolitan population. When using survey data ([C]), the tests of difference compare the
sample of the respondents of the department with the respondents of the rest of France.
Although differences are quasi-systematic in statistical terms, the selected department
has socio-demographic characteristics close to that of France overall. Our selected depart-
ment is however richer than the rest of France: it has a higher share of households subject
to the income tax and a lower poverty rate in the 75+ population, although the median tax-
able income in the department is only slightly higher than in France. Albeit the prevalence
of functional limitations in the 60+ population is similar in the department and in the rest
of France, the rate of APA beneficiaries is slightly higher in our department. This possibly
reflects local variations in the way the APA policy is implemented (Billaud et al., 2012).
30Insee et al. (2013) directly provides the deciles of the taxable income distribution in the metropolitan French
population aged 75 or more. The department is found to be richer than the 40% least wealthy departments, but
poorer than the 40% richest departments. We use the 4th and 6th deciles of the national distribution to bound
the median taxable income observed in the department studied.
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Table 2.A.1 – Descriptive statistics for department studied and metropolitan France
Metropolitan
France
Department Difference
(p. value)
Source
Variable [1] [2] [1]− [2] -
General population
Households subject to income tax 58.2% [61.9%–75.1%] 0.00 [A]
60+ population/total population 24.4% [23.8%–26.3%] 0.00 [B]
Elderly population (60+)
Average age 71.8 [71.3–71.7] 0.00
[C]
Health status (functional limitations)
0.48
Level 1 (least severe) 64.9% [63.9%–66.2%]
Level 2 21.4% [20.1%–21.0%]
Level 3 7.7% [7.2%–7.8%]
Level 4 (most severe) 6.0% [6.3%–7.0%]
100% 100%
Poverty rate in 75+ population 8.9% [6.9%–7.9%] 0.00
[A]
Median taxable income (75+ households) e19,536 [e17,380–e22,050] n.c.
Rate of APA beneficiaries 7.8% [8.1%–9.1%] 0.00
[D]
At–home recipients/all APA beneficiaries 58.7% [56.1%–60.6%] 0.00
At-home APA beneficiaries
Woman 73.7% [71.7%–72.8%] 0.00
[D]
Age groups
n.c.
Age 60-74 12.7% [11.2%–12.7%]
Age 75-79 13.6% [13.8%–14.6%]
Age 80-84 23.9% [23.5%–24.4%]
Age 85+ 49.7% [49.2%–51.0%]
100% 100%
Living arrangements
0.88 [C]
Living alone 55.3% [54.7%–56.9%]
Living with her spouse 30.4% [27.7%–32.7%]
Living with a relative other than her
spouse
14.3% [9.5%–12.5%]
100% 100%
Disability level
n.c.
[D]
Disability level 1 (most severe) 2.4% [1.7%–2.1%]
Disability level 2 16.8% [14.1%–15.6%]
Disability level 3 22.1% [20.0%–21.7%]
Disability level 4 (least severe) 58.8% [60.5%–64.5%]
100% 100%
Amount of effective subsidies e361.1 [e329.1–e350.5] n.c.
SOURCES: [A]: Insee et al. (2013); [B]: Insee (2014); [C]: Insee-Drees (2014) – APA benefit is self-declared. Rate
of spousal co-residence may be underestimated; [D]: Drees (2013)– Administrative files on APA beneficiaries in
2013, all French departments. Decomposition by sex and age (resp. by disability level) not available in 21 (resp.
in 5) departments.
NOTES: Column [2] reports intervals around the true department value to preserve its anonymity. Bounds are
computed so that 20% of the French departments closest to the department of interest (weighting by the size
of the departmental population aged 60 or more) have a value lying in the interval.
TESTS: n.c. stands for “not computable”. Test performed is a Student (resp. a Pearson χ2) test for binary (resp.
categorical) variables.
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2.A.2. Sample selection
This Appendix aims at documenting the selection steps the data from October 2014 have
gone through. We follow the same steps to construct the samples of October 2012 and 2013.
The percentages of individuals selected at each step are very similar to what is found for 2014
and are available upon request.
The initial number of beneficiaries is considered to be 5,486.31 Table 4.A.2 sums up the
selection steps.
Table 2.A.2 – Sample selection steps
Recipients with an authorized provider at least
All Recipients effectively consuming care in the month
All “Stable” recipients
All Recipients consuming only from
All one authorized provider
All Recipients with
0 < ci < 90%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number 5,486 4,475 4,199 3,527 3,327 2,862
% of previous step - 81.6% 93.8% 84.0% 94.3% 86.1 %
% of initial sample 100% 81.6% 76.5% 64.3% 60.6% 52.2%
NOTES: “Stable” APA recipients in October 2014 are defined as those for which information is available also for
the months of September and November 2014. For additional 63 individuals (not in the numbers here above),
the administrative files contain no information on the co-payment rate or or the consumption of home care
hours, or are inconsistent with national APA legislation.
To observe precisely both the out-of-pocket price and the number of hours that are ef-
fectively consumed and subsidized, we retain the beneficiaries receiving care from an autho-
rized provider. They represent the majority of APA recipients in the department (more than
4/5).
Among them, about 6% have no actual consumption of home care recorded in the files.
This might be explained by temporary absences (like hospitalizations) or disruptions (e.g.
visits from relatives, who replace temporarily professional home care services by providing
informal care). As the outcome of interest is missing, we drop these observations. Another
15% of APA recipients with an authorized provider have missing information on subsidized
care consumption for the preceding or the following month. We choose to drop them to
31For October 2014, administrative records indicate that 5,549 beneficiaries were receiving APA; but for 61
individuals, essential information on subsidized hours, co-payment rate or on matrimonial status was missing
or inconsistent. These individuals are presumably former APA recipients not yet erased from the files. For 2
additional individuals, the monetary value of the care plan was beyond the national legal ceiling, signaling a
probable error in the records. We dropped these 63 observations from our sample.
150
THE PRICE ELASTICITY OF HOME CARE USE
avoid potential unobservable shocks likely to bias our estimations. The remaining individu-
als can be regarded as “stable”.
Among beneficiaries actually receiving care from an authorized provider at least, less
than 6% receive care from a secondary provider.32 As we generally do not observe care con-
sumption from the secondary provider nor its price,33 we drop multiple-provider individu-
als.
Beneficiaries with income below a certain threshold have a 0% co-payment rate: their
OOP price is zero. Our log-log specification cannot be estimated on these observations. In
addition, so as to make the relationship between the consumer price and the provider price
fully linear in disposable income (see Appendix 2.B), we retain only those individuals with a
co-payment rate strictly below 90%. These two income groups represent respectively 12.7%
and 1.3% of the remaining 3,327 beneficiaries.
We end up with a sample that represents 52% of total at-home APA recipients of the de-
partment.
A Heckman-type model would allow to take into account the selection of our sample on
both observable and unobservable factors affecting the demand for home care. But we do
not have any good instrument at hand to construct an estimator that would not entirely rely
on a parametric assumption. We choose to estimate our parameters of interest directly on
the selected sample. Such a choice imposes to remain cautious about the external validity of
our estimates, as discussed in Section 5.3 of the paper.
32The majority of these beneficiaries receive additional care from an over-the-counter worker (see Section
2.E for more details on the different types of home care providers). Over-the-counter workers are generally
cheaper and more flexible than home care structures. 7 individuals receive home care from a second authorized
provider. Theoretically, there might be a third case: beneficiaries could also complement the care provided by
an authorized structure with care provided by a non-authorized structure. Our files do not allow us to identify
such cases; we believe they are marginal, as care provision by non-authorized structures is rare (only 6% of
beneficiaries with no authorized provider receive home care from a non-authorized structure).
33Even if we had all necessary information, dealing with the simultaneity of consumption decisions would
have made our empirical strategy considerably more complex.
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2.A.3. Imputation of couples of APA beneficiaries
The data we collected indicate when a beneficiary lives with a partner, but we do not
directly know whether the partner also receives APA. Having an APA-recipient spouse may
correlate with one’s own home care consumption; failing to control for such a characteristic
may bias our estimates.
To identify potential couples in our sample, we checked whether each individual could
be matched with another recipient of the opposite sex, recorded as living with a spouse, with
exactly the same income34 and residing in the same municipality. If two individuals match,
we assume they belong to the same household: our estimations will control for the fact of
having a spouse receiving APA.
The matching procedure may fail for individuals whose co-payment rate is 0%. The re-
ported disposable income is the same for all such individuals, be they actual spouses or not.
The same pitfall applies for individuals whose co-payment rate is 90%. In these cases, the
Departmental Council simply records the lower or upper income threshold of the APA co-
payment schedule. In October 2014, only 16 individuals were not matched for this reason.
But all our estimations rely on the sample of individuals with a co-payment rate strictly be-
tween 0 and 90%, for whom the matching procedure is systematically successful.
2.A.4. Descriptive statistics on the pooled sample
Table 2.A.3 replicates Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.1 of the paper, by presenting the
descriptive statistics on the pooled sample (and not on the 2014 sample only).
The pooled sample we derive our baseline estimates from is an unbalanced panel. In this
sample, 26% of beneficiaries are present all three waves; another 26% are present only in two
waves; finally, 48% are only present in one wave.35 Focusing on the sample of beneficiaries
in October 2014, we see that the longer the individual has been receiving APA, the older she
is; this translates into a higher proportion of women, who have a longer life-expectancy, and
a lower proportion of beneficiaries with a spouse alive among the beneficiaries present in
two or three waves. Those beneficiaries tend to be more disabled; they have, on average, a
higher care plan volume and a higher number of hours subsidized by the APA scheme (con-
sumption relative to the care plan volume being also higher). On the contrary, we do not see
any difference in average provider and OOP prices, nor in income.
When using the unbalanced sample, we do not select a specific population — the new
entrants into the APA scheme —; the shortcoming of such a choice, however, is that the in-
34The APA co-payment schedule takes into account the household income. See Appendix 2.B.
35This does not mean that the typical APA recipient benefits from the scheme less than one year. For indi-
viduals observed only in 2012, for example, we do not know whether they were receiving APA one year or two
years before. Average duration of APA benefits is estimated to be around 4 years (Debout, 2010).
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Table 2.A.3 – Descriptive statistics on the pooled sample (2012–2014)
Mean Std-dev.
Variable [1] [2]
Care plan volume [a] 20.9 10.7
Care plan monetary value [b] e456.1 e235.8
Hours effectively subsidized [c] 18.1 10.8
Amount of effective subsidies [d] e303.1 e199.2
[c] inferior to [a] 60.4% -
Ratio [c]/[a] 85.6% 19.8pp.
Ratio [d]/[b] 65.5% 21.7pp.
Individualized income e1,301.5 e415.6
co-payment rate 23.8% 17.2pp.
Provider price e21.8 e1.3
OOP price e5.2 e3.8
Total OOP payments e91.6 e95.2
on subsidized hours
Age 84.0 7.3
Woman 73.2% -
Disability level 1 1.2% -
Disability level 2 12.8% -
Disability level 3 20.2% -
Disability level 4 65.8% -
100%
Lives with a spouse 33.8% -
Lives alone 65.6% -
Spouse in institution 0.6% -
100%
Number of individuals 8,190 -
NOTES: “pp.” stands for percentage points. Care plan volume and effective home
care consumption are expressed in hours per month; income, subsidies and total
OOP payments are expressed in euros per month. Sample from October 2012, 2013
and 2014.
dividuals who have been present in several waves weigh more in the estimation than single-
observation individuals. The cross-sectional estimates presented in Appendix 2.G (Tables
2.G.1 to 2.G.3) show that the magnitude of the price elasticity estimate does not change sub-
stantially when replicating our estimations using the sample of beneficiaries present in Oc-
tober of either 2012, 2013 or 2014.
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2.B Specifications
2.B.1. Addressing income and co-payment rate issues in the empirical
specifications
In Section 4.2 of the paper, when taking the absolute consumption as the dependent
variable, our econometric specification is stated as follows:
l n(h∗i t ) = γ0 +β1.ln(p ji t )+ (β1 +β2).ln(Ii t )+X′i t .θ+λt +εi t (2.7)
To ensure a clean identification of the parameters, two features of the data must be taken
into account. First, the disposable income recorded in the data at time t is not the current
value of income but the income when the co-payment rate was computed or last revised,
denoted Iobsi t . We express disposable income at time t as: Ii t = ρi t Iobsi t , with ρi t the rate of in-
crease of individual disposable income between time t and the year i ’s last co-payment rate
was computed. As the rate of increase in disposable income ρi t is not directly observable,
we include a dummy 1di t equal to one when i ’s co-payment rate (observed in t ) was last re-
vised in year d . Dummy coefficients should capture the rate of increase in income between
years d and t .36 In our data, most co-payment rates were last computed between 2010 and
2014; for a few observations though, the latest computation of the co-payment rate is older
(d = 2002, ...,2014).
Second, the co-payment rate is set to be strictly proportional to the disposable income
at the time the latest personalized care plan was defined, Iobsi t , according to the following
function:
ci t = 0.9
2MTPDi t
Iobsi t
where MTPDi t is the value of a particular disability allowance (Majoration pour Tierce-
Personne) the year the co-payment rate was last computed for individual i observed at
time t . For a given observed income, the co-payment might differ according to the year d
when the co-payment rate was last computed. Year dummies 1di t , d = 2002, ...,2014 thus
additionally control for inter-individual and intra-individual variation in this parameter.
For 2% of our sample, the relationship between the income and the co-payment rate does
not respect the legal formula used to compute the co-payment rate. After a careful exami-
nation of the data, we hypothesize that most of these errors occurred when the co-payment
36We implicitly assume the rate of increase in disposable income to be identical for two individuals observed
a given year, whose personalized plans were decided upon the same year d . Retirees’ income is mostly made
of pension benefits (Deloffre, 2009), which are reevaluated every year following the inflation rate. It remains a
strong assumption given the heterogeneity in income composition across the income distribution.
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rate was computed; conversely, we assume the values of income are well recorded, and the
co-payment rate registered in the data is the value that is effectively applied to compute the
APA subsidy. We add a dummy variable 1ei t signaling whether the observation is affected by
such a calculation error. The full equation to be estimated is then:
ln(h∗i t ) = γ0 +β1.ln(p ji t )+ (β1 +β2).ln(Iobsi t )+
2014∑
d=2002
ξd .1di t +ζ.1ei t +X′i t .θ+εi t (2.8)
Finally, note that our econometric specification includes disposable income and not in-
come per se. In the APA scheme, disposable income is defined as the individualized income37
minus an amount equal to 0.67×MTPDi t (e739 per month for an individual whose income
and co-payment rate was last reassessed in 2014). It roughly equals the old-age minimum
income allowance. This amount may be regarded as the minimum income that will ensure
the individual can satisfy her basic consumption needs: the individual trades off home care
consumption for other consumption goods only when deciding upon the allocation of the
part of her income in excess of the minimum income allowance.
2.B.2. Specification with relative consumption
When using the specification with relative consumption, we consider as the dependent
variable the share of the care plan that is effectively consumed by the individual, h∗i t /h̄i t (this
is the ratio we call the “relative consumption").
Empirically, we take the log of the ratio and estimate the following specification:
ln
(
h∗i t /h̄i t
)= γ̃0 + β̃1.ln(p ji t )+ (β̃1 + β̃2)ln(Iobsi t )+β3.l n(h̄i t )
+
2014∑
d=2002
ξ̃d .1di t + ζ̃.1ei t +X′i t .θ̃+ λ̃t + ε̃i t (2.9)
The dependent variable is still censored when individuals fully consume their care plan
volume (exact volume or more), but the censoring point now equals ln(h∗i t /h̄i t ) = ln(1) = 0.
It is the same for all beneficiaries, whatever the volume of the care plan. Equation (2.9) is
37Individualized income equals the individual’s monetary income when the beneficiary has no spouse alive;
it is equal to the household monetary income divided by 1.7 when the beneficiary has a spouse alive. The
consumption unit attributed to the second adult of the household follows the Oxford (or “old OECD”) scale
(OECD, 2013a). Compared to the OECD-modified scale, which is nowadays the most frequently used in France,
the use of the Oxford scale to compute APA individualized income implies that the economies of scale in a
household with a disabled elderly are lower than in other households.
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equivalent to:
ln(h∗i t )− ln(h̄i t ) = γ̃0 + β̃1.ln(p ji t )+ (β̃1 + β̃2)ln(Iobsi t )+ β̃3.ln(h̄i t )
+
2014∑
d=2002
ξ̃d .1di t + ζ̃.1ei t +X′i t .θ̃+ λ̃t + ε̃i t
ln(h∗i ) = γ̃0 + β̃1.ln(p ji t )+ (β̃1 + β̃2)ln(Iobsi t )+ (β̃3 +1).ln(h̄i t )
+
2014∑
d=2002
ξ̃d .1di t + ζ̃.1ei t +X′i t .θ̃+ λ̃t + ε̃i t (2.10)
In Equation (2.9), β̃1 can thus be interpreted as the price elasticity of demand. The equa-
tion presented in the previous section, Equation (2.8), is nested in this equation. It would be
equivalent to Equation (2.10) if we imposed the constraint that β̃3 =−1.
The specification with relative consumption comes with several advantages. First, it in-
cludes the care plan volume as a control, which might be a proxy of the unobserved deter-
minants of consumption. Second, relative consumption is a better-behaved outcome than
absolute consumption: its distribution is closer to a normal (Figures 2.B.1 and 2.B.2) and the
consistency of Tobit estimates requires the normality of the error term. Finally, it enables
us to overcome the limitation of having an individual-specific censoring point: it eases the
implementation of the estimations.
[Figures 2.B.1 and 2.B.2 to be found on the following page]
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Figure 2.B.1 – Distribution of absolute home care consumption, by disability level
SAMPLE: Estimation sample (data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014; 8,190 individuals). Sub-
sample size: N=1,145 in GIR 1 or 2 (most severe disability levels); N=1,655 in GIR 3; N=5,390 in
GIR 4 (least severe disability level).
NOTES: The “GIR” corresponds to the official disability level of APA beneficiaries. The dashed
vertical line indicates the pooled sample median value of home care consumption.
Figure 2.B.2 – Distribution of relative home care consumption, by disability level
SAMPLE: Estimation sample (data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014; 8,190 individuals). Sub-
sample size: N=1,145 in GIR 1 or 2 (most severe disability levels); N=1,655 in GIR 3; N=5,390 in
GIR 4 (least severe disability level).
NOTES: Relative home care consumption designates the ratio hi /h̄i . The “GIR” corresponds
to the official disability level of APA beneficiaries. The solid vertical line at 1 indicates the
censoring point of relative consumption.
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2.C Maximum likelihood estimation
The objective of this appendix is twofold. First, it provides the expression of the likeli-
hood function we maximize to derive our baseline estimates (Tobit estimation). Second, it
shows that, within the framework proposed by Moffitt (1986), the censoring of the measure
of consumption at the kink and beyond does not prevent the identification of the sample
average price elasticity of demand, conditional on some assumptions on the stability of in-
dividual preferences.
To keep notations simple and concise, we ignore the time dimension (subscript t and
year dummies are not included) and consider home care consumption in level when deriv-
ing the likelihood function (while we include its log in the empirical specification).
2.C.1. General setting
The demand for home care with the kinked budget constraint generated by APA writes:
h∗i = g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )+νi if h∗i < h̄i
g (pi , Ĩi ;Xi )+νi ≤ h̄i ≤ g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )+νi if h∗i = h̄i
h∗i = g (pi , Ĩi ;Xi )+νi if h∗i > h̄i
(2.11)
with νi an individual preference shifter. We denote:
ψ a set of parameters characterizing the function g (.);
κ a set of parameters characterizing the distribution of the error term ν;
S1 the left-hand side segment of the budget constraint: i ∈ S1 ⇐⇒ h∗i < h̄i ;
S2 the right-hand side segment of the budget constraint: i ∈ S2 ⇐⇒ h∗i > h̄i ;
K the kink of the budget constraint: i ∈ K ⇐⇒ h∗i = h̄i .
2.C.2. Observational scheme with censoring
With hi the consumption in the data and h∗i the true consumption, our observational
scheme is:
hi =
{
h∗i if h
∗
i < h̄i
h̄i if h∗i ≥ h̄i
(2.12)
From Systems 2.11 and 2.12, we know that:
1. For all individuals i such that hi < h̄i , we know that hi = h∗i ; thus we have h∗i < h̄i
(i ∈ S1):
hi = g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )+νi < h̄i
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2. For individuals i such that hi = h̄i , we know that h∗i ≥ h̄i ; these individuals can be split
in two different sub-groups:
(a) Individuals i such that h∗i = h̄i (i ∈ K); then:{
g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )+νi ≥ h̄i
g (pi , Ĩi ;Xi )+νi ≤ h̄i
(b) Individuals i such that h∗i > h̄i (i ∈ S2); then:{
g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )+νi > h̄i
g (pi , Ĩi ;Xi )+νi > h̄i
Thus, all censored observations (i ∈ S2 or i ∈ K) have in common the fact that:
g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )+νi ≥ h̄i
We can thus write:
hi =
{
g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )+νi if g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )+νi < h̄i
h̄i if g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )+νi ≥ h̄i
(2.13)
which corresponds to the usual censored regression model setting.
The individual contributions to the likelihood function are derived from this setting. De-
note f (.|ci , pi , Ii , h̄i ,Xi ) the conditional density function of ν and F(.|ci , pi , Ii , h̄i ,Xi ) its con-
ditional cumulative distribution function. Then the likelihood function writes:
L(ψ,κ) =
n∏
i=1
[
f
(
hi − g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )|ci , pi , Ii , h̄i ,Xi
)]I[hi <h̄i ]
×
[(
1−F(h̄i − g (ci pi , Ii ;Xi )|ci , pi , Ii , h̄i ,Xi ))]I[hi =h̄i ]
In our setting, the censoring of the dependent variable exactly at the kink prevents us
from distinguishing between the individuals who consume exactly at the kink and those
who actually locate on the right-hand side segment of the budget constraint. Interestingly,
it does not prevent the identification of our parameters of interest (which relate to function
g (.)), although it comes at a cost in terms of precision. Assuming some stability of individ-
ual preferences,38 we can interpret the price elasticity estimated using information relating
to the left-hand side of the kink as the price sensitivity of demand along the entire budget
constraint.
38 Moffitt (1986) assumes the functional form of g (.) is invariant to changes in consumer price and income.
159
CHAPTER 2
Weaker assumptions on individual preferences would not undermine the identification
of the price sensitivity for the selected sample of APA beneficiaries consuming less than their
care plan volume. However, if the underlying data generating process actually changes at the
kink, censored regression methods would not adequately correct for the bias induced by the
non-observability of the individuals consuming at the kink or beyond.
2.C.3. Likelihood of our sample
As explained in Section 4.2 of the paper, we assumed the following specification for the
demand for home care:39
ln(h∗i ) = γ0 +β1.l n(p ji )+ (β1 +β2).ln(Ii )+X′i .θ+εi
We assume a normal distribution for the idiosyncratic shock ε:
ε | p, I,X ∼N (0,σ2)
Our likelihood function thus writes:
L(β,γ,θ,σ) =
n∏
i=1
[ 1
σ
φ
( ln(hi )−γ0 −β1.ln(p ji )− (β1 +β2).ln(Ii )−X′i .θ
σ
)]I[hi <h̄i ]
×
[(
1−Φ( ln(h̄i )−γ0 −β1.ln(p ji )− (β1 +β2).ln(Ii )−X′i .θ
σ
))]I[hi =h̄i ]
where φ(.) (resp. Φ(.)) the conditional density (resp. cumulative distribution) function of a
standardized normal variable.
When using the specification with the relative consumption, we have:
ln
(
h∗i /h̄i
)= γ̃0 + β̃1.ln(p ji )+ (β̃1 + β̃2).l n(Ii )+ β̃3.l n(h̄i )+X′i .θ̃+ ε̃i
Similarly, we assume a normal distribution for the idiosyncratic shock ε̃:
ε̃ | p, I,X, h̄ ∼N (0, σ̃2)
39Again, for the sake simplicity, we do not include in the expressions provided in this Appendix the full set of
dummies we actually include in our specifications to control for both the unobserved increase in income and
the legal relationship between the co-payment rate and disposable income (see Appendix 2.B).
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The likelihood function writes:
L̃(β̃, γ̃, θ̃, σ̃) =
n∏
i=1
[ 1
σ̃
φ
( ln(h∗i /h̄i )− γ̃0 − β̃1.ln(p ji )− (β̃1 + β̃2).ln(Ii )− β̃3.ln(h̄i )−X′i .θ̃
σ̃
)]I[hi /h̄i <1]
×
[(
1−Φ( ln(h∗i /h̄i )− γ̃0 − β̃1.l n(p ji )− (β̃1 + β̃2).ln(Ii )− β̃3.ln(h̄i )−X′i .θ̃
σ̃
))]I[hi /h̄i =1]
Consistent estimators of β1, β2 and θ (respectively of β̃1, β̃2, β̃3 and θ̃) can be derived as the
arguments of the maximization of the log-likelihood function, provided it is concave.40
In order to derive the likelihood function when taking the log-absolute consumption as
the dependent variable, we must assume the censoring point h̄i does not depend on the
error term, εi . In other words, the individual censoring point is assumed to be exogenous,
conditional on the observable variables. This assumption is discussed in the next Section
and is not needed when we take the log-relative consumption as the dependent variable.
40Similarly, though with a little more work, we could derive the likelihood function of the IV-Tobit model. In
the version we estimate (using Stata command ivtobit), the error terms of the first-stage and second-stage
equations are assumed to be jointly normally distributed.
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2.D Determinants of the care plan volume and censoring
When taking the log-absolute consumption as the dependent variable, the Maximum
Likelihood function (Appendix 2.C) is derived assuming the individual censoring point, de-
fined by h̄i , is exogenous conditional on explanatory variables. In addition, consistency of
estimates relies on the additional assumption that the provider price pi j is exogenous. When
estimating Equation (2.7) (Appendix 2.B), one particular concern is that the provider price
and the care plan volume are correlated even conditional on the control variables.
These two assumptions — exogeneity of the censoring point and no systematic condi-
tional relationship between the care plan volume and the provider price — are relaxed when
we take the log-relative consumption as the dependent variable. This Appendix nonetheless
discusses the plausibility of these assumptions, by presenting elements on the establishing
of the care plan volume and additional empirical material.
When setting the care plan volume h̄i , the evaluation team supposedly takes into ac-
count the needs of the beneficiary in terms of assistance with the activities of daily living.
By law, the care plan volume should depend on the administrative disability group. Gender
and age (which we control for) may influence the care plan volume, as they correlate with
unobserved health problems and housekeeping skills. Additionally, even tough matrimonial
status and family structure are not supposed to influence the care plan volume, anecdotal
evidence suggests that the evaluation team takes into account the possible assistance regu-
larly provided by relatives when establishing the care plan.
Additionally, h̄i could directly relate to the price of the chosen provider in a specific case:
when the evaluation team sets the personalized care plan, it has to check that the monetary
equivalent of the care plan volume is below the legal ceiling associated with the disability
level of the beneficiary. In the case care is provided by an authorized provider, the monetary
equivalent of the care plan equals the number of hours granted by the evaluation team times
the provider price. If the monetary equivalent of the care plan volume is higher than the legal
ceiling, the adjustment will go through a reduction in h̄i or the choice of a cheaper provider.
This may be a source of price endogeneity in both (absolute and relative consumption) spec-
ifications.41
Empirically, once controlling for income, gender, age, disability group, matrimonial sta-
tus and professional care received on weekends, we find a small positive correlation between
the (OOP or provider) price and the volume of the care plan, but the effect is not statistically
significant.42 Then, a probit estimation of the probability to be censored, P(hi = h̄i ), shows
41Yet it should remain limited: for 7% of our sample at most, the monetary equivalent of their care plan vol-
ume would exceed their legal ceiling if they choose the most expensive provider operating in their municipality.
42In the panel analysis, we include fixed effects and cluster at the individual level. Table of results is not
included but is available upon request.
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that the probability to be censored slightly correlates with the price. A e1 increase in the
provider price is predicted to increase the probability to be censored by 2 pp. (as a reminder,
the sample censoring rate is around 40% and the standard-deviation in provider prices is of
e1.3).
Although they are statistically significant, these effects are small in practical terms. In ad-
dition, they fade out when we restrict our attention to beneficiaries living in a municipality
where only one provider is operating. This suggests that the strategic choice of a provider
(price) to comply with the legal ceiling is empirically negligible in this sub-sample (see Ap-
pendix 2.G) — although we cannot rule out that there might be a relatively higher share of
beneficiaries contracting with over-the-counter workers or non-authorized providers in mu-
nicipalities where a single authorized provider operates.
The probability to be censored is higher for individuals with no partner at home, possibly
because individuals living with a partner benefit from economies of scale in home care uti-
lization, especially when the spouse is also benefiting from APA43, and from informal help
provided by their spouse, when she is has no disability herself. Consuming the care plan
volume totally is also more likely for individuals who are entitled to subsidies on formal care
served during the weekends.
Individual observable characteristics explain about 50% of the variations observed in the
care plan volume. This leaves a large share of the variations unexplained. Ethnographic work
suggests that unobserved informal care or health status can influence the evaluation team
in the set up of the care plan volume (Billaud et al., 2012).
As we do not have any good instrument to test the endogenity of the care plan volume
in our dataset, we have to rely on the assumption that it is reasonably exogenous when esti-
mating the specification with log-absolute consumption as the dependent variable. This is
one of the reasons why we favour the specification with the relative consumption (Equation
(2.5), Appendix 2.B).
43These economies of scale are not supposed to be factored in by the evaluation team when setting the care
plan volume. This is consistent with the fact that APA is meant to be a personal subsidy: legal ceilings do not
depend on whether a beneficiary has a partner also receiving APA.
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2.E The home care sector in France
2.E.1. Three main types of home care providers
Home care to the disabled elderly can be provided by three types of providers:
(1) Authorized structures (services autorisés), which must receive a special authorization
granted by the Departmental Council to enter the market; their price is fixed by the
Departmental Council.
(2) Non-authorized structures (services agréés non autorisés) are allowed to provide home
care services to APA beneficiaries under lighter conditions than authorized structures;
they are free to set their price (with some restrictions on yearly price evolution being
set at the departmental level).
(3) Over-the-counter workers (gré-à-gré ou mandataire): the beneficiary directly con-
tracts with a home care worker. The beneficiary is free to set her employee’s hourly
wage provided she complies with general labor law.
There is no regulation for over-the-counter workers. Both authorized and non-
authorized structures have to meet quality standards, though requirements are higher for
authorized structures. The existence of differences in quality between authorized providers
is less clear-cut. From a theoretical prospective though, the uncertainties regarding the
quality of services in the home care sector lead to rule out vertical differentiation through
prices (Messaoudi, 2012).
In our empirical analysis, we focus on authorized providers: technically, we are able to
compute the exact OOP price of their customers receiving APA as these services are priced
by the Departmental Council. Although they provide only partial information, available data
suggest that the majority of professional care provided within the APA program is delivered
by such authorized structures.
Using administrative data on APA beneficiaries from 45 departments from 2011 (Remon-
tées individuelles), Couvert (2017) documents that 79% of APA beneficiaries whose care plan
includes human assistance44 receive professional care from caregivers that are employed by
home care structures. Given that the share of beneficiaries receiving care from over-the-
counter workers increases as the care plan volume gets close to the disability-specific ceil-
ing, this means that 79% is an upper-bound for the share of professional care hours that are
provided by home care structures. Although we have not been able to reconstruct a lower-
bound, the different figures available suggest that these structures provide the majority of
44For 8% of beneficiaries, care plans only include technical assistance devices and punctual measures for
housing adaptation. The remaining 92% have human care in their care plan.
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professional care included in APA care plan volumes.45
Getting now to the distinction between authorized providers and non-authorized home
care structures, using a survey conducted on the French departments (LEDa-LEGOS and
CES, 2012), Hege et al. (2014) document that in over 45% of (responding) departments, more
than two thirds of APA home care hours are provided by authorized services. Care provided
by authorized structures represent less than one third of APA hours in only 15% of depart-
ments.
It must be highlighted however that focusing on beneficiaries served exclusively by an
(authorized) home care structure induces more sample selection among individuals with a
care plan volume high relative to their disability-specific national ceiling. As documented
by Couvert (2017), in all disability groups, the share of individuals using a mix of providers
or only over-the-counter caregivers increases steadily as the number of subsidized hours
granted increases. As the national ceiling is more frequently hit for individuals in GIR 1, this
means that focusing on beneficiaries receiving care only from home care structures induces
relatively more selection among GIR 1. Using our data, we study the determinants of the
choice of a provider type. We find that individuals receiving care from an authorized provider
are on average less rich than the overall population of APA beneficiaries; they tend to be
younger, less disabled and live more often alone46
2.E.2. The different status for authorized providers
Authorized providers can be either public, for-profit or non-profit. Historically, in France,
non-profit organizations were important providers of home care and they remain predomi-
nant in most rural areas. In our department, 5 authorized providers are non-profit, providing
care to about 54% of our estimation sample in October 2014. 20 municipal services are pro-
viding care to APA recipients (about 43% of the 2014 sample). For-profit structures represent
a small share of the authorized home care providers (3 in the department), as they provide
home care only to 3% of our 2014 sample.47
Theoretically, an APA beneficiary is free to choose her provider. In practice, the spatial
coverage by the different types of authorized services is unequal over the territory. In some
municipalities, several providers are found to operate, while there is only one provider in
others (see Section 2.G). In our department, among the beneficiaries living in a municipality
45Combining the proportion of beneficiaries in each GIR and the average care plan volume in each GIR, we
find that GIR–1 and –2 represent roughly 20% of all APA beneficiaries but 50% of the hours included in care plan
volumes. Given that 60% and 69% of beneficiaries from GIR–1 and –2 respectively receive care exclusively from
home care structures (Couvert, 2017), we may take the value of 2/3 as a reasonable conservative estimate of the
share of all professional hours included in care plan volumes that are to be provided by home care structures.
46Results available upon request.
47Proportions are similar in the pooled sample. The small market share of for-profit services among autho-
rized providers is not a specific feature of the department studied.
165
CHAPTER 2
where several authorized providers serve APA recipients, more than 50% can choose between
the three types (public/ non-profit/ for-profit) of authorized providers. These beneficiaries
live in relatively large municipalities: the supply mix is more diversified when there is an
important market for home care services, while small municipalities are generally de facto
served by a unique, non-profit structure. Conversely, the typical supply mix in medium-size
municipalities is the combination of non-profit and public authorized providers. Finally,
a for-profit provider is never found to be the only authorized service operating in a given
municipality.
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2.F Explaining variations in provider prices
2.F.1. Components of costs in the home care sector
In this section, we explain why customers may exogenously face different provider prices,
by detailing the components of prices in the home care sector.
Authorized providers are priced by the Departmental Council. The hourly price of each
provider, for one given year, should be set on the basis of the overall average hourly produc-
tion cost of the provider, of two years before. The various components of production costs
are described in qualitative studies, either in academic works (Gramain and Xing, 2012) or in
public reports.48 By order of importance (top-down), production costs can be decomposed
as follows:
• Workforce costs (80% of total charges): wages paid to professional caregivers and, for
a small part (around 10% of total charges), to the supervising staff. The wage of a care-
giver depends on her qualification, according to collective labour agreements. We ex-
pect that the larger the proportion of skilled caregivers, the higher the production cost
and the price. Wages are also augmented if employees work on Sunday or on public
holidays, in accordance with general labour legislation.
• Operating costs (10–15% of total charges): those include rents for the service’s offices
and other running expenses.
• Transportation costs (5–10% of total charges)49 correspond to the compensation for
the costs borne by employees to go to the consumer’s home. This item is likely to vary
largely across services according to their geographical area of intervention.
• Contrary to the health care sector, technological progress and capital costs are negligi-
ble in the home care sector.
We represent the relationship between the provider price and several providers’ charac-
teristics graphically.50 We distinguish between non-public (mainly non-profit) providers and
public providers. The latest are likely to receive grants or advantages (e.g., a free office) from
local municipalities that reduce operating costs. Such advantages are taken into account in
the pricing process done by the Departmental Council and lower down the regulated price of
48There is, though, no national, comprehensive benchmark study on the costs of home care services. Public
reports regularly deplore the lack of information on costs as a major shortcoming preventing from understand-
ing the functioning of the sector (Vanlerenberghe and Watrin, 2014; Poletti, 2012).
49This item only includes the compensation of employees for the monetary costs associated with transport.
Roquebert (2018) additionally takes into account the unproductive hours spent on transports by the employees
that are paid by the provider.
50We explore here other characteristics than the number of served municipalities, that we use as an instru-
ment for the price. The empirical relationship between the two variables is documented by Figure 2 in the
paper.
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public providers. In the graphical representation, we exclude the largest provider of the de-
partment, a nationwide non-profit organization, which has systematically the highest values
for the variables we are here interested in (see Appendix 2.G).
In Figure 2.F.1, provider prices are plotted against the number of APA beneficiaries served
by the service. Graphically, the more customers the provider has, the higher its price. Having
more customers might be associated with more municipalities to serve (see discussion in
Section 4.4 of the paper) or more unproductive hours.51 This graph should be interpreted
cautiously though: we only know the number of APA recipients served by each home care
provider, instead of the total number of customers (including non-APA beneficiaries, like
other elderly or disabled individuals) served in the department.
Figure 2.F.2 shows the relationship between the provider price and the share of hours
they serve on Sundays or on public holidays. Public providers have a very low share of such
hours, as most public services do not operate on weekends and holidays. A higher share of
hours made on holidays is associated with a higher price among public structures, which is
consistent with the financial compensation of employees for working on public holidays.
[Table 2.F.2 to be found on the following page]
Figure 2.F.1 – Provider price according to the number of APA beneficiaries served by the
provider, by legal status
SAMPLE: Authorized providers of the department serving at least one
APA beneficiary in October 2012, 2013 or 2014.
NOTES: The largest provider, which serves 43% of the APA beneficiaries
receiving care from an authorized provider in the department in 2014, is
not included.
51Unproductive hours (meetings, training) may become relatively more numerous when a service gets rela-
tively large.
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Figure 2.F.2 – Provider price according to the share of hours served on Sundays and public
holidays, by legal status
SAMPLE: Authorized providers of the department serving at least one
APA beneficiary in October 2012, 2013 or 2014.
NOTES: The largest provider, which has 1.80% of its home care hours
provided on Sundays and holidays in 2014, is not included.
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2.F.2. Correlations between individual characteristics and provider price
We also investigate the importance of the observable characteristics on the choice of a
given level of provider price. Table 2.F.1 presents the individual characteristics associated
with the choice of a “low-price” authorized provider, defined as a provider charging a price
strictly below the average price charged by the authorized providers operating in the ben-
eficiary’s municipality (in a given month). We estimate the probability of choosing a “low-
price” provider by a Probit on the sub-sample of individuals who live in a municipality where
several authorized providers serve APA recipients. Beyond a slight age effect, only the disabil-
ity level is found to have a significant impact. The least severely disabled are more likely to
choose a “low-price” provider, possibly reflecting that they perceive home care as less neces-
sary and are thus ex ante more sensitive to its price. Income is not found to have any impact
on this choice, nor is matrimonial status (Fisher tests reject the joint significance of both the
set of income quartile dummies and the set of matrimonial status dummies).52
[Table 2.F.1 to be found on the following page]
52Although we do not find any evidence that beneficiaries who are able to choose between different autho-
rized providers choose a price level according to their income, it might still be the case that there is systematic
correlation between income and provider price in the sample, as about 30% of beneficiaries are suspected not
to be able to choose between different providers (Appendix 2.G). When we take our estimation sample and
regress the provider price on income and all the socio-demographic variables we include in our estimations as
well as year dummies, we find a negative partial correlation between income and provider price. Although it
is statistically significant, it is fairly small: a one standard-deviation increase in disposable income is predicted
to decrease provider price by 0.01 standard-deviation. This is small enough not to undermine the separate
identification of the price and empirical income elasticities.
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Table 2.F.1 – Individual characteristics associated with the choice of a low provider price
Dependent variable: chooses a “low-price" provider
(1)
Income quartile: 1 -0.010
(0.025)
Income quartile: 2 Ref.
Income quartile: 3 -0.003
(0.028)
Income quartile: 4 -0.006
(0.029)
Woman -0.030
(0.019)
aAge: 60–69 -0.050
(0.054)
Age: 70–79 -0.040∗
(0.021)
Age: 80–89 Ref.
Age: 90 or more -0.029
(0.021)
Disability level: 1 (most severe) -0.102
(0.113)
Disability level: 2 -0.024
(0.036)
Disability level: 3 Ref.
Disability level: 4 (least severe) 0.068∗∗∗
(0.022)
Lives with no spouse -0.000
(0.021)
Spouse receives APA 0.004
(0.051)
Lives with non–APA spouse Ref.
Spouse in institution -0.098
(0.110)
Observations 5701
Number of clusters 82
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality
level; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Estimation of a Probit model
by Maximum Likelihood. Average partial effects (APE) are displayed.
“Low-price" providers are charging a price below the average price of
authorized providers within a given municipality (in one given month:
October 2012, 2013 or 2014); the estimation uses the sample of bene-
ficiaries served by only an authorized provider living in a municipality
where at least two different prices are offered by authorized providers.
Data pooled from October 2012, October 2013 and October 2014. Spec-
ifications include year fixed effects.
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2.G Robustness checks
2.G.1. Additional results: absolute or relative consumption
In this section, we present the results obtained on the pooled sample and by year, fit-
ting several specifications. Table 2.G.1 presents the estimates of the first specification, when
the dependent variable is the absolute consumption (Equation (2.7), Appendix 2.B). Tables
2.G.2 and Table 2.G.3 present the results obtained with the second specification, when the
dependent variable is the relative consumption, either assuming the provider price is ex-
ogenous (Table 2.G.2) or instrumenting it (Table 2.G.3). In all three tables, Column (1) gives
the estimate obtained on the pooled sample, while Columns (2) to (4) display the estimates
obtained on October 2012, 2013 or 2014.
Whatever the specification, estimates on 2014 are of a lower precision, essentially be-
cause there is one provider less (one provider closed down in 2014). The point estimates are
also systematically lower (in absolute value) in 2014 than in the other two years, although
the difference from one year to the other is never statistically significant.
When the dependent variable is the absolute consumption, the coefficients associated
with the price lie between -0.7 and -1.0: they are higher than those obtained with the rela-
tive consumption (between -0.3 and -0.7 with no instrumentation, -0.1 and -0.5 when the
IV strategy is implemented). It might be explained by the fact that the care plan volume,
which may be a proxy for some unobserved determinants of professional care consumption,
is not taken into account in the specification with absolute consumption as the dependent
variable.
With the absolute consumption, the income effect within the APA scheme is suggested to
be negative. When taking the relative consumption as the dependent variable, and including
the care plan volume as a control, point estimates are lower in absolute value (presumably
because the omitted variable bias is reduced); the effect of income within the APA scheme is
no longer significant. The IV-strategy only little affects point estimates. Except for 2014, we
can systematically reject that the price elasticity is zero.
Overall, these results confirm that the price elasticity is significantly different from zero
and inferior to one in absolute value. The -0.4 point estimate we finally retain is the one that
is the most likely to be unbiased (care plan volume as a control & IV strategy) and the most
precise (pooled data with both intra– and inter- individual price variations). Yet we must
acknowledge the relatively low precision of our results: the 95%-level confidence interval
derived from our favoured specification indicates a price elasticity between -0.01 and -0.76.
[Tables 2.G.1 and 2.G.2 to be found on the following page;
Table 2.G.3 to be found on page 174]
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Table 2.G.1 – Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours (absolute con-
sumption)
Dependent variable: absolute consumption h∗ (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012–14 2012 2013 2014
Price (log) -0.793∗∗∗ -0.977∗∗∗ -0.721∗∗ -0.709∗∗
(0.248) (0.260) (0.297) (0.290)
Disposable income (log) -0.039∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8190 2571 2757 2862
Censored observations 36.6% 40.4% 38.2% 40.2%
Number of clusters 28 28 28 27
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estimation
of a Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. All specifications include as controls
socio-demographic variables, dummies for the year the latest plan was decided
upon and dummies for the year in which the co-payment rate was computed.
Column (1) additionally includes year fixed effects.
Table 2.G.2 – Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours (relative con-
sumption)
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h̄ (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012–14 2012 2013 2014
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.670∗∗∗ -0.376 -0.300
(0.181) (0.180) (0.236) (0.238)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.003 -0.014 -0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016)
Care plan volume (log) 0.040∗ 0.054∗ 0.019 0.041
(0.023) (0.030) (0.027) (0.033)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8190 2571 2757 2862
Censored observations 36.6% 40.4% 38.2% 40.2%
Number of clusters 28 28 28 27
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level;
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014.
Estimation of a Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. All specifications in-
clude as controls socio-demographic variables, dummies for the year the
latest plan was decided upon and dummies for the year in which the co-
payment rate was computed. Column (1) additionally includes year fixed
effects.
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Table 2.G.3 – Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours (relative con-
sumption, IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012-14 2012 2013 2014
Panel A: Second Stage Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h̄ (log)
Price (log) -0.387∗∗ -0.537∗∗ -0.460∗∗ -0.134
(0.192) (0.209) (0.214) (0.245)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.003 -0.014 -0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016)
Care plan volume (log) 0.040∗ 0.054∗ 0.019 0.042
(0.023) (0.030) (0.028) (0.033)
Panel B: First Stage Dependent variable: provider price p (log)
Number of municipalities (std.) 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8190 2571 2757 2862
Censored observations 36.6% 40.4% 38.2% 40.2%
Number of clusters 28 28 28 27
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estimation of an IV-Tobit model by
Maximum Likelihood. Price is instrumented by the number of municipalities served by the
provider. In the first stage (Panel B), the log-provider price is regressed on the standardized
number of municipalities served by the provider. All specifications, for both Panel A and Panel
B, include as controls socio-demographic variables, dummies for the year the latest plan was
decided upon and dummies for the year in which the co-payment rate was computed. Column
(1) additionally includes year fixed effects.
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2.G.2. Clustering and Bootstrap inference
Level of clustering
In the paper, we denote ε̃i t the error term in our favoured specification (Equation (5)). As
we cluster at the provider level j , we actually implicitly assume the following structure for
the error term ε̃:
ε̃i j t = ξ̃i + ν̃ j + ζ̃i j t
with ξ̃i capturing the unobserved individual heterogeneity, and ν̃ j the provider level time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity. For two individuals i and i ′ that are served by the same
provider j (assume for the sake of simplicity that t is not varying), cor r (ε̃i j t , ε̃i ′ j t ) 6= 0 as long
as there are unobserved shocks taking place at the provider level.
For a given individual observed at t and t ′, error terms will be necessarily correlated if
there is some individual time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.53 As standard with panel
data, we would need to cluster at the individual level. Yet, as almost all APA beneficiaries
keep the same provider j over time, the latter way of clustering (at the individual level)
is essentially nested in the former clustering option (at the provider level). We believe
that within-individual correlation of errors is more important than within-provider shock
correlation; we nonetheless choose to cluster at the most aggregate level. In our specific
setting, in which our main explanatory variable varies at the provider-year level, clustering
at the provider level is of due caution as the provider price does not change within one
cluster cross-sectionally (Moulton, 1990; Cameron and Miller, 2015).
Inference with few clusters
With clustered standard errors, inference relies on asymptotic properties that kick in as
the number of clusters tends to infinity. The “few-cluster issue” was documented notably
by Cameron et al. (2008): in an OLS setting, Wald hypothesis tests based on the standard
cluster-robust estimate of the variance matrix tend to over-reject the null. Rejection rates
increase when clusters are of unequal sizes (Imbens and Kolesár, 2015).
In our department, there are relatively few authorized providers (28 in 2012 and 2013, 27
in 2014 as one provider closed down).54 and there is one very large authorized provider (Fig-
ure 2.G.1). This service is a local branch of a long-standing nationwide non-profit home care
service; it serves 37% of the APA beneficiaries in our sample. With only 28 clusters, including
one being considerably larger than the others, we face the risk that standard cluster-robust
inference is biased.
In order to assess the robustness of the inference on the estimates presented in the pa-
53Note that we are not able to include individual fixed-effects in the type 1-Tobit model, as there is no para-
metric solution to the incidental parameter problem (Lancaster, 2000).
54This is not a feature specific to our department though (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012).
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Figure 2.G.1 – Distribution of the size of authorized providers (October 2014)
NOTES: Size of a provider is measured by the number of APA beneficiaries
it serves. Data from October 2014, 27 authorized providers (one authorized
provider closed down in 2014).
per, we use a bootstrap procedure. By bootstrapping the Wald t-statistic associated with the
price elasticity estimate ˆ̃β1, we may improve small-sample inference by attaining asymptotic
refinement (Cameron and Miller, 2015).
We start by estimating our equation on the original sample (by Tobit or IV-Tobit).55 We
retrieve the point estimate of the price elasticity, β̂1 and its standard error, se(
ˆ̃β1), and we
compute the original sample Wald t-statistic t = ˆ̃β1/se( ˆ̃β1). We then implement a percentile
pair cluster bootstrap, by repeating 1,000 times the following steps:
1. We form 28 “pair" clusters of observations by re-sampling with replacement 28 times
from the original clustered sample.
2. For each bootstrap sample b = 1, ...,1000, we estimate ˆ̃βb1 (by Tobit or IV-Tobit), and the
associated cluster-robust standard error se( ˆ̃βb1 ).
3. For each bootstrap sample b, we compute the Wald t-statistic centered in ˆ̃β1 :
tb =
ˆ̃βb1 − ˆ̃β1
se( ˆ̃βb1 )
, b = 1, ...,1000
55Here, as well as in the subsequent bootstrap replications, we do not use Stata’s ivtobit command, through
which standard errors are derived using the observed information matrix (oim). Instead, we first regress the
(log) provider price on the instrument and the other exogenous controls (clustering at the provider level) and
derive a prediction of the log of the provider price. We run the second step by regressing the (log) relative
consumption on the predicted log-provider price and the other controls, again clustering at the provider level.
It gives the inputs we use in the bootstrap procedure.
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We then use the empirical distribution of the bootstrap t-statistics tb to derive the critical
values to be used in lieu of the critical values derived from a standard normal or T distri-
bution. We compare the t-statistic associated with the price elasticity coefficient obtained
in the observed sample to the symmetrical critical values derived from the bootstrapped t-
statistic distribution. The percentile-t p-value for the symmetric two-sided Wald test of H0:
“β̃1 = 0” is computed as the proportion of times the absolute value of the boostrapped t-
statistic is greater than the absolute value of the observed sample t-statistic; that is to say,
the proportion of times that |tb | > |t |, b = 1, ...,1000
Issues may arise when using pair cluster resampling with dummy control variables: some
of the bootstrap samples may have little or even no variation in the control variables. The
computation of tb in those samples is not possible; using the bootstrap t-statistics that were
actually computed is not an option either, as completed replications cannot be assumed to
be random.56 In order to avoid failure to complete the target number of cluster bootstrap
replications, we drop from our original sample the 8 individuals whose co-payment rate was
last reassessed prior to 2011.57
Table 2.G.4 displays the price elasticity estimates and compares standard inference with
bootstrap inference. Columns (1) to (3) display the estimates obtained using a Tobit model
to estimate our specification with relative consumption, while Columns (4) to (6) are de-
rived from an IV-Tobit estimation. Columns (1) and (3) display the original consumer price
elasticity estimates obtained by either Tobit or IV-Tobit estimations, while Columns (2) and
(5) display the same estimates obtained on the sample on which the pair cluster bootstrap
can be completed. Comparing (1) and (2) first, then (4) and (5), we see that dropping the 8
aforementioned individuals has virtually no effect on the point estimate.
[Table 2.G.4 to be found on the following page]
The Tobit estimation of the specification with the relative consumption produces a t-stat
equal to -2.50. The 25th lowest value of the bootstrap t-statistics is -1.87, while its 975th is
equal to 1.90. Using a symmetric Wald test, we find that the absolute value of the original
t-stat is larger than |tb | a little less than 99% of times (p-value of 0.018, Column (3) of Table
2.G.4). Bootstrap inference thus indicates that we can reject the hypothesis that the price
elasticity is zero at the 5% level.
Similarly, the IV-Tobit estimation of the specification with relative consumption pro-
duces a t-stat equal to -1.93. The 25th lowest value of the bootstrap t-statistics is -1.73, while
its 975th is equal to 1.38. Using a symmetric Wald test, we reject the hypothesis that the rela-
tive consumption of home care is price inelastic, again at the 5% level.
56Wild cluster bootstrap has been documented as leading to more robust inference in the case of few clusters,
as well as helping in the case that right-hand side dummy variables induce incomplete replications (Cameron
and Miller, 2015). To our knowledge though, wild cluster bootstrap has not been extended to nonlinear models.
57Our specifications with absolute and relative consumptions include a dummy for the year in which the
co-payment rate was assessed, as justified in Appendix 2.B.
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Table 2.G.4 – Bootstrap inference.
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h̄ (log)
Tobit IV-Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.451∗∗ -0.451∗∗ -0.387∗∗ -0.388∗∗ -0.386∗∗
(se) (0.181) (0.180) - (0.192) (0.192) -
p-value 0.013 0.012 0.018 0.044 0.044 0.014
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(se) (0.007) (0.007) - (0.007) (0.007) -
p-value 0.184 0.184 0.163 0.186 0.186 0.165
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample All co-payment reassessed All co-payment reassessed
no earlier than 2011 no earlier than 2011
Observations 8190 8182 8182 8190 8182 8182
Censored observations 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6%
Inference Default Default Bootstrap Default Default Bootstrap
Number of clusters 28 28 28 28 28 28
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Data
pooled from October 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estimation of a Tobit or IV-Tobit model by Maximum Likeli-
hood (Stata commands tobit for Columns (1) to (3), and ivtobit for Columns (4) and (5)). In Columns
(3) and (6), inference is obtained using a bootstrap procedure. Difference in the point estimates between
Columns (5) and (6) is due to the fact that in Column (6) we implement manually the IV strategy in two
separate steps, rather than using the ivtobit command, to make the Bootstrap procedure consistent.
SAMPLES: In Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6), individuals whose co-payment rate was reassessed prior to 2011
are not included in the sample (8 individuals).
BOOTSTRAP INFERENCE: We implement a pair cluster percentile bootstrap of the t-statistics (1,000 repli-
cations). The percentile-t p-value for the symmetric two-sided Wald test of H0: β̃1 = 0, is computed as the
proportion of times the absolute value of the boostrap t-statistic is greater than the absolute value of the
observed sample t-statistic.
Figures 2.G.2 and 2.G.3 display the empirical distribution of the bootstrap t-statistics ob-
tained following either the Tobit or the IV-Tobit estimation of the consumer price elasticity.
We display a normal distribution with mean and variance equal to the mean and variance
of the empirical distribution of the bootstrap t-statistics, and the normal distribution with
mean 0 and variance 1 as a benchmark. Despite the sample containing one very large clus-
ter, we observe a quite smooth distribution of t-statistics in both Figures. All replications are
complete and the tails of the distribution do not seem excessively fat, making us confident
in the quality of our bootstrap and in the statistical power of the deriving Wald test on the
price elasticity estimate.
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Figure 2.G.2 – Percentile-t bootstrap quality: Distribution of bootstrap t-statistics (Tobit es-
timation)
NOTES: t-stats from percentile bootstrap-t (1,000 replications). Output from To-
bit estimation on relative consumption (Column (3) of Table 2.G.4) on sample of
8,182 individuals. ∗The first normal distribution displayed has a mean and variance
equal to the mean and variance of the distribution of bootstrap t-stats. Dashed
vertical lines represent the 25th and 975th ordered elements and the mean of the
bootstrap t-stat distribution.
Figure 2.G.3 – Percentile-t bootstrap quality: Distribution of bootstrap t-statistics (IV-Tobit
estimation)
NOTES: t-stats from percentile bootstrap-t (1,000 replications). Output from man-
ual IV-Tobit estimation on relative consumption (Column (6) of Table 2.G.4) on
sample of 8,182 individuals. ∗The first normal distribution displayed has a mean
and variance equal to the mean and variance of the distribution of bootstrap t-
stats. Dashed vertical lines represent the 25th and 975th ordered elements and the
mean of the bootstrap t-stat distribution.
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2.G.3. Alternative identification strategy: using single-provider areas
Single-provider and multiple-provider areas
According to their geographical location in the department, beneficiaries may not be sys-
tematically able to choose between several providers of the department. We divide our sam-
ple into two sub-populations (Figure 2.G.4): on the one side, beneficiaries living in a munic-
ipality where a single provider is found to operate, or single-provider area (denoted “SPA";
areas in plain color). On the other side, individuals living in a municipality where two or
more authorized providers have customers, or multiple-provider area (denoted “non-SPA";
dotted areas).58
Figure 2.G.4 – Distribution of providers in the department - Schematic representation
NOTES: We provide only a schematic representation to preserve the anonymity of
the department. Different shades of plain grey indicate different areas served by
a unique authorized service (single-provider areas, or SPA), each being served by a
different provider with a given price level. The dotted areas correspond to multiple-
provider (non-SPA) municipalities.
As displayed in Table 2.G.5, 79% of the municipalities represented in our sample belong
to an SPA; 35% of beneficiaries included in the estimation sample live in this type of areas.
The remaining beneficiaries live in a municipality where two or more authorized providers
have customers. This partition interestingly reflects the spatial concentration of the APA
58To identify the two types of areas, we use the full population of APA beneficiaries in the department, not
only the APA beneficiaries of our estimation sample.
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population: 65% of the beneficiaries in our sample live in 21% of the department municipal-
ities. Consistently, non-SPA municipalities are more often urban centers than SPA munici-
palities.
Table 2.G.5 – Single-provider areas and multiple-provider areas (October 2014)
Municipalities Beneficiaries Average
price
Number Frequencies Number Frequencies
SPA 220 78.9% 995 34.8% e22.7
Non-SPA 59 21.1% 1,867 65.2% e22.0
Total 279 100% 2,862 100% -
NOTES: Estimation sample from October 2014. Average provider price per type of area is not
weighted by the number of customers of the providers.
The spatial distribution of professional care provision is consistent with the fact that
transportation costs are an important factor in the provision decision of home care services
(cf. Section 4.4 of the paper). Providing services all over the department would be costly
for a relatively small service. Typically, municipalities where only one provider is found to
operate are served by non-profit home care services. In urban centers, the supply proposed
by non-profit services may be complemented with municipal home care services, or even,
in the largest municipalities, with one of the few for-profit authorized services found in the
department (cf. Appendix 2.E).
Table 2.G.6 presents the descriptive statistics computed on the two sub-samples of APA
beneficiaries, depending on the type of area in which they live. The two sub-samples are
similar in terms of their socio-demographic characteristics albeit non-SPA residents are
richer on average. This is consistent with the fact that non-SPA residents tend to locate in
urban centers. The under-consumption rate is higher among non-SPA beneficiaries, but
the average number of hours effectively subsidized is similar in both types of areas. This
goes against the concern that SPA beneficiaries may experience rationing in the provision
of professional care. Although subsidized consumption relative to the care plan volume is
slightly higher for SPA beneficiaries on average (86% versus 84%), the overall distribution of
relative consumption is fairly similar in the two sub-samples. Overall, except for the income
level, the two populations little differ in terms of outcome and explaining variables.
Price elasticity estimates using SPA and non-SPA beneficiaries
Arguably, SPA beneficiaries have limited choice if they resort to an authorized provider.
As a consequence, they are not able to choose their price p ji . Note that home care price
endogeneity due to residential mobility is suggested to be negligible: the overall residential
mobility of the elderly is very low (Laferrère, 2008) and when moves occur, they are mainly
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Table 2.G.6 – Descriptive statistics on the two sub-samples (SPA/non-SPA, October 2014)
SPA Non-SPA Difference
(p-value)
Variable [1] [2] [1] - [2]
Care plan volume [a] 20.1 20.8 0.06
Care plan monetary value [b] e456.8 e454.8 0.83
Hours effectively subsidized [c] 17.5 17.8 0.38
Amount of effective subsidies [d] e311.7 e294.9 0.03
[c] inferior to [a] 57.2% 61.2% 0.03
Individualized income e1,272 e1,339 0.00
co-payment rate 21.9% 24.6% 0.00
Provider price e22.8 e21.8 0.00
Hourly out-of-pocket price e5.0 e5.4 0.01
Total OOP payments e86.0 e94.2 0.03
on subsidized hours
Age 84.4 84.0 0.18
Women 72.5% 74.7% 0.18
Disability level 1 (most severe) 1.5% 1.0 %
0.54
Disability level 2 12.2% 12.6%
Disability level 3 20.7% 19.1%
Disability level 4 (least severe) 65.6% 67.3%
100% 100%
Living with a spouse 34.7% 33.3%
0.81Living alone 64.7% 66.1%
Spouse in institution 0.6% 0.6%
100% 100%
Number of individuals 995 1867 -
Number of households 965 1820 -
NOTES: Estimation sample from October 2014. Descriptive statistics are computed on the sub-
sample of APA beneficiaries living in single-provider municipalities (SPA) in Column (1) and those
living in multiple-provider municipalities (non-SPA) in Column (2). Compared to Table 2.G.5, aver-
age provider price in each sub-sample is weighted by the number of beneficiaries in the sample.
TESTS: Last column presents the p-values associated with the tests of difference between SPA and
non-SPA beneficiaries. Test performed is a Student (resp. a Pearson χ2) for binary or continuous
(resp. categorical) variables.
explained by family motives or the need for adapted residences. Price endogeneity should
thus be limited in the SPA sub-sample; on the contrary, we suspect it may arise in the non-
SPA sample. Comparing the price elasticity estimates obtained on the two sub-samples may
thus provide a test of price endogeneity in the estimation sample.
The estimation is run using the specification with the relative consumption, the outcome
being h∗i t /h̄i t . Results are displayed in Table 2.G.7.
59 As presented in the paper, the price
elasticity is of -0.45 when estimated on the whole sample, significantly different from zero
at the 5% level. Restricting the sample to individuals who are assumed to have no provider
choice, the point estimate slightly changes to -0.52. Because of reduced sample size and
59We only display the price and income coefficients as the effects of controls are similar to the estimates
obtained with the full estimation sample (displayed in Table II of the paper).
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price variations, precision is lower but the estimate is still significantly different from zero at
the 10% level.
The point estimate is higher when we run the estimation on the sub-population of in-
dividuals who can choose between different providers, with a point value of -0.63. The dif-
ference between the two sub-sample estimates might potentially be explained by both an
omitted variable bias affecting the choice of the provider price and some differences in the
characteristics of the individuals of the two samples. However, the difference is not statis-
tically significant even at the 10% level. Overall, this alternative estimation strategy (relying
on SPA beneficiaries only) confirms our main results: the consumption of home care by the
disabled elderly is price-elastic, with a point estimate inferior to one in absolute value and a
magnitude seemingly around -0.5 or -0.4.
Table 2.G.7 – Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours (SPA/non-SPA)
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h̄ (log)
Sample: All SPA Non-SPA
(1) (2) (3)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.522∗ -0.626∗∗
(0.181) (0.305) (0.258)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 0.001 -0.013
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Care plan volume (log) 0.040∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.049∗
(0.023) (0.014) (0.029)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8190 2489 5701
Censored observations 39.6% 40.7% 39.1%
Number of clusters 28 18 28
AIC 11454 3277.318 8144
BIC 11643 3376.252 8324
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October 2012, 2013, 2014. Estimation of
a Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. All specifications include as controls socio-
demographic variables, dummies for the year the latest plan was decided upon,
dummies for the year in which the co-payment rate was computed and year fixed
effects. SPA stands for “single-provider area” beneficiaries, non-SPA for “multiple-
provider area” beneficiaries.
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This alternative identification strategy has several drawbacks. First, focusing on SPA ben-
eficiaries induces additional intra-departmental selection. We find the non-SPA to be richer
than SPA beneficiaries. If richer individuals are more price-elastic, as suggested by Table III
in the main text, the price elasticity obtained on the SPA sub-sample would then be a lower
bound (in absolute value) for the average price elasticity of our estimation sample. But we
may additionally suspect that the two sub-samples differ in terms of unobservable deter-
minants of professional care consumption. Using the specification with relative consump-
tion, we tested the effect of including a dummy equal to one for SPA beneficiaries (Table
2.G.8): living in a SPA is found to positively affect home care relative consumption, ceteris
paribus. The inclusion of the SPA dummy affects the price elasticity estimate (although not
statistically significantly). This might suggest that SPA beneficiaries behave differently than
non-SPA in terms of care consumption decisions.
[Table 2.G.8 to be found on the following page]
One might fear that authorized providers operating as monopolies may set their price
in accordance with the price elasticity of demand. In SPA municipalities, provider prices
could be higher where the price sensitivity of APA beneficiaries is lower, inducing a poten-
tial downward bias (in absolute value) in our point elasticity estimate. Given that the autho-
rized providers operating in an SPA are systematically non-profit structures and that they are
priced by the Departmental Council, there is limited scope for consumer surplus extraction
by monopolist providers.
A more serious issue a priori is that SPA and non-SPA sub-samples are constructed using
the available information of our sample. We construct the non-SPA sample by observing the
municipalities in which there are beneficiaries served by at least two different authorized
providers.60 It might be the case, especially in very small municipalities, that there are few
beneficiaries living in a municipality and they happen to all choose the same provider. In
this case, we will infer that there is only one provider operating; we do not have any other
way to infer from the data whether the individuals were able to choose between different
providers. Although such cases are scarce,61 we should remain cautious when interpreting
the price elasticity estimated on the SPA sample.
Finally, when focusing on SPA beneficiaries, we loose 10 clusters (corresponding to au-
thorized providers who are only found to operate jointly with other providers in the munic-
ipalities where they are present). This may undermine the validity of inference in the SPA
sub-sample.
60We do not have direct information on the supply and geographical coverage by the different providers.
618% municipalities turn out to have a unique APA beneficiary, hosting 1% of the department’s beneficiaries.
More largely, beneficiaries living in municipalities with 5 or less APA recipients represent around 10% of total
beneficiaries.
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Table 2.G.8 – Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours, controlling for
the type of area of residence
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h̄ (log)
(1) (2)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.613∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.202)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.008
(0.008) (0.007)
Lives in a SPA 0.064∗∗∗
(0.023)
Other controls Yes Yes
Observations 8190 8190
Censored observations 36.9% 36.9%
Number of clusters 28 28
AIC 11454 11431
BIC 11644 11621
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level;
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October 2012,
2013 and 2014. Estimation of a Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood.
Specifications include as controls socio-demographic variables, dum-
mies for the year the latest plan was decided upon, dummies for the year
in which the co-payment rate was computed and year fixed effects. SPA
stands for “single-provider area”, non-SPA for “multiple-provider area”
beneficiaries.
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2.G.4. Additional results: sensitivity to the inclusion of care received on
weekends
As we do not directly observe the informal care received by the individuals, we include as
a control in our estimation the formal home care the individual possibly receives during the
weekend and public holidays (Table 2.G.9).
As in our baseline estimations, the latent dependent variable is the number of hours con-
sumed between Monday and Saturday, except for public holidays, divided by the care plan
volume open for business days. Consistently, the care plan volume taken into account to
compute relative consumption only includes the hours that were prescribed to be consumed
over the week. APA beneficiaries may also be entitled to subsidies for a few hours of care to
be received during weekends and public holidays, which are set separately in the personal-
ized care plan. Although weekend hours are charged the same price, they are not fungible
with week hours. Only 7.5% of our estimation sample has weekend hours included in her
personalized care plan, for a median volume of about 5 hours a month.62 We did not in-
clude the home care hours received on weekends as a control in our baseline specifications
because of a simultaneity concern.
We hypothesize that, for given disability and socio-demographic characteristics, indi-
viduals not receiving professional home care over the weekend are more likely to receive
assistance from their relatives. We find that receiving formal care during the weekend is as-
sociated with more hours consumed during working days; reassuringly though, it does not
significantly affect the price elasticity estimate.
[Table 2.G.9 to be found on the following page]
62As beneficiaries with weekend care plan volume tend to be more severely disabled, their week care plan
volume, h̄i t , is on average higher than the week care plan volume of the rest of beneficiaries. Among these
beneficiaries, APA hours prescribed on weekends amount only to 15% of the week care plan volume on average.
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Table 2.G.9 – Inclusion of home care received on weekends
Dependent variable: relative consumption during the week h∗i /h̄i (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Price (log) -0.392∗∗ -0.452∗∗ -0.392∗∗
(0.193) (0.195) (0.196)
Consumes care on weekends 0.227∗∗∗ -0.054
(0.020) (0.054)
Number of hours received on weekends 0.080∗∗∗
(0.017)
Observations 8,190 8,190 8,190
Censored observations 39.6% 39.6% 39.6%
Number of clusters 28 28 28
AIC -22073.724 -22168.783 -22215.301
BIC -21884.435 -21979.495 -22026.013
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014 (population-
average model). Estimation of an IV-Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. Provider
price is instrumented by the number of municipalities served by the provider. All spec-
ifications, in both the first and second stages, include as controls the care plan volume,
socio-demographic variables, dummies for the year the latest plan was decided upon,
dummies for the year in which the co-payment rate was computed and year fixed effects.
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2.G.5. Robustness check: estimation by a truncated regression model
As a further robustness check, we estimate the price sensitivity of the demand for home
care using a truncated regression model. We make as if we did not observe all individuals
who consume beyond their care plan volume.
A first estimation attempt based on our preferred specification (Equation (2.5)) was
made. Unfortunately, the maximum likelihood is found to have discontinuous regions with
missing values and no estimate could be derived.63 As an alternative, we took the relative
consumption, hi /h̄i (without taking the log), as the dependent variable. Convergence is
achieved. As shown in Table 2.G.10, the truncated regression model gives a price coefficient
very close to what the censored regression model does. As we exploit less information
when fitting a truncation model (on about 40% of the sample), the precision is much lower.
Although the coefficient on income is higher in when using a truncated regression model,
this comparison gives credit to the econometric specification of the model. It gives empirical
support to the theoretical discussion presented in Appendix 2.C: under an assumption of
stability of preferences and constant price elasticity along the demand curve, we are able
identify the sample average price elasticity by using information on the individuals that
locate on the left-hand side of the kink in the budget constraint.
Table 2.G.10 – Consumer price elasticity estimations: Comparing truncated and censored
regression models.
Dependent variable: relative consumption (h/h̄)
(1) (2)
Truncated reg. Censored reg.
Price (log) -0.304 -0.275∗∗
(0.449) (0.111)
Disposable income (log) -0.076∗∗∗ -0.007∗
(0.027) (0.004)
Observations 4947 8190
Clusters 28.000 28.000
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level;
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October 2012,
2013 and 2014. Estimation of a Truncated regression model and a To-
bit model by Maximum Likelihood. Specifications include as controls
socio-demographic variables, dummies for the year the latest plan was
decided upon, dummies for the year in which the co-payment rate was
computed and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the relative
consumption, not in ratio.
63The maximum likelihood function of a truncated regression model is a ratio; as the algorithms behind
the truncreg command in Stata use analytic derivatives, we hypothesize that the estimation failure is due to
the fact that the denominator of the maximum likelihood function (the cumulative distribution function of a
Normal) gets too close to zero when taking the log-relative consumption as the dependent variable.
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2.H Deriving the price elasticity of the hicksian demand
Using the Slutsky equation, we can show that:
|εMh | = |εHh |+ shµIh
where εMh is the price elasticity of the marshallian demand for home care, ε
H
h is the price
elasticity of the hicksian demand, µIh is the income elasticity of the marshallian demand and
sh is the share of (individual) income allocated to home care spending.
From our estimations, we take:
|εMh | = |β̂1|
µIh = β̂2
From external data, we estimate sh to be around 12% on average for APA beneficiaries
(see Chapter 3 of this thesis).
With our preferred estimates, derived from the IV-Tobit estimation (reported in Table 2.2,
Section 5), this results in:
|εHh | = 0.35
The relatively low values of both the income elasticity and the budget share alocated to
home care spending that we have plugged in the formula explain that we end up with the
price elasticities of the hicksian and marshallian demands being close to each other.
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Chapter 3
Equity in the French home care subsidy
program: An ex ante evaluation of the 2016
APA reform
Summary of the chapter
While public long-term care (LTC) expenditure is growing across OECD countries, the
extent to which LTC systems ensure an equitable allocation and a fair financing of care ser-
vices has been little documented. Our paper sheds light on the equity in home care use and
in associated out-of-pocket (OOP) payments in the context of the largest French home care
subsidy program targeted to the disabled elderly (APA). We use original data from a home
care provider, with unique individual-level information on both APA-subsidized and unsub-
sidized care for a sample of APA beneficiaries. We then conduct a simulation-based ex ante
evaluation of the 2016 APA reform, whose aim was to increase public effort towards certain
beneficiaries. We predict that the reform will improve coverage against the high OOP pay-
ments that were incurred by the most severely disabled prior to the reform and decrease
vertical inequity in care use. Behavioral reactions are predicted to increase care use but
also OOP payments for the income-poor beneficiaries, leading to an increase in the verti-
cal inequity in the contributions made to the scheme. Evidence of limited income-related
horizontal inequity in use is found both before and after the reform.
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1 Introduction
With population aging, old-age disability and the financing of long-term care (LTC)
services for the elderly have turned into pressing issues in developed countries (Economic
Policy Committee, 2015). Despite their growing macroeconomic importance, the extent to
which LTC systems achieve insurance against old-age disability risk, affordability of LTC
services and redistribution between different segments of the population in OECD countries
is still largely undocumented. In particular, while there exists a large international literature
documenting how health care systems fare in terms of equity (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer,
2000a; van Doorslaer and van Ourti, 2011), these studies generally have left LTC services
aside.
Equity assessments require careful empirical analysis, based on explicit definitions of
which variations in care use and in financial contributions are to be considered as fair. As it
reflects value judgments, any equity principle can be disputed. As many countries discuss
potential reforms of their LTC systems, either to broaden coverage or curb increasing public
spending, it is critical to expand the body of empirical evidence on the performance of the
existing public LTC schemes with respect to well-defined and popular, if not consensual,
normative stances.
Several dimensions of equity may be considered when assessing how LTC systems per-
form. Equity can be defined with respect to the use of LTC services — whether different
groups of the population have a different consumption of care; or with respect to the finan-
cial contribution to the costs of LTC — whether different groups contribute to the financing
of LTC by differing amounts (Lachaud and Rochaix, 1995). For each of these dimensions, in-
equity may result from a situation of either horizontal inequity — individuals with the same
legitimate needs for care, or the same contributory capacity, use LTC services or contribute
to their costs differently; or vertical inequity — individuals with different levels of needs, or
contributory capacities, do not make a relative use of LTC or pay for these services in a way
that is deemed appropriate (Rochaix and Tubeuf, 2009).1
The public debate regarding equity in LTC tends to focus on the issue of the costs left to
the responsibility of the disabled elderly and of their family. Vertical inequity in the financing
of LTC costs is presumed to induce socio-economic horizontal inequity in the use of LTC ser-
vices. In most OECD countries, the coverage of LTC costs by public schemes, especially when
care is provided at home, is only partial (Fizzala, 2016; Muir, 2017). Countries either offer
means-tested programs or levy income- or assets-related co-payments, inducing transfers
of resources along the income or wealth distribution among the disabled elderly. Depending
1Put it differently, there is horizontal equity when the likes are treated alike, and vertical equity when unlike
individuals are treated differently to an extent that is deemed appropriate.
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on the cost-sharing rules and the price sensitivity of the demand for home care services, the
design of public schemes may in turn affect how the use of LTC services varies with income.
A recent empirical literature has tested whether public LTC systems achieve socioeco-
nomic horizontal equity in LTC use, i.e. whether allocation of care is made according to
needs. While García-Gómez et al. (2015) find evidence of pro-rich horizontal inequity in
the use of some home care services in Spain, Tenand et al. (2018) [Chapter 4 of this thesis]
find the Dutch income-poor to use more, or more expensive, LTC services than the richer
disabled elderly, even conditional on the needs assessed within the public LTC insurance.
Exploiting the SHARE survey, Carrieri et al. (2017) and Ilinca et al. (2017) find that the distri-
bution of professional home care consumption correlates with income or wealth when con-
trolling for arguably legitimate “needs” for LTC in some European countries, but not in all.
For most European countries, the scope of the results is limited by low statistical precision.
In line with this young literature, the aim of this paper is to shed light on how the
French LTC system rates in terms of equity, focusing on the disabled elderly who live in the
community. In France, about 5% of the population aged 60 and older benefit from public
home care subsidies. These schemes represent a spending of Be3.8 (Drees, 2014), or 2.9%
of public expenditures in France. The largest programme, the Allocation personnalisée
d’autonomie (APA), offers universal benefits, allowing the disabled elderly to pay mostly for
non-medical professional home care. However, APA beneficiaries are requested to make
income-dependent co-payments on the cost of the LTC they use. Created in 2002, the
at-home APA scheme was substantially reformed in 2016, so as to make the public coverage
more generous by increasing the transfers of resources achieved by the program towards the
poorest and middle-class beneficiaries, as well as the most severely disabled.
We use an original dataset made from the customer files of a home care provider operat-
ing in one French department. It contains detailed cross-sectional information on the con-
sumption of formal care by APA beneficiaries who were customers of the provider in October
2014 (N=1,616). The unique feature of these data is that they provide precise individual-level
information on the amount of APA subsidies received and the volume of care consumed,
including the formal care use that did not benefit from APA public support.
We first use these real-world data to document (i) how the use of professional home care
services varies along the income distribution and as disability gets more severe, and (ii) how
the OOP payments incurred by APA beneficiaries evolve along these same two dimensions,
before the 2016 reform. Contrary to the distributional analysis conducted by the Ministry
of Health (Fizzala, 2016), we do not need to rely on assumptions regarding the home care
demand behavior of APA beneficiaries and the local implementation of the APA program by
the Departmental Councils given that our data allow us to observe total home care use and
to compute OOP payments.
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Second, we define some normative stances taken from the egalitarian tradition and ac-
cordingly assess how equitable the pre-reform APA scheme was. In a final step, we propose
a simulation of the effects of the 2016 APA reform. We use recent estimates of the price and
income elasticity of the demand for home care of the disabled elderly to simulate the post-
reform formal care use at the individual level. We keep the empirical analysis voluntarily
very simple: it basically relies on the comparison of the use of LTC services and the associ-
ated OOP payments across income quintiles and across administrative disability groups.
Together with the companion study by Hege (2018), we provide the first empirical nor-
mative analyses of the APA policy. Our exploratory study intends to demonstrate the interest
and practical challenges associated with using simulation techniques to provide an ex ante
evaluation of a reform of home care subsidies. Such an exercise proves useful to anticipate
the effects of reforms of LTC that may have a differential impact on care use and co-payments
across socio-economic and disability groups. In the absence of any individual level data that
would make an ex post evaluation possible, our analysis provides suggestive evidence that
the 2016 APA reform should reduce vertical inequity in the use of home care, while providing
better coverage against the financial risk associated with severe disability. Vertical inequity
in OOP payments and horizontal inequity in use are however predicted to increase.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the APA program and its
2016 reform. Section 3 presents our data, while the outcomes and the normative stances we
base our empirical analysis on are described in Section 4. Results are presented in Sections
5 (pre-reform situation) and 6 (post-reform situation). Section 7 discusses the limitations of
the paper and concludes.
2 The French APA programme and its redistributive features
2.1 Background: the home care APA programme
With 740,000 beneficiaries living in the community, APA covers almost 90% of the 60+
who benefit from a home care subsidy (Amar et al., 2016).2 3 To be eligible for APA, an in-
dividual must be aged 60 or older and have moderate to major difficulties to perform some
activities of daily living, like getting up from bed, grooming or eating. A team made of social
workers and nurses pays a visit to the house of every applicant and assesses her disabil-
ity level. The disability grid used in France defines 6 disability levels, or GIR (Groupes Iso-
Ressources): if the individual is assigned to groups 1 (most severe disability) to 4 (moderate
2These figures do not take into account tax rebates that may be granted on LTC expenditures; as of 2014, the
rebates would reduce OOP payments for taxable beneficiaries only.
3APA can also benefit individuals who would like to enter a nursing home. We restrict our attention to the
home care component of the scheme, covering 60% of APA beneficiaries (Amar et al., 2016).
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disability), she can receive APA. Groups 5 and 6 (better functional status) are not eligible.
The evaluation team then conducts a complete assessment of needs to list the interven-
tions required by a beneficiary. APA can pay for domestic help, personal care and assistance
with IADL and ADL activities.4 The scheme works as an hourly subsidy on the unit price of
care.5 The maximum number of subsidized hours is set individually, consistently with the
needs assessment, and is called the “personalized care plan”. APA beneficiaries are free to
consume home care beyond that point, but they have to bear the full cost of it.
The APA subsidy is computed on the basis of the equivalized spousal income. Until 2016,
the legal co-payment rate was linearly increasing with income, with a zero co-payment rate
for individuals earning up to e740 a month (approximately the minimum living allowance
for the elderly) and a maximum rate of 90% for individuals with income beyonde2,945.
Although the general rules of APA are defined at the national level, the program is imple-
mented at the departmental level. The central government transfers financial resources to
the Departmental Councils so that they can finance the implementation of the APA scheme
on their territory. Yet the allocation of resources is made prospectively and explicitly meant
to cover only part of the costs of the scheme.The Departmental Councils bear (at the margin)
the financial risk associated with an ageing, unhealthy population and with the decisions
made by the evaluation teams at the moment of their needs assessments.
2.2 Redistributive features of the APA programme prior to the 2016 re-
form
By granting its beneficiaries additional financial resources to face the costs of LTC, the
APA policy operates redistribution from those paying for the scheme to the disabled elderly.
More precisely, as APA works as an hourly subsidy, the decrease in the home care price that
it creates induces a transfer of income from the taxpayers to the APA beneficiaries.
Ex ante, before consumption decisions are actually made, this can be seen from the bud-
get set of APA beneficiaries. Denote hi the home care consumption of individual i and Yi
her consumption of the numeraire composite good. Ii is her income, p is the provider price
of home care and p si is the APA-subsidized price of care (which depends on Ii ). Finally, h̄i is
her care plan volume. Figure 3.1 illustrates that the budget set of APA beneficiary (b) is made
larger by the APA scheme relative to that of a non-disabled individual otherwise identical.6
4APA may finance technical devices, meals-on-wheels and housing adaptation, but the bulk of APA spending
pays for human care (Amar et al., 2016; Couvert, 2017). Nursing care is delivered by providers paid by public
and private health insurances.
5APA-funded care is mainly provided by services (as opposed to over-the-counter workers), most of them
being non-profit or public structures.
6We use the term “redistribution” to designate the income transfers that are made possible by the APA
scheme, between different groups of the population (defined by their disability level or income). This term
does not imply that the redistribution operated by the scheme necessarily aims at reducing socio-economic
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Figure 3.1 – Budget set with APA.
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NOTES: The black line represents the budget constraint of an individual that is not eligi-
ble for APA. The piece-wise linear budget constraint of beneficiary (b) is represented by
gray lines. The gray-shaded area is the extension in the budget set induced by APA.
In addition, two features of the at-home APA scheme shape the redistribution of re-
sources among APA beneficiaries, meaning that beneficiaries with specific characteristics
may ex ante expect to enjoy larger income transfers.
The care plan volume formally sets how the costs of LTC should be split between the
part benefiting from public support within the APA policy, and the part left to individual re-
sponsibility (possibly supplemented by other forms of public support or private insurance).
Under the APA rules, the care plan volume should increase with the amount of assistance
an individual requires to perform the activities of daily living (Code de l’Action Sociale et des
Familles, Article L232–6). This allows the redistribution of resources operated by APA to be
more important for those who are more severely disabled. Ex ante, this is represented on
Figure 3.2 by the larger budget set incurred by a more disabled individual, relative to a ben-
eficiary less disabled but otherwise similar. Yet departmental-level budgetary constraints
weighing on the evaluation teams and the explicit limits imposed by the disability-specific
national ceilings7 limit the additional transfers towards the most severely disabled APA ben-
eficiaries.
inequalities; it also arises because of an insurance motive.
7The national GIR-specific ceilings imposed on care plan volumes were set at relatively low levels until 2015
(HCFEA, 2017). See Appendix 3.C.
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Figure 3.2 – Budget set with APA, depending on the beneficiary’s disability level (pre-reform
situation).
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NOTES: The black lines represent the budget constraint of APA beneficiary (b). The gray
lines represent the budget constraint of APA beneficiary (c), who is more severely dis-
abled than (b). The gray-shaded area is the extension in the budget set induced by the
care plan volume being increasing in the disability level.
The second feature of the program that intends to achieve redistribution within the pop-
ulation of APA beneficiaries is its co-payment. The national schedule must be used by De-
partmental Councils to define the amount of their participation to the individual costs of
home care. Departmental Councils however retain significant leeway in the implementa-
tion of APA (Billaud et al., 2012; Gramain, Hege and Roquebert, 2015). In particular, they are
free to choose how to use the national co-payment schedule to derive the effective subsidies
paid to beneficiaries.
By computing and comparing the APA subsidy and OOP payments incurred by benefi-
ciaries under the various rules departments are found to choose between, Bourreau-Dubois
and Gramain (2014) have shown that the choices made by the Departmental Councils af-
fect the way the APA scheme redistributes resources from the rich beneficiaries to the poorer
ones. Whatever the choices made by the department however, an APA beneficiary with a
lower income enjoys a larger budget set than an otherwise similar but richer beneficiary (Fig-
ure 3.3). For a given level of care use, OOP payments on home care are expected to increase
with the contributory capacity of APA beneficiaries.
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Figure 3.3 – Budget set with APA, depending on the beneficiary’s income.
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NOTES: The black lines represent the budget constraint of APA beneficiary (b). The gray
lines represent the budget constraint of APA beneficiary (d), who has a lower income
than (b). The gray-shaded area is the extension in the budget set induced by the income-
dependent co-payment. The area filled with gray stars corresponds to the reduction in
the budget set induced by the lower income of beneficiary (d).
2.3 Policy objectives of the scheme
The design of the APA scheme presumably pursues some efficiency goals. By increasing
the number of hours that benefit from public financing, a higher care plan volume enables
more pooling of the financial risk associated with intensive LTC use. Following Nyman (1999,
2006), the welfare gain associated with providing LTC insurance will be all the higher as the
disabled elderly value the implicit income transfer associated with an insurance scheme of-
fering partial reimbursement of the care consumed. Ex post, if individual preferences exhibit
less substitutability between home care and other consumption goods as disability gets more
severe, increasing the care plan volume with the disability level may allow to achieve higher
welfare gains (through the income effect) with limited efficiency loss (due to the substitu-
tion effect induced by the price distortion). Moreover, decreasing the co-payments rate for
the poorest would improve the efficiency of APA in the case substitutability is higher at the
margin for the income-rich.
It however seems that the APA design also aims at addressing equity concerns. It is possi-
ble to interpret the care plan as a tool ensuring that the allocation of publicly-subsidized for-
mal home care is made according to the disability level. The income-dependent co-payment
schedule may result from an efficiency-equity trade-off, in which the concern that a high
marginal cost of care may reduce the use of home care for lower-income beneficiaries pre-
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vails over moral hazard considerations. Imposing a co-payment increasing with income is
also a way to make the out-of-pocket contribution to the scheme all the higher as income is
high, thereby possibly ensuring some vertical equity in financing.
The design of the at-home APA scheme thus seems to meet concerns for both equity in
the use of LTC and equity in the financial contributions made to the scheme. This shows
also from the motivations of the 2016 APA reform, whose aim was not only to increase public
support towards the disabled elderly but also to rebalance the intended redistribution of
resources towards specific categories of beneficiaries, as explained below.
2.4 The 2016 APA reform
Five years after the national debate on old-age disability and LTC policies in 2010–2011,
France passed a law that brought important changes to the at-home APA scheme.8 The mo-
tivations behind the reform were that the APA scheme offered insufficient coverage against
the financial risk associated with home care costs, especially for the most disabled. In ad-
dition, it was considered that the poorest beneficiaries incurred a subsidized price of home
care that was still too high given their limited financial resources. Finally, the reform aimed
at addressing the recurrent claim that the middle-class elderly are relatively disfavored by
LTC policies in France.
The reform thus implemented four important modifications. First, the legal co-payment
rate became a function of both income and the care plan volume: this would make the out-
of-pocket cost of home care lower for more severely disabled individuals. Second, hold-
ing the disability level fixed, the relationship between income and the co-payment rate was
changed, following an inverted U-shape: the decrease was higher for middle-class benefi-
ciaries. Third, the income threshold below which the legal co-payment is zero was raised
from e740 to 800e. For individuals earning an income between these two values, the OOP
price of every subsidized hour of care decreased (assuming no change in the prices charged
by home care providers). The fourth change consisted in the increase of the GIR-specific
national ceilings on care plan volume: the ceilings for the least disabled (GIR 3 and 4) in-
creased by 18%, while the ceilings for beneficiaries of GIR 2 and 1 increased by 22% and 31%
respectively.
The concerns behind the reform were supported by some empirical elements. Pre-
reform statistics from the French Ministry of Health showed that severely disabled APA
beneficiaries (GIR 1 and 2) were more likely to have their care plan volume constrained
by their GIR-specific national ceiling (“saturation du plan d’aide”, Bérardier (2012)) than
the least severely disabled. Under the assumption that APA beneficiaries do not consume
unsubsidized care and that the Departmental Councils apply the legal co-payment schedule
8Loi 2015–1776 du 28 décembre 2015 relative à l’adaptation de la société au vieillissement.
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to the price effectively charged by providers, the effort rate in the pre-reform situation was
predicted to increase with income.9 As no national or local administrative records would
however allow to assess to what extent APA beneficiaries would consume beyond their care
plan volume,10 the French Ministry of Health used a microsimulation model dedicated
to public LTC schemes to explore this question (Fizzala, 2016). Under the alternative as-
sumption that beneficiaries whose care plan volume hits their GIR-specific national ceiling
consume some unsubsidized care (call it scenario B), effort rates are found to decrease with
income.
Additionally, Fizzala (2016) simulated the OOP payments under the assumption that
Departmental Councils use a lump-sum tariff instead of the price charged by home care
providers to compute the APA unit subsidy (call it scenario C). Effort rates prior to the
reform are again predicted to be high, on average, for the very low-income (about 40% for
beneficiaries in GIR 1 or 2 with monthly income lower around e800) and decreasing with
income (Fizzala, 2016). Under both scenarios B and C, the effort rate of the most severely
disabled (GIR 1 or 2) was predicted to exceed 20% even for beneficiaries in the top income
decile.11
Those microsimulation results rely on two sets of assumptions: (i) hypothesis on the ben-
eficiaries’ behavior in terms of home care demand, and (ii) assumptions on the Departmen-
tal Councils’ choices regarding the implementation of the APA program. Such assumptions
may affect the assessment of equity in the use and in the financing of home care within the
APA program in the pre-reform situation.12 We propose to overcome these shortcomings by
using original observational data.
9We define the effort rate as the ratio of total OOP payments on home care to income.
10The administrative records of the Ministry of Health (Remontées individuelles 2007; 2011) or the depart-
mental datasets used by Bourreau-Dubois, Gramain, Lim and Xing (2014) and Roquebert and Tenand (2017)
[Chapter 2 of this thesis] only contain a censored measured of home care consumption, equal to the number
of hours effectively subsidized by the Departmental Councils.
11The case for the relative disadvantage of the middle-class in the pre-reform situation is less clear. It appears
when we consider the tax rebate on out-of-pocket home care spending that existed until it was transformed
into a tax credit in 2017. By construction, among individuals with a relatively high home care consumption, the
rebate was higher for high-income beneficiaries, who pay more taxes.
12In particular, the microsimulation exercise did not consider the case in which beneficiaries other than those
with a “saturated” care plan may consume unsubsidized care. This could further increase the negative income-
gradient in the effort rate on home care spending.
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3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Customer files of a home care provider
We use data extracted from the customer files of one French home care provider.13 The
department in which this home care provider operates is relatively rich and rural and has an
oligopolistic home care supply: 4 providers operate in the department,14 with only 2 cover-
ing the entire territory.15 These providers are not directly priced by the Departmental Coun-
cil, although the evolution of their prices is legally monitored. The service we focus on has a
non-profit status and is the largest to operate in the department.
The dataset contains information on the professional care delivered to the house of each
beneficiary, whether it is subsidized by APA or paid entirely out-of-pocket by the individual.
Care use is recorded on a monthly basis. The data relate to the month of October 2014 and
provide a sample of 1,616 APA beneficiaries.
The customer files contain additional variables such as the administrative disability level,
the provider price of care, the APA co-payment rate, the APA care plan volume, age and gen-
der, and a dummy indicating whether the individual lives in a rural area.
3.2 Measures of home care use
We distinguish between different measures of formal home care consumption. First, the
number of hours of professional home care that are consumed by a given individual and
subsidized by APA, which we call “subsidized consumption”; second, the number of hours
an individual may consume beyond her care plan volume, which we call “unsubsidized con-
sumption”; third, “total consumption”, equal to the sum of subsidized and unsubsidized con-
sumption.16
In a given month, the customer files of the home care provider contain information only
on the APA beneficiaries that have been provided some care over the month by the provider.
13These files were collected as part of the MODAPA project. For confidentiality reasons, the name of the
service and its location cannot be disclosed.
14This figure includes home care structures (public, for-profit and not-for-profit organizations) but it does
not take into account over-the-counter workers. APA beneficiaries are allowed to contract directly with a pro-
fessional caregiver, although they more frequently receive care from a home care structure.
15The home care market may vary substantially from one department to the other, depending on the regula-
tory decisions made by Departmental Councils. Studying a department of a similar size, Roquebert and Ten-
and (2017) [Chapter 2 of this thesis] document the existence of 28 authorized services (not taking into account
“non-authorized” structures), while Bourreau-Dubois, Gramain, Lim and Xing (2014) count only 15 authorized
providers (with delimited perimeters of intervention) in a much more populated department. Such a variability
was also documented in an ad hoc survey (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012).
16Information on the care plan volume can be considered as highly reliable, as the provider bills APA-
subsidized hours directly to the Departmental Council, which can be expected to track any reporting error.
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Our data do not allow us to observe whether some beneficiaries forgo entirely home care
consumption over the month.17 18
In the department our data come from, the Departmental Council distinguishes between
hours of professional home care that are to be received on weekdays (Monday to Saturday)
and hours to be received on Sundays and non-labor days (call them weekend hours). As
weekend hours are charged at a higher price than weekday hours, they appear separately in
the care plan set by the evaluation team. If an APA beneficiary reaches the volume of weekend
hours prescribed in her care plan, she has to pay the full price of the weekend hours if she
wants to use additional care on weekends, whether she has reached the volume of weekday
hours prescribed in her care plan or not, and symmetrically (there is no fungibility).19
In our sample, less than 13% of beneficiaries are prescribed or consume weekend hours.
In the analysis, we add together both types of hours. Since weekend hours have a higher
monetary value, we check the robustness of our results to the weighting of the two types of
hours by their relative prices (Appendix 3.A).
3.3 Information on income and disability status
Although this dataset provides precious, unique information of the use of home care that
is not subsidized by APA, it has two important limitations with respect to our research ques-
tions.
First, information on the administrative disability status (GIR) turns out to be recorded
with error by the service. This is visible in the service’s files, as the monetary value of the care
plan of some customers is higher than the GIR-specific national ceiling set for APA trans-
fers. Our assumption is that the service correctly noted down the GIR of each of its cus-
tomers when she first joined the service, but does not systematically update this informa-
tion if the disability group of the customer gets re-assessed by the Departmental Council.20
In the case the individual care plan value was found to be inconsistent with the recorded
GIR, we coded upward the disability level so that the care plan value systematically lies be-
low the GIR-specific ceiling imposed on subsidized hours. Adjustment of the disability group
was made for 6% of the sample. Although some recording errors may have been left unde-
17Additional 46 APA beneficiaries were found in the files, with a recorded consumption of home care for the
month of zero. Given that we cannot exclude that these observations are individuals not yet erased from the
files, we drop them from the sample. We erased one additional individual due to her entry date in the service
being missing.
18However the measure of unsubsidized consumption can take the value of zero, as APA beneficiaries do not
necessarily consume professional care hours beyond their care plan volume.
19Unsubsidized consumption is then defined as the number of weekday hours consumed beyond the num-
ber of weekday hours included in the personalized care plan, plus the number of weekend hours consumed
beyond the number of weekend hours set in the care plan.
20This is all the more likely as not updating the disability status in the customer files entails no consequences
for either the beneficiary or the service.
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tected,21 examination of the data makes us confident that potential mis-categorization of
individuals in disability groups should be limited (cf. descriptive statistics below).
A second drawback of our dataset is that we do not observe income directly. However, we
have individual information on the APA co-payment rate, which is computed on the basis of
an extensive definition of income (which roughly covers all taxable income, including capital
income and pensions earned by the household). We are able to impute income using the co-
payment schedule. The income definition we refer to in the analysis is thus the measure used
by the Departmental Council to levy the beneficiaries’ financial participation. In the case the
individual has a spouse alive and living in the same household,22 the household income is
divided by 1.7 before the co-payment schedule is applied.23
For individuals at the very bottom (top) of the income distribution, the imputed income
is however an upper (lower) bound for income. 11% of the sample have a zero co-payment
rate, implying that their equivalized household income is at most equal to e738 a month.
Given that there is a minimum living allowance for the elderly, we conjecture that the large
majority of these individuals have indeed an income close to e738.24 At the other end of
the income distribution, only 5 individuals have a co-payment of 90%, meaning that we can
successfully reconstruct the income of almost all richest beneficiaries.25
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics on the sample. The age and gender composition
matches the usual profile of the elderly disabled population. The majority of APA beneficia-
ries are women, aged more than 80. Over 4/5 of them live in a rural area. APA beneficiaries
in our sample perceive on averagee1,218 of equivalized income.26
[Table 3.1 to be found on page 207.]
The majority of APA beneficiaries served by the provider are moderately disabled (GIR 3
and 4). In the department as a whole, in 2013, about 16% of APA beneficiaries were severely
21See Appendix 3.A for explanations.
22The presence of other members in the household does not seem to be taken into account in the computa-
tion of APA equivalized income. In any case, only 14% of self-declared APA beneficiaries reside with someone
else than a spouse (Insee-Drees, 2014).
23See Appendix 3.C for discussion of the implicit economies of scale associated with this scaling factor.
24The minimum living allowance for a single elderly was of e791 a month in 2014. If we equivalize the min-
imum living allowance for an elderly couple using the scale used in the APA scheme, we obtain a minimum
monthly income of e723, thus fairly close to an imputed value of e738. The first decile of household income
per consumption unit among elderly households (head of the fiscal unit being 75 or older) was equal to e903
in 2013 (Insee et al., 2013), thus comfortably higher than the minimum imputed value for income in our sam-
ple. Yet, given that the old-age living allowance can be recovered from inheritance, there may be some non-
negligible take-up among those eligible; this makes it likely that some individuals in our sample earn less than
the minimum imputed value for income.
25See Appendix 3.A for further details on our data imputations.
26This figure is in line with the average pension benefit (Solard, 2015).
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disabled (GIR 1 and 2), while it is the case for 10% of our sample. On the contrary, the least
severely disabled (GIR 4) are over-represented in our sample relative to the departmental fig-
ure and, even more so, relative to the national proportion of beneficiaries in GIR 4 (58.8%)
(Drees, 2013). We expect the relatively low proportion of severely disabled beneficiaries
found in our sample to reflect the fact that the most disabled APA beneficiaries do not opt
for relatively expensive authorized providers, and in particular not for the service our data
come from.27
On average, the APA beneficiaries in our sample are entitled to 20.8 subsidized hours per
month. The average number of hours effectively subsidized is however lower (18.6). We also
observe that the total number of hours consumed is higher (19.4 hours per month). About
25% of individuals consume hours beyond their care plan volume, but unsubsidized hours
represent on average less than one hour a month.
The hourly price charged by the provider for weekday home care ranges between e19.6
and e22.15.28 Although the average APA co-payment rate is about one-fifth, the share of
the cost of home care that is paid out-of-pocket reaches 1/3 on average. This is due both to
the fact that some beneficiaries consume unsubsidized hours and to the choice made by the
Departmental Council to apply the legal co-payment rate to a lump-sum tariff rather than to
the price actually charged by the provider.29
27Using data from a different department, Roquebert and Tenand (2017) [Chapter 2 of this thesis] document
that the APA beneficiaries opting for an authorized structure have on average less severe disabilities. This is
due to the fact that disabled individual APA beneficiaries with a severely deteriorated functional status are
more likely to receive care from over-the-counter workers: in such a case, the unit price of care is lower than
when care is provided through a home care structure, the beneficiary can afford more hours with a given bud-
get and the evaluation team can grant more subsidized hours before hitting the ceiling. This is confirmed by
Couvert (2017): using 2011 national data on APA beneficiaries and their care plan, she documents that bene-
ficiaries whose care plan is close to their GIR-specific ceiling are less likely to receive care from an authorized
provider. As individuals in GIR 1 and 2 are more likely to have their care plan hitting the national ceiling, this
translates into the most severely disabled being more likely to receive care from other types of services. This
effect offsets the legal provision that Departmental Councils should foster the matching of the most severely
disabled beneficiaries with authorized providers (Article L232–6 du Code de l’action sociale et des familles).
28The provider charges a different price for customers that joined the service in different years: the earlier the
customer joined the provider, the less expensive the price of care.
29Section 4 and Appendix 3.C provide explanations about the computation of the individual APA subsidy and
of OOP payments on home care in this department.
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Table 3.1 – Descriptive statistics on the sample.
Average Std-dev.
Home care use (in hours)
Total consumption 19.4 14.4
Subsidized consumption [a] 18.6 13.1
Unsubsidized consumption [b] 0.8 3.1
Share with [b] > 0 25.0% –
Ratio [b]/([a]+[b]) 2.6% 6.8
Care plan volume [c] 20.8 13.5
Ratio ([a]+[b])/[c] 92.5% 23.9
Home care price and APA
APA co-payment rate 19.6% 17.2
Share with zero APA co-payment rate 11.0% –
Provider price of care (weekday hours) e20.9 e0.5
Hourly OOP on subsidized hours (total) e6.8 e3.1
Public cost (APA transfer) [d] e265.3 204.3
Total cost [e] e409.2 e306.5
Ratio [d]/[e] 66.0% 15.0
Demographic & and socio-economic characteristics
Man 28.0% –
Age 60–69 5.6% 23.1
Age 70–79 19.9% 39.9
Age 80–84 23.0% 42.1
Age 85–89 30.6% 46.1
Age 90+ 20.8% 40.6
Disability group: 1 2.7% 16.3
Disability group: 2 8.3% 27.6
Disability group: 3 15.3% 36.1
Disability group: 4 73.6% 44.1
Income 1218.8 421.3
Lives in a rural area 83.0% –
Observations 1616
NOTES: Consumption of care and care plan volume are expressed in hours per month. They in-
clude both weekend and weekday care hours. Income is expressed in euros per month; it cor-
responds to the equivalized household income as computed within the APA scheme. Provider
price is the price charged by the provider for one hour of care provided between Monday and
Saturday.
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4 Empirical approach
Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. In a first descriptive step, we assess the
degree of income-related and disability-related inequality in the use of home care and in
the OOP payments using our observational data. Given our limited sample size, individuals
are simply grouped either by income quintile or by their administrative disability group. We
compute and compare the average of the number of hours consumed, or OOP payments
incurred, across the different groups.
Second, we propose some normative stances and draw implications in terms of equity
in the APA scheme in the pre-reform situation. We additionally discuss some aspects of ef-
ficiency. Finally, we assess how the 2016 reform has affected the extent to which the APA
scheme ensures equity and coverage against severe disability.
4.1 Differential home care use by income
We start by comparing the total volume of home care consumed in the month across in-
come quintiles. Socio-economic inequalities in the use of LTC services are not necessarily
a policy concern: if we assume that one of the goals of the at-home APA scheme is to en-
sure income-related horizontal equity in use (equal care for equal needs), inequalities in LTC
use would be acceptable if they merely reflect systematic differences in the “needs” for LTC
across the income distribution, i.e. legitimate determinants of LTC use.
Any empirical assessment of the degree of horizontal inequity in use requires a norma-
tive stance regarding what is defined a need. In the context of the APA program, one possible
measure of “needs” is the care plan decided upon by the evaluation team of the Departmen-
tal Council. Yet this interpretation raises two concerns. First, given that the decision upon
the care plan is made by the Departmental Council, which is the marginal payer for APA, the
care plan volume should not be seen only as a device to ensure that the allocation of public
spending is made according to needs, but also as a tool regulating the local level of spending.
Second, if the APA reform led to an increase in the care plan relatively higher for some ben-
eficiaries, our measure of needs would not be robust to the policy change we are interested
in.30
30The implicit assumptions we have to make so that we can interpret the care plan volume h̃i as a measure
of needs is that (i) relative inequalities matters and (ii) relative differences in care plan volumes are relevant to
measure differential needs. But the existence of GIR-specific national ceilings and the non-negligible rate of
care plans that hit these ceilings makes this second assumption fragile. Consider two beneficiaries, one whose
care plan volume equal her GIR-specific ceiling and another one with a care plan volume equal to half of this
same ceiling. In order to infer that the legitimate needs for care of the first beneficiary is twice as high as the
care needs of the second beneficiary, we have to assume a specific behavior of the evaluation teams in setting
care plan volumes. This would indeed requires that evaluation teams allocates the “saturated” care plans to
the individuals with the very worst functional status; and then set the care plans of individuals with better
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The other candidate as a need variable is the administrative disability group itself. It
comes with two disadvantages — that there may be some measurement error and that it
only counts 4 categories; yet, as it derives from an explicit grid (grille AGGIR), we take it as
being a conceptually more robust measure of needs. Following Wagstaff et al. (1991), we test
for income-related horizontal inequity by estimating the following linear regression:
hi =π0 +
5∑
j=1, j 6=3
π
j
11[qi= j ] +
4∑
k=1,k 6=3
πk21[di=k] +
5∑
j=1, j 6=3
4∑
k=1,k 6=3
π
j k
3 1[qi= j ] ×1[di=k] +εi (3.1)
where: hi is total number of home care hours consumed, qi = j with j = 1, ...,5 if individ-
ual i is in the j th income quintile, di = k with k = 1, ...,4 if individual i is classified in GIR k. εi
is an error term. We take income quintile 3 and GIR 3 as reference categories. If, within each
disability group, individuals use on average the same amount of home care across income
quintiles, we would have:
H0 : π j1 = 0, j = 1,2,4,5 and π
j k
3 = 0, j = 1,2,4,5;k = 1,2,4 (3.2)
Failing to reject the null means that we are not able to find evidence of income-related
inequality in use.
4.2 Differential contributions by income
The second outcome we look at is how OOP vary with income. In normative terms, we
postulate that having effort rates that are increasing in income is a necessary condition for
APA to ensure vertical equity in the contributions to the scheme.31
Given the rules adopted by the department our data come from, the monthly OOP pay-
ments, OOPi for APA beneficiary i who is a customer of the home care provider we are con-
sidering, are equal to:
OOPi =
{ (
(ci t )+ (pi − t )
)
hi if hi ≤ h̄i(
(ci t )+ (pi − t )
)
h̄i +pi (hi − h̄i ) if hi > h̄i
where ci is the APA legal co-payment rate, a function of income with values ranging from
0 to 0.9.32 t is the tariff set by the Departmental Council to compute APA subsidies, which
is equal to e17.59 for weekday hours, systematically lower than the price charged by the
provider to individual i , pi .
The formula enlightens three important things. First, for any additional hour consumed
up to the care plan volume, OOP payments increase by an amount equal to (ci t )+ (pi − t ).
functional status as a proportion of this benchmark.
31This reflects the stance that a fair social scheme should ensure the progressivity of contributions (Wagstaff
and van Doorslaer, 2000a).
32See Appendix 3.C for details on the computation of OOP payments.
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This amount increases with income, but at a smaller rate than the slope of the legal APA co-
payment rate.33 Second, the OOP formula shows that even individuals with income so low
that they have a legal APA co-payment rate equal to zero (ci = 0) bear positive OOP payments
even on the hours subsidized by the APA scheme.34 Finally, any additional hour consumed
beyond the care plan volume increases OOP payments by a higher amount, equal to pi . Un-
subsidized care is all the more expensive relative to subsidized care as the APA unit subsidy
is high and thus income is low.
4.3 Differential use by disability level
The third outcome we document is how home care use varies across disability groups.
For a LTC system to ensure vertical equity in use, individuals with more needs for care should
be able to consume more care, by a proportion that is considered as fair. Rather than assum-
ing a precise norm here, we postulate that, prior to the reform, APA did not ensure that the
most severely disabled beneficiaries consumed sufficiently more than those with moderate
disability. We this assume that APA did not allow to reach a situation of vertical equity in
the use of home care, which is an interpretation consistent with the criticisms that were ad-
dressed to the scheme. We then focus on assessing whether the 2016 reform has induced the
most severely disabled to increase their home care use relatively more than those with more
moderate disability.
Relatively small differences in the use of care across disability levels may also reveal some
inefficiency in the APA design. It may result from the most disabled being little income-
elastic in their home care consumption, or healthier beneficiaries being much more price-
elastic. If this is the case, a home care subsidy scheme may prove an inefficient way of pro-
viding insurance against old-age disability.
4.4 Differential contributions by disability level
The fourth and final outcome we study is how OOP payments and effort rates vary across
disability groups. The APA creates a direct link between the volume of care consumed and
the OOP payments incurred, even at the margin. We thus expect OOP payments and effort
rates to increase as disability becomes more severe. Comparing the OOP payments borne
by beneficiaries in GIR 1 with those with better functional status provides information on
the degree of coverage against severe disability that is provided by APA. Departing from an
equity analysis, we thereby provide some indication of the degree of risk-sharing induced by
APA and how the 2016 reform has improved this efficiency aspect of the scheme.
33See Appendix 3.C for further details.
34For such individuals, the APA-subsidized unit price of weekday care equals (pi − t ), or aboute3.5.
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Table 3.2 summarizes the indicators that we study.
Table 3.2 – Indicators used in the empirical analysis and their interpretation.
[1] Use [2] OOP payments or effort rates
[a] By income quintile Horizontal inequity in use Vertical equity in financing
[b] By disability group Vertical equity in use Extent of coverage
5 Results for the pre-reform situation
Table 3.3 provides the sample averages by income quintile and disability group of the
relevant outcomes, as observed in our 2014 data.
Table 3.3 – Differential use and contributions by income and disability levels.
Average use Share with
unsubsidized use
Average OOP
payments
Average effort rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Differences across income quintiles
Income quintile: 1 21.0 0.276 88.2 0.115
[19.5,22.6] [0.228,0.323] [72.9,103.5] [0.104,0.126]
Income quintile: 2 19.0 0.245 104.0 0.110
[17.5,20.6] [0.197,0.292] [88.7,119.3] [0.099,0.121]
Income quintile: 3 18.2 0.217 121.5 0.108
[16.6,19.8] [0.169,0.265] [106.2,136.8] [0.097,0.119]
Income quintile: 4 18.6 0.263 155.9 0.114
[17.0,20.1] [0.215,0.311] [140.6,171.3] [0.102,0.125]
Income quintile: 5 20.0 0.302 249.1 0.129
[18.4,21.5] [0.255,0.350] [233.8,264.4] [0.118,0.141]
Panel B: Differences across disability groups
Disability group: 1 63.1 0.727 470.6 0.390
[60.6,65.7] [0.603,0.852] [434.7,506.5] [0.369,0.411]
Disability group: 2 41.8 0.522 326.2 0.263
[40.3,43.2] [0.451,0.594] [305.7,346.8] [0.251,0.275]
Disability group: 3 28.2 0.347 218.6 0.173
[27.1,29.3] [0.294,0.399] [203.5,233.7] [0.164,0.182]
Disability group: 4 13.4 0.196 95.6 0.076
[12.9,13.9] [0.172,0.220] [88.7,102.5] [0.072,0.080]
NOTES: APA beneficiaries customers of the anonymous home care provider in October 2014 (N= 1,616). Care
use is expressed in hours in the month and adds together weekday and weekend hours of care, be it APA-
subsidized or not. Beneficiaries with unsubsidized care are those consuming beyond their care plan volume.
OOP payments are expressed in euros per month. 5% confidence intervals are displayed in brackets.
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5.1 Results on differential use by income
From Column (1) of Panel A (Table 3.3), we observe a U-shaped relationship between
income and actual use of care. Beneficiaries in the middle of the income distribution are
less likely to consume unsubsidized care, but the relatively large standard deviation makes
differences between quintiles not statistically significant (even at the 10% level).
In order to assess whether there is a systematic correlation between income and home
care use when we control for the disability group (care needs), we estimate Equation (3.1).
Results are reported in Table 3.B.1 (Appendix 3.B). A Fisher test of joint significance does not
allow to reject H0 (cf. formula (3.2)) even at the 10% level. However, the t-tests on individual
coefficients reveal that beneficiaries in the 4th income quintile are predicted to consume
significantly less than those in the third quintile when in GIR 3 (at the 5% level).35 Individuals
in the upper middle-class seemed to receive relatively too little care. These results suggest
that, prior to the reform, the APA scheme was not too far from a situation of income-related
horizontal equity in use, although it did not completely achieve it.
5.2 Results on differential contributions by income
From Table 3.3 – Panel A, Column (3) shows a positive income-gradient in the average
OOP payments: the contributions borne by beneficiaries were on average of e88 in the
month for those in the bottom income quintile, while being almost three times higher for
beneficiaries in the top income quintile. The differences between the bottom 4 income quin-
tiles are fairly small, reflecting the facts that (i) the legal co-payment rate increases at a rel-
atively small pace between the bottom of the income distribution and the fourth quintile
(where it does not exceed 30%), and (ii) the existence of a fixed component of the subsidized
price of care (p− t ), independent from income, which presses down on the income-gradient
attached with the co-payment schedule.
Column (4) reveals that the effort rate on home care spending is on average of 11% in the
bottom 80% of the income distribution, and reaches 13% in the top income quintile. Given
that the imputed income is an upper bound for the true income for about 45% of benefi-
ciaries in the bottom income quintile, their true average effort rate can be expected to be
higher. Vertical equity in the contributions made to the APA scheme was thus not achieved
in the pre-reform situation.
35Among interaction terms, only the coefficient of the interaction term between the dummy for the fourth
income quintile and fourth disability group is statistically significantly different from 0 at conventional levels.
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5.3 Results on differential use by disability level
We now focus on Panel B of Table 3.3. Column (1) shows that the more severely disabled
indeed receive more home care than beneficiaries with better functional status. The share of
those consuming home care beyond their care plan volume is however substantially higher
among the most disabled: more than 50% of beneficiaries in GIR 1 or 2 consume unsubsi-
dized care, while it is the case of less than 20% of GIR 4 beneficiaries.
In microeconomic terms, the fact that the most disabled beneficiaries choose to locate
beyond the kink of their budget constraint, despite the much higher OOP price of care there,
is consistent with them having high preferences for care, a low price elasticity or high income
elasticity in their demand for home care. This would make a case for achieving welfare gains
by increasing the public effort towards the most severely disabled, as the 2016 reform did.
5.4 Results on differential contributions by disability level
From Column (3) of Table 3.3, Panel B, we see that OOP payments are relatively high for
individuals in GIR 1 and 2, translating into effort rates close to 40% on average for GIR 1 ben-
eficiaries. High OOP payments are partly due to the more frequent unsubsidized consump-
tion as disability becomes more severe; for GIR 1 and 2, the average is pulled up by very high
effort rates for some beneficiaries (cf. the box plots presented in Figure 3.B.3, Panel B, Ap-
pendix 3.B). About 25% of beneficiaries in GIR 3 had an effort rate in excess of 20%, while
this is the case for only 1% of GIR 4 beneficiaries.36
Prior to the reform, APA thus offered fairly limited coverage against the financial risk as-
sociated with the risk of severe old-age disability for community-dwelling beneficiaries.
36We can compare the average OOP payments by GIR with the simulated values presented in Fizzala (2016)
(Table 2 , scenario “H2”). We find lower OOP payments across all disability levels, even though the price
charged by our home care provider is relatively high and the decision of the department to compute APA subsi-
dies based on a lump-sum tariff is unfavorable to APA beneficiaries. This reveals that either (i) the care “needs”
Fizzala (2016) relies on, following a methodology proposed by Bérardier and Debout (2011), are over-estimated,
or (ii) the assumption that individuals would consume all their “needs” does not reflect the true behavioral re-
actions of beneficiaries. We believe that this latter assumption is indeed inconsistent with plausible values of
the price elasticity of home care demand by APA beneficiaries. Of course, the discrepancy can also be explained
by the fact that the most disabled beneficiaries of each GIR are likely to be under-represented in our sample.
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6 Simulated impacts of the 2016 APA reform
6.1 The potential impact of the reform on inequalities in care use and in
OOP payments
The impacts of the 2016 reform on the use of home care and OOP payments borne by APA
beneficiaries will depend on two empirical elements, which are: how the demand for formal
care of the disabled elderly will adjust to a decrease in the price of care they have to pay
out-of-pocket; and how the departmental evaluation teams will adjust care plan volumes
following the increase in the national ceilings.
If APA beneficiaries are not price-sensitive,37 their consumption of home care should
not adjust to the APA reform. The 2016 reform would then translate unambiguously into
a reduction of OOP payments, higher for the very low-income and middle-class beneficia-
ries as well as for the most severely disabled. If APA beneficiaries react to the decrease in
the OOP price of care induced by the reform, its effects on total OOP is a priori unclear:
if the upward-adjustment of formal care consumption is proportionately higher than the
downward-adjustment of the unit price of care, total OOP payments may actually increase
with the reform.
Several studies have provided reduced-form evidence that the use of professional home
care services is price elastic, based on North-American or European data (Pezzin et al., 1996;
Stabile et al., 2006; Rapp et al., 2011; Fontaine, 2012). Exploiting French data, a couple of
recent papers (Bourreau-Dubois, Gramain, Lim and Xing, 2014; Hege, 2016; Roquebert and
Tenand, 2017) [Chapter 2 of this thesis] have directly estimated the price elasticity of the
demand for home care of APA beneficiaries. With point estimates ranging from -0.16 to -
0.55, they point to a statistically significant price sensitivity, yet much below unity in absolute
value. Exploiting a reform of the co-payment schedule in the Netherlands, Non (2017) also
finds evidence that home care use is price-sensitive.
Would the price elasticity be constant along the income distribution, it would be suffi-
cient for the modifications in the APA schedule to impact differential home care use across
income quintiles: given that richer individuals were slightly more likely to consume unsub-
sidized hours than the poor in our sample, the relative change in the marginal OOP price
of care induced by the reform should vary along the income distribution. In addition, Hege
(2016) and Roquebert and Tenand (2017) [Chapter 2 of this thesis] find the price elasticity
of professional home care to be higher (in absolute value) for richer APA beneficiaries. The
heterogeneity in the price sensitivity along the income distribution is a second reason why
the reform may have impacted how home care use — and in turn, OOP payments — vary
37And that we abstract from the income effects potentially induced by the increase in care plan volumes.
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with income.
The second crucial element that will affect the outcomes of the reform in terms of both
coverage and equity is how the increase in the GIR-specific national ceilings will translate
into increases in individual care plan volumes. If the evaluation teams of Departmental
Councils react to the reform by increasing the care plan volume of a beneficiary, this will
decrease her OOP payments if she was consuming unsubsidized care prior to the reform.
For those who were consuming exactly the number of hours for which they were entitled to
receive a subsidy, the increase in the care plan volume will create a sharp decrease in the
marginal price of care (as it will go from the provider price to the APA-subsidized price).
Final impacts on home care use and OOP payments across the distributions of income and
disability groups will depend not only on how the different groups are affected by an upward-
adjustment of their care plan volume, but also on how the pre-reform consumption of bene-
ficiaries was set relative to their post-reform care plan volume (Fontaine and Gramain, 2017).
Assessing these different effects and how they combine is thus an essentially empirical
question.
6.2 Simulation approach
No administrative or survey data on home care consumption by APA beneficiaries in the
post-reform period are available. We propose to use our data and available estimates of the
price elasticity of home care demand to simulate the impact of the reform on APA beneficia-
ries’ consumption.
Appendix 3.D provides a detailed presentation of the methodology of the simulation. We
construct the budget constraint in the context of both the pre-reform and the post-reform
APA scheme using the pre- and post-reform co-payment schedules (see Appendix 3.C). We
then predict the change in the marginal price of care and any potential income effect to
simulate the change in home care consumption. Several important assumptions are made.
First, we assume that the evaluation teams of the Departmental Council will react to the
reform by increasing the care plan volume for all beneficiaries of a given disability group in a
uniform way. Second, using the estimates from Roquebert and Tenand (2017) [Chapter 2 of
this thesis], we assume a price elasticity and an income elasticity of home care consumption
of −0.4 and 0.4 respectively, constant across the income distribution.38
The quality of the results obtained from the simulations is contingent on the assumptions
made. The validity of some of our hypothesis is however difficult to assess. In particular, the
price and income elasticities are assumed to be the same for weekday hours and weekend
hours of care. It is likely though that they are considered as two different goods by the dis-
38Although richer beneficiaries seem to more be price-elastic, available evidence makes it hard to assess by
how much.
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abled elderly; however, no specific study of the demand of care on weekends can provide us
with quantitative elements we could inject in our simulation. More importantly, there are
limited empirical elements available to anticipate the reaction of evaluation teams. Ethno-
graphic observations made in several French departments suggest that the adjustment of
evaluation teams is likely to depend on the department: there is considerable variation from
one Department Council to the other in terms of the background of evaluation team mem-
bers and the way they perceive their task, of the financial margin of maneuver available to
the department, and to the degree of control exerted by the hierarchy on the individual deci-
sions made by the evaluation team (Billaud et al., 2012; Gramain, Billaud and Xing, 2015a).39
6.3 Simulation results
Descriptive statistics on the simulated changes in prices, care use and OOP payments due
to the reform are provided in Table 3.4 (on the following page). Given our assumptions, we
predict a decrease in the APA co-payment rate by about 30% on average, leading to a change
in the marginal price of care for weekday hours of 40%. We can compare the average values
of consumption as simulated for the post-reform situation and to the pre-reform, observed
consumption values. On average, total consumption is predicted to increase by 12.2%, while
the consumption of subsidized hours would increase by only slightly less (11.6%). The share
of beneficiaries consuming unsubsidized hours is predicted to double; the average number
of unsubsidized hours for individuals consuming beyond their care plan volume however
remains roughly the same. The lower standard deviation (2.1 against 3.1) is consistent with
the reform allowing the individuals for which the pre-reform legal ceilings were much below
their actual use of professional care (mostly beneficiaries in GIR 1 and 2) to benefit from
subsidies on a higher number of hours.40
[Table 3.4 to be found on the following page.]
39With the new co-payment schedule, the decision made by the evaluation team on the care plan volume
does not only affect the number of hours for which the beneficiary can perceive a subsidy, but also the subsidy
rate on these hours. If the evaluation team derives a specific utility from granting a beneficiary with the high-
est possible APA transfer (due to some form of altruism or professional ethos), the reform provides the team
with an additional incentive to increase the care plan volume. Conversely, if we consider the fact that most
Departmental Councils are heavily budget-constrained, the reform will increase the incentive for departments
to closely monitor care plan volumes.
40Complementary descriptive statistics on unsubsidized care use before and after the reform are provided in
Table 3.D.7, Appendix 3.D.
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Table 3.4 – Descriptive statistics on simulated post-reform home care consumption.
Average Std-dev.
Increase in care plan volume
Change in care plan volume 18.7% 2.3
Post-reform care plan volume 24.9 16.8
Change in marginal price & virtual income
Change in APA co-payment rate -29.9% 25.7
Post-reform co-payment rate 16.2% 16.6
Change in marginal price (weekday) -40.9% 33.3
Change in marginal price (weekend) -4.6% 16.0
Change in virtual income -10.2% 13.6
Post-reform consumption
Change in total consumption 12.2% 9.2
Post-reform total consumption 21.8 15.9
Change in subsidized consumption 11.6% 7.4
Post-reform subsidized consumption 21.0 15.2
Change in unsubsidized consumption 21.6% 113.0
Post-reform unsubsidized consumption 0.8 2.3
Observations 1616
NOTES: Consumption of care and care plan volume are expressed in hours per month.
Unless specified differently, consumption includes both weekend and weekday care
hours. Changes in income and prices and post-reform consumption are simulated.
We now present how simulated home care use and OOP payments vary with income and
disability level. As displayed in Figure 3.4, the increase in total care consumption is roughly
of the same magnitude in the bottom 4 income quintiles; the increase is less marked for
the 20% richest, probably because of the limited decrease in the legal co-payment rate ex-
perienced by those beneficiaries. The simulated data reveal that the average unsubsidized
consumption should increase for beneficiaries in income quintiles 1 to 4, but decrease in the
top income quintile.41 This can be explained both by the richest benefiting after the reform
from APA subsidies on hours that they would previously pay entirely out-of-pocket, and by
the fact that the more modest beneficiaries experience strong price effects.
[Figure 3.4 to be found on the following page.]
We re-estimate Equation (3.1) to test for horizontal inequity in use, with simulated home
care use as the outcome. Again, the F-test fails to reject that all coefficients on income quin-
tiles and interacted terms are zero, but t-tests indicate that a few coefficients are individually
statistically significant.42 In particular, beneficiaries at the very bottom of the income dis-
tribution and in the fourth quintile are predicted to consume significantly less than other
41These descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.D.7, Appendix 3.D.
42Results are presented in Column (2) of Table 3.B.1, Appendix 3.B.
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beneficiaries, except when they belong to GIR 4. The reform has thus not allowed to reach a
situation of horizontal equity in use.
Figure 3.4 – Use of formal home care, by income quintile: Pre- and post-reform comparison.
NOTES: APA beneficiaries customers of the anonymous home care provider in October
2014 (N=1,616) and own simulations of post-reform outcomes. The dashed horizontal
line represents the sample average use in the pre-reform situation. The dash-dotted
thicker horizontal line represents the sample average use in the post-reform situation.
As shown by Figure 3.5 (Panel A), the reform has increased the contributions made to the
scheme for beneficiaries in the bottom two income quintiles, while the average OOP pay-
ments decreased in the top of the income distribution due to the lower use of unsubsidized
care. The reform would lead the average effort rate to be similar in the poorest and richest
quintiles (around 12.5%), while being lower (11% or less) in the middle of the income distri-
bution.
[Figure 3.5 to be found on the following page.]
If vertical equity in financing is to be judged by the progressivity of OOP payments, then
the APA reform is predicted to accentuate vertical inequity in financing. This conclusion is
contingent on the substantial increase in the care use that we predict for individuals in the
bottom of the income distribution and it heavily relies on the assumption of constant price
and income elasticities of home care demand. If low-income individuals turn out to be less
sensitive to a decrease in the OOP price of care, then we may not observe an increase in the
effort rate on home care for the poorest.
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Figure 3.5 – Contributions to the APA scheme, by income quintile: Pre- and post-reform
comparison.
Panel A (top): OOP payments.
Panel B (bottom): Effort rate on home care.
NOTES: APA beneficiaries customers of the anonymous home care provider in October
2014 (N=1,616) and own simulations of post-reform outcomes. The dashed horizontal
line represents the sample average OOP payments (Panel A) or the sample average ef-
fort rate (Panel B) in the pre-reform situation. The dash-dotted thicker horizontal line
represents the sample average OOP payments (Panel A) or the sample average effort rate
(Panel B) in the post-reform situation.
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We now turn to comparing disability groups. The increase in home care use following the
reform is predicted to be all the higher as disability is more severe (Figure 3.6), suggesting
that the reform would decrease vertical inequity in use.
The share of those consuming unsubsidized care is predicted to decrease in GIR 1 and 2,
due to the relatively high increase in the care plan volumes for these groups. For GIR 3 and
4, the proportion of those consuming beyond their care plan is expected to increase, but the
average unsubsidized consumption among them is predicted to fall. This means that, if the
increase in national ceilings translates in increases in care plans following our assumption,
the situations of beneficiaries with moderate disabilities having to consume a substantial
number of unsubsidized hours should become much rarer.
Figure 3.6 – Use of formal home care, by disability level: Pre- and post-reform comparison.
NOTES: APA beneficiaries customers of the anonymous home care provider in October
2014 (N=1,616) and own simulations of post-reform outcomes. The dashed horizontal
line represents the sample average use in the pre-reform situation. The dash-dotted
thicker horizontal line represents the sample average use in the post-reform situation.
Finally, Figure 3.7 shows that the OOP payments and effort rates on home care have de-
creased for GIR 1 to 3 (and substantially so for the most severely disabled), while they are pre-
dicted to remain roughly unchanged for beneficiaries in GIR 4. While the full welfare gains
to the reform cannot be assessed without further information and assumptions on prefer-
ences, we can yet infer that the 2016 reform has improved coverage against the risk of severe
disability. We thus tentatively predict efficiency gains from a higher ex ante risk sharing.
[Figure 3.7 to be found on the following page.]
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Figure 3.7 – Contributions to the APA scheme, by disability level: Pre- and post-reform com-
parison.
Panel A (top): OOP payments.
Panel B (bottom): Effort rate on home care.
NOTES: APA beneficiaries customers of the anonymous home care provider in October
2014 (N=1,616) and own simulations of post-reform outcomes. The dashed horizontal
line represents the sample average OOP payments (Panel A) or the sample average ef-
fort rate (Panel B) in the pre-reform situation. The dash-dotted thicker horizontal line
represents the sample average OOP payments (Panel A) or the sample average effort rate
(Panel B) in the post-reform situation.
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7 Discussion
7.1 Limitations
While we believe our simulation offers a valuable ex ante evaluation of the APA reform
in the absence of any data available for ex post evaluation, we acknowledge that our results
rely on relatively strong assumptions. First, our results do not reflect the substantial uncer-
tainty around the parameters and assumptions we are using in the simulation. Several em-
pirical elements on the demand of home care by the disabled elderly have been produced
in the recent years, but further evidence is needed to make simulation exercises more ro-
bust. Second, we have adopted a fairly simple simulation method to predict post-reform
care use. Given the non-linearity of the budget constraint induced by APA, a more sophisti-
cated method may be warranted. As for now, our simulated outcomes fail to reproduce the
significant bunching at the kink (the level of the care plan volume), which we expect from
the microeconomic consumer theory and that we observe in our 2014 data (Figure 3.D.2,
Appendix 3.D).
There are certainly ways to improve and enrich the simulation that we have not explored
yet, both in technical terms and with respect to scenarios. In particular, we could distinguish
between the mechanical effects of the reform and the ones further induced by the behavioral
reactions of APA beneficiaries. Given that the reaction of the departmental evaluation teams
to the increase in national ceilings is extremely speculative, it would be of interest to test
different hypothesis for the adjustment of care plan volumes. Our current implicit assump-
tion is that the evaluation team fully integrates the budgetary constraints weighing on the
Departmental Council and sets the care plan volumes proportionately to individual needs.
Another possible decision model would consider that the evaluation teams first decide upon
the volume of care a given APA beneficiary requires, and then “censor” the care plan volume
if it lies above the GIR-specific national ceiling.43 In such a case, if we consider that the un-
derlying “norm” that the evaluation team members implement when they set a care plan
volume, in terms of how much an individual requires of professional assistance, is left un-
changed by the reform (Fontaine and Gramain, 2017), then we would expect only the care
plan volumes that were hitting the national ceilings to be adjusted upward. As pointed out
in Fontaine and Gramain (2017), APA beneficiaries in such a situation (and who were actually
consuming at least their care plan volume) represent only 15% of the sample. The scenario
we have simulated might thus over-estimate the overall increase in home care use induced
by the reform.
In a companion analysis conducted within the MODAPA research project, Hege (2018)
43This is the decision model that is suggested by the APA legislation.
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has used the same data to propose an assessment of the redistribution induced by the APA
scheme and simulate the effects of the 2016 reform. Although they address the same broad
questions, our two studies differ in the choice of the outcomes of interest and the simulation
assumptions. Hege (2018) focuses on the distribution of APA spending and of disposable
income (net of APA benefits) across income deciles. His assessment of horizontal equity in
home care use relies on the assumption that the care plan is a relevant individual measure of
relative needs for care, whereas we have retained the administrative disability group. He sim-
ulates the change in care use based on the price elasticity estimated in Hege (2016), which
varies with the subsidized price of care and thus with income. In spite of these methodolog-
ical differences, our two studies deliver similar messages, in particular regarding the unin-
tended marked decrease in out-of-pocket payments and associated increase in APA transfers
at the top of the income distribution.
The scope of our analysis should not be over-stated. We focus on the APA policy and ig-
nore other public support provided to the disabled elderly. The tax rebates on OOP payments
on home care that were available until 2016 achieved substantial redistribution of resources
towards the middle-class and richest beneficiaries, presumably increasing the vertical in-
equity in out-of-pocket financing in the French home care subsidy system. The conversion
of the rebate into a tax credit in 201744 is expected to have reshuffled the decks, as it can now
benefit equally the large taxpayers and the modest households (HCFEA, 2017). Neither do
we assess how the taxes and contributions that finance the APA spending spread out.45
In addition, the external validity of our study is limited by the nature of the data we use.
Our sample is not necessarily representative of the total population of at-home APA bene-
ficiaries in France. In particular, the department which the data come from is richer than
average metropolitan France (Insee et al., 2013). Given the significant leeway the depart-
ments retain in the implementation of the APA policy, we should be careful in extrapolating
our conclusions. As discussed earlier, the fact the Department Council applies the APA legal
co-payment schedule to a lump-sum tariff decreases the vertical redistribution relative to
what is embedded in the national legislation. In terms of socio-economic differences in LTC
use and OOP payments, we adopt an unfavorable scenario perspective. Moreover, within the
department our data come from, we do not observe APA beneficiaries who do not choose
our specific provider. Our sample may not be representative of the at-home APA beneficiary
population in terms of income and disability level.
Finally, we focus on the at-home APA scheme and leave aside the elderly who reside in in-
stitution (about 40% of the disabled elderly nationwide). In France, the elderly and their fam-
ily are free to choose whether they want to stay home or enter a nursing home; depending
44Loi 2016–1917 du 29 décembre 2016 de finances pour 2017.
45The assessment of the progressivity of the mix of taxes that fund APA spending would require a careful
analysis. Yet the fact that some of these taxes are regressive may prevent overall funding from being progressive.
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on their choice, their disability group and APA benefit are assessed either within the at-home
APA program or within the in-institution scheme. Given this peculiarity and the differences
in co-payments across living arrangements, we expect the decision to stay in the commu-
nity to depend on socio-economic status. There is however little ground to predict how this
would affect our conclusions in terms of equity.
7.2 Concluding remarks
This paper provides an exploratory study of the distribution of the use of home care and
OOP payments across the income distribution and disability levels, for the disabled elderly
benefiting from the French APA program. Our original data allow us to document the use
of unsubsidized home care by APA beneficiaries and the full OOP payments that they incur,
once the local decision regarding the computation rules of APA benefits and the unsubsi-
dized care use are taken into account. In addition to these descriptive results, we assess
whether equity in home care use and equity in the contributions made to the scheme are
achieved within the at-home APA policy, based on egalitarian normative stances. As a last
step, we dig into the “anatomy of APA” to propose a simulation of the 2016 reform of the
scheme and compare inequalities in the use of formal care and in the OOP payments before
and after the reform.
We predict that the 2016 APA reform would increase home care consumption across all
disability groups and income levels. Effects on total OOP payments are more ambiguous:
those may actually increase in the bottom of the income distribution, due to a strong pre-
dicted increase in home care use. Some limited income-related horizontal inequity in use
was detected prior to the reform and should keep holding afterwards. Vertical inequity in
OOP financing is even predicted to accentuate with the reform. On the other hand, we pre-
dict that the reform-induced increase in home care use will be all the higher as disability
is more severe. Assuming there was vertical inequity in home care use prior to 2016, the
reform should decrease it. OOP payments are predicted to decrease substantially for the
most severely disabled, meaning that the reform should increase the degree of coverage of
the financial risk associated not only with old-age disability, but also with the most severe
functional losses, provided individuals are able to stay in the community.
Given the limitations of our data, we remain cautious about the scope of our conclusions.
The opportunity to replicate the analysis on more comprehensive data should be considered.
The upcoming release of a new survey on disability and LTC use by the 60+ living either in the
community or in institution by the French Ministry of Health should open the way for a more
comprehensive analysis.46 The data were collected a few months before the 2016 reform was
46The CARE survey, which is expected to be made available in 2018, will contain information on income and
publicly-financed home care use matched from administrative sources.
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enacted. As no follow-up wave is scheduled, only an ex ante evaluation of the reform can
be considered. Another option would be to use the individual-level administrative registers
of APA beneficiaries that the Ministry of Health intends to collect. The data would cover all
French APA beneficiaries in 2017 and the APA subsidies they have received over the previous
years. A mandate for improved collection of individual-level information relating to the APA
and other LTC schemes was enacted by the 2016 APA reform. However, such data will only
contain information on APA-subsidized care; we will have to rely on assumptions on the
consumption of unsubsidized care if we are to assess the effects of the reform on the full LTC
use and OOP payments.
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Appendix
3.A Data issues
3.A.1 Imputation of the administrative disability group
As explained in Section 3.3, reported disability group (GIR) is found to be inconsistent
with the values of national ceilings for a number of observations. We adjust the GIR following
the rule described in Section 3.3. There may however remain measurement errors on the
GIR.
There are theoretically two reasons for that. First, within a given reported disability
group, we have no way to detect whether individuals with a relatively small care plan vol-
ume (relative to the national ceiling corresponding to this disability level) have their GIR
correctly coded. However, if an APA beneficiary is granted a re-assessment of the adminis-
trative disability group, this is generally because the care plan volume cannot be adjusted
upwards sufficiently without hitting her initial GIR-specific ceiling.
The second reason for which we might fail to adjust upward the disability level is that
we have to refer to the 2014 values of the national ceilings. Yet the national ceilings that are
binding for a given beneficiary are those who were in place when her needs assessment was
last conducted.47 Imagine the case of an individual who is recorded as a GIR 2, while her
most recent need assessment would place her in GIR 1 (most severe disability level). The
monetary value of her care plan volume (correctly recorded in the data) is supposed to be
e1,110. Say the reassessment was done in 2012, so that the maximum value for a care plan
of GIR 2 that year was e1,104. As we refer to the value of 2014 (which indicates a maximum
ofe1,125), we fail to detect that this individual is actually a GIR 1. Again, we believe that this
issue is practically negligible: re-assessment of needs are meant to be conducted every two
years, and the two-year difference in the value of national ceilings is less thane25.
3.A.2 Imputation of income
As explained in Section 3.3, the income of APA beneficiaries is not directly recorded in the
provider’s files. However, we know the APA legal co-payment rate for each APA beneficiary;
we thus use the APA co-payment schedule to impute individual income.
The co-payment rate is linearly increasing with income, with lower and upper bounds.
For the 11% individuals who have a co-payment of zero, we only know their monthly income
47The values of national ceilings are reassessed yearly following the value of a disability benefit called MTP.
See Appendix 3.C for further explanation.
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is of or below e738, which is a value almost equal to the equivalized minimum living al-
lowance for the elderly. In our sample, there are 5 individuals with a co-payment of 90%, for
which we only know their income is equal or greater thane2,945. We impute them this value
for income: given the low number of APA beneficiaries with the maximum co-payment, the
expected measurement error should have little impact on our results.
The coefficient that relates the (unobserved) income to the (observed) co-payment rate
depends on the year the co-payment was last computed.48 As we do not have this infor-
mation, we use the coefficient that was used when the individual joined the service. This
uncertainty may cause some — limited — upward measurement error on income.
In our empirical analysis, we only group individuals by their income quintile, and do not
rank them one by one: there is then no uncertainty about the fact that the 11% of individuals
with a zero co-payment rate are in the bottom income quintile, and that the 5 individuals
with a 90% co-payment belong to the top quintile.
When computing the effort rates (ratio of OOP payments on income), we should keep in
mind that they may be under-estimated in the bottom income quintile.
What we impute is the individual income definition used by the Departmental Councils
to compute their financial participation to APA beneficiaries’ costs of LTC. Following the APA
legislation, they have to use the equivalized “spousal” income: it is equal either to the indi-
vidual income for individuals who are single, or the sum of the income of the two spouses, if
the beneficiary is living with a partner, that is divded by 1.7.
This scaling implicitly uses the Oxford scale (also called “old-OECD scale”) for equiv-
alence units (OECD, 2013b). Compared to the OECD-modified scale, which is often used
in France, the old-OECD scale integrates a lesser degree of economies of scale within the
couple. If the spouse of the beneficiary is alive but lives in a nursing home, the household
income is divided by 2, reflecting the little scope for economies of scale.
48See Appendix 3.C for further explanation.
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3.A.3 Sensitivity analysis: relative value of weekend hours
Hours of care provided on a weekday are not charged the same price by the provider as
hours of care provided on a weekend or working holiday. Consistently, when converting the
care plan volume into its monetary equivalent, the Departmental Council does not take the
same unit price to value weekday hours and weekend hours.
When measuring home care use, it is not conceptually clear whether we should weigh
the hours received by their monetary value. On the one hand, individuals with activity re-
strictions may value assistance they receive the same whatever the day they receive it. On the
other hand, being prescribed care on weekends may reflect the fact that care consumption is
not easily inter-temporally substitutable. Then, compared to individuals that are not being
prescribed hours on weekends, individuals who have weekend hours in their care plan may
attribute a higher value to these hours as they were not reallocated to weekdays.
In the baseline analysis, we weigh equally weekday and weekend hours, thereby implic-
itly considered they are homogeneous goods. As a sensitivity analysis, we weigh both the
hours prescribed in the care plan and the hours actually consumed by the relative provider
price of weekend and weekday hours. The provider charges a price 30% higher for weekend
hours. Then, for an individual with h̄wd hours of care prescribed on weekdays and h̄we hours
of care prescribed on weekends, the weighted care plan volume is equal to h̄wd +1.3∗ h̄we .
Similarly, for an individual with hwd hours of care actually consumed on weekdays and hwe
hours of care consumed on weekends, the weighted consumption is equal to hwd +1.3∗hwe .
The results of our analysis are invariant to the inclusion of the weights. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that only 12.7% (resp. 12.2%) of the beneficiaries have weekend hours
prescribed (resp. consumed), representing 1.5% of the care plan volume (resp. 1.2% of total
consumption).
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3.B Complementary results on the pre-reform situation
3.B.1 Distribution of care use, OOP payments and effort rates in the pre-
reform situation
Figure 3.B.1 – Distribution of home care use by disability group and income quintile (pre-
reform situation).
Panel A (top): Use by income quintile.
Panel B (bottom): Use by disability level.
NOTES: APA beneficiaries customers of the anonymous home care provider in October
2014 (N= 1,616). Use is expressed in hours (weekday and weekend) consumed in the
month. The dashed horizontal line represents the sample average of home care use. In
the bottom Panel, we group together beneficiaries of GIR 1 and GIR 2 given the low num-
ber of individuals in GIR 1 (N=22).
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Reading: there are five horizontal segments defining each box plot. The second, third and
fourth segments respectively indicate the lower quartile, the median and the upper quartile
of the distribution of the variable. The lower segment indicates either the minimum value
taken by the variable, or the difference between the lower quartile and 2/3 of the interquartile
range if it is higher than the minimum. Similarly, the upper segment indicates either the
maximum, or the sum of the upper quartile and 2/3 of the interquartile range if it is lower
than the maximum. The dots indicate outlying values (such that there are more than 2/3 of
the interquartile range away from either the lower or the upper quartile).
Figure 3.B.2 – Distribution of OOP payments by disability group and income quintile (pre-
reform situation).
Panel A (top): OOP payments by income quintile.
Panel B (bottom): OOP payments by disability level.
NOTES: APA beneficiaries customers of the anonymous home care provider in October
2014 (N= 1,616). OOP payments are expressed in euros per month. The dashed hori-
zontal line represents the sample average of OOP payments. In the bottom Panel, we
group together beneficiaries of GIR 1 and GIR 2 given the low number of individuals in
GIR 1 (N=22). For better readability, we exclude from the graph 2 individuals whose OOP
payments exceede1,200.
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Figure 3.B.3 – Distribution of effort rate by disability group and income quintile (pre-reform
situation).
Panel A (top): Effort rate by income quintile.
Panel B (bottom): Effort rate by disability level.
NOTES: APA beneficiaries customers of the anonymous home care provider in October
2014 (N= 1,616). The effort rate equals OOP payments divided by income. The dashed
horizontal line represents the sample average of the effort rate. In the bottom Panel, we
group together beneficiaries of GIR 1 and GIR 2 given the low number of individuals in
GIR 1 (N=22). For better readability, we exclude from the graph 2 individuals whose effort
rate exceeds 80%.
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3.B.2 Regression results
Table 3.B.1 – OLS regression of home care use on income quintiles and disability groups (test
for income-related horizontal inequity in use).
Outcome: home care use
Pre-reform Post-reform
Income quintile: 1 -2.228 -3.491∗
(1.755) (1.961)
Income quintile: 2 -1.905 -2.295
(1.780) (1.988)
Income quintile: 3 Ref. Ref.
Income quintile: 4 -3.883∗∗ -4.336∗∗
(1.772) (1.979)
Income quintile: 5 -1.006 -2.310
(1.755) (1.961)
Disability group (GIR): 1 34.917∗∗∗ 39.081∗∗∗
(3.308) (3.695)
Disability group (GIR): 2 12.392∗∗∗ 13.797∗∗∗
(2.317) (2.588)
Disability group (GIR): 3 Ref. Ref.
Disability group (GIR): 4 -17.390∗∗∗ -19.592∗∗∗
(1.396) (1.559)
Interacted term: GIR 1 × Income quintile 1 -0.819 -2.367
(4.126) (4.608)
Interacted term: GIR 1 × Income quintile 2 -5.595 -7.709
(5.572) (6.223)
Interacted term: GIR 1 × Income quintile 4 3.977 5.298
(4.661) (5.206)
Interacted term: GIR 1 × Income quintile 5 0.819 -0.003
(4.655) (5.199)
Interacted term: GIR 2 × Income quintile 1 2.123 1.529
(3.060) (3.417)
Interacted term: GIR 2 × Income quintile 2 0.369 0.405
(3.023) (3.376)
Interacted term: GIR 2 × Income quintile 4 4.386 4.588
(3.199) (3.573)
Interacted term: GIR 2 × Income quintile 5 -0.544 -1.083
(3.046) (3.402)
Interacted term: GIR 4 × Income quintile 1 3.416∗ 4.900∗∗
(1.926) (2.151)
Interacted term: GIR 4 × Income quintile 2 2.703 3.393
(1.944) (2.171)
Interacted term: GIR 4 × Income quintile 4 4.531∗∗ 5.002∗∗
(1.934) (2.161)
Interacted term: GIR 4 × Income quintile 5 2.094 2.911
(1.923) (2.147)
Constant 30.083∗∗∗ 34.047∗∗∗
(1.285) (1.436)
Observations 1616 1616
R2 0.644 0.636
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
232
EQUITY IN THE APA SCHEME
3.C The APA scheme and the 2016 reform: Additional infor-
mation
3.C.1. APA disability groups and national ceilings before 2016
To be eligible for APA, individuals must be assessed as belonging to the administrative
group (GIR) 1, 2, 3 or 4. GIRs and the corresponding grid (AGGIR) are a French specificity.
Here is a brief description of the profiles of the different eligible groups:
• Beneficiaries in GIR 1 (most severe disability) are individuals who lost their cognitive,
physical and social autonomy. They absolutely require constant supervision;
• Beneficiaries in GIR 2 require assistance in most of the activities of daily living and are
of two types. They can be either individuals with deteriorated cognitive functions but
with good mobility; or individuals that are bedridden but with satisfactory intellectual
functioning;
• Beneficiaries in GIR 3 have good cognitive capacities, partial mobility and require as-
sistance for personal care several times a day;
• Beneficiaries in GIR 4 (least severe disability, among eligible categories) are of two
types. They can be either individuals who need assistance to get up from their bed, but
that can then move around their house without assistance, while requiring punctual
assistance with grooming and dressing. Or they can be individuals with no mobility
limitations but who require assistance with personal care and for meal preparation.
In 2014, the monthly ceiling for the most severe disability group was ofe1,312. Depend-
ing on the price of care, this amount would pay for 13 to 26 hours per week of a combination
of personal care, domestic help and assistance with other ADLs/IADLs (Couvert, 2017). This
can be compared with the (non-binding) ceiling of 50 hours a week set on the combination
of personal care and individual guidance in the Dutch public LTC insurance for home care
recipients (Tenand et al., 2018) [Chapter 4 of this thesis], which can be complemented by
domestic help provided by the municipalities.
For individuals in GIR 2, the number of hours of care that can be subsidized by APA is
capped at around 22 hours a week; this figure is of 17 and 11 hours a week for beneficiaries
in GIR 3 and GIR 4 respectively.
233
CHAPTER 3
3.C.2 Computation rule of the APA hourly subsidy and transfer
The amount of APA transfer of a given beneficiary is equal to the APA hourly subsidy times
the number of hours of care she effectively consumed up to care plan volume. To derive the
individual APA hourly subsidy for each APA hour of care, each Departmental Council can
choose the tariff to which apply the national APA co-payment schedule. In the department
we study, the Departmental Council does not apply the APA co-payment rate to the price
charged by the provider, but to a lump-sum tariff. The APA hourly subsidy is thus equal to:
si = (1− ci )t
where ci is the legal APA co-payment rate (set at the national level) and t is the lump-sum
tariff set by the Departmental Council.49
Before the 2016 reform, the legal co-payment rate ci was a simple function of the monthly
equivalized household income Ii :
ci =

0 if Ii ≤ 0.67MTPi
0.9Ii
2MTPi
0.67MTPi < Ii < 2.67MTPi
0.9 if Ii ≥ 2.67MTPi
where MTP stands for Majoration pour tierce-personne, which is a disability benefit
whose value is reassessed every year nationally (equal to e1,107 in April 2017). In the
formula, MTP is indexed by i : the value of the MTP to be applied will be the one in the year
the individual’s situation was (last) assessed.50
The individual APA transfer will be equal to an hourly APA subsidy times the number of
hours of care that are effectively consumed, up to the volume defined by the individual care
plan. APA does not provide a monetary transfer: it is an in-kind benefit.
3.C.3 Computation of out-of-pocket payments
From the beneficiary’s point of view, the hourly price that APA beneficiary i has to pay
out-of-pocket (called her consumer price, CPi ) on the subsidized hours she consumes51 is
then equal to:
CPi = pi − si
= (ci t )+ (pi − t )
49For the sake of simplicity, we disregard for now the distinction made between weekend and weekday hours
of home care, which are priced and reimbursed at different rates.
50Legally, Departmental Councils should regularly — maximum every 2 years — reassess the situation of APA
beneficiaries. In practice, there is local variation in the regularity of reassessments. MTP varying by a few euros
from one year to another, this has limited implications on c at the individual level.
51This is the subsidized price, p s , we referred to in Section 2.2.
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where pi is the price charged by the service to individual i .
Next, for hours that are consumed beyond the care plan volume and do not benefit from
a home care subsidy, the consumer price simply equals the provider price:
CPi = pi
Finally, we derive total OOP payments for APA beneficiary i as:
OOPi =
{ (
(ci t )+ (pi − t )
)
hi if hi ≤ h̄i(
(ci t )+ (pi − t )
)
h̄i +pi (hi − h̄i ) if hi > h̄i
The APA-subsidized consumer price can be decomposed in two parts: (ci t ) is the OOP
payment associated with the APA co-payment rate, and (pi − t ) can be seen as an hourly
surcharge (independent from income). The out-of-pocket price of care on APA-subsidized
hours is higher than what it would be if the Departmental Council applied the APA co-
payment rate to the provider price. Indeed, as the home care provider our data come from
charges prices that are strictly higher than the lump-sum tariffs set by the Departmental
Council (t < pi ), we have:
ci t + (pi − t ) = pi − (1− ci )t > pi − (1− ci )pi = cpi
The effective co-payment rate on every hour of care is thus:
OOPi /pi = 1− (1− ci )t/pi
We have disregarded here the difference between weekend and weekday hours. In prac-
tice however, the APA-subsidized price is computed separately for the two types of care,
given that the two types of hours are not priced the same and cannot be traded off. OOP
payments are then the sum of the OOP payments incurred on weekend hours and of the
OOP payments incurred on weekday hours.
3.C.4 The 2016 APA reform
Regarding the APA scheme for individuals living in the community, the reform imple-
mented in 2016 introduced the following changes:
1. The national ceilings on the care plan volume were increased, more so for more severe
disability groups;
2. The lower income threshold was raised by 8%, to allow more low-income beneficiaries to
benefit from the zero APA co-payment rate;
3. The APA co-payment schedule was substantially modified:
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• Overall, it was made more generous: every beneficiary experienced a decrease or no
change to her APA co-payment rate;
• The decrease in the APA legal co-payment rate was higher for individuals in the mid-
dle of the income distribution.
• While before the reform, the APA co-payment rate would depend only on income, it
now depends on the disability level: the higher the care plan volume, the lower the
APA co-payment rate.
Table 3.C.1 – APA care plans: National ceilings, by disability group.
GIR 1 GIR 2 GIR 3 GIR 4
Pre-reform ceilings (April, 1st 2015) e1,312.67 e1,125.14 e843.86 e562.57
Post-reform ceilings (April, 1st 2016) e1,714.80 e1,376.92 e994.87 e857.40
Increase due to the reform +31% +22% +18% +18%
NOTES: Ceilings are expressed in euros per month. The GIR corresponds to the administrative disability group
(GIR 1 being the group of the most severely disabled beneficiaries).
The co-payment schedule since the 2016 reform
The formula of the co-payment rate ci is now much more complex. It depends on the
care plan volume h̄i and is defined as Pi /h̄i , where Pi is computed as:
1. If h̄i < s1 :
Pi = 0.9∆0i h̄i
2. If h̄i ∈ [s1, s2[ :
Pi = 0.9∆0i
(
s1 +∆1i (h̄i − s1)
)
3. If h̄i ≥ s2 :
Pi = 0.9∆0i
(
s1 +∆1i (s2 − s1)+∆2i (h̄i − s2)
)
with:
• s1 = 0.317×MTPi
• s2 = 0.498×MTPi
• Ii n f = 0.725×MTPi
• Isup = 2.67×MTPi
• ∆0i =
Ii−Ii n f
Isup−Ii n f
• ∆1i =∆0i +0.4
Isup−Ii
Isup−Ii n f
• ∆2i =∆0i +0.2
Isup−Ii
Isup−Ii n f
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As it was already the case before the reform:
• ci = 0 if Ii ≤ Ii n f ;
• ci = 0.9 if Ii ≥ Isup .
The changes in the co-payment schedule induced by a reform: an illustration
We illustrate how the reform has affected the co-payment rate for different profiles of
beneficiaries, depending on their income and care plan.
Figure 3.C.1 (resp. 3.C.2) shows the pre- and post-reform co-payment rate (the change in
the co-payment rate induced by the reform) for beneficiaries with 3 different values of the
care plan, as a function of the beneficiary’s income:
• Beneficiaries with a “small care plan” have a care plan equal to 0.3 MTP, or aboute300 per
month. The median value of care plans for beneficiaries in GIR 4 in 2011 was ofe345.52
• Beneficiaries with a “medium care plan” have a care plan equal to 0.4 MTP, or aboute441
per month. This is a value close to the 3rd quartile of the distribution of the values of care
plans for beneficiaries in GIR 4 and the 1st quartile for beneficiaries in GIR 3.
• Beneficiaries with a “high care plan” have a care plan equal to 1.1 MTP, or about e1,215
per month (this is the median care plan value for individuals in GIR 1). As a reminder, the
national ceiling for individuals in GIR 1 before the reform was of 1.19 MTP; it is now of
1.553 MTP.
For those beneficiaries with a post-reform care plan set beyond the pre-reform value of
the national ceiling in GIR 1 (equal to 1.33MTP), the decrease in the APA co-payment rate
will be especially marked: it will equal the weighted sum of the decrease in the co-payment
rate on the hours below the pre-reform national ceiling for GIR 1 (-0.15 pp at maximum) and
of the decrease in the co-payment rate on the hours beyond this value (the co-payment rate
will go from 1 to about 0.35 for an individual with an income close to the 6th decile of the
income distribution).
[Figures 3.C.1 and 3.C.2 are displayed on the following page.]
52We retrieve information on the distribution of care plan volumes in the French population of APA benefi-
ciaries thanks to a dataset from 2011 called “Remontées individuelles APA”. We only take into account the care
plans including human care only. See Couvert (2017) and the figures provided with this publication.
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Figure 3.C.1 – APA co-payment rate, before and after the 2016 reform, depending on income
NOTES: Income is equal to the monthly equivalized household income and is expressed in eu-
ros. The three vertical dotted lines respectively indicate the pre- and post-reform lower income
thresholds and the upper income threshold in the APA co-payment schedule. The vertical dot-
ted line indicates the median taxable income per consumption unit of fiscal units whose head
is 75 years or older (2013 value, Insee et al. (2013)).
Figure 3.C.2 – Change in the APA co-payment rate induced by the 2016 reform, depending
on income.
NOTES: Income is equal to the monthly equivalized household income and is expressed in eu-
ros. The three vertical dotted lines respectively indicate the pre- and post-reform lower income
thresholds and the upper income threshold in the APA co-payment schedule. The vertical dot-
ted line indicates the median taxable income per consumption unit of fiscal units whose head
is 75 years or older (2013 value, Insee et al. (2013)).
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Figure 3.C.3 (3.C.4) shows the pre- and post-reform co-payment rate (the change in the
co-payment rate induced by the reform) for beneficiaries with 3 different values of income,
as a function of their care plan value:53
• 2nd income decile: e1,120 a month;
• 4th income decile: e1,450 a month;
• 7th income decile: e2,100 a month;.
Below a care plan value equal to 0.317MTP (which is close to the median care plan value
for beneficiaries in GIR 4), the decrease in the co-payment rate induded by the reform is
limited, whatever the income level. This reflects the reform’s ambition to target beneficiaries
with moderate to severe disability.
[Figures 3.C.1 and 3.C.2 are displayed on the following page.]
53We refer to the distribution of the taxable income per consumption unit of fiscal units whose head is 75
years or older (2013 value, Insee et al. (2013)).
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Figure 3.C.3 – APA co-payment rate, before and after the 2016 reform, depending on the care
plan.
NOTES: The care plan is expressed in euros per month. The two vertical dotted lines to the right
respectively indicate the national ceiling for GIR 1, before and after the reform. The vertical
dotted line to the left indicates the value of 0.317MTP.
Figure 3.C.4 – Change in the APA co-payment rate induced by the 2016 reform, depending
on the care plan.
NOTES: The care plan is expressed in euros per month. The two vertical dotted lines to the right
respectively indicate the national ceiling for GIR 1, before and after the reform. The vertical
dotted line to the left indicates the value of 0.317MTP.
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3.D Simulation of post-reform home care consumption
3.D.1 Assumptions
Our simulation is based on a range of assumptions, regarding the way evaluation teams
are predicted to adjust the care plan volume following the reform and the behavioral
reactions of APA beneficiaries.
Assumptions made on the change in the care plan volume.
The reform increased the legal ceilings specific to each administrative disability group by
31% (GIR 1), 22% (GIR 2) or 18% (GIR 3 and 4). Following the reform, the evaluation teams of
the Departmental Councils are supposed to progressively proceed to a new need assessment
for every APA beneficiary. The objective of the reform is to allow APA beneficiaries to be
granted higher care plan volumes, but the actual change in care plan volumes will eventually
depend on the decisions of the departmental evaluation teams.
There are little empirical elements to predict whether evaluations teams will increase
care plan volumes more for certain types of beneficiaries. We thus assume that the care plan
volume of the beneficiaries of a given GIR will increase by the same factor as the GIR-specific
legal ceiling increased.
Assumptions on behavioral responses of APA beneficiaries to changes in price and vir-
tual income
1. We use the values of price and income elasticities of professional home care obtained
by Roquebert and Tenand (2017) [Chapter 2 of this thesis] (price elasticity of −0.4 and
income elasticity of 0.4).
2. The income and own-price elasticities of the marshallian demand for weekday and
weekend care are constant. A value for the income elasticity of the demand for care
is needed because some individuals may experience a change in their virtual income
(Moffitt, 1990), in addition to or without a change in the marginal price of care;
3. The price and income elasticities are the same for weekday and weekend hours of care;
4. The cross-price elasticity between weekday and weekend care consumption is zero;
5. For the sake of simplicity, our simulation does not integrate the fact that the price and
income elasticities taken from Roquebert and Tenand (2017) [Chapter 2 of this thesis]
and used in the simulation are only point estimates, whose confidence intervals are
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relatively large. Ideally, inference at the simulation stage should reflect the uncertainty
surrounding the true values of the behavioral reactions of APA beneficiaries.
6. We consider the unit price of care to be the OOP price the individual has to pay to
buy an additional hour of care, given her pre-reform consumption. We neglect the fact
that, for individuals close (from the left) to their pre-reform or post-reform care plan
volumes, the marginal price of some hours of care may turn out to be different if they
“cross” the threshold following the reform. Theoretically, this means that individuals
who were consuming slightly below their care plan volume are assigned a smaller price
decrease than what they are exposed to if they actually end up consuming beyond their
care plan volume. Playing in the opposite direction is the fact that we should then
factor in the decrease in their virtual income.
Relatively few individuals consume slightly below their care plan volume in the pre-
reform period: consistent with the existence of a concave kink in the budget constraint,
there is substantial bunching at the kink for weekday hours (Saez (2010); cf. Figure
3.D.2). With that respect, our simplifying simulation assumption should lead to under-
estimate the actual OOP price decrease for a limited number of beneficiaries.54
On the other hand, our simulation method does not allow to fully integrate the non-
linearity of the post-reform budget constraint of APA beneficiaries. This may lead to
over-estimate the adjustment in consumption in some cases.55 Figure 3.D.2 (Panel B)
indeed suggests that our simulated data over-estimate the share of individuals con-
suming more than their post-reform care plan volumes.
A more sophisticated simulation technique (e.g. that relies on a calibration of indi-
vidual preferences) may be warranted given the kink in the budget constraint of APA
beneficiaries.
54Given that home care provision is organized on a weekly basis, APA beneficiaries may have an imperfect
control over their monthly consumption of home care (Fontaine and Gramain, 2017). Another simulation op-
tion would then be to consider that individuals who locate sufficiently close to their kink in the 2014 data would
actually react as if they were consuming their care plan volume.
55Think about the case of a beneficiary who was consuming more than her pre-reform care plan volume in
2014; thanks to the reform-induced increased in her care plan, she will experience a strong decrease in her
marginal OOP price of care. But if her pre-reform consumption was actually fairly close to her post-reform care
plan, the consumer theory leads to predict that she has a high probability to optimally consume no more than
her post-reform care plan volume after the reform.
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3.D.2 The budget constraint of APA beneficiaries: pre- and post-reform sit-
uations
Table 3.D.1 – Budget constraint and home care consumption with APA: Notations
Pre-reform Post-reform
Pre- & and post-reform
Parameters of the budget constraint
Equivalized income I
Legal co-payment rate c0 c1
Hourly price of weekday care pA
Hourly price of weekend care pB
Hourly departmental tariff of weekday care tA
Hourly departmental of weekend care tB
Care plan volume for weekday hours h̄0A h̄
1
A
Care plan volume for weekend hours h̄0B h̄
1
B
Composite good Y
Individual consumption of home care
Consumption of home care during weekdays h0A h
1
A
Consumption of home care during weekends h0B h
1
B
For the APA beneficiaries in our sample, the pre-reform budget constraint can be written
as follows: 
I = (c0tA + (pA − tA))h0A
+ (c0tB + (pB − tB))h0B +Y if h0A ≤ h̄0A,h0B ≤ h̄0B
I = (c0tA + (pA − tA))h̄0A +pA(h0A − h̄0A)
+ (c0tB + (pB − tB))h0B +Y if h0A > h̄0A,h0A ≤ h̄0A
I = (c0tA + (pA − tA))h0A
+ (c0tB + (pB − tB))h̄0B +pB(h0B − h̄0B)+Y if h0A ≤ h̄0A,h0B > h̄0B
I = (c0tA + (pA − tA))h̄0A +pA(h0A − h̄0A)
+ (c0tB + (pB − tB))h̄0B +pB(h0B − h̄0B)+Y if h0A > h̄0A,h0B > h̄0B
To have a graphical representation of the budget constraint and anticipate the impact of
the APA reform on it, it is more convenient to rewrite the budget constraint in terms of virtual
income (Moffitt, 1990) rather than of monetary income. The previous system is equivalent
to:
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
I = (c0tA + (pA − tA))h0A
+ (c0tB + (pB − tB))h0B +Y if h0A ≤ h̄0A,h0B ≤ h̄0B
I+ (1− c0)tAh̄0A = pAh0A
+ (c0tB + (pB − tB))h0B +Y if h0A > h̄0A,h0A ≤ h̄0A
I+ (1− c0)tBh̄0B =
(
c0tA + (pA − tA)
)
h0A
+ pBh0B +Y if h0A ≤ h̄0A,h0B > h̄0B
I+ (1− c0)(tAh̄0A + tBh̄0B)= pAh0A
+ pBh0B +Y if h0A > h̄0A,h0B > h̄0B
Similarly, the post-reform budget constraint writes:
I = (c1tA + (pA − tA))h1A
+ (c1tB + (pB − tB))h1B +Y if h1A ≤ h̄1A,h1B ≤ h̄1B
I+ (1− c1)tAh̄1A = pAh1A
+ (c1tB + (pB − tB))h1B +Y if h1A > h̄1A,h1A ≤ h̄1A
I+ (1− cv )tBh̄1B =
(
c1tA + (pA − tA)
)
h1A
+ pBh1B +Y if h1A ≤ h̄1A,h1B > h̄1B
I+ (1− c1)(tAh̄1A + tBh̄1B)= pAh1A
+ pBh1B +Y if h1A > h̄1A,h1B > h̄1B
Depending on the pre-reform care plan volume and consumption and on her income, a
given APA beneficiary will be subject to a more or less important decrease in her co-payment
rate, and thus in the marginal price of home care. In addition, if she was consuming more
than her care plan volume, she will experience an income effect induced by the fact that the
subsidies perceived on hours included in the care plan increased.
To illustrate the effects, suppose there is only one type of care provided (weekday hours).
We can represent the pre- and post-reform budget constraints in a 2-dimensional figure (Fig-
ure 3.D.1), with the horizontal axis displaying the consumption of care and the vertical axis
the consumption of the composite good. The black lines illustrate the pre-reform situation,
while the gray lines refer to the post-reform situation. Both budget constraints are kinked,
but the kink moves to the right with the reform if the care plan volume is adjusted upward
(h̄1A > h̄0A). For each hour of care up to h̄0A, the OOP price decreases because of the decrease
in the legal co-payment rate (c1 < c0). Moreover, the price of each hour consumed between
h̄0A and h̄
1
A also decreases, from pA to
(
c1tA+(pA−tA)
)
, because of the increase in the number
of hours entitled to a subsidy.
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Figure 3.D.1 – Budget constraint of APA beneficiaries: pre- and post-reform
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The price and income effects induced by the reform will ultimately depend on the initial
position of the beneficiary on the pre-reform budget constraint. If she was consuming less
than her care plan volume (h0A < h̄1A), she will only experience the decrease in her marginal
price of care. If she was consuming more than her pre-reform care plan volume, but less than
her post-reform care plan volume, (h0A ≥ h̄0A and h0A < h̄0A ), she will also experience a decrease
in her marginal price of care, of a higher magnitude, and a decrease in her virtual income.
Finally, if the beneficiary was consuming more than her post-reform care plan volume, she
will experience no change in her marginal price of care, but an increase in her virtual income
(from I+ (1− c0)pAh̄0A to I+ (1− c1)pAh̄1A).
Integrating now the difference between the care received in the weekdays and weekend
care, we have 3 × 3 groups of beneficiaries who will experience different combinations of
price and income effects. The groups and their size are displayed in Table 3.D.2.
Table 3.D.2 – Simulation of post-reform home care consumption: The different cases
h0A < h̄0A h0A ≥ h̄0A &
h0A < h̄1A
h0A > h̄1A Total
h0B < h̄0B N=61 (3.7%) N=46 (2.9%) N=11 (0.6%) N= 118 (7.3%)
h0B ≥ h̄0B & h0B < h̄1B N=18 (1.1%) N=53 (3.2%) N=8 (0.5%) N= 79 (4.8%)
h0B > h̄1B N=610 (37.7%) N=736 (45.5%) N=73 (4.5%) N=1,419 (87.8%)
Total N=689 (42.6%) N=835 (51.6%) N= 92 (5.6%) N=1,616 (100%)
NOTES: The subscript A (B) stands for weekday (weekend) hours.
NOTES: 51.6% of the sample were consuming in 2014 a volume of care higher than their pre-reform care plan
volume but lower than their post-reform care plan volume.
A simple parametric illustration
Assuming APA beneficiaries maximize preferences defined over their home care con-
sumption and the composite good, the optimal levels of home care consumption for an APA
beneficiary in the pre-reform and post-reform situations could be characterized in terms of
the marginal rate of substitution between home care and the composite goods, and of the
parameters of the budget constraint. Nonetheless, the kinked budget constraint makes the
comparative statics complex.56 We propose to assume a simple functional form for the util-
ity function of APA beneficiaries and highlight different cases. For the sake of simplicity, we
consider only one type of home care (either care provided on weekdays or care provided on
weekends) and forgo the subscript A and B.
Assume the utility function of APA beneficiaries is a Cobb-Douglas function:
U(h,Y) = hαY1−α
56Due to the kink, and the translation of the kink to the right, the demand function is not continuous. The
standard decomposition of a price change in an income effect and a substitution effect through the Slutsky
equation cannot be done.
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where 0 < α < 1 measures the relative preference for home care. Using the first order
conditions of the consumer’s optimization program and the fact that the budget constraint
is saturated (given the monotonicity of Cobb-Douglas-type preferences), we derive the home
care demand function:
h j∗ = αI/(c j t + (p − t )) if αI/(c j t + (p − t ))≤ h̄ j
h j∗ = α(I+ (1− c j )t h̄ j )/p if α(I+ (1− c j )t h̄ j )/p ≥ h̄ j
h j∗ = h̄ j if αI/(c j t + (p − t ))> h̄ j ,α(I+ (1− c j )t h̄ j )/p < h̄ j
where j = 0,1 designates the pre-reform or post-reform situation. The optimal consumption
level in the pre-reform situation depends on the beneficiary’s income and (associated) co-
payment rate, her care plan volume and her preferences.
Let us take the situation of a beneficiary with a monthly income of e1,300 (close to the
sample average). In the pre-reform situation, her co-payment rate is of 23%; the provider
charges her an hourly price ofe21 (the reimbursement tariff t is set toe17.59): she thus has
to paye7.4 out-of-pocket on each subsidized hour she consumes.
Table 3.D.3 displays the optimal consumption in the pre-reform and post-reform situa-
tions for this agent, depending on her relative preference for home care and her initial care
plan volume. Due to the reform, the decrease of the APA co-payment rate was much higher
for individuals with a more severe disability level: the 23% pre-reform co-payment rate went
down to 13% for individual (c), while the number of subsidized hours increased by 31%. Sub-
sequently, the increase in consumption for these individuals is predicted to be high (30%,
whatever the scenario on preferences).
Individuals of type (b), with moderate disability and a relatively weak preference for
home care are expected to adjust quite importantly their level of consumption: given that
the kink in the budget constraint for such individuals was quite low in the pre-reform situ-
ation, they found it optimal to consume no more than the number of hours for which they
would perceive a subsidy. It is mainly the increase of the care plan volume that leads them
to increase their care consumption, and not much the decrease in the co-payment rate on
subsidized hours. For individuals who were already consuming beyond their post-reform
care plan volume, the increase in consumption is predicted to be limited: the income effect
driving this increase is small given that both the decrease in the co-payment rate and the
increase in the number of hours that turn out to be subsidized are limited.
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Table 3.D.3 – Optimal consumption in the pre-reform and post-reform situations: Numerical
examples.
Preference Optimal home consumption (hours/month) Increase in
for home care (α) Pre-reform: h0∗ Post-reform h1∗ consumption
(a) Individual with h̄0 = 20 (pre-reform average) and h̄1 = 23.6; c1 = 18.1%
0.1 17.9 (< kink) 19.7 (< kink) +10%
0.2 20 (= kink) 23.6 (= kink) +18%
0.3 22.5 (> kink) 23.6 (= kink) +5%
0.4 30.0 (> kink) 31.2 (> kink) +4%
(b) Individual with h̄0 = 12 (pre-reform first quartile) and h̄1 = 14.2; c1 = 21.0%
0.1 12 (= kink) 14.2 (= kink) +18%
0.2 12 (= kink) 14.3 (< kink) +19%
0.3 20.9 (> kink) 21.3 (> kink) +2%
0.4 27.9 (> kink) 28.5 (> kink) +2%
(c) Individual with h̄0 = 39 (pre-reform top decile) and h̄1 = 51.1; c1 = 12.9%
0.1 17.4 (< kink) 22.8 (< kink) +31%
0.2 34.8 (< kink) 45.8 (< kink) +32%
0.3 39 (= kink) 51.1 (= kink) +31%
0.4 39 (= kink) 51.1 (= kink) +31%
NOTES: For the 3 cases displayed in this table, we have selected values for the pre-reform care plan
volume equal to the pre-reform average value of care plan volumes, the pre-reform first quartile and
the pre-reform top decile respectively. These 3 typical cases are meant to represent individuals with
respectively severe, moderate and very severe disability.
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Table 3.D.4 – Simulation of the change in marginal price of weekday hours
h0A < h̄0A h0A >= h̄0A & h0A < h̄1A h0A > h̄1A
h0B < h̄0B −(c
0−c1)tA
c0tA+(pA−tA)
−(1−c1)tA
pA
0
h0B >= h̄0B & h0B < h̄1B −(c
0−c1)tA
c0tA+(pA−tA)
−(1−c1)tA
pA
0
h0B > h̄1B −(c
0−c1)tA
c0tA+(pA−tA)
−(1−c1)tA
pA
0
Table 3.D.5 – Simulation of the change in marginal price of weekend hours
h0A < h̄0A h0A >= h̄0A & h0A < h̄1A h0A > h̄1A
h0B < h̄0B −(c
0−c1)tB
c0tB+(pB−tB)
−(c0−c1)tB
c0tB+(pB−tB)
−(c0−c1)tB
c0tB+(pB−tB)
h0B >= h̄0B & h0B < h̄1B −(1−c
1)tB
pB
−(1−c1)tB
pB
−(1−c1)tB
pB
h0B > h̄1B 0 0 0
Table 3.D.6 – Simulation of the change in virtual income
h0A < h̄0A h0A >= h̄0A & h0A < h̄1A h0A ≥ h̄1A
h0B < h̄0B 0
−(1−c0)tAh̄0A
I+(1−c0)tAh̄0A
tA
(
(1−c1)h̄1A−(1−c0)h̄0A
)
(I+(1−c0)tAh̄0A)
h0B >= h̄0B & h0B < h̄1B
−(1−c0)tBh̄0B
(I+(1−c0)tBh̄0B)
−(1−c0)(tAh̄0A+tBh̄0B)
I+(1−c0)(tAh̄0A+tBh̄0B)
tA
(
(1−c1)h̄1A−(1−c0)h̄0A
)
−(1−c0)tBh̄0B)
I+(1−c0)(tAh̄0A+tBh̄0B)
h0B ≥ h̄1B
tB
(
(1−c1)h̄1B−(1−c0)h̄0B
)
(I+(1−c0)tBh̄0B)
tB
(
(1−c1)h̄1B−(1−c0)h̄0B
)
−(1−c0)tAh̄0A)
I+(1−c0)(tAh̄0A+tBh̄0B)
tA
(
(1−c1)h̄1A−(1−c0)h̄0A
)
+tB
(
(1−c1)h̄1B−(1−c0)h̄0B
)
I+(1−c0)(tAh̄0A+tBh̄0B)
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3.D.3 Post-reform simulated home care consumption: Descriptive statis-
tics
Table 3.D.7 – Unsubsidized consumption by income and disability levels.
Share with unsubsidized use Average use of unsubsidized care
among those with unsubsidized care
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Differences across income quintiles
Income quintile: 1 0.276 0.511 2.4 1.4
[0.228,0.323] [0.456,0.565] [1.3,3.5] [0.9,1.8]
Income quintile: 2 0.245 0.542 2.5 1.3
[0.197,0.292] [0.487,0.596] [1.3,3.6] [0.9,1.7]
Income quintile: 3 0.217 0.533 3.1 1.4
[0.169,0.265] [0.478,0.587] [1.8,4.3] [1.0,1.9]
Income quintile: 4 0.263 0.548 2.4 1.1
[0.215,0.311] [0.494,0.602] [1.3,3.5] [0.7,1.6]
Income quintile: 5 0.302 0.420 4.8 2.3
[0.255,0.350] [0.365,0.474] [3.8,5.9] [1.8,2.8]
Panel B: Differences across disability groups
Disability group: 1 0.727 0.205 5.5 5.8
[0.603,0.852] [0.058,0.351] [3.7,7.3] [3.9,7.7]
Disability group: 2 0.522 0.343 4.5 3.9
[0.451,0.594] [0.259,0.427] [3.3,5.8] [3.1,4.7]
Disability group: 3 0.347 0.548 4.5 2.6
[0.294,0.399] [0.487,0.610] [3.4,5.5] [2.1,3.0]
Disability group: 4 0.196 0.533 1.8 1.0
[0.172,0.220] [0.505,0.561] [1.2,2.5] [0.8,1.2]
Observations 1616 1616 421 825
NOTES: APA beneficiaries customers of the anonymous home care provider in October 2014 (N= 1,616) and
simulated post-reform data. Care use is expressed in hours in the month. Beneficiaries with unsubsidized care
are those consuming beyond their care plan volume. 5% confidence intervals are displayed in brackets.
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Figure 3.D.2 – Bunching at the kink for weekday care use, before and after the reform.
Panel A (top): Bunching in the pre-reform situation
(observational data).
Panel B (bottom): Bunching in the post-reform situation
(simulated data).
NOTES: APA beneficiaries customers of the anonymous home care provider in October
2014 (N=1,616) and own simulations of post-reform use. Beneficiaries who locate at the
level of zero on the x-axis are individuals who consume exactly their care plan volume.
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Chapter 4
Long-term care use in the Netherlands:
Equal care for equal needs? An assessment
using administrative data
This chapter was co-authored with Pieter Bakx and Eddy van Doorslaer.
Summary of the chapter
The Netherlands stands out for offering a generous public coverage of long-term care (LTC)
services. This paper investigates whether individuals with similar “needs for LTC” receive the
same amount of services in the Netherlands, irrespective of their income. While most studies
of horizontal equity in care use rely on a statistically derived measure of needs, we use the
eligibility assessment made by the Dutch independent central LTC assessment agency as an
indicator of the legitimate needs for LTC. We exploit rich administrative data on the universe
of the individuals aged 60 or more eligible for public LTC in 2012 (N=616,934). We construct
measures LTC use and LTC needs as the monetary value of all institutional care and home
care services the individual used, or was entitled to, in 2012, which we match with individual
socio-economic and demographic information. We find substantial pro-poor concentration
of LTC use, only partially offset by poorer individuals having higher needs for LTC. When
eligible for institutional care, high-income individuals are more likely to use home care or
cash benefits than low-income beneficiaries. Among those eligible for home care, the rich
are also found to use less of additional care entitlements. Depending on the value judgment
we adopt, our results may be indicative of the Dutch public LTC insurance being overly “pro-
poor” or unduly unfavorable to the poor.
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1 Introduction
All developed countries have introduced some forms of social support for the disabled
elderly, yet we observe substantial cross-country variation in the resources devoted to LTC
policies: while, in 2014, public LTC spending represented less than 1% of GDP in Southern
Europe countries, it exceeded 3% in Nordic countries (OECD, 2017a). Demographics and
population health alone cannot explain these differences. Countries vary greatly in the way
LTC systems are organized, in the coverage they offer and in the financial participation that
is required from beneficiaries (Colombo et al., 2011; Muir, 2017). Despite the growing impor-
tance of LTC policies, the extent to which they achieve insurance against old-age disability
risk, affordability of LTC services and redistribution between different groups of the popu-
lation is still largely undocumented. In particular, there is limited evidence on whether LTC
systems achieve socioeconomic horizontal equity in LTC use, that is to say whether disabled
individuals with similar “needs” for assistance with activities of daily living receive equiva-
lent LTC services, irrespective of their socio-economic status.
The economic literature has produced a fair deal of theoretical and empirical assess-
ments of equity in the context of curative health care use and financing (Fleurbaey and
Schokkaert, 2011; van Doorslaer et al., 2000), which offer guidance for the empirical inves-
tigation of equity in LTC systems. In particular, many such studies have tested whether al-
location of care is made according to medical care needs in different OECD countries (see
e.g. van Doorslaer et al. (2006)). Although the justification and implications of the allocation
rule “to each according to her needs” in health care are controversial among economists,
this social justice principle turns out to be endorsed by most health care professionals and
European policy-makers (Culyer et al., 1992). That this principle of social justice is equally
endorsed for the allocation of LTC can be disputed. In many countries, public LTC support
takes the form of means-tested social assistance, although in some other countries compre-
hensive social insurance schemes have been implemented to cover old-age disability. What-
ever the policy objectives adopted in the different OECD countries, pinpointing inequalities
and potential inequity in the use of LTC services is important for the public debate. It seems
especially useful as the public opinion in Europe regularly expresses concerns about fairness
in the access to LTC services, and as many countries discuss potential reforms of their LTC
systems, either to broaden coverage or to curb increasing spending.
Our paper aims at documenting income-related inequalities and assessing potential hor-
izontal inequity in the use of LTC services in the Netherlands. From an international per-
spective, studying inequalities in the Dutch public LTC insurance is relevant for two reasons.
First, the Dutch system stands out as a model: with the second highest spending in terms of
GDP of all OECD countries (4.3% of GDP in 2014 (OECD, 2017a)), the Dutch LTC system is
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able to insure the elderly against catastrophic expenditures on home care and institutional
care (Mot, 2010; Schut et al., 2013; Bakx, Chernichovsky, Paolucci, Schokkaert, Trottmann,
Wasem and Schut, 2015). As a result of its overall generosity, the system is often perceived as
leaving little room for inequalities, as stated by Mot (2010) (p. 66): “While the system in the
Netherlands is not completely egalitarian, it is not too far from it”.1 Yet empirical evidence
is scarce and focuses on regional disparities. Given the large investment of resources made
by the Netherlands in its LTC policies, it is critical to assess to what extent LTC is indeed
allocated according to needs.2
Secondly, another distinctive feature of the Netherlands is the quality of available data
on eligibility for and use of LTC services. In this paper, we exploit exhaustive administrative
records providing information on the eligibility decisions issued in 2012 by the Dutch central
agency CIZ, in charge of needs assessments for applicants to the public LTC insurance.
To our knowledge, only three papers have specifically focused on socio-economic in-
equality and horizontal inequity in LTC use.3 García-Gómez et al. (2015) find professional
home care use to be disproportionately concentrated among the richer elderly in Spain. As
the poor tend to have more activity restrictions, this translates into pro-rich horizontal in-
equity. Contrary to the Dutch case, the low public support offered by the Spanish LTC system
leaves substantial financial barriers to access to formal LTC services. Two recent papers (Ro-
drigues et al., 2017; Carrieri et al., 2017) exploit the SHARE survey to estimate horizontal
inequity indexes in the Netherlands and other European countries. Rodrigues et al. (2017)
compute income-related and wealth-related horizontal inequity indexes for home care use
in 11 European countries. At the extensive margin, formal home care use is found to be
roughly proportionately distributed along the income distribution in most countries. Carri-
eri et al. (2017) conclude that there is at most limited income-related horizontal inequity in
the use of personal or nursing care at the extensive margin, in Southern Europe as in Nordic
countries.
However, the analyses in these articles are limited by data availability in three ways.
First, they do not include institutional care, which still represents the vast majority of LTC
spending in all OECD countries (67% in the Netherlands in 2012, Statistics Netherlands
(2012a,b,c)). Second, they only study the decision whether to use care, but ignore the
1In their analysis of the recent reforms of the Dutch LTC system, Maarse and Jeurissen (2016) refers to the
Netherlands as having a “highly egalitarian ... health care culture”, with the term health care encompassing
both curative care and LTC.
2This is all the more important as the Dutch public LTC insurance has been undergoing major changes since
2013 (Maarse and Jeurissen, 2016). As a further wave of reforms is being discussed, insights into inequity in use
in the pre-reform situation should come in handy to policy discussion.
3These papers fit within a broader strand of the literature on the determinants of LTC use, which has sug-
gested that there is an income gradient in the use of formal care in some countries but not in others (Bonsang,
2009; Bakx, de Meijer, Schut and van Doorslaer, 2015). However, these papers do not specifically investigate
into socio-economic inequalities in the use of LTC nor attempt to summarize inequity using synthetic indexes.
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decision about how much to use, which is likely to witness substantial inter-personal
variation — home care use may be limited to two hours of care for a couple of months
after surgery up to round-the-clock nursing in the last months before death — that may be
correlated with socio-economic status. Third, while SHARE is a large panel survey data set,
the number of observations per country is limited, thereby limiting statistical precision. We
overcome these three problems by using administrative on the universe of LTC eligibility
and use.4
Our paper contrasts with the existing literature also in the way potential horizontal in-
equity in use is distinguished from fair inequalities. The distinction requires incorporating
a norm of vertical equity in use in the empirical framework, stating by how much individu-
als with different levels of “needs” for care are expected to use different levels of LTC services
(van Doorslaer et al., 2000; Sutton, 2002). Traditionally, the empirical economic literature has
refrained from assuming an arbitrary explicit norm of vertical equity. In most existing stud-
ies, an implicit, average norm is derived by regressing care use on the variables considered to
lead to fair inequalities in care use and potential confounders (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer,
2000b; van Doorslaer and van Ourti, 2011). Instead, we rely on an explicit equity norm. We
use the monetary value of the entitlements made by the independent, central Dutch agency
in charge of the eligibility decisions as the only indicator of legitimate needs for LTC. We
consider the individual entitlements for LTC support to embody the norm of vertical equity
prevailing in the Dutch LTC public insurance and implemented by CIZ assessors.
This paper brings two main findings. Firstly, we find the use of LTC services (in value)
to be concentrated among the income-poor. The rich are more likely not to use any care
or to use home care services and cash benefits rather than (more costly) institutional care.
Secondly, we provide evidence that the low-income elderly tend to use more LTC (in value)
than the rich even when the differences in LTC needs across the income distribution are
controlled for. Regardless of which factors induce this pattern and its interpretation, the
marked income gradient in the need-standardized LTC use was an unexpected feature of the
Dutch LTC system.
The Chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the Dutch LTC
system. Sections 3 and 4 present the empirical approach and the data we rely on, as well as
descriptive statistics. The baseline results are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 offers
complementary results from the separate analysis of the population eligible for home care
and the population eligible for institutional care. Section 7 discusses the interpretation of
the results and their limitations. Section 8 concludes.
4A fourth advantage of administrative data over survey data is that the former do not suffer from reporting
and recall bias, which may be substantial: e.g. while social LTC insurance provides universal coverage in the
Netherlands, two-thirds of the Dutch SHARE respondents report not being covered by a public LTC insurance.
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2 The Dutch long-term care system
The Dutch public LTC insurance (Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten, or AWBZ) has
existed since 1968. It offers universal benefits and a comprehensive coverage of LTC ser-
vices. In 2014, 18% of the individuals aged 65 and older received public LTC support in the
Netherlands (OECD, 2017a; Muir, 2017), while private LTC is believed to remain marginal
(Maarse and Jeurissen, 2016). Individuals can receive support either in the community or in
specialized institutions. About 30% of public LTC beneficiaries aged 65 and older live in an
institution, where they receive a package of services tailored to the type and severity of their
disability (Table 4.1). The institutionalized elderly most often reside in two types of settings:
nursing homes and residential care homes. Residential care homes allow the elderly to live
in their own residential unit while receiving mostly personal care and guidance in the daily
activities, while nursing home residents much more frequently receive nursing care (Mot,
2010). At home, individuals can receive nursing care, personal care, individual and group
guidance and short stays in an institution. Domestic help used to be included in the pub-
lic insurance scheme, but has been delegated to municipalities since 2007 and is provided
under the Social Support Act (Wmo).5
Table 4.1 – Types of LTC services paid by the Dutch public LTC insurance
Home care Institutional care
Types of care Nursing care, personal care,
individual guidance, group
guidance
Institutional stay
Content of
prescription
Numbers of hours or half–days for
each type of care
Type of institution and “packages”
of services (ZZP package)
Reference period A week A day
NOTES: Individuals can be eligible also for individual and group therapy, or short stays in institution
when they keep on living in the community. As we lack information on the actual use of these ser-
vices and their prices, we do not take them into account in the empirical analysis. Such a limitation
should only marginally affect our analysis, as these services are only seldom granted. Domestic help
is not part of the social LTC insurance (AWBZ).
Decisions regarding eligibility for public LTC are taken by a central independent agency
(Centrum indicatiestelling zorg, or CIZ). To claim an assessment, individuals have to fill in
an application form and send it to the regional office of CIZ (CIZ, 2017). Health care workers
and family members can also apply on the behalf of the disabled individual. An applica-
tion contains information on the functional limitations of the applicant, her health status
and background characteristics.6 The application is reviewed by an assessor, who has also
5 We describe the pre-2015 system because we use data from 2012. See van Ginneken and Kroneman (2015)
for details of the 2015 reform.
6Individuals may also specify which types of care they would like to receive; yet the documentation about
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information about any previous applications and past use of public LTC. The review proce-
dure may take different forms (desk checks, phone calls to the applicant or her health care
providers, face-to-face interview, visit of a multidisciplinary staff), depending on the sever-
ity and complexity of the case. The assessor is entitled to collect additional information on
the social environment and the living conditions of the applicant and might decide to con-
duct a home visit; she is however not supposed to inquire into the income or wealth of the
applicant.
Assessors decide on the type and volume of care the individual will be entitled to receive
and the period for which the decision is valid, following a list of criteria. The entitlements are
expressed in hours per week for home care services, or as a type of institution and a package
of services if the individual is made eligible for institutional care. Beneficiaries can ask for a
reassessment whenever their health condition or personal situation evolves. The presence of
relatives is taken into account during the need assessment inasmuch as the members of the
household of the applicant are expected to provide some minimum personal care to their
relative (Mot, 2010).
Beneficiaries can receive in-kind care, but they can also opt for cash benefits. In that case,
they are entitled to receive a monetary transfer equal to about 75% of the value of the in-kind
care they were made eligible for (Schut and Van Den Berg, 2010).7 The provision of care is
organized at a regional level. 32 regional purchasing agencies (zorgkantoren) are entrusted
with buying the LTC to be provided in-kind. While publicly-funded institutions are required
to be non-profits, home care providers can be for-profit. Tariffs for institutional care and
price caps for home care are set at the national level.8
Mandatory social security contributions to the scheme represent about 2/3 of the to-
tal costs (Schut et al., 2013); in 2012, about 25% came from general governments revenues
while only 8% were financed privately (mainly through income-dependent co-payments)
(Maarse and Jeurissen, 2016). These co-payments increase with income and with the use
of LTC services when those are received in the community; yet they do not exceed the cost
of care nor the user’s income.9 Furthermore, co-payments are capped at roughly e2,248
per month for institutional care. When the individual receives care at home, co-payments
should not exceed e1,750 per month, with a minimum fee of about e20 for beneficiaries
the assessment procedure shows that the preferences expressed by applicants need not be taken into account.
According to Bakx et al. (2017), who interviewed several CIZ assessors, these preferences rarely play a role in
the assessment process.
7The cash benefits work as a cash-for-care program: transfer of funds is conditional on the beneficiary pro-
ducing invoices from registered home care providers. Relatives providing informal care can be paid by cash
benefits provided they have a formal work contract with their relative as caregivers.
8The tariffs applied in 2012 are provided in Table 4.B.1, Appendix 4.B.
9Co-payments also depend marginally on wealth and include allowances for a range of circumstances. See
Appendix 4.B for further details on the schedule of co-payments.
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with lowest incomes.10 Given the value of care individuals can be entitled to and the sched-
ule of co-payments, the Dutch public LTC insurance operates transfers of resources towards
LTC beneficiaries that are fairly high by international standards.
3 Empirical approach
3.1 Concentration index and concentration curve
The standard methodology to assess the existence of horizontal inequity in care use con-
sists of two steps. The first one consists in documenting potential inequalities in care use.
The second step involves normative judgments to distinguish between acceptable inequal-
ities and unfair ones (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011; van Doorslaer and van Ourti, 2011;
Wagstaff et al., 1991; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000a).
Assessing income-related inequalities is traditionally done by drawing the concentration
curve of the outcome of interest (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000a).11 Our concentration
curve plots the cumulative percentage of the monetary value of LTC use (on the vertical axis)
against the cumulative percentage of the population of interest ranked by individualized in-
come. If the concentration curve coincides with the line of equality, there is no systematic
association between LTC use and individual income. If the concentration curve lies above
(below) the line of equality, the poorer individuals consume on average a higher (lower) value
of LTC services than the richer individuals.
We additionally compute the concentration index of LTC use (Kakwani, 1980; Kakwani
et al., 1997; Wagstaff et al., 1991).12 A negative concentration index indicates that, overall,
there is some pro-poor inequality in LTC use: consumption is disproportionately concen-
trated among the less well-off. Conversely, a positive concentration index signals some pro-
rich inequality.
A convenient way of expressing the concentration index for LTC use, denoted CI(y), is:
CI(y) = 2
ȳ
cov(y,r I) (4.1)
10The agency in charge of computing the individual co-payments, CAK (Centraal Administratie Kantoor), is
fully distinct from CIZ.
11There is a normative premise associated with this choice, which is that relative inequalities in the use of
LTC, as opposed to absolute inequalities, matter.
12The concentration index takes values between –1 and 1. It equals twice the area between the concentration
curve and the line of equality. Portions of the income distribution for which the concentration curve lies above
(below) the line of equality will contribute negatively (positively) to the index. If the concentration curve crosses
the line of equality, then there is pro-poor inequality in LTC use for some portions of the income distribution
and pro-rich inequality at some other points. The concentration index implicitly attributes arbitrary weights to
the inequality observed at different parts of the distribution (Bleichrodt and van Doorslaer, 2006). As Wagstaff
and van Doorslaer (2000a) put it, the concentration index gives a measure of horizontal inequity “on balance”.
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where r Ii denotes the fractional rank of individual i in the income distribution of the
population of interest (r Ii = i /N if i is the i -poorest individual); yi is a (continuous and un-
bounded) measure of LTC use over year 2012 for individual i , and ȳ denotes the population
average LTC use over 2012.
3.2 Horizontal inequity in LTC use
From inequality to horizontal inequity in LTC use
Not all income-related inequality in LTC use should be considered as horizontally in-
equitable. In particular, heterogeneity in functional status may correlate with income, and
induce fair differences in LTC use along the income distribution. In empirical assessments
of horizontal equity in care use, the conceptual challenge lies in the delimitation of those
factors leading to fair inequalities, which are called the “need” variables.13
Pinpointing need factors is however not sufficient: we need a stance in terms of how dif-
ferent the use of LTC services should be for individuals with different levels of needs. In other
terms, an horizontal equity assessment involves the incorporation of a norm of vertical eq-
uity in care use in the empirical analysis.14 Rather than proposing an arbitrary ad hoc norm
of vertical equity, applied economists interested in equity in health care use have proposed
to infer the norm from the data (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000a). The typical way of pro-
ceeding is to assume that the population average relationship between need variables and
care use, when controlling for potential confounders, provides a sensible norm of vertical
equity in care use. One criticism addressed to this method is that horizontal equity assess-
ment has to rely on the assumption that there is no vertical inequity in care use overall.15
In the context of the Dutch LTC system, the eligibility assessment rules set by the Ministry
of Health and implemented by the CIZ assessors de facto define a norm of vertical equity in
use: CIZ entitlements to public LTC provide a straightforward indicator of the fair extent to
which two persons with different levels of “needs” should receive different levels of support.
We thus take the monetary value of CIZ-assessed needs as the only need variable to be used
in our empirical investigation and consider that vertical equity in LTC use is achieved when
an additional euro of entitlements to publicly-subsidized care translates into an additional
euro in the value of services being used.
Such an institutionalized norm of “needed care” is seldom available in other contexts: in
13This word “needs” is used not to capture any deterministic relationship between an individual characteris-
tic and the use of LTC at the individual level, but to reflect the normative nature of any equity assessment.
14Keep in mind that we are interested in equity in use and not equity in financing: our analysis leaves aside
the question of the differential ability to pay for LTC services across the income distribution.
15Ruling out (average) vertical inequity is a priori a relatively strong assumption; it is carefully discussed in
Sutton (2002), who proposes an alternative, data-driven method to come up with a norm of vertical equity
while imposing as little arbitrary assumptions as possible.
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most cases, the diagnosis and the provision of health care are done by the same agent and
through a decentralized process, at the level of the individual health care providers. In such
cases, there is no measure of needs that can be distinguished from the treatment decision
and observed empirically; even if diagnosis were recorded and centralized, we may suspect
that they would partly reflect providers’ and system-wide incentives to deliver a certain type
and amount of care. Given the purpose of CIZ agency, its centralized organization and its
independence from the bodies in charge of the provision and financing of the LTC services,
we believe that CIZ eligibility decisions are informative of national policy objectives regard-
ing access to LTC in the Netherlands. The question we are thus asking in the paper is: “How
much of the potential income-related inequalities in the use of LTC services can not be ex-
plained by differences in CIZ-assessed needs?”.
The horizontal inequity index
Empirically, in order to isolate the impact of needs on LTC use system-wide, we follow a
standard method and compare the concentration of the actual use of LTC services with the
concentration of the legitimate needs for LTC (van Doorslaer and van Ourti, 2011). Consis-
tently with our assumption that the observed CIZ eligibility decisions embody the relevant
norm of vertical equity in use, we depart from the previous literature in the way we compute
the concentration of needs, CN(y): we simply take it to be equal to the concentration index of
CIZ-assessed needs, multiplied by the the ratio of population-average needs to population
average use.16 Denoting xi the needs as assessed by CIZ for individual i , we define:
CN(y) = x̄
ȳ
CI(x) = 2
ȳ
cov(x,r I) (4.2)
with x̄ the population-average of CIZ-assessed needs. We define the horizontal inequity
index of LTC use, HI(y), as:
HI(y) = CI(y)−CN(y) (4.3)
Like the concentration index, the horizontal inequity index varies between -1 and +1.
When positive (negative), it indicates that the rich (poor) consume LTC services dispropor-
tionately with respect to their needs.
Interpreting the magnitude of the horizontal inequity index is not straightforward. One
more visual way of assessing the extent of horizontal inequity in the use of LTC services can
be obtained by plotting the need-standardized LTC use, ŷ ISi , which is equal to:
ŷ ISi = yi −xi + x̄ (4.4)
16This is a normalization that will enable the decomposition of total inequality in the contributions of differ-
ent factors (see Section 5.3).
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The need-standardized use provides a measure of LTC use that “purges” the individual
measure of actual use from the legitimate needs for LTC. The distribution of need-
standardized LTC use across income may be interpreted as the distribution of LTC use that
we would observe if differences in needs across the income distribution were neutralized.17
If, for example, need-standardized use is much higher among the rich than among the poor,
this means that the rich consume disproportionately more than the poor even when taking
into account differential needs across the income distribution. Consistently, we can relate
need-standardized use with our horizontal inequity index:
HI(y) = CI(ŷ IS) (4.5)
Compared with the existing literature, the strength of our empirical investigation is that
the computation of need-standardized use and of the horizontal inequity index does not rely
on any econometric estimate.18 19
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Exhaustive administrative information on LTC eligibility and use
We use a rich set of data sources covering the entire Dutch population at the individual
level in 2012 (described in Appendix 4.A) that are linked through a unique identifier.20 We
have detailed information on the eligibility decisions made by CIZ in 2012; in particular, we
know the reasons why the individual is made eligible, whether she is eligible for home care
or for institutional care, and the types and amounts of services she is entitled to receive. The
data contain similarly precise information on the actual use of LTC services financed by the
Dutch public LTC insurance (cf. Table 4.1 in Section 2). Additional administrative records
provide information on household income and assets, personal address and demographic
information.
17We adopt an indirect standardization approach. See O’Donnell et al. (2008), Chapter 5, for a discussion of
the interpretations of direct and indirect standardization methods.
18In addition, given the very large size of our sample, which virtually matches our population of interest,
statistical uncertainty regarding the population average of needs and use (x̄ and ȳ) and the covariance either
between needs and the income rank (cov(x,r I)) or between use and the income rank (cov(y,r I)) is extremely
limited.
19Appendix 4.E explains how our method relates to the standard method of empirical assessment of horizon-
tal equity we refer to.
20Access to the microdata and permission to merge different datasets are granted by Statistics Netherlands
(CBS) under a confidentiality agreement.
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4.2 Population of interest and baseline sample
We focus on the individuals who were 60 years of age or more in 2012 and who were
entitled to LTC at some point during the year because of a somatic or a psycho-geriatric
condition. Among those who were eligible only for institutional care in 2012, we further
exclude those who were eligible for a stay in another type of specialized institution than a
nursing home, a residential care home, a rehabilitation center or a palliative care facility.21
Given that we measure needs as CIZ entitlements to public LTC, we do not take into account
individuals who were not eligible for elderly care at any point in 2012. In addition not to
having any needs for LTC, by definition, those individuals systematically have a zero use of
elderly care services, as access to (public) LTC in the Netherlands is possible only for people
made eligible by CIZ. Leaving out these individuals from our population of interest should
not bias our analysis insofar as it relies on the assumption that CIZ entitlements to public
support embody the legitimate LTC needs.
The population of interest is made of 618,041 individuals. Missing background informa-
tion reduces the sample by less than 0.2%,22 meaning a final sample of 616,934 individuals.
4.3 Variables of interest
The ranking variable
We focus on income-related inequality and horizontal inequity. Individuals are ranked
by their household taxable income of year 2011,23 which is equivalized using the square root
equivalence scale.24 The distribution of income is smooth, with virtually no mass point,
making it empirically straightforward to rank individuals from the poorest to the richest.25
Measure of LTC use and needs
The monetary value of annual LTC use is equal to the sum of the value of in-kind ser-
vices used and of the imputed value of cash benefits. To obtain the monetary value of in-
kind services, we multiply quantities used by their unit price (for institutional care) or by the
21Other types of institutions include psychiatric hospitals and centers for the physically handicapped. We
exclude individuals eligible for LTC due to mental health problems or a physical or cognitive handicap. Those
individuals have often lived for years with functional limitations and their use of LTC services may follow dif-
ferent patterns than those observed in the population affected by disability at an old age.
22Appendix 4.A provides additional details.
23As individuals who died in 2012 were not taxed in 2012, for all individuals we consider the taxable income
and wealth of 2011.
24The equivalized income of an individual is then equal to her household income divided by the square root
of the number of household members (OECD, 2011a).
25In particular, less than 500 individuals have an income equal to 0.
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maximum tariff (for home care) that are set by the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZA).26 If
individuals opt for cash rather than in-kind care, we only observe the take-up of benefits,
not their amount. We exploit the official grid used to convert entitlements to in-kind LTC
into a cash transfer.27 On average, 89.5% of the value of cash benefits granted are actually
used (Statistics Netherlands, 2017). We thus discount the imputed cash equivalent of enti-
tlements to in-kind services by 10.5% to obtain the individual imputed monetary value of
cash benefits.
Similarly, needs are computed as the monetary value of LTC the individual was eligible
for.28
One issue when considering annual LTC use (resp. needs) is for individuals who died
before the end of 2012: their use of (needs for) LTC services is right-censored by their death.
We prorate the monetary value of LTC use (needs) of individuals who died in 2012 on the
basis of the proportion of the year they were alive.29
Socio-demographic information
As we assume that CIZ eligibility decisions capture the sources of legitimate interper-
sonal differences in LTC use, we do not need any individual-level information other than
income, care use and CIZ-assessed needs to derive a measure of income-related horizon-
tal inequity. Yet, beyond providing valuable descriptive information on the composition of
our population of interest, individual-level information on socio-demographic characteris-
tics will also be used to shed light on the potential sources of income-related horizontal in-
equity. We have information on gender, age, marital status, household composition, whether
the individual has a foreign background, wealth, home ownership.30 We also know the LTC
purchasing region the individual lives in.
26Additional details and the grid of tariffs are reported in Appendix 4.B.
27See Appendix 4.B. The cash equivalent of in-kind services represents about 75% of their national price.
28Eligibility for home care services is granted in hours per week and is expressed as a range (e.g., the individual
can receive from 6 to 7 hours of nursing care per week); we take the middle point of the range (in our example,
6.5 hours) when computing the value of LTC the individual is eligible for. In the Dutch LTC system, this mid-
point is the one taken into account when entitlements to in-kind services are converted into entitlements to
cash benefits.
29For example, for an individual who died at the end of June, we multiply the value of her actual use of (needs
for) LTC services and CIZ entitlements by 2.
30When the household composition, family status or address has changed in the course of 2012 for an indi-
vidual, we retain the situation she spent the most time in.
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4.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.2 provides summary statistics on the baseline sample. The top panel provides
information on eligibility for public LTC. Almost two thirds of the individuals eligible for LTC
benefits were eligible for home care services, while less than half were eligible for institu-
tional care; about 12% of individuals were eligible for both home care and institutional care
in year 2012.31 The average monetary value of LTC an individual was eligible for amounted
to ke31 — slightly more than the average equivalized income in the population of interest.
The average annual value of needs for institutional care assessed by CIZ is higher than the
average value of needs for home care, reflecting the fact that institutional care is generally a
more costly form of LTC. Finally, about half of the population was not eligible for LTC during
the entire year: most of them entered the scheme during the year, and 16% of the sample
died before the end of 2012.
As shown in Panel B, the average value of LTC use is about ke23 in the year; roughly
two thirds are spent on institutional care, one third on home care. Individuals opting for
cash benefits represent less than 5% of the sample; about 8% of those eligible for publicly-
subsidized LTC did not use any in-kind care or cash benefits. The distribution of the value
of CIZ-assessed LTC needs has a very high standard deviation (equal to half the mean) and a
long upper tail, reflecting the combination of the heterogeneity of the population of interest
and the comprehensive coverage offered by the Dutch LTC insurance. The distribution of
actual use is even more spread out: 1% of individuals having a use exceeding ke125.32
Comparing use and CIZ needs, we find that for 70% of individuals, the value of LTC
services used is strictly below the value of their entitlements to care. In terms of socio–
demographic characteristics, Panel C of Table 4.2 shows that most individuals in the pop-
ulation of interest are women, in their 80s. 70% of the sample lived without a partner for
most of 2012: for 5pp of them, this is because they spent the largest part of the year in a
nursing home. 12% of individuals have a migrant background: 9pp. are first or second gen-
eration migrants from a foreign Western country. The remaining 3pp. hail from non-Western
countries.
Equivalized income exhibits a long upper tail, but wealth per capita is even more un-
equally distributed. One third of individuals own the house in which they live; roughly half
of (net) wealth is housing wealth.
31Someone can be eligible for only one type of care at a point in time. However, an individual can have her
needs reassessed and become eligible for another care setting.
32The annual cost of staying the entire year in a nursing home with the most intensive care package reaches
ke93. It turns out that the most expensive users are using home care. Providing care in the community can
prove more costly than providing institutional care for the most severely disabled elderly; as there is no ceiling
on the volume of home care services that someone may be eligible for in the Netherlands, this may translate
into some home care users benefiting from higher public spending than institutional care recipients.
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Table 4.2 – Sample descriptive statistics
Mean Standard-deviation
Panel A: Eligibility
Eligible for home care (yes/no) 0.650 –
Eligible for institutional care (yes/no) 0.467 –
Value of entitlements to home care 12.179 25.686
Value of entitlements to institutional care 18.882 24.973
Value of total LTC entitlements 31.061 29.871
Number of eligibility decisions over the year 1.8 1.2
Number of days of LTC eligibility 255.4 132.3
Panel B: Use
Any use of in-kind home care (yes/no) 0.615 –
Any use of institutional care (yes/no) 0.387 –
Any take-up of cash benefits (yes/no) 0.044 –
Any use of LTC (yes/no) 0.918 –
Any use of in-kind home care used 7.430 17.565
Value of institutional care used 14.595 23.580
Value of cash benefits used 0.935 6.572
Value of total LTC used 22.960 26.664
Panel C: Demographic characteristics
Gender: woman 0.670 –
Age: 60–69 0.125 –
Age: 70–79 0.258 –
Age: 80–84 0.227 –
Age: 85–89 0.222 –
Age: 90+ 0.168 –
Has died in 2012 0.160 –
Married/in civil partnership 0.345 –
Partner in household 0.309 –
Number of household members 1.446 0.737
Origin: Dutch 0.880 –
Origin: Turkey 0.009 –
Origin: Morocco 0.005 –
Orign: Suriname 0.010 –
Orign: Dutch Caribbean 0.002 –
Origin: foreign Western country 0.088 –
Origin: other non-Western country 0.006 –
Panel D: Socio-economic characteristics
Equivalized household income 29.519 24.187
Net wealth (per capita) 159.302 53.715
Owner of main residence 0.322 –
Observations 616934
SAMPLE: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public “elderly” LTC in the Netherlands in
2012.
NOTES: Values of LTC entitlements and use and income are expressed in thousands euros
per year. Wealth is expressed in thousands euros.
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5 Baseline results
5.1 Income-related inequality in LTC use
Figure 4.1 shows that the concentration curve of LTC use is above the line of equality
almost over the entire income distribution: the x% poorest individuals consumed more than
x% of the total value of LTC services used in 2012. Hence, the concentration index of LTC
use is negative (−0.0853) and statistically significant at the 1% level,33 reflecting a pro-poor
concentration of LTC use.
Figure 4.1 – Concentration curve of LTC use.
SAMPLE: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public “elderly” LTC in the Netherlands in 2012
(N=616,934).
NOTES: LTC use is expressed in annual monetary value. It is the sum of the value of home care ser-
vices used in kind, of the value of cash benefits granted and of elderly institutional care received in
2012. Individuals are ranked by their equivalized 2011 household taxable income.
Figure 4.2 suggests that this pro-poor concentration seems to be driven both by the low-
est utilization rate of LTC services of the rich and by the higher institutionalization rate of
the poor. Indeed, we observe that the proportion of individuals with no or little LTC use is
higher among the 50% richest individuals, while the spikes in the distribution of LTC use,
which reflect a full year spent in an institution,34 are more marked among the 50% poorest.
33Appendix 4.G presents the formula used to derive the standard error of the concentration index.
34Each of these spikes (with a strictly positive value) corresponds to individuals spending the full year in an
institution with a given package of services or, equivalently, a given severity of disability. We have truncated Fig-
ure 4.2 from the right (individuals spending the entire year in a nursing home with the highest level of services
have an annual value of LTC use exceeding ke90).
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Figure 4.2 – Distribution of LTC use, among the 50% poorest and 50% richest individuals.
SAMPLE: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public “elderly” LTC in the Netherlands in 2012
(N=616,934).
NOTES: LTC use is expressed in annual monetary value. It is the sum of the value of home care ser-
vices used in kind, of the value of cash benefits granted and of elderly institutional care received in
2012. Individuals are ranked by their equivalized 2011 household taxable income.
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5.2 Differential use by income for equal needs
Using the formula presented in Section 3, we now compute the contribution of needs to
total inequality, CN(y) and derive the horizontal inequity index of LTC use. As displayed in
Table 4.3, CN(y) is negative, statistically and practically significant (−0.0485), indicating that
the poor tend to be assessed higher needs. The pro-poor concentration of needs is yet lower
than the pro-poor concentration of use, resulting in a negative horizontal inequity index
equal to −0.0368 and thus a disproportionate pro-poor concentration of LTC use on balance.
Table 4.3 – Concentration and horizontal inequity indexes of LTC use
CI(y) CN(y) = CI(x)x̄/ȳ HI(y) = CI(ŷ IS)
(1) (2) (3)
-0.0853∗∗∗ -0.0485∗∗∗ -0.0368∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0007)
SAMPLE: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public “elderly” LTC in the
Netherlands in 2012 (N=616,934).
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
See Appendix 4.G about the computation of the standard errors.
We now compute for each individual her need-standardized use, y ISi , following Equation
(4.4) (Section 3). Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of the average need-standardized LTC use
per income decile.
Figure 4.3 – Distribution of need-standardized LTC use across income deciles
SAMPLE: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public “elderly” LTC in the Netherlands in
2012 (N=616,934).
NOTES: Need-standardized LTC use is expressed in annual monetary value. The dashed
horizontal line indicates the average value of actual LTC use in the sample. Income
deciles are defined using equivalized 2011 household taxable income.
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There is a clear negative income gradient: the poor tend to consume more LTC (in value)
even conditional on needs, along the entire income distribution. The gradient is however
more marked at the very bottom and at the top: when adjusting for LTC needs the 10% poor-
est individuals are predicted to use 25% LTC services more than the 10% richest individuals.
Differential use by income for equal needs is thus substantial.
5.3 Decomposition of potential horizontal inequity
To get a better sense of what may drive such a marked differential use of LTC across the
income distribution, we use a decomposition technique to highlight the individual charac-
teristics that correlate most strongly with both income and LTC use (Wagstaff et al., 2003;
O’Donnell et al., 2012). Following the literature, we call a “non-need factor” a variable zk
that is considered to be an illegitimate determinant of the use of LTC. We can break the total
income-related inequality in use down in the following way:
CI(y) = x̄
ȳ
CI(x)+
K∑
k=1
[(
βNNk
z̄k
ȳ
)
CI(zk )
]
+ 2cov(ε,r
I)
ȳ
(4.6)
= CN(y)+CNN(y)+ 2cov(ε,r
I)
ȳ
(4.7)
= CN(y)+HI(y) (4.8)
where z̄k denotes the population-average of variable zk . The βNNk , k = 1, ...,K, are the
coefficients from a linear regression of the use of LTC, yi , on the needs xi and the K non-
need factors zki :
yi = β0 +1.xi +
K∑
k=1
βNNk z
k
i +εi (4.9)
with ε being the error term.35 As non-need factors, we include age (5 brackets), gender,
whether the individual has a partner living in the house, the number of household mem-
bers, the migrant background (7 categories) and whether the individual owns her house.36
In order to take into account potential nonlinear effects of income and wealth, we include
dummies for the income and wealth deciles. The model also includes dummies for the LTC
purchasing region the individual lives in.
In the decomposition, CNN(y) represents the total contribution of the observable non-
need determinants of care to the concentration index of LTC use; 2cov(ε,RI)/ȳ is the gener-
alized concentration index of the error term and captures the degree of correlation between
35The coefficient of needs is constrained to be equal to 1, so that the contribution of needs CN(y) is exactly
equal to the concentration index of CIZ-assessed needs times x̄/ȳ . Appendix 4.E provides a discussion of this
constraint in line of the choice of a norm of vertical equity in use.
36The categories can be read directly from the regression results, in Table 4.D.1, Appendix 4.D.
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LTC use and income that is not explained by neither needs nor non-need factors. The con-
tribution of a given factor to inequality is all the larger as its partial correlation with LTC use
is high and that is is unequally distributed across the income distribution.
As it derives from a linear regression without ruling out all sources of endogeneity, the
contribution of each variable needs not be causal (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011; van
Doorslaer and van Ourti, 2011). Yet such a decomposition can provide some useful insights
into the potential sources of inequity and guide further investigation.37 We thus use the
available socio-demographic information as non-need factors to perform the regression un-
derlying the decomposition. By doing so, we do not assume that age and gender, in par-
ticular, are not legitimate determinants of LTC use: given that we control for needs in the
regression, we instead take that age and gender (and all the other non-need factors) should
not weigh in the use of LTC services above and beyond the assessment done by CIZ.
Figure 4.4 displays the results of the decomposition. To interpret the contribution of a
variable zk , we combine the descriptive statistics (Table 4.2) to get z̄k , the estimates of Table
4.D.1 (Appendix 4.D) to get β̂NNk , and the concentration index CI(zk ) of the variable provided
in Table 4.D.2 (Appendix 4.D). Age, not living with one’s partner and income are the main
observed factors behind the higher use of LTC services by the poor. Being older increases the
use of care, and the eldest tend to be poorer. Having a partner in the house is associated with
a lower value of LTC services used; this situation is more frequently encountered among the
rich, because those are less likely to live in an institution and more likely to have a spouse.
The high contribution of income is not mechanical: it is due to the high negative income
elasticity of LTC use being augmented by the concentration of income (Gini index of 0.33).
Home ownership also contributes to pro-poor horizontal inequity in use: being a home
owner is much more frequent for the high-income elderly and is associated with a lower use
of LTC (in value). This may reflect the fact that home owners are more likely to stay home
rather than to enter a nursing home, as compared to renters, and therefore use less expensive
services than institutional care. Individuals residing in an institution may also be more likely
to have sold their house, inducing a negative relationship between home ownership and the
use of expensive forms of LTC.
The contributions of gender, having a migrant background, wealth, the household com-
position and the region of residence are small. Differences in wealth are only associated
with limited differences in LTC use. Interpretation is different for migrant background and
the region of residence: while these variables are found to have statistically significant and
37In particular, one potential concern is that income and wealth could be lowered by a high use of LTC ser-
vices. We believe there is little scope for a reverse causality bias here: income being mostly made of pen-
sions, it is independent from the disability status of the individuals. As individual co-payments are capped, the
medium-run impact of intensive LTC use on wealth is limited. We also exclude individuals with mental health
issues and handicaps, which may affect life-time earnings.
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practically important effects on the use of LTC, their correlation with income is not system-
atic. Schematically, individuals with a non-Western country origin tend to consume less LTC
in value than the Dutch natives while being poorer on average. However, individuals with
origins in a Western country (other than the Netherlands) tend to be richer than the average
elderly in our population and are predicted to use only slightly less LTC than a Dutch native.
Given that the horizontal inequity index gives a synthetic measure of system-wide inequity,38
the pro-poor contribution of the 3% of non-Western migrants that we find in our population
of interest is offset by the pro-rich contribution associated with the Western migrants, who
amount to 9% of our population.
Figure 4.4 – Contribution of non-need factors
SAMPLE: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public “elderly” LTC in the Netherlands in
2012 (N=616,934).
NOTES: Variables depicted on the right-hand side of 0 contribute to pro-rich inequality;
variables on the left-hand side of 0 contribute to pro-poor inequality.
READING: On a total horizontal inequity index of −0.0368, income contributes negatively
by −0.0188.
The case of the contribution of the place of residence can be discussed in the light of
recent Dutch and international empirical findings. The largest gap in average LTC use across
two of the 32 Dutch LTC purchasing regions, once needs and other non-need factors are
controlled for, reachese5,000 a year (Figure 4.D.3, Appendix 4.D). This represents more than
20% of the average LTC use nationwide. Practice variation (Chandra et al., 2011) in access
to and use of LTC services by the elderly has been documented in the US and in Nordic
countries (Trydegård and Thorslund, 2001; Miller, 2002; Pulkki et al., 2016). The existence of
38Recall that the contribution of each non-need factor is proportional to the population average of this vari-
able.
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cross-regional differences in the ratio of LTC services used to CIZ entitlements was recently
documented by the Dutch Audit Office (Netherlands Court of Audit, 2015); our results show
that, in spite of the Netherlands being a relatively small country, territorial differences persist
even when we control for a rich set of individual characteristics. In contrast, Duell et al.
(2017) find that practice variation in eligibility for public LTC is limited in the Netherlands
and correlates little with health care supply characteristics. Our estimates suggest that it
is relevant to look at actual use, beyond eligibility, when interested in horizontal inequity
in the Dutch LTC system. Nonetheless, we find that regional disparities do not contribute
to differential care use that relates to income, as the high-use regions are not found to be
systematically richer or poorer.
The last thing to be noticed from Figure 4.4 is that the residual is fairly small, meaning
that our model does a good job at capturing out unobserved determinants of LTC use that
correlate with income.
Although it provides an encompassing picture of inequalities and horizontal inequity in
the Dutch LTC system, our baseline analysis has the drawback of putting together two poten-
tially heterogeneous populations, namely individuals eligible for institutional care and those
eligible for home care. Digging further into horizontal inequity in LTC use and the factors as-
sociated with it thus requires to have a separate look at institutional care and home care. A
separate analysis is also motivated by the strong contribution of income to HI, and negligi-
ble contribution of wealth. In 2012, co-payments in the Dutch LTC insurance were such that,
except for the very wealthy individuals, assets did have a limited impact on co-payments. By
contrast, co-payments are strongly tied with income and they have a substantially different
schedule when individuals are using institutional care rather than home care.
6 Home care versus institutional care: subgroup analysis
6.1 Subgroup definition
We now construct a subgroup of individuals who were eligible for home care at least one
day in 2012 and a subgroup of individuals who were eligible for institutional care at some
point that year. Table 4.4 describes the measures of LTC use and needs in each of the sub-
groups. When focusing on individuals eligible for institutional care (47% of the total popu-
lation), we compute the monetary value of CIZ needs as the value of institutional stays the
individual was made eligible for. LTC use is then computed as the value of institutional stays
while the individual was eligible for such stays. As entitlements to institutional care can be
converted into home care services or cash benefits, we add the value of home care services
and the (imputed) value of any cash benefits that were used during the periods the individual
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was eligible for institutional care.39 When focusing on the subgroup analysis of individuals
eligible for home care (2/3 of the total population), we compute the monetary value of LTC
use of each individual as the sum of in-kind home care services and cash benefits used while
she was eligible for home care support.
Table 4.4 – Definition of LTC use and needs in the subgroup analysis
Subgroup A: Individuals eligible
for home care
Subgroup B: Individuals eligible
for institutional care
Monetary value of LTC
needs
Monetary value of home care
services the individual was
eligible for
Monetary value of institutional
stays the individual was eligible
for
Monetary value of LTC
use
Monetary value of in-kind home
care services + monetary value of
cash benefits granted when the
individual was eligible for home
care
Monetary value of institutional
care + monetary value of in-kind
home care + monetary value of
cash benefits granted when the
individual was eligible for
institutional care
N 401,262 287,932
Share of total sample 64.9% 46.6%
Individuals eligible for institutional care tend to be older, more often women and single,
and less likely to have a migrant background. They have lower wealth and a lower income.40
6.2 Income-related inequality and horizontal inequity index by subgroup
Table 4.5 shows the inequality and the horizontal inequity indexes in each of the sub-
groups.41 In Column (1), we see from the negative concentration indexes that LTC use is
concentrated among the poor in both subgroups.42 Interestingly though, Column (2) sug-
gests that the rich tend to have higher needs for home care than the poor: the positive sign of
CN (equal to 0.0254) indicates that, if only needs for home care mattered for actual use of LTC
services, then we would expect the rich to consume relatively more home care than the poor.
Because the needs are distributed pro-rich and the use pro-poor, the horizontal inequity in-
dex is strongly negative (HI = −0.0612). Within the subgroup eligible for institutional care,
the pro-poor concentration of use is partially offset by the pro-poor concentration of needs
leading to a horizontal inequity index that is less strongly negative.43
39This means that, in order to relate the CIZ-assessed needs for institutional care with a chronologically con-
sistent measure of use, we disregard any LTC used while the individual was not eligible for institutional care.
40See Table 4.C.2 in Appendix 4.D for the descriptive statistics in each subgroup.
41Estimates of the model of LTC use for each subgroup can be found in Appendix 4.D, Table 4.D.3.
42Concentration curves of LTC use in both subgroups are provided in Appendix 4.D, Figure 4.C.1.
43The horizontal inequity indexes of the two subgroup do not add up to the value of the index in the entire
sample. This is due to the fact that about 12% of the population of interest is eligible for both types of care in
2012, and thus contribute to the indexes of both sub-groups.
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The pro-rich concentration of entitlements for home care, contrasting with the pro-poor
concentration of entitlements for institutional care might be explained by systematic differ-
ences in functional status, health and household composition at the point of entry in the LTC
system depending on income. This pattern would be consistent with individuals with a low
socio-economic status going through the frailty and disability process faster and being more
frequently deprived from a supporting physical and family environment, leading them to be
assessed higher needs for formal care.
Table 4.5 – Concentration index and horizontal inequity index: subgroup results
CI CN CNN Residual HI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(1)-(2)
Subgroup eligible -0.0358∗∗∗ +0.0254∗∗∗ -0.0606 -0.0005 -0.0612∗∗∗
for home care (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Subgroup eligible -0.0453∗∗∗ -0.0238∗∗∗ -0.0215 -0.0000 -0.0214∗∗∗
for institutional care (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0010)
SAMPLES: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public “elderly” LTC in the Netherlands in 2012 (N=616,934),
eligible for home care (N=401,262) or eligible for institutional care (N=287,932).
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Computation of standard errors
are described in Appendix 4.G. Bootstrap derivation of the standard errors of the contribution of non-need
factors, CNN, and of the residual has not been completed yet.
We also replicate the full decomposition analysis on each subgroup to highlight the con-
tribution of each non-need factor. Results are reported in the Appendices (Figure 4.D.4, Ap-
pendix 4.D). In the subgroup eligible for home care, the two variables relating to household
composition are found to contribute to pro-poor inequity in use. This is consistent with Il-
inca et al. (2017), who use SHARE data and find the contribution of household composition
to inequality in the home care utilization rate to be highest in the Netherlands, relative to
other European countries. In both subgroups, income has the highest contribution relative
to the other non-need factors. In relative terms, the contribution of income is especially high
in the subgroup eligible for institutional care. One assumption for the weight of income is
that the income-rich may be more likely to convert their entitlements to institutional care
into a package of home care services when eligible for entering a nursing or residential care
home. In the Dutch LTC insurance, co-payments tend to be higher when using institutional
care than for home care services. This is especially true for individuals with a relatively high
income.44 For relatively rich individuals, the differential co-payment on home care and in-
stitutional care use thus creates a financial incentive to substitute institutional care for —
socially and privately — less costly home care services.
44Take the example of an individual with an annual equivalized income equal toe70,000, who is eligible for a
stay in a nursing home with the most intensive level of care. If she enters the nursing home, she will be required
to paye2,248 per month out-of-pocket. If she instead decides to receive an equivalent package of care services
at her house (28.5 hours a month), she will instead incur a co-payment arounde900 per month.
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Recent studies (Bourreau-Dubois, Gramain, Lim and Xing (2014); Hege (2016); Non
(2017) and Roquebert and Tenand (2017) [Chapter 2 of this thesis]) used data on benefi-
ciaries of home care public schemes from either France or the Netherlands and found the
disabled elderly to be price-sensitive in their consumption of home care. Evidence regarding
the price sensitivity of institutional care use is more mixed.45 If our hypothesis that LTC use
is price-elastic and that this contributes to explaining the differential use of LTC along the
income distribution, for given needs, is a valid assumption, then we should observe some
differential in the probability to use LTC services when eligible for them across income
levels.46 To explore this assumption, we depict the probability to use institutional care,
in-kind home care or cash benefits depending on the income decile and the type of care the
individual is eligible for. Among individuals eligible for institutional care, the probability of
staying in an institution decreases from 92% in the bottom income decile, to 80% in the top
70% of the income distribution (Figure 4.5, Panel B). In the subgroup eligible for home care,
we observe a roughly constant LTC use along the income distribution (Figure 4.5, Panel A),
but the bottom and top income deciles are more likely to use cash benefits, as opposed to
in-kind care, than the middle of the income distribution.
One obvious limitation with these simple statistics is that they do not control for needs
and only focus on the extensive margin of LTC use. We additionnally estimate a model in
which the outcome variable is the value of LTC use and the main regressors are the needs, the
income deciles and the interaction terms between deciles and needs.47 We find a negative
income-gradient in the conversion rate between needs and use among individuals eligible
for institutional care. Among those eligible for home care, the relationship is nonlinear; yet,
when controlling for needs, individuals in the top 50% of the income distribution are found
to convert a lower share of their entitlements into actual use.
These patterns would be consistent with the hypothesis that the lower use of LTC, or
the use of lower-value services, by the rich that we observe might be partly explained by
them adjusting their consumption to the higher co-payments they face, relative to poorer
beneficiaries. However, this is probably only part of the story, if any. In the subgroup eligible
for home care, we find that other non-need factors, such as household composition, marital
45Focusing on the United States, Hoerger et al. (1996) exploit state-level variation in Medicaid reimburse-
ment rates of nursing home stays and find that it affects the use of institutional care. However, the decrease in
the relative price of home care induced by state variation in home care subsidy programs has no effect on the
probability to enter a nursing home. Using a rich set of indicators of the generosity of Medicaid reimbursement
rules, again at the state level, Grabowski and Gruber (2007) conclude to the demand for institutional care be-
ing price inelastic, confirming the findings obtained by Reschovsky (1996) with data from the US Channeling
Demonstration. Yet in another study, Reschovsky (1998) find demand for nursing home stays to be elastic to
price; this echoes the result obtained by Garber and MaCurdy (1990), who exploit the temporal variation in
Medicare reimbursement rules for nursing home stays and find peaks in the hazard rate of nursing home stays
around the discontinuities in the reimbursement schedule.
46Unless income effects offset the price effects, which we cannot a priori rule out.
47Results are presented in Figures 4.E.2 and 4.E.3, in Appendix 4.E.
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status and gender, bring an important contribution to pro-poor income-related horizontal
inequity. The fact that women tend to receive more formal home care when eligible for it may
reflect their lower propensity to receive informal care from their spouse (Katz et al., 2000).
The lower conversion rate of entitlements into actual use and the higher take-up of cash
benefits at the very bottom of the income distribution may also reveal a higher propensity to
use one’s entitlements to pay for informal caregivers among the poorest.
Figure 4.5 – Probability of using a given type of LTC, by subgroup
Panel A (top): Individuals eligible for home care.
Panel B (bottom): Individuals eligible for institutional care.
SAMPLE: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public home care (Panel A) or institutional
care (Panel B) in the Netherlands in 2012 (N=401,262 in Panel A; N=287,932 in Panel B).
NOTES: Probability of using a given type of care while the individual was eligible for home
care (Panel A) or institutional care (Panel B). A given individual may use several types of
care over the period she is eligible for either home care or institutional care.
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7 Discussion
7.1 Robustness check and wealth-related horizontal inequity
Our analysis aims at providing a measure of average socio-economic horizontal inequity
in the Dutch LTC system. Within our population of interest, the share of individuals who
died before the end of year 2012 is far from negligible (16%). As mortality is not uniform
across the income distribution, ignoring this sub-population may bias our assessment of
income-related inequalities and inequity in LTC use. Yet when pro-rating the needs and
consumption of those who have died in the year, we create some outliers with respect to our
two main variables of interest. We thus checked that our conclusions are not sensitive to our
methodological choice by replicating the analysis excluding individuals who died before the
end of 2012. As shown in Appendix 4.F, the concentration and horizontal inequity indexes
remain pro-poor.
We have focused on income-related inequality in use. Most of our population of interest
has retired. For the retirees, income is mostly made of pensions, which are more equally dis-
tributed than the housing and financial wealth accumulated by the elderly cohorts.48 By tak-
ing income as our ranking variable, we neglect an important component of socio-economic
resources in the elderly population. As a complementary analysis, we assess whether the pat-
tern of differential use of LTC services across the per capita wealth distribution echoes the
one observed across the income distribution.49 As displayed by Figures 4.F.2 and 4.F.3 (Ap-
pendix 4.F), the differences in the need-standardized use between wealth deciles are smaller
than those observed between income deciles; nonetheless the 30% wealth-richest individu-
als tend to use less LTC (in value), conditional on their entitlements.
The indicator of socio-economic status is thus not neutral to our conclusions in terms of
horizontal inequity in LTC use in the Netherlands. Given that co-payments in 2012 would
mostly depend on income, we believe it is especially relevant to document how actual use of
LTC varies along this dimension.
7.2 Interpretation of the results
Interpreting our horizontal inequity index as a measure of income-related horizontal in-
equity in LTC use in the Netherlands hinges on two necessary conditions. Firstly, it rests on
the normative stance that eligibility decisions made by CIZ give the “relevant” norm of ver-
48In our population, the Gini coefficient equals 0.32 for equivalized income and 0.45 for individualized
wealth.
49Theoretically, the degree of socio-economic inequality and horizontal inequity in LTC use is all the more
sensitive to taking income rather than wealth as the measure of socio-economic background as the individuals
have different ranks in the income and wealth distributions (Carrieri et al., 2017; Wagstaff and Watanabe, 2003).
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tical equity. Secondly, taking HI(y) as a measure of inequity can only be done if there are no
systematic differences in preferences for the use of LTC services across the income distribu-
tion, or if these preferences are not considered as legitimate determinants of care use.
The unique institutional setting and information system of the Dutch LTC system provide
us with an explicit and grounded norm of vertical equity in use. We have yet tested what our
conclusions in terms of horizontal inequity would be if we were to rely on the more classical
“the system gets it right” assumption. The results (Appendix 4.E) show that the negative
horizontal inequity index is robust to this alternative assumption, although the magnitude
of the disproportionate pro-poor concentration of use changes.
Can we assume preferences for aging in place and forward-looking behavior to be invari-
ant to socio-economic status? Individuals’ preferences over care settings seem to fluctuate
even in the short run (Wolff et al., 2008) and are therefore hard to test empirically. However,
experimental evidence from the Netherlands (Nieboer et al., 2010) suggests that income-rich
individuals have a negative willingness to pay for nursing home care, relative to living inde-
pendently, while the income-poor tend to derive a positive relative utility from institutional
care.50 These studies may be evidence either that preferences differ with income or that in-
stitutional care is an inferior good, i.e. that its use has a negative income elasticity. In both
cases, the lower use of more costly forms of care by the rich may well be consistent with indi-
viduals trading-off optimally between additional care and other consumption goods, given
their preferences, their economic resources and the amount of subsidies provided by the
Dutch LTC system. In the same vein, the lower use of LTC services by individuals with a
non-Western migrant background we document might be interpreted as the result of differ-
ent norms regarding old-age disability and the role of the family rather than evidence of an
inequitable treatment (Morris et al., 2005).
There has been a vivid debate about whether, and how, equity considerations may and
should be reconciled with Paretian economics and the respect of preferences (Fleurbaey,
2008; Culyer et al., 1992; Mooney et al., 1991). As highlighted by Culyer et al. (1992) and van
Doorslaer and van Ourti (2011) in the health care context, the non-Welfarist Marxist or egal-
itarian principle of distributive justice of “allocation of care according to needs”, irrespective
of preferences, seems to command a strong support among physicists and the public opin-
ion. Assume that this is the fairness principle consistent with the public view on public LTC
support. Then our “pro-poor” horizontal inequity index would suggest that the Dutch LTC
system overshoots its goal of ensuring equitable access to LTC. One reason may be that the
income-dependent co-payments are set too high for the relatively rich individuals and in-
duce them to forgo their care entitlements to an unfair extent.
50Nieboer et al. (2010) derive willingness to pay for care settings by running a discrete choice experiments on
middle-aged (mostly non-disabled) individuals, who are asked to consider different scenarios of disability for
a fictitious relative.
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Yet our results may lend themselves to a very different interpretation if we are to adopt a
Welfarist stance: if institutionalization actually is an inferior good, then the disproportion-
ate use of expensive nursing home care by the poor might reveal that the Dutch LTC system
put the elderly with low financial resources at a disadvantage in terms of well-being or the
perceived value of the care they receive. Beyond raising equity concerns, the higher con-
sumption of institutional care by the poor may reveal some inefficiencies, if there would be
alternative ways of providing lesser-cost but higher-value care.
Another value judgment implicit in our analysis, and made necessary given the absence
of any data on the use of informal care in our population of interest, is that we make infer-
ences on inequities in the use of formal care only. Whether one is interested in inequity in i)
the use of formal care or ii) in the use of total care, i.e. formal care plus informal care, depends
on whether formal care is both individually and collectively preferred over informal care or
merely perceived as a back-up option for when there is insufficient informal care available.
The perspective of the Dutch public LTC insurance is in-between these two polar views. On
one hand, the comprehensive coverage offered to all elderly for all types of LTC means that
formal care is collectively valued, in a normative sense. On the other hand, entitlements to
personal care in the first months are reduced by the amount of “usual care” that household
members are expected to provide. Given this position, we may infer that whether LTC ben-
eficiaries have equal access to formal LTC independently from the informal care they may
receive, beyond usual informal care, is of policy relevance in the Netherlands.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we use high-quality population data to measure income-related inequality
in the use of LTC services in the context of the generous Dutch public LTC insurance. We
test the “equal care for equal needs” principle by relying on an explicit norm of vertical eq-
uity in care use, which is derived from the eligibility decisions issued by the central needs
assessment agency.
The results are somewhat at odds with the common view that the Dutch LTC system is
very egalitarian. Rich or poor, the old Dutch appear to be using a value of LTC lower than
what they are entitled to. However, the “under-utilization” of LTC, in relation to assessed
needs, is more pronounced among the rich than among the poor. This implies that the
income-related inequality in use we document cannot be entirely explained by differential
needs for LTC across the income distribution. Separate analyses for home care versus insti-
tutional care show that i) differential (under)use of LTC is more marked among individuals
eligible for home care and ii) the differential probability to stay in a nursing home, when
eligible, contributes to the difference in LTC use.
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Interpreting our results in terms of horizontal inequity requires several important as-
sumptions regarding the definition of fairness, the role of preferences and about informal
care being a legitimate substitute for publicly-subsidized formal care. It also rests on CIZ
entitlements being a relevant indicator of the legitimate determinants of LTC use. In the
case the rich are more able to navigate the LTC system and claim benefits, relying on CIZ-
assessed needs would hide potential socio-economic inequity at the stage of the eligibility
decision. Further empirical evidence on the drivers of LTC eligibility and how they relate to
socio-economic conditions is needed, so that we can fully assess whether the allocation of
public support to the disabled elderly meets with the concern for equitable access to LTC,
while ensuring that the highest value is derived from the publicly-subsidized services being
used.
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Appendix
4.A Data treatment and sample selection
4.A.1. Description of datasets
We match together different microdatasets, the access to which was granted by Statistics
Netherlands, by the means of a unique identifier. The datasets are described in Table 4.A.1.
Table 4.A.1 – Description of the microdata sources
Dataset Source Unit of observation Content
Long–term care
CIZ eligibility decisions
(INDICAWBZTAB)
CIZ One eligibility
decision of an
individual
Date of start; date of end; types of
care prescribed; volume of care
prescribed
Use of home care
(GEBZZVTAB)
CAK One care period for
an individual
Care period; types of care used;
volume of care used
Use of institutional care
(ZORGMVTAB)
CAK One institutional
stay of an individual
Date of start; date of end; ZZP
package
Take-up of cash benefits
(GBBAWBZTAB)
Vektis A period of cash
benefits use of an
individual
Date of start; date of end; types of
care for which the budget was
granted
Income and wealth
Personal and household
income (Integraal
Huishoudens Inkomen)
Tax records
An individual Total household taxable income
Assets (Integraal
Vermogen)
Tax records An individual Household financial and housing
assets and debts
Others
Demographic information
(GBAPERSOONTAB)
Municipal
population
registers
An individual Age, gender, migrant background
Record of deaths
(GBAOVERLIJDENTAB)
Municipal
population
registers
An individual Date of death, if any
Spouse/registered partner
identifier (GBAVERBIN-
TENISPARTNERBUS)
Municipal
population
registers
One partner of an
individual
Date of formation of the couple;
date of dissolution; identifier of
the spouse
Household composition
(GBAHUISHOUDENSBUS)
Municipal
population
registers
One household of
an individual
Date of formation of the
household; date of dissolution;
number of adults and children in
the household
Address
(GBAADRESOBJECTBUS +
VSLGWBTAB)
Municipal
population
registers
One address of an
individual
Housing identifier; corresponding
exact address code
(neighborhood, district,
municipality)
NOTES: In the Netherlands, individuals have to declare any change of address (if their stay exceeds 4
months) to the municipality of their new address. Deaths and births have also to be reported to the
municipality. We can thus track individuals’ location, couples and household composition. Over one year,
an individual can have different addresses, can get, lose or change partners or household composition.
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To complement the individual-level data sources, we use the following additional data
and grids:
1. The grid of the official tariffs of LTC services applied in 2012 (source: CAK);
2. The grid used to convert entitlements to institutional care with a given package of
services (ZZP package) into a package of home care services (source: College voor
Zorgverzekeringen, CVZ);
3. The grid used to convert entitlements to home care services into cash benefits (source:
CVZ);
4. The correspondence map between the municipalities and the 32 contracting LTC re-
gions (source: Gebieden in Nederland 2012 dataset, CBS).
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4.A.2. Sample selection
Our population of interest is made of all individuals who were born in or before 1952,
who were alive at least one day in 2012 and who were made eligible for “elderly” LTC by CIZ
at least one day in the year 2012.
An individual is considered as eligible for “elderly” LTC if she was made eligible at least
one day for home care services, for a stay in a nursing home, in a residential care home,
in a rehabilitation center or in a palliative care center, due to a somatic or psycho-geriatric
condition.51 Our population of interest is made of 618,041 individual.
We keep individuals for which we have information on age, gender, marital status, house-
hold composition, migrant background, income, wealth, home ownership and address. The
data contain very few missing values. As displayed in Table 4.A.2, we loose only 1,107 indi-
viduals throughout the matching of our different data sources. Our baseline sample is made
of 616,934 individuals (99.82% of the population of interest).
Table 4.A.2 – Sample selection
Sample size Share of
previous
sample
Share of
population of
interest
After treatment of information on eligibility for and
use of care, date of birth and date of death
618,041 100.0% 100.0%
(Population of interest)
After merging additional socio-demographic
information
618,034 99.99% 99.99%
After merging income and wealth information 617,635 99.94% 99.93%
After merging information on address 616,934 99.88% 99.82%
(Baseline sample)
51CIZ assigns an applicant a primary condition and a secondary condition motivating the entitlements to
LTC. We retain individuals with a somatic or psycho-geriatric condition, whether one of these conditions is
registered as the primary or as the secondary condition.
286
EQUITY IN THE DUTCH LONG-TERM CARE SYSTEM
4.B Additional information of the Dutch long-term care sys-
tem
4.B.1. Prices of LTC services in the Netherlands
The monetary costs of LTC services funded through the public insurance system are com-
puted using a national grid of tariffs, presented in Table 4.B.1.
LTC institutions, who are public in the Netherlands, receive funding in accordance with
this grid. Providers of home care services are mostly private; those covered by the public LTC
insurance contract with the regional authorities and agree on hourly prices that should not
exceed the national tariffs reported below.
Table 4.B.1 – Tariffs of publicly-funded LTC services in the Netherlands in 2012
Home care services Nursing and residential care homes
Type of care Tariff/hour Level of services
(ZZP package)
Tariff/day
Personal care e49.81 Level 1 e63.03
Guidance e57.75 Level 2 e80.44
Nursing care e71.52 Level 3 e98.07
Level 4 e113.117
Level 5 e174.32
Level 6 e168.28
Level 7 e210.35
Level 8 e239.14
Level 9 e211.21
Level 10 e259.72
SOURCES: Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit (2011b,a).
NOTES: In the Netherlands, domestic help is not funded by the public LTC insurance. The ZZP
packages we refer to correspond to institutional care of type Verpleging en verzoging (stays in
a nursing home, residential care home, rehabilitation center or palliative care center).
When individuals are eligible for institutional care but they choose to stay in the com-
munity and receive home care services instead, the package of services they would have
received in an institutional setting is converted into a certain package of home care services,
following the grid presented in Table 4.B.2.
Table 4.B.2 also provides a comparison between the monetary value of an institutional
stay and the monetary value of the equivalent package of home care services. The absolute
difference between monetary values, as a function of the level of services (thus, roughly as a
function of the severity of disability), is U-shaped. The difference exceeds a hundred euros
per week for low levels of disability; it decreases until the two living arrangements are equally
costly (for ZZP package 7), before increasing again for the most severe disability levels. Indi-
viduals who opt for home care when they are eligible for institutional care with low and high
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levels of LTC services have thus a lower value of LTC use than similar individuals opting for a
stay in an institution.
Table 4.B.2 – Correspondence between institutional care and home care: Official conversion
grid and comparison of costs
Hours of home care services, per week Monetary value, per week
Personal
care
Nursing
care
Guidance Cost of
home care
equivalent
Difference
institutional
care −
home care
Ratio of
home care
cost /insti-
tutional
care cost
Level of services
(ZZP package)
(1) (2) (3) (a) (b) (c)
Level 1 1 1.5 3 e330 e110 74.9%
Level 2 5.5 1.5 1 e440 e123 78.1%
Level 3 8.5 1.5 1 e589 e97 85.8%
Level 4 5.5 1.5 5.5 e699 e92 88.3%
Level 5 5.5 5.5 8.5 e1,158 e61 95.0%
Level 6 8.5 5.5 5.5 e1,135 e42 96.4%
Level 7 8.5 5.5 11.5 e1,481 -e9 100.6%
Level 8 11.5 5.5 11.5 e1,631 e42 97.5%
Level 9 8.5 5.5 8.5 e1,308 e170 88.5%
Level 10 14.5 8.5 5.5 e1,649 e168 90.7%
SOURCE: College voor Zorgverzekeringen (2012); Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit (2011b,a). Authors’ computations
of weekly monetary values.
READING: An individual made eligible for institutional care with a ZZP package of level 1 will be equivalently
entitled to receive 1 hour of personal care, 1.5 hour of nursing care and 3 hours of guidance per week. The mon-
etary value of home care services equivalent to the level of services the individual would receive in institution
represents 74.9% of the monetary value of the institutional care she is entitled to.
NOTES: The ZZP packages we refer to correspond to institutional care of type Verpleging en verzoging (stays in
a nursing home, residential care home, rehabilitation center or palliative care center).
Individuals eligible for either home or institutional care can also opt for cash benefits (or
a combination of cash benefits and in-kind care). If the individual is eligible for institutional
care, her entitlements are first converted into a package of home care services (grid in Table
4.B.2). The value of the cash benefits is equal to the monetary value of the package of home
care services, computed using the tariffs of Table 4.B.1, minus a 25% discount.
From the individual point of view, these figures do not adequately capture the incentive
to substitute institutional care for home care: the individual bears only part of the cost of the
care she receives and the schedule of co-payments is not the same for home care and insti-
tutional care. The schedule of the co-payments on public LTC is described in the following
section.
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4.B.2. Co-payments in the Dutch LTC system
The use of LTC services within the Dutch public LTC insurance requires beneficiaries to
pay part of the costs of the services. Co-payment schedules are not the same for institutional
care and home care.
Co-payment on home care use
Co-payment schedule
The following description is partly based on Non (2017) and presents the rules and values
applicable in 2012.
For home care, a year is divided into 13 periods of 4 weeks. The computation of co-
payments is based on the total number of hours of home care used each care period at the
household level.52 Basically, the cost-sharing rule is such that individuals have to bear part of
the cost of each additional hour of care they consume, before they reach a volume of care be-
yond which each additional hour consumed becomes free of charge. This threshold volume
of care is increasing with the income measure relevant for the scheme and additionally de-
pends on some individual and household characteristics. In practice, this means that there
is a cap on the co-payment to be paid in each care period, which depends on income — and
never exceeds it.53
When applicable, the marginal price of care that individuals have to pay out-of-pocket is
e13.4 (18% of the national tariff of one hour of nursing care and 27% of the tariff of one hour
of personal care).
Taking the case of individuals who are 65+ and are single (the most typical case in our
population of interest), the co-payment cap (per care period) is equal to the maximum of:
C̄P = max(18;0.0115× Ĩ−167)
where C̄P denotes the co-payment cap (per four-week period) and Ĩ the relevant (annual)
income measure. For individuals with income below e14,521 annually, this means that the
co-payment will be capped toe18 per care period.54
On Figure 4.B.1, we have depicted the budget constraint (per four-week period) of indi-
viduals eligible for home care (who are single and 65+), in the plane (h,Y) (h is the number of
52The hours taken into account group together the hours of personal care, nursing care and guidance that are
part of the public LTC insurance scheme, and the hours of domestic help that are financed by municipalities
(Wmo scheme).
53Whatever the levels of income, wealth and disability levels, an individual is never required to finance pri-
vately more than 25% of the total costs of the care she may receive in the community.
54The amount ofe18 is also the minimum co-payment that individuals have to pay every four week as soon
as they receive home care (for single individuals).
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home care hours consumed per four-week period, Y is the composite good). h̄ denotes the
number of hours the individual was made eligible for (per care period) by CIZ; h̃ is the num-
ber of hours consumed beyond which the co-payment cap becomes binding (it is a function
of the individual’s income and characteristics X). For individuals with Ĩ ≤ 14,521, except for
the very first half-an-hour of care, the marginal price of care is null whatever their consump-
tion level (as long as it remains below what they are entitled to).
Figure 4.B.1 – Budget constraint for single, 65+ individuals eligible for home care (per four-
week period).
For individuals who are single but have not turned 65 yet, the annual income threshold
(below which their co-payment is capped at e18 per care period) is of e21,391. For
individuals who live with other household members, the minimum co-payment is ofe25.8.
This is also the co-payment cap for low-income individuals in this family setting (household
income below e20,173 if both partners are 65 and older, or household income below
e26,173 if one partner is younger than 65).
Relevant income measure for home care
The income measure taken into account to compute co-payments on home care includes
all income from work, social benefits and pension benefits, as well as 4% of taxable financial
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assets.55
For individuals living with other household members, taxable household income is taken
into account.
For LTC services consumed in 2012, the computation of co-payments is based on income
of year 2010 and on the financial assets held on January, 1st 2010.
Practical examples
Table 4.B.3 – Co-payments and effort rate on home care: Some practical examples
Annual income Ĩ
e15,000 e30,000 e70,000
Very low use: 2 hours/week e18 e107 e107
1.6% 4.7% 2.0%
Low use: 5.5 hours/week e18 e178 e295
1.6% 7.7% 5.5%
Median use: 13 hours/week e18 e120 e638
1.6% 7.7% 11.9%
Intensive use: 28.5 hours/week e18 e120 e638
1.6% 7.7% 11.9%
NOTES: Co-payments per care period are expressed in euros. We assume here that per capita wealth is
lower than e21,139. The effort rate is expressed in percentages and is equal to the ratio of co-payments
to income. Levels of use (low, median and intensive) are defined in reference to ZZP packages (cf. Table
4.B.2).
As shown by Table 4.B.3, when individuals have no taxable wealth, the effort rate (com-
puted as the ratio of co-payments to income) is systematically lower than 12%. For indi-
viduals with very low income, co-payments are capped at a very low level (effort rate of
1.6%, whatever the consumption level). Finally, for individuals with income close to the
average equivalized household income observed in our population of interest (e30,000), the
co-payments do not exceed 8% of income.
If we now take into account taxable wealth, we observe that effort rates increase: for
an individual with average income and average per capita wealth (e150,000), the share of
income that she has to pay for LTC can reach 10% even for low use of LTC. Yet, unless indi-
viduals enjoy very high levels of wealth, the effort rate remains lower than 16%.56
All in all, co-payments are capped at relatively low levels when care is received in the
community, meaning that the public LTC system eliminates a substantial share of the
55These are the assets held in bank accounts, stocks and bonds in excess of an amount of e21,139 per indi-
vidual.
56This is the level reached by an individual with annual income equal toe70,000 and per capita wealth equal
toe500,000. For an individual with an incomee70,000, the maximum amount of co-payments (aboute1,500
per 4-week period) she can be expected to pay for intensive care use is hit only if her wealth exceeds Me2.
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financial risk associated with old-age disability for the majority of individuals.
Co-payment schedule on institutional care use
The concept of care period is not used for institutional care, as stays in institution are
meant to be on a permanent basis.
The schedule for computing the monthly co-payment on institutional care depends on
the individual and household characteristics of the beneficiary:
• When the beneficiary’s spouse does not live in a nursing home, or when the beneficiary
was admitted less than 6 months ago in the institutional setting, or when she is raising
a child:
CPi nst = 0,125× (Ĩi nst /12)
where Ĩi nst is the relevant income measure. The co-payment is subject to a minimum
ofe156 and a maximum ofe816.4 per month.
• Otherwise:
CPi nst = mi n(2,248; Ĩi nst /12)
Co-payment on institutional care does not depend on the intensity of care received.
Thus, for individuals with high income and moderate needs, co-payments can be much
higher if they choose to enter a nursing home than if they convert their entitlements into
home care use.
Relevant income measure for institutional care
The relevant income measure is the beneficiary’s income minus health insurance pre-
miums, an allowance for pocket money, a rebate if the beneficiary is retired, 15% of labor
income and 25% of any income above the income threshold (e8,076 when the beneficiary is
single;e9,785 for two beneficiaries living together).
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4.C Additional descriptive statistics
4.C.1. LTC utilization rates in the Dutch elderly population
To ease the comparison of the Dutch LTC system with other countries, Table 4.C.1 pro-
vides the share of the elderly population eligible for publicly-funded LTC and the utilization
rates of LTC services.
Table 4.C.1 – LTC eligibility and utilization rates in the Dutch elderly population in 2012
Among the 60+ Among the 65+
Eligible for LTC 14.8% 19.3%
Eligible for home care 9.7% 12.3%
Eligible for institutional care 6.9% 9.2%
Use of LTC 13.6% 17.7%
Use of home care 9.1% 11.8%
Use of institutional care 5.7% 7.7%
Take-up of cash benefits 0.6% 0.7%
Size of population 4,149,445 3,038,407
NOTES: Eligibility and utilization rates in the 60+ population (resp. 65+ population) are
computed on the basis of all individuals who were born in 1952 (resp. 1947) or before and
who were alive at least 1 day in 2012. Are taken into consideration only entitlements to
“elderly LTC” (granted due to a somatic or psycho-geriatric condition; institutional stays
in an institution other than a nursing home, a residential care home, a rehabilitation
center or a palliative care center are not taken into account). Only the use of LTC and cash
benefits while the individual was eligible for “elderly LTC” is taken into consideration.
These eligibility and utilization rates were obtained computing the number of all indi-
viduals eligible for or using either “elderly” institutional care or home care at any point of
2012, and dividing by the of individuals who were born before 1952 (or 1947) and were alive
at least one day in 2012. Moreover, these figures do not take into consideration the elderly
who were eligible for and used LTC services because of cognitive, physical or sensory hand-
icaps or of long-term mental health problems. These are two important elements to keep
in mind when interpreting these figures and comparing them with other available statistics
(e.g. Muir (2017); OECD (2017a)): similar rates may be derived taking the ratio of the number
of individuals eligible for or using (any type of) LTC to individuals alive one specific day of
the year, depending on the country and type of care being considered.
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4.C.2. Descriptive statistics: Individuals eligible for home care and individ-
uals eligible for institutional care
Table 4.C.2 – Descriptive statistics by subgroup of eligibility
Eligible for: Home care Institutional care
Mean
Panel A: Eligibility
Eligibility for home care in the year 1.000 0.254
Eligible for institutional care in the year 0.182 1.000
Eligible for both home care and institutional care 0.182 0.254
Value of entitlements to home care 18.726 4.052
Value of entitlements to institutional care 4.275 40.457
Value of LTC prescribed during the year 23.000 44.509
Number of indications over the year 2.0 1.8
Number of days of LTC eligibility 242.9 279.6
Panel B: LTC Use
Any use of in-kind home care 0.854 0.364
Any use of institutional care 0.134 0.829
Any take-up of cash benefits 0.058 0.024
Use of LTC 0.905 0.956
Value of in-kind home care used 9.929 5.643
Value of institutional care used 2.216 31.271
Value of cash benefits 1.161 0.823
Value of total LTC used 13.307 37.737
Panel C: Demographic characteristics
Gender: woman 0.645 0.704
Age: 60–69 0.159 0.064
Age: 70–79 0.302 0.192
Age: 80–84 0.233 0.227
Age: 85–89 0.195 0.269
Age: 90+ 0.111 0.247
Has died in 2012 0.131 0.211
Married/in civil partnership 0.404 0.262
Partner in household 0.396 0.190
Number of household members 1.5 1.3
Origin: Dutch 0.869 0.898
Origin: foreign Western country 0.090 0.085
Origin: non-Western country 0.040 0.017
Panel D: Socio-economic characteristics
Equivalized household income 30.569 27.721
Net wealth (per capita) 170.839 142.606
Owner of main residence 0.367 0.263
Observations 401262 287932
SAMPLES: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public “elderly” home care or institutional care in the
Netherlands in 2012.
NOTES: Values of LTC entitlements and use and income are expressed in thousands euros per year.
Wealth is expressed in in thousands euros. Individuals eligible for institutional care may be con-
sidered as having a partner in the household in the case they have not spent the entire year in an
institutional setting.
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4.C.3. Concentration curves of LTC use among individuals eligible for
home care and among individuals eligible for institutional care
Figure 4.C.1 – Concentration curve of LTC use, by subgroup.
Panel A (top): Individuals eligible for home care.
Panel B (bottom): Individuals eligible for institutional care.
SAMPLE: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public home care (Panel A) or institutional
care (Panel B) in the Netherlands in 2012 (N=401,262 in Panel A; N=287,932 in Panel B).
NOTES: LTC use is expressed in annual monetary value. In Panel A, it is the sum of
the value of home care services used in kind and of the imputed value of cash benefits
granted while the individual was eligible for home care in 2012. In Panel B, it is the sum
of the value of home care services used in kind and of the imputed value of cash benefits
granted while the individual was eligible for home care in 2012. Individuals are ranked
by their equivalized 2011 household taxable income.
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4.C.4. Use of cash benefits by income deciles
In the Netherlands, individuals eligible for some public LTC have, in most cases, the op-
tion to opt for cash benefits rather than receiving in-kind care. In 2014, cash-benefits repre-
sented 9% of all LTC expenditures and the sustained rise in this figure turns out to be a policy
concern (Maarse and Jeurissen, 2016). Yet the take-up of cash benefits (also called personal
budgets, or PGB) is more frequent for individuals with handicaps or mental health problems
than among the disabled elderly.
As displayed in Table 4.C.3, the proportion of the population eligible for some LTC in
2012 that used cash benefits that year is less than 5%. The take-up rate however increases
at the top of the income distribution: it exceeds 9% among the 10% richest individuals. The
positive income-gradient in the take-up of cash benefits is especially noticeable among in-
dividuals eligible for institutional care, while the differences in the average value of cash
benefits for those who use them when eligible for institutional care are less marked. This
pattern is consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that some very well-off individuals
opt for cash benefits, when eligible for institutional care in order, to arrange their own LTC
provision in a private luxury residential care home.57
Among individuals eligible for home care, the take-up rate of cash benefits is relatively
high in the bottom 2 income deciles, and it increases again in the top 3 income deciles.
When looking at the average value of cash benefits being received, we now see a strong pos-
itive income-gradient: among those receiving cash benefits when eligible for home care,
the income-rich beneficiaries receive an amount 50% higher on average. Again, in line with
some anecdotal evidence, these patterns may suggest two things: i) the poor are more likely
than individuals in the middle of the distribution to opt for cash benefits to formally hire
some informal caregivers, and ii) the rich are more likely to take up cash benefits, even at
relatively high levels of needs as assessed by CIZ, to arrange their home care provision them-
selves.
57On aggregate though, privately-funded LTC facilities seem to remain marginal in the Netherlands.
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Table 4.C.3 – Take-up and average value of cash benefits, by income deciles.
Entire Eligible for:
population Home care Institutional care
(1) (2) (3)
Take-up of cash benefits
Income decile 1 0.038 0.090 0.011
Income decile 2 0.043 0.065 0.016
Income decile 3 0.029 0.040 0.015
Income decile 4 0.026 0.033 0.014
Income decile 5 0.032 0.042 0.015
Income decile 6 0.034 0.044 0.019
Income decile 7 0.034 0.042 0.021
Income decile 8 0.046 0.055 0.032
Income decile 9 0.065 0.076 0.049
Income decile 10 0.093 0.108 0.072
Observations 616934 401262 287932
Average imputed value of cash benefits among users
Income decile 1 18.829 17.399 32.787
Income decile 2 17.895 16.680 31.246
Income decile 3 18.888 18.007 32.053
Income decile 4 18.926 17.623 32.762
Income decile 5 19.150 18.129 32.341
Income decile 6 18.924 17.683 34.028
Income decile 7 19.870 18.731 33.403
Income decile 8 19.497 17.644 32.605
Income decile 9 22.605 21.425 33.869
Income decile 10 27.188 26.473 35.898
Observations 27143 23316 7035
NOTES: The average value of cash benefits is computed among individuals who used at least
once cash benefits in the year (while eligible for home care in Column (2), or while eligible for
institutional care in Column (3)). The number of observations displayed on the last row gives
the number of individuals who were granted cash benefits in 2012 in each of the samples.
The value of cash benefits used has to be imputed based on information on LTC eligibility.
The value is expressed in thousands euros per year. This is the value of cash benefits before
income-dependent deductions apply.
297
CHAPTER 4
4.D Complementary inputs on horizontal inequity assess-
ment and decomposition analysis
4.D.1. Estimates of the model of LTC use: baseline sample
In this Appendix, we complement the comments made on the estimates of the regression
of LTC use on needs and non-need factors (Equation (4.9), Section 5.3), on which the decom-
position analysis is based. Table 4.D.1 reports the estimates β̂NNk . For better readability, we
report the coefficients associated with the income, wealth and regional dummies separately
(Figures 4.D.1 to 4.D.2).
The negative income gradient in LTC use is mostly driven by the high positive coefficients
in the bottom of the income distribution: being among the 10% poorest individuals is asso-
ciated with an increase of almost e2,500 in annual LTC use, as compared to being in the
middle of the income distribution (5th decile), while differences between income deciles 2 to
8 are rather limited (Figure 4.D.1). The top two income deciles use significantly less (about
e1,000) than individuals in the middle of the income distribution. Differences across the
wealth distribution — controlling for income — are much less pronounced (Figure 4.D.2).
Having a partner in the household is associated with lower LTC use (-e3,000 a year). This
seems to suggest that the partner provides informal care substituting for formal LTC services
above and beyond the level of “usual care” provided by co-residing relatives that should, by
law, be taken into account by CIZ assessors. Following this interpretation, the coefficient
could be read as a rough estimate of the additional savings that informal care could generate
for the public LTC insurance — beyond the domestic help and personal care that household
members are already expected to provide. Yet this coefficient may capture a composition
effect. Individuals who live in an institution do not have a partner in the house, by definition,
and they use LTC services that tend, in most cases, to be more expensive than care provided
in the community. Surprisingly maybe, having an additional co-residing relative (beyond the
partner) is associated with a higher value of LTC use.58
Overall, our estimates show that demographic and socio-economic characteristics have a
substantial impact on the use of LTC, even when we control for CIZ-assessed LTC needs. The
statistical significance of our coefficients per se suggests that the Dutch elderly population
do receive different levels of care for equal needs, depending on their characteristics.
58Given that only few elderly in the Netherlands reside with a relative other than their spouse, this coeffi-
cient may pick up very specific living arrangements and informal care patterns. It might also be that the “extra”
household members compete for care if they are young children or elders as well, or that the non-coordination
of potential informal caregivers induces a Nash equilibrium with lower informal care provision than the level
we would observe in the presence of a unique co-residing relative (see e.g. Fontaine et al. (2009) for an illustra-
tion of this mechanism in the case the potential caregivers are non-co-residing children).
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Table 4.D.1 – Model of LTC use: OLS regression results (entire sample)
Dependent variable: value of LTC use
(1)
Need variable
CIZ-assessed LTC needs 1.000
(.)
Non-need variables
Age: 60–69 -1.929∗∗∗
(0.095)
Age: 70–79 -0.856∗∗∗
(0.067)
Age: 80–84 Reference
Age: 85–89 0.268∗∗∗
(0.063)
Age: 90+ 0.598∗∗∗
(0.070)
Gender: woman 0.662∗∗∗
(0.053)
Partner in household -2.932∗∗∗
(0.074)
Number of household members 0.179∗∗∗
(0.051)
Origin: the Netherlands Reference
Origin: foreign Western country -0.759∗∗∗
(0.088)
Origin: Turkey -5.370∗∗∗
(0.308)
Origin: Morocco -3.926∗∗∗
(0.396)
Orign: Suriname -4.461∗∗∗
(0.295)
Orign: Dutch Caribbean -1.870∗∗∗
(0.558)
Origin: other non-Western country -4.957∗∗∗
(0.374)
Owner of main residence -0.452∗∗∗
(0.086)
Dummies for LTC contracting regions Yes
p < 0.01
Dummies for equivalized household income deciles Yes
p < 0.01
Dummies for per capita wealth deciles Yes
p < 0.01
Constant -9.493∗∗∗
(0.236)
Observations 616934
R2 0.662
NOTES: Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The monetary value of LTC use and CIZ-assessed needs, income and wealth
are expressed in thousands euros. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values for the test of
joint significance (F-test) of the dummies for contracting regions, for income deciles and
for wealth deciles.
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Figure 4.D.1 – Estimates of the coefficients of income deciles.
NOTES: For each coefficient, the 5% confidence interval is depicted (computed using
the Huber-White robust standard errors). LTC use is expressed in monetary value, in
thousands euros per year. Individuals are ranked by their equivalized 2011 household
taxable income. Estimates from the baseline regression (Equation (4.9)).
READING: Being in the 2nd bottom income decile is associated with a higher use of LTC
bye2,500, compared to belonging to the 5th income decile.
Figure 4.D.2 – Estimates of the coefficients of wealth deciles
NOTES: For each coefficient, the 5% confidence interval is depicted (computed using
the Huber-White robust standard errors). LTC use is expressed in monetary value, in
thousands euros per year. Individuals are ranked by their 2011 per capita household
wealth. Estimates from the baseline regression (Equation (4.9)).
READING: Being in the 10th wealth decile is associated with a lower use of LTC by e500,
compared to belonging to the 5th wealth decile.
300
EQUITY IN THE DUTCH LONG-TERM CARE SYSTEM
Figure 4.D.3 – Estimates of the coefficients of LTC contracting regions.
NOTES: For each coefficient, the 5% confidence interval is depicted (computed using
the Huber-White robust standard errors). LTC use is expressed in monetary value, in
thousands euros per year. Ranking of regions from the left to the right is made according
to the value of their coefficient. Estimates from the baseline regression (Equation (4.9)).
READING: Living in the region ranked eight from the left is associated with a higher LTC
use of aboute1,500, compared to living in the region ranked first from the left.
301
CHAPTER 4
4.D.2. Concentration indexes of CIZ needs and non-need factors
Table 4.D.2 – Concentration indexes of CIZ-assessed needs and non-need factors.
Entire sample Eligible for:
Home care Institutional care
(1) (2) (3)
CIZ-assessed LTC needs -0.0358 0.0136 -0.0260
Age -0.0134 -0.0123 -0.0088
Woman -0.0728 -0.0777 -0.0599
Having a partner in the household 0.0263 0.2443 –
Number of household members 0.1307 0.1218 –
Married – – 0.1843
Origin: foreign Western country 0.0434 0.0385 0.0498
Origin: Turkey -0.1407 -0.2033 -0.0990
Origin: Morocco -0.0868 -0.1581 -0.0231
Origin: Suriname -0.2603 -0.2834 -0.2782
Origin: Dutch Caribbean -0.2706 -0.2758 -0.3101
Origin: other non–Western country -0.2177 -0.2602 -0.2048
Equivalized household income 0.3215 0.3120 0.3228
Per capita household wealth 0.4459 0.4314 0.4585
Home owner 0.3264 0.2759 0.3771
NOTES: When estimating the model of LTC use on the subgroup of individuals eligible for institu-
tional care, we do not include the household composition as a control variable. In additional, we
replace the dummy “having a partner in the house” by the marital status.
A negative (positive) concentration index indicates that the characteristic is relatively
more (less) widespread among the income-poor than among the rich. For example, Table
4.D.2 indicates that women and non-Western migrants tend to be poorer, while home own-
ers and individuals with a partner tend to be richer.
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4.D.3. Contributions of non-need factors to horizontal inequity in the sub-
group analysis
Figure 4.D.4 provides the decomposition of the horizontal inequity index in each of the
subgroups, which is discussed in Section 6.2.
The contribution of each factor depends on its sub-sample average (reported in Table
4.D.2, Appendix 4.D) and on the OLS estimate of the coefficient of this factor in the sub-group
regression of LTC use on needs and non-need factors (reported in Table 4.D.3, Appendix 4.D,
p. 305).
Figure 4.D.4 – Contribution of non-need factors to horizontal inequity, by subgroup.
SAMPLES: Individuals 60 and older eligible for either public “elderly” home care (top bar, N=401,262)
or public “elderly” institutional care (bottom bar, N=287,932) in the Netherlands in 2012.
NOTES: Variables depicted on the right-hand side of 0 contribute to pro-rich inequality; variables
on the left-hand side of 0 contribute to pro-poor inequality. Having a partner in the house and
the number of additional household members are variables only included in the model of LTC use
estimated in the subgroup eligible for home care. Conversely, marital status is only included in the
model of LTC use estimated on the subgroup eligible for institutional care.
READING: On a total horizontal inequity index of−0.0612, income contributes negatively by−0.0314
(top bar).
303
CHAPTER 4
4.D.4. Estimates of the model of LTC use in the subgroups eligible for home
care or eligible for institutional care
The linear estimates of the model of LTC use that are used for the decomposition analysis
in the subgroups of individuals eligible for home care or institutional care are presented in
Table 4.D.3, Columns (4) and (6).
This Table additionally presents the estimates for an alternative specification of the
model of LTC use (for the three samples of interest), which we discuss in Appendix 4.E.
Notes for Table 4.D.3: Columns (1), (3) and (5) are obtained by not constraining the co-
efficient of needs to 1. All specifications include dummies for LTC contracting regions, for
income deciles and for wealth deciles. In each specification, the F-test for joint significance
of LTC contracting regions (resp. income deciles or wealth deciles) gives a p-value p < 0.01.
Age 80–89 is the category of reference for age dummies; coming from the Netherlands is the
category of reference for the migrant background. Linear estimates are obtained by OLS es-
timation in Columns (1), (3) and (5) and by Maximum Likelihood estimation in Columns (2),
(4) and (6). We use the Stata command cnsreg to run the constrained linear estimations.
The table provides the Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.D.3 – Model of LTC use: OLS regression results by subgroup.
Dependent variable: value of LTC use
Eligible for: Entire sample Home care Institutional care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CIZ-assessed LTC needs 0.687∗∗∗ 1.000 0.499∗∗∗ 1.000 0.990∗∗∗ 1.000
(0.002) (.) (0.003) (.) (0.001) (.)
Age: 60-69 -3.273∗∗∗ -1.929∗∗∗ -1.142∗∗∗ -1.808∗∗∗ -2.799∗∗∗ -2.762∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.095) (0.069) (0.112) (0.128) (0.128)
Age: 70-79 -1.779∗∗∗ -0.856∗∗∗ -0.684∗∗∗ -0.633∗∗∗ -1.390∗∗∗ -1.368∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.067) (0.052) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
Age: 85-89 1.270∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ -0.182∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.063) (0.057) (0.084) (0.069) (0.069)
Age: 90+ 3.275∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 1.714∗∗∗ -1.381∗∗∗ 1.397∗∗∗ 1.360∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.070) (0.078) (0.113) (0.070) (0.070)
Gender: woman -0.061 0.662∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 1.574∗∗∗ -0.631∗∗∗ -0.634∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.053) (0.044) (0.070) (0.059) (0.059)
Married -0.805∗∗∗ -0.794∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.064)
Having a partner in the household -5.060∗∗∗ -2.932∗∗∗ -1.278∗∗∗ -1.579∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.074) (0.059) (0.095)
Number of household members 1.099∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ -0.450∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.051) (0.045) (0.073)
Origin: foreign Western country -0.493∗∗∗ -0.759∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗∗ -1.065∗∗∗ -0.079 -0.084
(0.075) (0.088) (0.071) (0.115) (0.096) (0.096)
Origin: Turkey -5.978∗∗∗ -5.370∗∗∗ -2.594∗∗∗ -5.093∗∗∗ -3.651∗∗∗ -3.649∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.308) (0.165) (0.322) (0.724) (0.727)
Origin: Morocco -4.771∗∗∗ -3.926∗∗∗ -1.264∗∗∗ -3.373∗∗∗ -4.195∗∗∗ -4.186∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.396) (0.240) (0.416) (0.897) (0.900)
Orign: Suriname -3.046∗∗∗ -4.461∗∗∗ -0.653∗∗ -5.906∗∗∗ -0.140 -0.150
(0.242) (0.295) (0.227) (0.362) (0.372) (0.373)
Orign: Dutch Caribbean -1.603∗∗∗ -1.870∗∗∗ 0.452 -1.740∗ -0.411 -0.414
(0.483) (0.558) (0.478) (0.704) (0.611) (0.611)
Origin: foreign non-Western country -4.709∗∗∗ -4.957∗∗∗ -2.262∗∗∗ -5.495∗∗∗ -1.846∗∗∗ -1.833∗∗∗
(0.296) (0.374) (0.253) (0.455) (0.480) (0.481)
Owner of main residence -1.660∗∗∗ -0.452∗∗∗ -0.093 0.498∗∗∗ -1.412∗∗∗ -1.370∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.086) (0.075) (0.117) (0.094) (0.094)
Constant -0.392 -9.493∗∗∗ -0.110 -7.488∗∗∗ -7.862∗∗∗ -8.217∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.236) (0.205) (0.332) (0.254) (0.254)
Observations 616934 401262 287932
R2 0.662 – 0.595 – 0.734 –
NOTES: See page 4.D.
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4.E Playing around with the norm of vertical equity in use
As explained in Section 3.2, the empirical assessment of horizontal inequity in use must
rely on a stance regarding vertical equity in use. We have claimed that CIZ eligibility deci-
sions provide an explicit and relevant norm of vertical equity in the use of LTC services within
the Dutch LTC system.
An alternative assumption that could be made with our data is that CIZ-assessed needs
sum up all the relevant information regarding the legitimate needs for LTC without exactly
embodying the relevant norm of vertical equity. We could then invoke the conventional as-
sumption that “on average the system gets it right” in terms of how much individuals with
different levels of needs should receive different levels of care (van de Poel et al., 2012). Put it
differently, rather than assuming that CIZ eligibility decisions provide both a relevant mea-
sure of needs and determine how needs for LTC should legitimately relate to use, we could
instead assume that CIZ eligibility decisions indeed give a relevant measure of needs, but
that the system-wide average relationship between needs and use reveals what is fair.
One drawback of this alternative assumption is that it amounts to ruling out that there
is vertical inequity in use on average. In addition to the institutional elements that make
a strong case for considering that CIZ decisions embody an equity norm (as discussed in
Section 3.2), this is the reason why we stick to our initial assumption. We however show in
this Appendix the results we would obtain under the alternative assumption. This way, we
will provide an assessment of how different the conclusions would be if we were to rely on a
different (less grounded, in our opinion) value judgment.
The literature has underlined that the results from an empirical assessment of horizon-
tal inequity may be extremely sensitive to the explicit or implicit stance in terms of fairness.
For the studies that rely on survey data with no straightforward, single measure of needs, this
means that estimates may vary depending on where we draw the line between legitimate de-
terminants of care use (needs) and illegitimate ones (non-need factors). This is remarkably
illustrated by Morris et al. (2005) in the context of health care use; using SHARE data, Ilinca
et al. (2017) show that the horizontal inequity index in formal home care use varies substan-
tially in some European countries when household structures are considered as needs rather
than as non-need factors.
For the reader not familiar with this literature, this Appendix will also precisely shows
how our empirical approach (closely) relates to the methodology used in the other existing
papers that have derived a synthetic measure of horizontal inequity in the use of LTC services
in several European countries (García-Gómez et al., 2015; Carrieri et al., 2017; Ilinca et al.,
2017; Rodrigues et al., 2017)
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4.E.1. Statistical derivation of the norm of vertical equity in use
If we take that CIZ assessments provide a relevant measure of needs but do not say how
these needs should legitimately relate to LTC use, we can statistically derive the norm of
vertical equity in use, following the methodology developed by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer
(2000b).
In our framework, assume the monetary value of LTC services consumed by individual i ,
yi , is a linear function of the needs as assessed by CIZ, xi , and of the K “non-need variables”,
zki , which are assumed to be additively separable:
yi = β0 +βNxi +
K∑
k=1
βNNk z
k
i +εi (4.10)
where εi is an idiosyncratic error term. From the estimation of Equation (4.10), we con-
struct the need-predicted LTC use ŷNi as:
ŷNi = β̂0 + β̂Nxi +
K∑
k=1
β̂NNk z̄
k (4.11)
where z̄k is the population average of variable zk .59 Need-predicted use gives the value
of LTC services that would be observed if only needs mattered. We now compute the need-
standardized LTC use for individual i , ŷ ISi , as:
ŷ ISi = yi − ŷNi + ȳ (4.12)
The horizontal inequity index of LTC use, HI(y), is then equal to:
HI(y) = CI(ŷ IS) (4.13)
= CI(y)−CI(ŷN) (4.14)
In this framework, the contribution of needs to total income-related inequality in use,
CI(ŷN), is equal to
(
βN x̄ȳ
)
CI(x). The horizontal inequity index is indeed obtained by subtract-
ing fair inequalities from total inequalities.
Obviously, the analysis bears close resemblance with the empirical approach we adopt
in the paper. Equation (4.9), on which we base the decomposition of horizontal inequity in
Section 5.3, is nested in Equation (4.10): we obtain it by constraining the coefficient βN to 1.
We can fit our own analysis into this more general framework by defining the need-predicted
LTC use ŷNi in our baseline analysis as xi +(ȳ− x̄). We obtain: y IS = (yi −xi )+ x̄. In both cases,
59Taking the population averages of need variables to plug them in the need-predicted care is a normalization
made to ensure that the population average of ŷN is equal to ȳ .
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the horizontal inequity index is equal to the concentration index of the need-standardized
use, or to the difference between the concentration index of actual use and the concentration
index of need-predicted use.60
In our own analysis, the inclusion of non-need factors only affects the decomposition
analysis: whether we can interpret the βNNk in a causal way in Equation (4.10) (with β
N equal
to 1) or not will affect the way we can interpret the contribution of each factor, but will not
impact the computation of the horizontal inequity index.
When relying on a statistical derivation of the norm of vertical equity, the empirical chal-
lenge consists in specifying the “right” model of care use. The econometric model should
be such that the estimate of the coefficient ahead of the need variable reveals how much an
additional euro of CIZ entitlements would translate into extra spending on LTC, assuming
that the system is vertically equitable. The inclusion of the non-need variables in the model
has been the object of some debates (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000a), but there seems
now to be a consensus that all non-need determinants of LTC use that correlate with needs
should be included. Failing to include one such factor in the model would induce an omitted
variable bias on β̂N. In practical terms, this means we would end up comparing individuals
with different needs that also differ in some other (illegitimate) determinants of LTC use.
This will in turn bias the estimate of the concentration index of need-predicted use and, ulti-
mately, HI. The derivation of HI under the alternative assumption is thus sensitive to having
a limited set of socio-economic and demographic control variables.
In the standard methodology, the decomposition formula rewrites as:
CI(y) = (βN x̄
ȳ
)
CI(x)+
K∑
k=1
[(
βNNk
z̄k
ȳ
)
CI(zk )
]
+ 2cov(ε,r
I)
ȳ
(4.15)
= CN(y)+CNN(y)+ 2cov(ε,r
I)
ȳ
(4.16)
= CN(y)+HI(y) (4.17)
We replicate the analysis presented in the core of the paper without constraining the co-
efficient βN to 1. The results are presented in the following two Appendices. We use Equation
(4.15) to understand the differences with our baseline results:
• The difference between the contribution of needs in our own analysis and under the alter-
native assumption (that βN 6= 1) will be all the higher as β̂N differs from 1.
• While in our analysis, the residual in the decomposition was unambiguously treated as
horizontal inequity, this is less clear-cut under the alternative assumption. If ε includes
unobserved factors that correlate with needs, then the residual may be the counterpart of
60In the case βN is constrained to 1, the contribution of needs to total inequality is: CI(ŷN) = x̄ȳ CI(x).
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the omitted variable bias on β̂N. If the residual is high, one may take the contribution of
non-need factors CNN(y) as a conservative horizontal inequity index (Bago d’Uva et al.,
2009).61
• Finally, the difference in the contribution to HI of a given non-need factor zk in our base-
line analysis and under the alternative assumption will arise because of the difference in
the estimate β̂NNk in the two specifications. The contribution of z
k will varies all the more
between the two analysis as zk correlates with CIZ-assessed needs, x.
4.E.2. Robustness of the results under the alternative assumption
Linear estimation of the impact of needs and non-need factors
In Table 4.D.3 (page 305), we report the estimates of Equation (4.10) for each subgroup
and each specification. In Columns (2), (4) and (6), βN is constrained to 1 (as in our core
analysis); in Columns (1), (3) and (5), it is estimated empirically.
Comparing Columns (5) and (6), we observe that the alternative assumption makes
very little difference when we focus on individuals eligible for institutional of care: β̂N is
extremely close to 1. This means that the norm of vertical equity of CIZ assessors almost
perfectly fits the average relationship between entitlements for care and actual use. This
result stands in sharp contrast with the results obtained on the individuals eligible for
home care: β̂N is less than 0.5, meaning that an additional e1,000 of needs for home care
empirically translates into an additional e498 of LTC use on average. The analysis on the
entire population is in-between, as the partial correlation between needs and use is 0.687.
Concentration of needs and horizontal inequity index
When conducting the analysis on the entire population, we see that the horizontal in-
equity index HI is affected by the assumption we make on the norm of vertical equity in use.
However, under both assumptions, the horizontal inequity index is negative.
Constraining the coefficient to 1 has more impact of the decomposition of inequality in
use for the subgroup of individuals eligible for home care. This was expected given than β̂N
is found to be much further away from 1 in the subgroup eligible for home care.62
61As suggested by Bago d’Uva et al. (2009), in the empirical analysis of horizontal equity that rely on a sta-
tistical derivation of the norm of vertical equity in use, the residual term can be alternatively considered as
reflecting unobserved needs. In this more conservative approach, the horizontal equity index would corre-
spond only to CNN. Given that we have identified needs ex ante here, the high residual in the decomposition
of inequality does not challenge the interpretation of the conventional HI. However, as it may reflect omitted
variables or unmodelled heterogeneity along the income distribution, a high residual calls for a non-causal
interpretation of the estimates of the non-need factors βNNk . In particular, if we were to observe some of the
components of the error term, the contribution of income might be lower.
62CN in the constrained estimation is expected to be equal to 1/0.49 (about 2) times the value of CN obtained
when βN 6= 1.
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Table 4.E.1 – Concentration of needs and horizontal inequity index: Comparison of results
under the two norms of vertical equity in use.
CI CN CNN Residual HI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(1)-(2)
Entire population
βN = 1 -0.0853∗∗∗ -0.0485∗∗∗ -0.0365 -0.0002 -0.0368∗∗∗
βN 6= 1 -0.0853∗∗∗ -0.0333∗∗∗ -0.0516 -0.0003 -0.0520∗∗∗
Subgroup eligible for home care
βN = 1 -0.0358∗∗∗ +0.0254∗∗∗ -0.0606 -0.0006 -0.0612∗∗∗
βN 6= 1 -0.0358∗∗∗ +0.0126∗∗∗ -0.0483 -0.0001 -0.0484∗∗∗
Subgroup eligible for institutional care
βN = 1 -0.0453∗∗∗ -0.0238∗∗∗ -0.0215 -0.0000 -0.0215∗∗∗
βN 6= 1 -0.0453∗∗∗ -0.0236∗∗∗ -0.0217 -0.0000 -0.0217∗∗∗
SAMPLES: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public “elderly” LTC in the Netherlands in 2012 (N=616,934),
eligible for home care (N=401,262) or eligible for institutional care (N=287,932).
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Computation of standard errors
are described in Appendix 4.G. Bootstrap derivation of the standard errors of the contribution of non-need
factors and of the residual has not been completed yet.
Ultimately, what induces the difference between the two estimations in terms of the
concentration of needs (CN) — and thus the split between fair inequalities and potential
horizontal inequity — is the fact that the partial correlation between CIZ entitlements and
LTC use varies across the income distribution. The average under-use of CIZ entitlements is
(overall) lower in the bottom of the income distribution than in the 5th income decile, and
is much more pronounced as income increases (see Appendix 4.E). Comparing Panel A and
Panel B of Figure 4.E.3, we indeed see that the differences across the income distribution
in terms of the gap between actual use and CIZ entitlements are more marked (in absolute
value) in the subgroup eligible for home care.
Despite some differences, our conclusions in terms of horizontal inequity are robust
to statistically deriving the norm of vertical equity in use: the horizontal inequity index is
statistically and practically significant and negative, and is stronger when individuals are
eligible for home care than when they are eligible for institutional care.
Decomposition analysis
The comparison of the decomposition analysis depending on the value of βN is reported
in Figure 4.E.1, for all three samples.
When looking at the entire sample, the differences in the relative contributions to in-
equity in the entire sample are not striking.
When focusing on individuals eligible for home care, the number of persons in the house-
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Figure 4.E.1 – Decomposition of horizontal inequity: Comparison of results under the two
norms of vertical equity in use.
SAMPLES: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public “elderly” LTC (top two bars), eligible for home care (middle
two bars) or institutional care (bottom two bars) in the Netherlands in 2012 (N=401,262).
NOTES: Bars 1, 3 and 5 (from the top) give the decomposition obtained in the baseline analysis (βN = 1); bars 2, 4
and 6 give the decomposition derived under the alternative norm of vertical equity (βN 6= 1). Variables depicted
on the right–hand side of 0 contribute to pro-rich inequality; variables on the left–hand side of 0 contribute to
pro-poor inequality.
hold (beyond the presence of a spouse) is found to contribute to pro-poor inequity in our
baseline analysis, while it is found to have a pro-rich contribution under the alternative as-
sumption. This is due to the negative correlation between CIZ-assessed needs and house-
hold size, which is partially picked up by coefficient βN under the alternative assumption,
but not in our core analysis. The pro-rich contribution of age is more pronounced under
the alternative assumption, while the contributions of home ownership, origin and gender
decrease much.
When looking at individuals eligible for institutional care, results are much more sta-
ble: again, this was expected given that a βN-estimate close to 1 reveals that needs and the
non-need factors little correlate in this subgroup. Only gender is found to have a (pro-poor)
contribution to horizontal inequity under the alternative assumption while it has essentially
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none with our preferred assumption.
Under both assumptions and in all samples, the contributions of wealth and LTC con-
tracting regions are found to be very limited.
We thus conclude that, although our conclusions are robust to making a different as-
sumption on the norm of vertical equity in use, the decomposition of the horizontal inequity
index is less so when we focus on the population eligible for home care. This is where our
stance on what the assumption we believe is more credible is empirically matters.
This also suggests that the results from the decomposition analysis should be interpreted
in a cautious way, keeping in mind that the contributions are non-causal. A downside of
our administrative data is that they do not contain information on informal care receipt. For
personal care and assistance with IADL and ADL limitations, informal care was found to be a
substitute for formal care (Bolin et al., 2008; Bonsang, 2009; Van Houtven and Norton, 2004).
If informal care receipt correlates with non-need factors, then our estimates of their contri-
butions to inequality may be biased. This bias may in particular affect the contributions of
income and marital status. If income correlates negatively with informal care provision in
the Netherlands, as suggested by Rodrigues et al. (2017), the impact of income on LTC use
and its contribution to pro-poor differential use would be under-estimated.
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4.E.3. Conversion rates of CIZ entitlements into use by income decile
We estimate a variant of Equation (4.10):
yi = β0 +βNxi +
10∑
d=1,d 6=5
θd Idi +
10∑
d=1,d 6=5
µd Idi xi +M′iθNN +νi
where Idi is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i is in the d
th income decile, and Mi is the
vector of non-need factors excluding the income deciles. Income decile 5 is defined as the
reference category. If coefficients µd , d = 1, ...,10;d 6= 5 differ from zero, this means that the
ability to convert one additional euro of CIZ entitlements into actual use (in value) varies
across the income distribution. This could also be interpreted as evidence that the effect of
income on use varies with the levels of CIZ-assessed needs.
Figure 4.E.3 displays the estimates β̂N+µ̂d for the income deciles d = 1, ...,10. Empirically,
we find the coefficients µd to be almost linearly decreasing with income decile in the entire
sample analysis (Figure 4.E.2), and statistically significantly different from the coefficient
associated with the reference decile.
This means that low-income individuals are able to convert more of additional entitle-
ments for LTC into actual use. This pattern is observed when considering the entire popula-
tion and the total LTC use. It holds when considering the sub-sample of individuals eligible
for home care (Figure 4.E.3, Panel A) if we exclude deciles 1 and 2: one additional euro of CIZ
entitlements translate into e0.6 more LTC use for deciles 3 and 4, and to only e0.45 more
for deciles 6–7. When looking at individuals eligible for institutional care and their use of
LTC, the pattern is less salient; yet the bottom 4 deciles are found to “convert” 1 euro more
of entitlements into almost 1 euro more LTC use, 5 cents more than the top 3 deciles.
When individuals are eligible for institutional care, if they choose to enter an institution
they have virtually no ability to adjust the intensity of the care they receive “on paper”, as
they are assigned a package of services by the CIZ assessor. The only reason some of the
coefficients in Panel B of Figure 4.E.3 are below one is that individuals may choose to receive
home care or cash benefits rather than entering in institution. On the contrary, individuals
eligible for home care may adjust their use of services at the intensive margin.
As underlined by Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2011), Gravelle (2003) and van de Poel et al.
(2012), variation in the responsiveness of care use to needs by socio-economic status con-
tributes to the horizontal inequity index, although an additively separable model like Equa-
tion (4.15) does not make this contribution explicit (van Doorslaer et al., 2004). Figure 4.E.3
shows that the existence of a substantial differential in the needs-use relationship among
individuals eligible for home care is an important driver of the income-related horizontal
inequity we measure.
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Figures 4.E.2 and 4.E.3 are also evidence that, empirically, the income-use relationship
is not the same for all needs levels. This implies that, if we were to assume a different norm
of vertical equity in use (e.g. the one based on the population average relationship between
needs and use), the fact that individuals with low income tend to consume more care (which
was considered as vertically equitable under our preferred norm, given the higher needs of
the poor) may then be partly recategorized as unfair inequalities in use between individuals
with different income levels. Consistently, we observe that the income-related horizontal
inequity indexes are indeed higher under the “on average, the system gets it right” norm of
vertical equity in use, when looking at the entire population.63
Figure 4.E.2 – Estimates of the impact of needs on LTC use, by income decile.
SAMPLE: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public “elderly” home care in the Nether-
lands in 2012 (N=616,934).
NOTES: LTC use is expressed in annual monetary value, in thousands euros. The 5th
income decile is the reference. The dashed horizontal line indicates the value of the co-
efficient of CIZ needs in the baseline model (without interaction terms).
63The effect goes in the other direction when we look at the sample of individuals eligible for home care, as
the concentration of needs is not pro-poor but pro-rich.
314
EQUITY IN THE DUTCH LONG-TERM CARE SYSTEM
Figure 4.E.3 – Estimates of the impact of needs on LTC use, by income decile and subgroup.
Panel A (top): Individuals eligible for home care.
Panel B (bottom): Individuals eligible for institutional care.
SAMPLES: Individuals 60 and older eligible for either public “elderly” home care (Panel A;
N=401,262) or public “elderly” institutional care (Panel B; N=287,932) in the Netherlands
in 2012.
NOTES: LTC use is expressed in annual monetary value, in thousands euros. The 5th
income decile is the reference. The dashed horizontal line indicates the value of the co-
efficient of CIZ needs in the baseline model (without interaction terms). In Panel B, it
happens to have almost the same value as the coefficient of CIZ needs for individuals in
the reference category.
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4.F Robustness check and wealth-related inequality
4.F.1. LTC use and needs for individuals who died in 2012
Our population of interest being made of elders in relatively bad health, mortality is high:
16% of them died before December, 31st 2012. For these individuals, we observe a censored
measure of their annual LTC needs and use. Were mortality uniform across the income dis-
tribution, we could focus only on individuals who survived through the entire year. How-
ever, the probability to have died in 2012 varies across the income distribution, ranging from
13.6% to 19.7% (Figure 4.F.1). Mortality is highest among the very poor but also among the
top two deciles: this reflects the fact that the rich are on average older given their higher life
expectancy.
In addition, needs for and the use of LTC services tend to increase steadily in the months
preceding death (de Meijer et al., 2011). Leaving out the dead may then bias the measure-
ment of income-related inequalities in LTC use.64
Figure 4.F.1 – Probability to have died in 2012, by income decile.
SAMPLE: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public “elderly” home care in the Nether-
lands in 2012 (N=616,934).
NOTES: The dashed horizontal line indicates the sample one-year mortality rate.
In order to include those who died before the end of 2012 in the analysis, we pro-rate the
observed CIZ-assessed needs and use of LTC services based on the share of the year indi-
64It is however less clear that it would necessarily bias the computation of the horizontal inequity index.
de Meijer et al. (2011) show that time-to-death hardly explains any variation in the use of LTC services when we
control for detailed information on disability and health. If CIZ entitlements capture adequately the severity of
disability, it remains theoretically possible that differential use by income decile when controlling for needs is
robust to the exclusion of the dead even in the presence of differential mortality.
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viduals were alive. With this solution, individuals who have died very early in the year may
have extremely high (pro-rated) values of needs and use. One concern is that some outlying
observations, which are not randomly distributed in the income distribution, may drive our
results. As a robustness check, we replicate the analysis only on the individuals who survived
through the year.
Table 4.F.1 – Concentration and horizontal inequity indexes: Excluding the deceased (entire
sample)
CI CN HI N
(1) (2) (3)
Entire sample
Baseline -0.0853∗∗∗ -0.0485∗∗∗ -0.0368∗∗∗ 616,934
Excluding the dead -0.0941∗∗∗ -0.0609∗∗∗ -0.0332∗∗∗ 518,097
Eligible for home care
Baseline -0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0254∗∗∗ -0.0612∗∗∗ 401,262
Excluding the dead -0.0530∗∗∗ -0.0079∗∗∗ -0.0450∗∗∗ 348,702
Eligible for institutional care
Baseline -0.0453∗∗∗ -0.0238∗∗∗ -0.0214∗∗∗ 287,932
Excluding the dead -0.0493∗∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗ 227,251
From Table 4.F.1, we see that the concentration index of LTC use is higher when we leave
out the deceased. This is also the case for the concentration index of need-predicted use
(CN), so that the horizontal inequity index remains roughly the same (around −0.03).
Differential mortality across socio-economic status raises another conceptual issue:
when focusing on the individuals who are alive at the beginning of 2012, we select out all
the individuals from the birth cohorts of interest (who were born in 1952 or before) but
who died before that date. Given differential longevity across the income distribution, this
causes a selection issue in the measurement of inequality at the cohort level (Lefebvre et al.,
2013). Given the conceptual challenges associated with the issue of “dealing with the dead”,
we do not attempt to address this source of selection.
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4.F.2. Wealth-related horizontal inequity
As argued in Section 7, wealth, or some combination of wealth and income, may be used
as an alternative indicator of socio-economic status in the elderly population (Van Ourti,
2003; Wagstaff and Watanabe, 2003; Rodrigues et al., 2017). In some OECD countries, ac-
cess to public LTC support or the amount of transfers is actually made conditional on both
wealth and income (Muir, 2017). Although co-payments on LTC use would depend only little
on wealth in the Netherlands until 2012,65 it is of interest for international comparisons to
document how effective use of LTC varies with wealth in the Netherlands.
As a preliminary analysis, we have computed the average need-standardized LTC use by
per capita household wealth decile, in the entire population of interest and in the subgroups
of individuals eligible for home care or individuals eligible for institutional care. As shown
by Figures 4.F.2 and 4.F.3, there is no clear wealth-gradient in the actual use of LTC services
when differential needs across the wealth distribution are taken into account. The wealth-
richest 10% in the entire population and in both subgroups seem to use less services in value
than the average, while the middle of the distribution (deciles 3 to 5) tend to use more care
for a given level of CIZ-assessed needs. Panel B of Figure 4.F.3 suggests that the wealth-rich
are significantly less likely to use institutional care when eligible for it. Yet, overall, the differ-
ences in need-standardized use across the wealth distribution are much smaller than what
we observe across the income distribution.
Given the relatively high level of insurance offered by the public LTC insurance, it is un-
likely that wealth is a barrier to LTC access. Except for individuals with very high level of
wealth, the co-payment schedule ensures that out-of-pocket expenditures on public LTC
services do not exceed income: contrary to what is observed in other countries, the majority
Dutch elderly do not need to draw on their housing or financial wealth to finance the use of
public LTC services.
This was the case at least until 2012, when co-payments would depend on income and
4% of taxable wealth. A 2013 reform (described in Non (2017)) increased to 12% the share
of taxable wealth to be taken into account when computing co-payments. It is thus possible
that the wealth-gradient of LTC use is different after the reform than what we measure in
our data, and that high-wealth individuals had to adjust their consumption of LTC services
based on their their trade-off between the marginal value of LTC services and the utility they
derive from their wealth.
65See Appendix 4.B for information on co-payments.
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Figure 4.F.2 – Distribution of need-standardized LTC use across wealth deciles: Entire popu-
lation
SAMPLE: Individuals 60 and older eligible for public “elderly” LTC in the Netherlands in 2012
(N=616,934).
NOTES: LTC use is expressed in annual monetary value, in thousands euros. The dashed horizontal
line represents the average value of LTC use in the sample. Individuals are ranked by their per capita
2011 household taxable wealth.
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Figure 4.F.3 – Distribution of need-standardized LTC use across wealth deciles, by subgroup.
Panel A (top): Individuals eligible for home care.
Panel B (bottom): Individuals eligible for institutional care.
SAMPLES: Individuals 60 and older eligible for either public “elderly” home care (Panel A;
N=401,262) or public “elderly” institutional care (Panel B; N=287,932) in the Netherlands
in 2012.
NOTES: LTC use is expressed in annual monetary value. LTC use is expressed in annual
monetary value. In Panel A, it is the sum of the value of home care services used in kind
and of the imputed value of cash benefits granted while the individual was eligible for
home care in 2012. In Panel B, it is the sum of the value of home care services used in
kind, of the value of cash benefits granted and of elderly institutional care received in
2012. Individuals are ranked by their per capita 2011 household taxable wealth.
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4.G Inference in horizontal equity analysis
4.G.1. Standard error of concentration index of actual use
In order to assess the statistical significance of inequality in use, we need to associate
standard errors with the concentration index of actual LTC use, CI. The literature has pro-
posed two ways of deriving the standard errors.
Kakwani et al. (1997) have derived a closed-form formula for the standard error by apply-
ing the delta method. The formula is the following:
Var (ĈI) = 1
n
[ 1
n
n∑
i=1
a2i − (1+CI)2
]
(4.18)
with:
ai = yi
µ
(2r Ii −1−CI)+2−qi−1 −qi
and:
qi = 1
nµ
i∑
j=1
y j
(qi is the ordinate of the Lorenz curve for the i th poorest individual, and q0 = 0).66
Another method is to use the convenient regression (O’Donnell et al., 2008). The conve-
nient regression (Kakwani et al., 1997) allows to derive the concentration index directly from
the estimation of the regression of a transformation of the LTC use variable on the fractional
rank in the income distribution. The convenient regression corresponds to the following
specification:
2σ2r (yi /µ) = α+δr Ii +εi (4.19)
where σ2r is the variance of the fractional rank. The OLS estimate of δ corresponds to the
concentration index of y and is equivalent to the index computed using Equation (4.1).
However, the standard error associated to δ does not incorporate the sampling variabil-
ity of the dependent variable in Equation 4.19 (which contains an estimate of the population
mean of LTC use, µ). The solution is to regress the un-transformed outcome, y , on the frac-
tional rank, then transform the coefficient on the fractional rank, and apply a delta method
to derive a correct standard error:
yi = α1 +δ1r Ii +ui (4.20)
66This formula is only valid when there are no sampling weights and that the sampling is random (which is
the case with our exhaustive administrative data).
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The estimate of the concentration index CI is then equal to:
δ̂=
(2σ2r
µ
)
δ̂1
This expression can be rewritten as:67
δ̂=
( 2σ2r
α̂1 + δ̂1/2
)
δ̂1
The estimate of the concentration index is now written as a function of the regression coef-
ficients from Equation 4.20; we can then apply the delta method to derive the standard error
of the concentration index (in Stata, this can be done using the command nlcom (O’Donnell
et al., 2008)).
4.G.2. Standard error of concentration index of need-predicted use
Need-predicted use of LTC services, ŷNi , is constructed as the linear prediction from the
fitted model of LTC use, setting the individual value of the non-need variables to their sample
mean (cf. Equation (4.11)).68 The concentration index of need-predicted LTC use, CN, gives
the degree of income-related inequality in LTC use that we should observe if differences in
actual use would only reflect differences in needs.
The standard error of CN cannot be simply derived by applying the formulas presented
in the previous subsection to ŷNi , as it would not take into account the sampling variability
of ŷNi . Correct inference can be achieved by Bootstrap (see Section 4.G). So far, we have used
the convenient regression approach to derive approximate values for the standard error of
CN. Given our very large sample size, we do believe that our results will remain unchanged
when we derive the standard errors appropriately.
4.G.3. Standard error of horizontal inequity index
The horizontal inequity index is equal to the difference between the concentration index
of actual use, CI, and the concentration index of need-predicted use, CN. Alternatively, we
can derive the horizontal inequity index as the concentration index of the (indirectly) need-
standardized LTC use, y ISi (cf. Equation (4.12), Section 3).
67Using the fact that the sample mean OLS predicted value of the outcome is by construction equal to the
mean of the outcome, µ, and that it is also equal to the predicted outcome at the sample mean of the fractional
rank. The sample mean of the fractional rank is simply equal to 0.5.
68We describe the method for the general setting presented in Appendix 4.E, in which βN may differ from 1.
Inference in our core analysis is based on this method, with constraining βN to 1.
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The distribution of (indirectly) need-standardized LTC use across income gives the dis-
tribution of LTC use that would be observed if needs were uniformly distributed across the
income distribution.69
Again, the standard error of HI cannot be simply derived by applying the formulas pre-
sented in the previous subsection to y ISi , for the same argument as the one stated in the previ-
ous section. So far, we have used the convenient regression approach to derive approximate
values for the standard error of HI; again, we believe that our results are not qualitatively
affected by this approximation. Nonetheless, we plan to implement a Bootstrap resampling
method to obtain correct standard errors for HI.
4.G.4. Standard errors of the contributions of non-need variables to in-
equity and of the residual
No analytical expressions of the standard errors of horizontal inequity index, of the con-
tributions of need and non-need factors and of the residual term in the decomposition of
inequality are available. We intend to derive these standard errors using a Bootstrap proce-
dure.70
The procedure would go as follows. For each bootstrap replication, we draw with replace-
ment N pairs of observations (dependent variable, explanatory variables) from our original
sample of size N. For each Bootstrap sample b = 1, ...,B, we re-estimate Equation (4.10) (Sec-
tion 3) and derive the coefficient estimates β̂0, β̂N and β̂NNk for k = 1, ...,K. For each Bootstrap
sample, we can construct an individual–level measure of need-predicted LTC use ŷNi , follow-
ing Equation (4.11) (Section 3). We are then able to compute, for each Bootstrap sample, the
concentration index of actual consumption and the concentration index of need-predicted
consumption, and the income-related horizontal inequity index as the difference between
the two.
For each of these three indexes, a Bootstrap standard error can be computed as the stan-
dard deviation of the sample made of the B different values derived from the B Bootstrap
samples. We may then use the Bootstrap samples in a similar way to derive standard errors
for the contributions of each need and non-need factor and of the residual.
69On the interpretation of and differences between direct and indirect standardization of health care use
variables, see O’Donnell et al. (2008).
70Due to time constraints, this has not been achieved yet.
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General conclusion
To conclude this thesis, I propose a review of the key results obtained in the different
chapters, with respect to the economic literature and the policy debates, as well as a discus-
sion of their main limitations or blind spots. I also sketch directions for future research.
1 Main results and contributions
1.1 LTC in the Netherlands: a less egalitarian system than expected
Starting from the finish, Chapter 4 has investigated the degree of income-related inequal-
ities in the consumption of publicly-subsidized LTC by the disabled elderly in the Nether-
lands. The use of exhaustive and high-quality administrative data is extremely valuable for
the purpose of our distributional analysis. Observing the universe of the eligibility decisions
issued by the Dutch LTC needs assessment agency makes it possible to construct an explicit
measure of the needs for LTC. The specific institutional context of the Netherlands moti-
vates the use of these “eligible needs” in a normative analysis of equity in LTC use. We find
evidence of a differential use of LTC services across the income distribution, even when con-
trolling for differential needs. For a given level of needs, the elderly in the bottom of the
income distribution tend to consume more care in value than the rich. Given the strong
egalitarian culture the Dutch social LTC insurance is embedded in, the existence of income-
related horizontal inequity in the use of publicly-subsidized LTC was not expected.
By replicating the analysis on the subgroups of individuals eligible for home care and
of those eligible for institutional care separately, we show that the patterns of LTC use and
the conversion between eligible needs and actual use differ across the income distribution.
The rich are less likely to effectively stay in a nursing home. This finding alone begs a host
of further policy-relevant questions that our analysis does not address. Does this pattern
arise because the higher co-payments the rich incur in nursing homes lead them to substi-
tute home care for institutional care? If so, is the co-payment schedule tailored in a way that
ensures that residential care is used when its marginal costs become lower that the costs of
home care? Our results might also reflect that institutional care is an inferior good, consis-
tently with the popular view that everyone who can afford to arrange her LTC at home would
want to do so rather than entering a nursing home. If this is the case, then it would have
important implications for the efficiency of the LTC schemes offering subsidies on the price
of nursing homes, as the income effects associated with the ex post shift in care use would
not induce efficiency gains. Of course, any sound welfare analysis should also take into ac-
count external effects associated with nursing home use, starting with the costs and benefits
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accruing to informal caregivers. Those are important questions to address if we want to an-
ticipate how the ongoing reforms in the Netherlands will affect the efficiency of the Dutch
LTC policies and income-related inequalities in care use.
Our analysis also shows that among those eligible for home care, the income-rich tend
to be assessed higher needs than the poor. That those in the bottom of the income distri-
bution have a better functional status than the rich, at a given age, would be surprising. In
the general population, good health is found to be pro-rich concentrated; this is also what
the SHARE survey data suggest for functional status. The pro-rich concentration of “eligible
needs” may rather reflect the fact that socio-economic status plays a role in the access to the
LTC system. One scenario consistent with our results is that the poor are less likely to claim
public support for LTC, or claim it later in the disablement process. Our implicit assumption
in giving a normative content to CIZ-assessed needs for care is that CIZ does a good job at
“scanning” out the population, by allowing health care providers, social workers and family
members of a disabled individual to fill in a request for a needs assessment. Whether there
is horizontal inequity at the very stage of the eligibility decisions is yet an empirical ques-
tion, which is crucial to address, in order not only to give a sensible normative interpretation
of CIZ-assessed needs but also to judge upon the fairness of the LTC system as a whole. As
Culyer et al. (1992) put it:
“... ‘equality of access’ is almost certainly required in order that needs can be assessed... ”.
1.2 A better understanding of the French at-home APA scheme
In Chapters 2 and 3, I focused on the largest home care subsidy program targeted to the
elderly, the Allocation personnalisée d’autonomie (APA).
APA works as an hourly subsidy on the price of home care
The economic analysis of the scheme, which was undertaken within the MODAPA re-
search project, made it possible to improve our understanding of its efficiency implications
and redistributive properties. The APA is an in-kind transfer working as a subsidy on the
hourly price of home care. The existence of an individual limit on the number of hours
of professional care to be subsidized by APA creates a kink in the budget constraint of
beneficiaries, whose magnitude is all the higher as individual income is low. The design of
the APA scheme thus matters for the microeconomic modeling and empirical analysis of
the demand for home care of the disabled elderly. It also has important implications for
the statistical information available on professional care use and out-of-pocket payments:
in their administrative records, the Departmental Councils only keep track of subsidized
care use, i-e of what happens on the left-hand side of the kink in the budget constraint.
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In my doctoral research, I have overcome this information gap either through appropriate
econometric modeling, in Chapter 2, or by using records of APA beneficiaries’ use of
professional home care other than the ones kept by Departmental Councils, in Chapter 3.
The demand for home care by the disabled elderly is price-elastic
From a policy perspective, the estimate of the price elasticity of home care demand
offered by Chapter 2 has several important implications. Together with the other studies
led in the MODAPA project, this analysis provides evidence that APA beneficiaries adjust
their consumption of professional home care to the price they pay out-of-pocket. The
assumption that the individual care plan volume is a good proxy for the actual use of care
does not hold. In the consumer theory framework, this suggests that the disabled elderly
trade off the marginal utility of the professional care they consume and its costs, considering
their resource constraints. The existence of behavioral reactions to a change in the price of
home care services implies that any reform of cost sharing in home care subsidy programs
should anticipate adjustments in individual and aggregate quantities of care consumption.
As illustrated by Chapter 3, such behavioral reactions may alter the redistribution intended
by a reform like the one implemented in France in 2016.
Adjustment to a price change goes through both income and substitution effects
Chapter 2 also demonstrates that the adjustment in home care use following a change
in the relative price of care goes through both income and substitution effects. The ex post
moral hazard in the consumption of formal care due to the price distortion alone is a funda-
mental reason why home care subsidies should not be analyzed as mere income transfers.
This source of efficiency loss is to be taken into account when comparing the costs and ben-
efits associated with a system of lump-sum payments, as opposed to a subsidy scheme. The
nature of disability and of LTC services makes it practically feasible to condition eligibility
for public support upon a unique needs assessment — which is not doable for health care.
Under this regard, the case for a LTC insurance offering a price payoff rather than an income
transfer is less compelling than in the field of health care insurance. The question of reform-
ing the design of the APA scheme in a fundamental way, in particular by making the amount
of public support independent from the choice of entering a nursing home rather than stay-
ing in the community, has recently come into force in the public debate in France (Bozio
et al., 2016; HCFEA, 2017). Progressing in the understanding of the efficiency implications
of shifting to a system closer to one of lump-sum transfers is an important contribution that
economics can bring to this debate.
The results from Chapter 2 also urge the economic literature to refrain from using the
term “LTC needs” in positive analysis: by showing that APA beneficiaries’ preferences exhibit
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some substituability between LTC and other consumption goods, the available empirical
evidence clashes with the idea that the disabled elderly would consume a definite amount of
LTC services regardless of their relative prices. The extent to which the severity of functional
losses affects the marginal rate of substitution between home care and other goods, and
thus the efficiency gains and losses associated with subsidizing the price of care, remains an
open question.
The 2016 reform should have decreased vertical equity in out-of-pocket payments and
horizontal equity in home care use
In Chapter 3, I have focused on two features of the APA scheme that condition its redis-
tributive properties: the income-dependent co-payment and the care plan volume, which
were the targets of the 2016 APA reform. The customer files from a home care provider that I
have used make it possible to observe total formal home care use for APA beneficiaries and
to compute their total out-of-pocket payments, before the 2016 reform. The consumption
of professional care beyond the care plan volume is more frequent for richer beneficiaries as
well as for the most severely disabled. The relatively low levels of the APA national ceilings
before the reform explain that beneficiaries with severe disability incurred high effort rates
on home care spending. The decision of the department our data come from to compute
APA subsidies on a lump-sum price rather than on the provider price induces non-negligible
out-of-pocket payments at the bottom of the income distribution, even for those who do not
consume unsubsidized care. Reaching progressivity in the out-of-pocket financing of formal
home care nationwide would require explicit legal provisions regarding the computation of
the APA subsidies, an issue that was left aside by the 2016 reform.
The ex ante evaluation of this reform that I have proposed in Chapter 3 is based on
the estimates derived in Chapter 2. It suggests that the modifications in the co-payment
schedule and the increase in care plan volumes should allow the most severely disabled
beneficiaries (GIR 1 and 2) to lower their out-of-pocket payments more so than the rest of
the beneficiaries, consistently with the objectives of the reform. But the reform may not
hit its underlying target of improving vertical equity in out-of-pocket financing. The richer
beneficiaries are predicted to incur lower out-of-pocket payments after the reform, while
the increase in the use of home care in the bottom of the income distribution may actually
lead to an increase in out-of-pocket payments. As directly shown by the companion analysis
by Hege (2018), the increase in public transfers induced by the reform is predicted to be
higher at the top of the income distribution than at the bottom. Differential effects across
the income distribution would be accentuated if we were to take into account the suggestive
evidence obtained in Chapter 2 that richer beneficiaries react more to a change in the price
of home care than poorer beneficiaries.
328
Main limitations to Chapters 2 and 3
Due to several data limitations, the scope of the results derived in Chapters 2 and 3 should
be qualified. First, the samples we use are local. The department from which the data used in
Chapter 2 are taken is arguably close to the French average with respect to its disabled elderly
population, except for its higher income level. If price sensitivity increases with income,
our local estimate would be an upper bound of the price elasticity at the national level, in
absolute value. In order to strengthen the internal validity of our estimates, we proceed to
intra-departmental sample selection. In particular, we retain in the sample beneficiaries
who are served by an authorized provider, which is seemingly the case of the majority of APA
beneficiaries in France. The behavioral reactions we capture may be different from that of
beneficiaries who have chosen a lower-price provider.
Having a sample of APA beneficiaries that is not nationally representative is arguably
more problematic for distributional analysis like the one presented in Chapter 3. As APA
beneficiaries whose care plan volume is close to their GIR-specific national ceiling are less
prone to being served by an authorized provider, our estimation sample may give an inac-
curate picture of home care use and out-of-pocket payments for the most severely disabled
beneficiaries within each administrative disability group. In addition, socio-economic in-
equalities in the take-up of LTC benefits may also arise in the French LTC system. As our
investigation of efficiency and equity in the APA scheme relies on administrative data and
customer files providing information on APA beneficiaries only, I am only able to shed light
on the distribution of care use, out-of-pocket payments and the behavioral reactions of those
who benefit from the program. Given that I do not observe the entire elderly population and
that I do not have any estimate of the price elasticity of the demand for home care at the
extensive margin, the ex ante evaluation I have conducted does not integrate the additional
take-up of APA benefits that the increase in the generosity in the scheme may drive.
Our APA-centered data do not allow us to take into account other public programs tar-
geted to the disabled elderly that may impact the private financing of home care. Until 2016,
APA beneficiaries were able to halve their out-of-pocket payments through an income tax
rebate. This tax scheme would profit only those with taxable income; if anything, the pro-
rich vertical inequity in the private financing of home care detected in Chapter 3 would be
larger if we were able to take into account these tax rebates. Since 2017 however, the rebate
has been converted into a tax credit, thereby increasing public effort towards low-income
beneficiaries while not changing the spending drained by the beneficiaries with high taxable
income. The ceiling on this credit is sufficiently high for those incurring high out-of-pocket
expenses, because of a high consumption of professional care, not to hit it. In its review of the
French LTC policies targeted to the elderly, the High Council of Family, Childhood and Age
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(HCFEA) has asked the Ministry of Health to conduct some simulations of the joint impact
of the 2016 APA reform and of the 2017 creation of the tax credit. Using a microsimulation
model, the Ministry of Health predicts that the effort rate of GIR–1 and GIR–2 beneficiaries
would decrease to less than 8% on average — although it is not clear what the assumptions
in terms of the computation of the APA subsidies and of behavioral reactions are. This leads
the HCFEA to consider that the reforms have made it possible to reach a satisfactory level of
public financing of home care use (HCFEA, 2017).
The analysis presented in Chapter 3 is in line with the idea that the 2016 APA reform
should allow a substantial decrease in out-of-pocket payments, especially with the back-up
of the tax credit; it however calls for caution. The impact of the reform will, to a large extent,
depends on the way the evaluation teams in charge of needs assessments in the Departmen-
tal Councils react to it. Chapter 3 has made the simple and favorable assumption that all care
plan volumes will be adjusted proportionately to the increase in national ceilings. Even if we
assume that the evaluation teams do set all care plans as a proportion of the levels of the na-
tional ceilings — which is not granted — the budget constraints weighing on Departmental
Councils make my assumption little likely to hold.
Alternative assumptions are however not straightforward to implement empirically. For
those beneficiaries who had a care plan equal to the national ceiling (plan d’aide saturé),
inferring their “eligible needs” from the actual use of home care would amount to ignoring
that they are price-elastic. The Ministry of Health relies on econometric analysis to pre-
dict “eligible needs” beyond the care plan volume of beneficiaries with a saturated care plan
(Bérardier and Debout, 2011). Assuming in the first instance that only these beneficiaries will
benefit from an increase in their care plan would be in line with the legal provision passed
with the reform, stating that the Departmental Councils must reassess the situation of all
beneficiaries with a saturated care plan. Given my limited sample size, I have preferred to
rely on a simple assumption rather than on an econometric analysis. The limited availability
of data on the evolution of care plan volumes between 2015 and 2016 at the departmental
level makes it difficult to assess how far my assumption is from the real-world adjustment.
Using data from a few departments, an administrative report assessing the implementation
of the reform documents some unexpected adjustments — such as a higher increase in the
care plan volumes of the least disabled (Bensadon et al., 2017). This shows the importance of
both the collection of data appropriate for an ex post analysis of this complex reform and im-
provement in the understanding of the practices of local evaluation teams, which will make
it easier for researchers and administrations to draw up ex ante evaluations. The current ini-
tiatives launched by the National Fund for Solidarity and Autonomy (Caisse nationale pour
la solidarité et l’autonomie, CNSA) in order to survey the practices of the evaluation teams
and define guidelines for needs assessments will certainly help.
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My ex ante evaluation of the reform relies on price and income elasticity parameters,
which themselves were estimated based on modeling assumptions and limited data. As we
have limited information on the supply of home care services at the local level, we make the
implicit assumption that there is no rationing of quantities on this (regulated) market. We as-
sume that the disabled elderly are sensitive to the spot price of home care and that they make
consumption decisions individually, based on their own income. Rather, Hege (2018) pro-
poses to interpret the price elasticity as a “collective” elasticity, which results from the joint
reaction of the beneficiary, her family and her care providers. The economic and sociological
literature has provided evidence that decisions regarding professional care use frequently in-
volve the relatives. A more accurate modeling of the demand for formal care would take into
account family composition, its resources and the informal care it may provide. Addition-
ally, our analysis relies on the assumption that care consumption decisions are taken on a
monthly based and by fully rational behaviors. The existence of weekly routines is suggested
by several data sources; that APA beneficiaries do not behave like the typical consumer from
the microeconomic theory is especially likely as many suffer from neuro-degenerative trou-
bles. Relaxing the assumption that the observed care use equals the optimal consumption
for APA beneficiaries, an ongoing study by two researchers of the MODAPA group finds a
price elasticity much above unity in absolute value. It also finds a higher value than the one
estimated in Chapter 2 when relaxing the assumption that the price elasticity is constant
with the out-of-pocket price of care. Assessing the robustness of price and income elastic-
ity estimates to modeling assumptions is a critical step before we engage in a full welfare
analysis of home care subsidy programs.
1.3 Handicap versus dependence schemes: a challenging assessment
A policy evaluation of the age 60 threshold in LTC policies
With respect to Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 1 has taken a larger focus by studying the
effects of the French home care subsidy programs at large, including APA but also other
smaller schemes targeted to the elderly and the benefits aimed at those aged less than 60. In
this Chapter, I have used a reduced-form approach to assess the impact of the institutional
threshold separating the dependent elderly from the handicapped adults in the French LTC
policies, on the LTC services received by the individuals with activity restrictions. I have used
a general population survey, the French Health and Disability Survey (HS), to select a sample
of individuals aged 50–74 and compare care utilization rates and the probability to reside in
institution of those aged 60-74 to the same quantities in the sub-sample aged 50–59.
By contrast with the approach to equity adopted in Chapters 3 and 4, Chapter 1 aims at
uncovering the causal relationship between the design of LTC policies and an unequal treat-
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ment of the equals. The arbitrary age threshold that separates handicap and dependence
policies creates a priori a perfect setting for a quasi-experimental identification by a Re-
gression Discontinuity Design (RDD) estimation. Even though the HS survey over-sampled
individuals with functional limitations, among individuals living in the community the
number of those reasonably close to the age threshold is too low to implement this strategy.
In order to assess whether it makes a difference to be considered a dependent elderly rather
than a handicapped adult in the home care one’s receive, I have proposed multivariate
estimations including a rich set of controls and age effects to capture systematic differences
in unobserved determinants of care and preferences for care settings. Instead, thanks to
a larger size of the sample representative of the entire population, I am able to assess the
effect of the age 60 threshold on the probability to reside in an institutional setting by an
RDD strategy.
Data limitations and conceptual challenges to the interpretation of the results
Among those living in the community, the dependent elderly are found to be more likely
to receive formal home care but somewhat less likely to receive assistance with the activities
of daily living from their relatives. This is true on average, but the effects differ substantially
by gender and disability level. The interpretation of the results is challenging, for several rea-
sons. First, I have thought it safer to make use of binary (use/no use), rather than continuous
LTC measures. I thus assess the effects of the age 60 threshold at the extensive margin only;
results at the intensive margin may well be different. Second, information in the HS survey
regarding the LTC schemes the respondents actually benefit from is not deemed reliable and
thus prevents me from digging into the mechanisms behind the results. Is the higher utiliza-
tion rate of professional personal care by the 60+ due to their higher probability to benefit
from a home care subsidy program? Or is it that they are more likely to receive LTC from
nursing services (SSIADs), because the rationing of supply from SSIADs was still important
for the handicapped adults at the time of the survey? Given the complexity of the French
LTC policies and the co-existence of several schemes, the matching of administrative infor-
mation on LTC benefits and on the use of nursing services paid by the Health Insurance with
survey data would definitely better the understanding of the patterns of LTC use.
The third reason why the interpretation of the results should be made with caution is the
dynamic aspect of the disablement process, that the cross-sectional nature of the HS survey
is not able to capture. It is possible that the handicapped adults are less likely to receive
formal home care due to their relatives being more involved in informal caregiving precisely
because the onset of their disability happened at a relatively young age. The possibility that
the “individual history of disability” has long-lasting effects on family dynamics and LTC
arrangements raises an immediate empirical question for the econometrician interested
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in uncovering the causal impact of LTC policies on the use of formal care: do I adequately
control for differences in individual and contextual factors that may affect the use of LTC
independently from the age 60 threshold? The empirical analysis proposed in Chapter
1 adopts a static approach to disability: differences in current functional limitations,
activity restrictions and health status are controlled for, but not the duration for which
health conditions have affected the individual, nor the coping strategies (e.g. housing
adaptation) she may have adopted. This also raises more fundamental questions regarding
the conceptual ground for assessing the effects of LTC schemes on care arrangements and
horizontal equity in the use of LTC. Even if we agree on taking a consequentialist stance,
the question remains whether preferences for care arrangements should be taken as given,
or whether adaptation mechanisms should be netted out. This echoes the essential debate
faced by responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism about the split between circumstances and
effort when the former causally impacts the latter.
The age 60 threshold and data collection on LTC use
Chapter 1 provides original evidence that the dependent elderly are more likely to reside
in an institutional setting on a permanent basis than the handicapped adults. This finding
is counter-intuitive, as out-of-pocket payments on residential care tend to be substantially
higher for the dependent elderly. Differences in the rationing of supply may explain this
result. This finding also sheds light on the upstream effect that the age 60 barrier has on sta-
tistical categories and data collection: the definition of living arrangements in the HS survey
was actually made contingent upon this age threshold and the existing disability schemes.
This has important implications for the interpretation of the finding that individuals living in
the community are less likely to receive formal home care when they are less than 60: those
may actually receive unobserved professional care provided in day care facilities or handicap
centers. This calls for future data collection operations to carefully take into account the age
60 barrier, so as to ensure a full mapping of the care options available to, and used by, each
sub-population.
2 Future developments
2.1 Working with new French databases
In order to overcome some of the limitations discussed earlier, I intend to make use of
new French data sources that will soon be made available.
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New general population surveys
In the second semester of 2018, the French Ministry of Health will release a new general
population survey, called CARE (Drees, 2015–2016a). This survey was conducted in 2015 for
a sample representative of the 60+ population. One section of the survey was collected on
individuals living in the community, whereas a second section surveyed individuals residing
in institutions. Micro-linkage with administrative data will provide high-quality information
on LTC benefits, income and wealth.
CARE will make it possible to dig further into the research questions addressed in Chap-
ters 2 and 3. Joint information on out-of-pocket payments and the volume of care provided
by professional caregivers for the community-dwelling elderly should provide new estimates
of the price elasticity of the demand for home care. A possible identification strategy would
draw inspiration from Hege et al. (2014) and Arnault (2015), and use departmental-level in-
formation on home care prices to obtain exogenous variations in the out-of-pocket price
of care. Rich information on the tasks performed by caregivers will enable to test whether
the price sensitivity varies with the type of LTC services, and thus whether cost sharing in
home care subsidies programs should depend on this dimension. As CARE is a general pop-
ulation survey, it will make it possible to assess how the cost sharing associated with APA
influences the take-up of the benefits, in particular among the richest beneficiaries, and to
quantify the price sensitivity of home care use at the extensive margin. Rich information
on socio-demographic and family characteristics as well as on informal care will reduce the
risk of omitted variable biases and allow us to estimate the cross-price elasticity of informal
care utilization. Linkage with fiscal data will provide a way to simulate the tax rebates on the
out-of-pocket payments incurred by APA beneficiaries and assess what the price sensitivity
of the disabled elderly is under the assumption that they react to the ex post price of home
care.
Given these same features, CARE will also make it possible to considerably enrich the
exploratory analysis provided in Chapter 3. Individual contributions to the financing of LTC
policies may be simulated using the linked fiscal data. Comparing information on the con-
tributions made by those living at home and of those in institutions might enable an assess-
ment of vertical equity in the financing of LTC that would be immune to differential use of
institutional care by socio-economic status.
However, as CARE only surveys the 60+, it cannot be used to extend or even assess the
robustness of the analysis conducted in Chapter 1. The next general population survey in-
cluding the entire population (AUTONOMY) will seemingly be collected in the early 2020s.
The matching of administrative information modeled after what has been done for CARE
would make it possible to compare the LTC benefits perceived by the dependent elderly ver-
sus the handicapped adults, and assess how they relate to differential LTC use.
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CARE and AUTONOMY will both be cross-sectional surveys; given the dynamic aspects
of disability and long-term care decisions, this is an important limitation. Under that regard,
the international SHARE survey has a clear advantage. Although national sample sizes are
limited, the number of waves may now be sufficient to shed light on the use of LTC by the
“aging handicapped” in France, which I have not been able to consider in Chapter 1.
A renovated information system on APA beneficiaries
The law that enacted the 2016 APA reform also mandated an important renovation of
the public statistical information system on LTC beneficiaries, described in Roy (2017). Each
Departmental Council has now to send detailed aggregate information on its APA beneficia-
ries every quarter and the information is published online.71 In the second quarter of 2017,
more than 20% of Departmental Councils were still not able to report all the statistical in-
formation requested, but it can be hoped that the development of routine procedures for
data output will soon enable a mapping of all departmental situations. Although they will
not make it possible to assess the impact of the 2016 reform, these data will offer materials
for a departmental-level analysis of the evolution of care plan volumes and APA spending
following the reform.
The Ministry of Health will also collect this year individual-level information on all in-
dividuals who were entitled to APA in 2017. These data will be similar to the Remontées in-
dividuelles already collected in 2007 and 2011; as the transmission of information is now
mandatory for the departments, the 2017 edition of Remontées individuelles will enjoy a
larger sample size and no selection issue. Without additional information on home care
prices, it is unlikely that these data alone can be used for the purpose of price elasticity es-
timations; they can however be much valuable for distributional analysis of subsidized care
use and public spending on APA. In addition, the Ministry of Health is currently working to-
wards the creation of a panel of APA beneficiaries (ENEAS panel); its longitudinal dimension
will enrich distributional analysis by making it possible to take into account income-related
differences in the time spent in the APA scheme.
All in all, the important enrichment of the statistical information system paves the way
for extensions of the analysis conducted in this thesis, although the lack of national and de-
partmental level information on home care providers and the prices they charge will remain
an issue.
71Enquête trimestrielle APA; Décret 2017-334 du 16 mars 2017 relatif aux transmissions de données sur
l’allocation personnalisée d’autonomie et l’aide sociale à l’hébergement.
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2.2 Take further advantage of the opportunities offered by the Dutch
linked micro-data
Regarding the Netherlands, the matching of additional sources to the rich data that I
have already exploited will make it possible to explore some of the issues adjacent to the
research question raised by Chapter 4.72
Horizontal inequity in eligibility for publicly-subsidized LTC
A large sample size survey on health that is representative of the non-institutionalized
adult Dutch population (the Health Monitor of 2012) was matched with our administrative
data. For close to 200,000 individuals aged 60 or older, we observe self-reported information
on health status, chronic conditions and functional limitations. We intend to shed light on
possible socio-economic disparities at the very stage of eligibility for publicly-subsidized
LTC. We would infer from a systematic correlation between the entitlements to LTC as
assessed by the CIZ agency and income, when controlling for self-reported health status and
functional limitations, that there is socio-economic horizontal equity in eligibility for LTC.
If this is the case, this will have important implications for the use of CIZ-assessed needs
as a relevant measure of needs for the purpose of equity assessments. Methodologically
speaking, one way to go is to use concentration and horizontal inequity indexes as done in
Chapter 4. We may alternatively expand the focus to horizontal inequity relating to ethnic
origin, place of residence, etc. The release of a new wave of the Health Monitor survey
for year 2016 offers the possibility to compare the 2012 and 2016 situations, in light of the
reforms of the Dutch LTC social insurance that took place in-between these two dates.
The effect of cost sharing on LTC use
An agreement passed with the Dutch LTC Authorities has granted the Netspar research
project within which Chapter 4 was conducted with an access to individual-level infor-
mation on co-payments on LTC. We intend to use this dataset to assess how co-payments
relate to the use of LTC services and, in particular, the decision to use institutional care.
Several options will be explored to obtain exogenous variations in the out-of-pocket price
of LTC. First, we intend to use the 2013 reform of the co-payment schedule; second, we will
evaluate the feasibility of exploiting the non-linearities in the co-payment schedule. The
use of bunching methods (Saez, 2010) should prove especially appropriate with exhaustive
administrative records, while it was made impossible with the French data I have been
using in Chapters 2 and 3, because of censoring at the kink of the budget constraint, sample
72The projects described here-below will be carried out as part of a post-doc research at the Erasmus Univer-
sity of Rotterdam, jointly with Pieter Bakx and Eddy van Doorslaer.
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selection and small sample size.
The impact of LTC use on health care consumption
Finally, we intend to take a broader perspective on the question of the efficiency of LTC
policies by assessing the effects of LTC use on health care consumption. Under-use of LTC
may indeed have adverse health effects and cause a greater use of medical care. Some com-
mentators have suggested that the 2015 reforms of the Dutch LTC system have strongly
pushed the Netherlands in this direction, yet citing only anecdotal evidence. Unwarranted
hospitalizations, in particular, can have dreadful effects on frail elderly and are extremely
costly for health care systems. If higher use of some LTC services decreases hospital care use,
then a proper reallocation of budgets across schemes would improve overall allocative effi-
ciency. Assessing the full budgetary savings and the welfare costs associated with cutbacks
on health or LTC policies thus requires analyzing jointly health care and LTC use. We will
exploit exogenous variations in LTC use induced by variations in co-payments (cf. supra) or
by the random assignment of need assessors to applicants for public subsidies, which was
already documented and exploited by Bakx et al. (2017). The matching of the data used in
Chapter 4 with exhaustive administrative records of hospital care use will provide sufficient
sample size to run heterogeneity analysis, which is critical to tailoring at best the future re-
forms of the Dutch public LTC insurance aiming at containing future public expenses.
2.3 Medium-run research agenda
Through and beyond the empirical studies I have just mentioned, I also wish to push
forward a longer-run research agenda on LTC policies.
In a first direction, I would like to test alternative frameworks for the empirical assess-
ment of equity in the use and financing of LTC. The health economics literature has recently
proposed ways to amend the conceptual and empirical framework for the analysis of eq-
uity in health care, so that it can integrate concerns about the distribution of different goods
(and not merely health or health care) and the respect of preferences. Given the specific
nature of LTC, attention will have to be paid to the role assigned to informal care and the
issue of quality in LTC delivery, which is especially difficult to observe and measure. A more
integrated approach to equity and redistributive objectives will also make it easier to hold
together efficiency and equity aspects of the performance of LTC policies. Adding more the-
oretical structure to empirical investigations will offer a way to quantify the equity-efficiency
trade-offs of LTC reforms and their ultimate welfare gains.
Regarding empirical tools, the development of micro-simulation models would offer the
way to progress in the ex ante evaluation and comparison of scenarios for reforms of LTC
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schemes. Plugging estimates of the behavioral reactions to the out-of-pocket price of LTC
will make it possible to predict quantity adjustments, which may be critical for the redis-
tributive effects of reforms. The development and use of such tools will also favor the analy-
sis of the interactions between LTC policies and other social insurance schemes, in particular
health care and pension systems.
Following the example of the seminal ECuity project conducted on health care systems in
the 1990s and early 2000s, the development of equity assessments on different countries may
contribute to a better understanding of how the architecture of LTC systems affect the dis-
tribution of LTC use and financing across socio-economic groups. The recent studies based
on the SHARE data have made a valuable step in this direction. The current development of
statistical information systems on LTC policies in OECD countries will probably offer ways
to retrieve administrative measures of eligible needs for LTC and to discuss to what extent
they can, or not, be used to answer normative questions.
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Résumé 
 
Dans les pays de l’OCDE, le vieillissement 
démographique et la prévalence croissante de 
maladies chroniques induisent un 
accroissement marqué des effectifs de 
personnes âgées dépendantes. Répondre à la 
préoccupation sociétale concernant 
l’accompagnement des personnes en 
incapacité dans un contexte de pression sur les 
finances publiques constitue un défi majeur 
pour les politiques publiques.  
Comment les dispositifs publics visant à 
financer les soins de longue durée affectent les 
aides formelles et informelles reçues par les 
personnes en situation d’incapacité ? La 
distribution des aides médico-sociales et des 
restes-à-charge est-elle équitable ? Comment 
améliorer l’efficience et l’équité des dispositifs 
publics ? Cette thèse apporte un éclairage sur 
ces questions en mobilisant les outils 
conceptuels de la microéconomie et les 
méthodes de l’économie appliquée. Elle 
rassemble quatre investigations empiriques 
menées à partir de données françaises et 
néerlandaises récentes.  
Les 3 premiers chapitres traitent du cas 
français. Le chapitre 1 étudie la distinction faite 
entre adultes handicapés et personnes âgées 
dépendantes. Il évalue l’effet de la « barrière 
des 60 ans » sur les aides formelles et 
informelles reçues. Les chapitres 2 et 3 se 
focalisent sur le dispositif-phare destiné aux 
personnes âgées dépendantes, l’Allocation 
personnalisée d’autonomie (APA). Le chapitre 2 
estime les élasticités prix et revenu de la 
demande d’aide à domicile des bénéficiaires de 
l’APA. Le chapitre 3 évalue l’équité dans 
l’utilisation des aides et des restes-à-charge 
dans le cadre de l’APA. Le chapitre 4 évalue 
l’équité horizontale dans l’utilisation de soins de 
longue durée aux Pays-Bas.  
Les subventions sur l’aide à domicile induisent 
des ajustements dans la consommation d’aide 
via des effets de revenu et de substitution, ce 
qui a des implications pour l’efficience de ces 
dispositifs.  Des iniquités sont détectées dans 
les deux pays. 
 
Mots-clés 
 
Soins de longue durée ; Dépendance ; 
Vieillissement démographique ;  Equité ; 
Efficacité ; Microéconomie appliquée 
 
Abstract 
 
In OECD countries, population ageing and the 
increasing prevalence of some chronic diseases 
cause a substantial increase in the number of 
the disabled elderly. Responding to both the 
societal concern for ensuring appropriate long-
term care (LTC) to the disabled and the 
pressure on public spending is a major 
challenge for public policies.  
How do public LTC schemes affect the use of 
formal and informal care by the disabled? Are 
there socio-economic disparities in the use of 
formal care? Is the allocation of LTC services 
and of the out-of-pocket payments incurred by 
the disabled elderly equitable? Which features 
of LTC policies could be changed to make them 
more efficient and more equitable? 
My research sheds light on these questions, 
using conceptual tools from microeconomics 
and methods in applied economics. It brings 
together four empirical investigations led in the 
contexts of France and the Netherlands, which 
have contrasting LTC systems. I make use of 
recent administrative and survey microdata. 
The first three Chapters focus on French 
policies. Chapter 1 studies the distinction that is 
made between the handicapped adults and the 
dependent elderly in access to public LTC 
support. It assesses the effect of the “age 60 
threshold” on the formal and informal care 
received by individuals with a disability. 
Chapters 2 and 3 concentrate on the main 
scheme accessible to the disabled elderly, the 
Allocation personnalisée d’autonomie (APA). 
Chapter 2 estimates the income and price 
elasticities of formal home care demand by APA 
beneficiaries. Chapter 3 assesses equity in the 
use and financing of home care within the APA 
scheme. Chapter 4 lands in the Netherlands 
and assesses income-related horizontal equity 
in LTC use.  
Home care subsidies trigger adjustments in the 
use of care through both substitution and 
income effects. This has implications for the 
efficiency of such policies.  Some inequity is 
detected in both countries. 
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